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ABSTRACT 
 
JEFFREY ALAN ERBIG JR.: Imperial Lines, Indigenous Lands: Transforming  
Territorialities of the Río de la Plata, 1680-1805 
(Under the direction of Kathryn Burns) 
 
 
In the 1750s, and again in the 1780s, Portugal and Spain commissioned mapping expeditions to 
draw a border between Brazil and Spanish South America. The two Iberian courts hoped to resolve long-
standing disputes over territorial possession through the latest cartographic technologies, yet their proposed 
division ran through lands controlled by autonomous indigenous communities. This dissertation explores 
the relationship between the subsequent mapping expeditions and interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata 
region – Uruguay, northeastern Argentina, and the far south of Brazil.  
Recent work on the history of cartography shows that maps were powerful tools of imperial 
governance, while scholarship on interethnic borderlands in the Americas suggests that imperial borderlines 
had little to no impact on native peoples until the nineteenth century. I contribute to this discussion by 
arguing that mapped lines were significant in certain eighteenth-century borderlands, but mainly because 
native peoples appropriated them for their own purposes. I draw upon manuscript materials from twenty-
six archives in seven countries, and use Geographic Information Systems (GIS), to demonstrate the 
centrality of independent indigenous communities to the entire bordermaking process.  
At the time of the mapping expeditions, native peoples known as Charrúas and Minuanes were the 
principal arbiters of the Río de la Plata’s rural interior, restricting Iberian and Jesuit-Guaraní settlers to its 
perimeter. Given their limited territorial reach, Portuguese and Spanish diplomats turned to mapmaking as 
a means to claim native lands without having to claim native peoples as vassals. The mapping expeditions 
iv 
 
transformed imperial interethnic policies and engendered responses from Charrúas and Minuanes, who 
exploited Iberian bordermaking to expand kinship ties, establish commercial networks, and gain refuge in 
times of duress. These shifting territorial dynamics enabled some communities and caciques to expand their 
networks of power, while exposing others to capture and dislocation. Those who had prospered through 
the development of an operative borderline nonetheless found themselves debilitated when it began to 
dissolve in the early nineteenth century. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Seen from an Amerindian perspective the world, more often than not, looks like coexisting territories within the 
same space. Such a perspective is quite different from the Spanish (and European) one, in which either there is 
not such a thing as coexisting territorialities [or], if there is, Amerindian cosmology and cosmography were 
reduced to the Christian ones. – Walter Mignolo1 
 
This colonial perspective still dominates our way of imagining the space we inhabit.…The dehistoricization of 
the territory and its dehumanization leave an imprint in our cognitive format, in our culture, and in our 
episteme. – Gustavo Verdesio2 
 
 
On January 13, 1750, Portuguese and Spanish diplomats reached an ambitious agreement in 
Madrid. More than a century removed from the disunion of their two crowns, they sought to create a 
definitive division of their South American territories. Their aim was to resolve the conflicting claims to 
territorial possession that had resulted from years of overlapping settlement and a litany of interimperial 
accords. The Treaty of Madrid diverged from earlier agreements, as its architects sought to establish an 
exclusionary borderline that would not only eliminate ambiguous and contingent claims to territorial 
possession but establish exclusive rights for each crown over contiguous spaces on its side of the line.3 
Furthermore, interlocutors on both sides aspired to avoid further conflicts by utilizing the latest mapping 
technologies to measure and represent the borderline with exactitude. For this reason, they commissioned 
joint mapping expeditions to traverse the continent from the Caribbean coast in the north, through the 
                                                       
1 Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1995), 246. 
2 Gustavo Verdesio, “Forgotten Territorialities: The Materiality of Indigenous Pasts,” Nepantla: Views from South 2, no. 1 (2001): 
103. 
3 I differentiate the concepts of possession (claims over land) and sovereignty (claims over subjects) in order to demonstrate the 
interplay between them. Prior to the invention of an interimperial divide, a sovereign’s claim to territorial possession derived 
from ownership of lands belonging to their subjects; afterward, claims to sovereignty over imperial subjects derived from their 
occupation of lands possessed by a given crown. 
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Amazon and the Pantanal, to the Atlantic coast in the southeast.4 These expeditions included parallel 
Portuguese and Spanish teams of trained cosmographers, astronomers, engineers, and geographers, 
supported by hundreds of laborers, who modified and added precision to the general line agreed upon by 
the courts. Their principal task was to draft and cosign maps at various scales that would serve as legal 
documents for both the royal courts and local officials as they scrambled to populate, administer, and 
exploit the resources of the continental interior. 
 The Treaty of Madrid and its execution, while ostensibly bilateral endeavors, were nonetheless 
contingent upon the activities of independent indigenous communities throughout the continent. The 
perpetuity of conflicting imperial claims was due in part to inability of either Iberian crown to establish 
footholds in lands distant from the continental coast or the fragile corridors that ran through parts of the 
interior. The territories over which they sought legal possession were contested spaces – what most 
scholars call “borderlands” – where native peoples limited the actions of imperial agents.5 Moreover, as 
territorial possession often derived from claiming native peoples as vassals, indigenous autonomy frequently 
belied imperial claims. The treaty was therefore an attempt to establish a priori territorial possession 
through geographic representation, thereby circumventing the dynamism and contingency of local 
                                                       
4 The commissioning of joint-mapping expeditions as part of treaties, and the superimposition of boundary lines upon frontiers as 
markers of territorially derived sovereignty, was part of a broader eighteenth-century trend in Europe. See: Rifaat A. Abou-el-
Haj, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 89, no. 3 (Jul-
Sep 1969): 467; Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989); Naomi Standen and Daniel Power, eds., Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700 (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1999); Madalina Valeria Veres, “Redefining Imperial Borders: Marking the Eastern Border of the Habsburg Monarchy in 
the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century,” in History of Cartography, ed. Elri Liebenberg, Imre J. Demhardt and Zsolt Gyözö 
Török, 3–23 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2014). Earlier examples of borderlines used to define sovereignty existed, such as the 
Belgorod line near the Black Sea steppes, yet they did not include mapping expeditions as a means of legal formalization. Brian J. 
Boeck, “Containment vs. colonization: Muscovite approaches to settling the steppe,” in Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland 
Colonization in Eurasian History, ed. Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Abby M. Schrader and Willard Sunderland, 41–60 (New 
York: Routledge, 2007). 
5 While the term “borderlands” has acquired myriad meanings, I use it narrowly in its more traditional sense, to refer to 
contested, permeable, and changing sites of multidirectional exchange between indigenous and imperial agents. See: Pekka 
Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, “On Borderlands,” Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (2011): 338–45. 
3 
 
relations.6 As demarcation teams crisscrossed the continent, however, they confronted the complexities of 
local rivalries, power relations, knowledge, and territorial claims. They sought to demonstrate imperial 
possession through their maps and diaries, yet depended upon indigenous agents for geographic 
information, safe passage, guidance, and sustenance. Native responses varied, as some individuals and 
communities shared information, traded cattle and captives, guided the expeditions, and corrected 
imprecision in their guidemaps, while others charged tribute or openly attacked the interlopers.7 The 
southernmost demarcation teams even incited a three-year uprising by Guaraní mission dwellers and 
neighboring native communities. 
 The Madrid demarcations concluded in 1759, but their results were short-lived as the Treaty of El 
Pardo annulled them two years later. They nonetheless served as a precedent and model for a later peace 
accord, signed in San Ildefonso in 1777. Here again, the Iberian crowns commissioned joint mapping 
expeditions to determine and map a detailed borderline. These demarcators recounted experiences similar 
to those of their antecessors, and when taken together, these mapping endeavors constituted a significant 
turning point in imperial logics and strategies in claiming possession of ultramarine territories. For the first 
time, jointly mapped borderlines served as the preeminent determinants of territorial possession, 
superseding or limiting the applicability of other avenues towards making claims, such as occupation, trade, 
or vassalage. Furthermore, these expeditions coincided with broader shifts in imperial governance, often 
referred to as the Bourbon (Spain) and Pombaline (Portugal) reforms, as administrators on both sides of the 
                                                       
6 Lauren A. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), Chapter 1; Tamar Herzog, Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), Chapters 1 & 2. 
7 Ângela Domingues, Quando os índios eram vassalos: colonização e relações de poder no norte do Brasil na segunda metade do século XVIII 
(Lisboa: Comissão Nacional Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2000), 226–37; Maria de Fátima Costa, “Viajes en 
la frontera colonial: Historias de una expedición de límites en la América Meridional (1753-1754),” Anales del Museo de América 16 
(2009); Bruna Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato: Indígenas e demarcadores na fronteira sul da América Ibérica no século XVIII,” 
(2008); Jeffrey A. Erbig Jr., “Forging Frontiers: Félix de Azara and the Making of the Virreinato del Río de la Plata,” (M.A. 
Thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010), 23–33. 
4 
 
divide sought to incorporate indigenous peoples as imperial subjects, exploit new resources, and create 
efficient structures of tax and trade within their dominions.8  
What is less clear is whether mapmaking and subsequent attempts to impose mapped lines upon 
physical lands had any tangible impact upon interethnic relations in the areas where the border ran. Did the 
declaration and performance of these imaginary spatial frames engender any meaningful changes? If so, what 
difference did the demarcations make for independent native peoples? How could a border come into being 
in lands controlled by people who did not share that spatial vision? The answers to such questions are 
important not only to the ways in which we conceptualize mapmaking, but to the very nature of interethnic 
relations in borderland spaces. I argue that the mapping of borderlines had the potential to dramatically 
restructure interethnic relations by incentivizing and making possible new territorial formations, and that 
these changes required the participation of autonomous native peoples. While indigenous communities 
surely did not imagine borderlines from the panoramic perspective of royal mapmakers, they nonetheless 
recognized the changing territorial practices – settlement patterns, trade routes, assertions of lordship – of 
their imperial counterparts, and sought to utilize them to their advantage. As a result, indigenous and 
imperial territorialities came to coexist in ways that simultaneously resembled a borderline and, at least 
temporarily, reinforced the authority of native communities.9  
                                                       
8 For more on the relationship between Bourbon Reform efforts, territorial objectives, and changing policies vis-à-vis neighboring 
native peoples, see: John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782-1810: The Indendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la 
Plata (London: University of London, 1958), Chapter 2; Abelardo Levaggi, “Los tratados con los indios en la época borbónica: 
Reafirmación de la política de conquista pacífica,” in XI Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano (Buenos Aires, 
4 al 9 de septiembre de 1995): Actas y estudios, ed. Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano, 103–18 Vol II (Buenos 
Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1997); David J. Weber, Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age 
of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Raul Mandrini, “Transformations: The Río de la Plata During the 
Bourbon Era,” in Contested Spaces of Early America, ed. Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, 142–62 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2014). Portuguese efforts at native incorporation as a means to territorial control was perhaps best 
exemplified by the Directorate, a policy implemented from 1757 to 1798. See: Rita Heloísa de Almeida, O Diretório dos índios: um 
projeto de "civilização" no Brasil do século XVIII (Brasília: Editora UnB, 1997); Domingues, Quando os índios eram vassalos. See also: 
Gabriel Paquette, Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions: The Luso-Brazilian World, c. 1770-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), Chapter 1. 
9 The use of “territoriality” here follows David Delaney, who defines it as “an aspect of how humans as embodied beings organize 
themselves with respect to the social and material world” in order to identify the historical production of territories as “human 
social creations” that “reflect and incorporate features of the social order that creates them.” Territoriality is thus the interplay 
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 This assessment of the interplay between mapped lines and interethnic relations builds upon two 
pillars of interdisciplinary research: the history of cartography and borderlands studies. In recent decades, 
historical sensibilities regarding cartographic practices have changed significantly. Scholars are increasingly 
aware that imperial maps “exercise[d], and [were] instruments of, power.”10 As mapmaking was a means to 
“discursively appropriate space,” the selective and subjective representation of human, political, and 
physical geography both “reflected and reinforced the material transformations of New World landscapes.”11 
With this conceptual outlook, historians have adopted two principal strategies to situate mapmaking within 
broader political, social, and epistemological trends in colonial Latin America. The first has been to focus on 
maps as representational forms, which served as evidence of broader territorial processes or conscious 
efforts to highlight or conceal certain geographical information. Numerous works have thus analyzed the 
content and form of maps in order to identify changing methods of measurement and representation, 
political motives, or prescriptive territorial claims.12 This approach has also enabled scholars to identify 
                                                       
between territorial imaginations and territorial practices. David Delaney, Territory: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2005), 10–12. 
10 Karl Offen and Jordana Dym, “Introduction,” in Mapping Latin America: A Cartographic Reader, ed. Jordana Dym and Karl Offen, 
1–18 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 8. 
11 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 34–
36; Heidi V. Scott, Contested Territory: Mapping Peru in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2009), 9. 
12 Jerry Brotton, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Chapter 2; Santa 
Arias and Mariselle Meléndez, eds., Mapping Colonial Spanish America: Places and Commonplaces of Identity, Culture, and Experience 
(Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2002); Susan Deans-Smith, “Nature and Scientific Knowledge in the Spanish Empire 
Introduction,” Colonial Latin American Review 15, no. 1 (2006): 29–38; David Buisseret, “Spanish Colonial Cartography, 1450-
1700,” in The History of Cartography: Cartography in the European Renaissance, ed. David Woodward, 1143–71 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2007); Íris Kantor, “Usos diplomáticos da ilha-Brasil: Polêmicas cartográficas e historiográficas,” 
Varia História 23, no. 37 (Junho 2007); Mariselle Meléndez, “The Cultural Production of Space in Colonial Latin America: From 
Visualizing Difference to the Circulation of Knowledge,” in The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Barney Warf and 
Santa Arias (London, New York: Routledge, 2009); Daniela Bleichmar et al., eds., Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 
1500-1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Joaquim Romero Magalhães, “Mundos em miniatura: aproximação a 
alguns aspectos da cartografia portuguesa do Brasil (séculos XVI a XVIII),” Anais do Museu Paulista 17, no. 1 (jan-jun 2009); María 
M. Portuondo, Secret Science: Spanish Cosmography and the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Héctor 
Mendoza Vargas and Carla Lois, eds., Historias de la Cartografía de Iberamérica: Nuevos caminos, viejos problemas, Colección Geografía 
para el siglo XXI, Serie Libros de investigación 4 (México, D.F.: Instituto de Geografi ́a, UNAM; INEGI, 2009); Íris Kantor, 
“Cartografia e diplomacia: usos geopolíticos da informação toponímica (1750-1850),” Anais do Museu Paulista 17, no. 2 (jul-dez 
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indigenous territorial perspectives by reading imperial maps for native signs, names, and locations or by 
expanding traditional definitions of “maps” to include spatial representations drawn by native peoples 
themselves.13 The second strategy has been to consider the process of mapmaking, from the collection of 
information to a map’s final form. Scholars have pointed to the relationships between mapmakers, 
informants, administrators, and engravers in order to assess their experiences and the cartographic materials 
that they eventually produced. Here too, several works point to the active participation of native individuals 
in the production of imperial or hybridized “geographical imaginations.”14 
 These studies of cartography in colonial Latin America have collectively demonstrated the 
subjectivities of maps and have offered new and useful techniques for utilizing visual sources to understand 
territorial practices. The underlying premise of the power of maps nonetheless requires further 
interrogation. Despite the common historiographical assumption that mapmaking was a means to effect 
territorial change, few works demonstrate the mechanisms whereby this occurred materially. As a result, 
narratives of imperial mapmaking tend to assume the realization, however limited, of such territorial forms, 
                                                       
2009); Scott, Contested Territory; Karl Offen and Jordana Dym, “Introduction” in Mapping Latin America, Part I; Júnia Ferreira 
Furtado, O mapa que inventou o Brasil, 1a ed (Rio de Janeiro: Versal, 2013). 
13 Hugh Brody, Maps and Dreams (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982); William G. Gartner, “Mapmaking in the Central Andes,” in 
The History of Cartography: Cartography in the Traditional Africa, America, Arctic, Australian, and Pacific Societies, ed. David Woodward 
and G. Malcolm Lewis, 257–300 2.3 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998); Dana Leibsohn, “Colony and 
Cartography: Shifting Signs on Indigenous Maps of New Spain,” in Reframing the Renaissance: Visual Culture in Europe and Latin 
America, 1450-1650, ed. Claire J. Farago, 265–81 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Barbara E. Mundy, The Mapping of 
New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and the Maps of the Relaciones Geográficas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); G. 
Malcolm Lewis, Cartographic Encounters: Perspectives on Native American Mapmaking and Map Use (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998); Arias and Meléndez, Mapping Colonial Spanish America; Davíd Carrasco and Scott Sessions, eds., Cave, City, and 
Eagle's Nest: An Interpretive Journey through the Mapa de Cuauhtinchan no. 2 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press; 
Published in collaboration with the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies and the Peabody Museum of 
Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, 2007); Martin Brückner, ed., Early American Cartographies (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, Part II. 
14 Lewis, Cartographic Encounters; Neil Safier, Measuring the New World: Enlightenment Science and South America (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008); Neil Safier, “The Confines of the Colony: Boundaries, Ethnographic Landscapes, and Imperial 
Cartography in Iberoamerica,” in The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire, ed. James R. Akerman, 133–83, The 
Kenneth Nebenzahl, Jr., Lectures in the History of Cartography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Scott, Contested 
Territory, 4-5, 50-1, 59-60. 
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while those of native mapmaking demonstrate the “colonization of literacy,” or the gradual waning of 
indigenous territorial representations and practices.15 Accepting maps as opaque indicators of territorial 
practices and particular mapping conventions as patently European necessarily leads to such conclusions, as 
maps attributed to native peoples were generally restricted to Mesoamerica and the Andes during the 
sixteenth century. Additionally, as most revisionist histories of cartography derive from theories of 
hegemonic power relations, they tend to position indigenous peoples as subalterns or imperial subjects 
whose territorial forms were challenged by European mapmaking.16 Such power dynamics were not 
omnipresent, and the limited and negotiated nature of imperial authority in the early Americas renders 
claims to the impact of mapmaking more tenuous than commonly imagined. 
 Skepticism toward the material impact of mapping is perhaps no more evident than in studies of 
interethnic borderlands between imperial agents and independent native peoples. Whereas historians of 
cartography have argued for the inherent power of maps as tools of empire, borderlands studies have tended 
to question the impact of mapped borders in such spaces. Reacting against traditional narratives that 
imagined imperial limits (borderlines) and intercultural frontiers (borderlands) as synonymous, scholars 
have since dismissed mapped lines as strictly discursive “expressions of [imperial] desire,” distinguishable 
                                                       
15 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, 309. 
16 This tendency derives perhaps from the origins of revisionist histories of cartography, which initially focused on contexts of 
identifiable state power during the nineteenth- and twentieth- centuries, on global or hemispheric scales within expanding 
capitalist world systems, or on maps as representational forms. For example: Michel Foucault, “Questions of Geography,” in 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, 63–77 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (revised and extended) 
(London: Verso, 1991), Chapter 10; J. Brian Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” in Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in 
the Representation of Landscape, ed. T.J Barnes and J.S Duncan, 277–89 (London: Routledge, 1992); Mignolo, The Darker Side of the 
Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization, Part 3; Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, Remaking the Nation: Place, 
Identity and Politics in Latin America (London and New York: Routledge, 1996); James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), Part 1; David Woodward, “'Theory' 
of The History of Cartography,” in Approaches and Challenges in a Worldwide History of Cartography, ed. David Woodward, Catherine 
Delano-Smith and Cordell D. Yee, 1st ed., 23–9 (Catalunya: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya, 2001); Raymond B. Craib, 
Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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from the on-the-ground “realities” of borderland regions.17 Studies of mapped borderlines are almost 
entirely restricted to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as scholars have tacitly accepted a temporal 
distinction between “borderlands” (imperial) and “bordered lands” (national), thus synchronizing the 
creation of American borders with similar mapping projects in South and Southeast Asia.18 In eschewing 
borderlines as meaningful concepts, most contemporary scholarship stresses the permeability of borderland 
spaces, employing such terms as “zones/spaces of interaction,” “contact zones,” “permeable frontiers.”19 
Others have preferred frames such as “middle ground,” “contested ground/spaces,” or “native ground” to 
highlight disputed or indigenous sovereignty, while still others have emphasized the expansion of native 
power or the construction of ethnic identities by employing terms such as “Comanchería” or “Araucanía” to 
define their regions of study.20  
                                                       
17 Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, “Introduction: Maps and Spaces, Paths to Connect, and Lines to Divide,” in Contested 
Spaces of Early America, ed. Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, 1–28 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 4. 
See also: Karl S. Hele, “Introduction,” in Lines Drawn upon the Water: First Nations and the Great Lakes Borders and borderlands, ed. 
Karl S. Hele, xiii–xxiii (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008). 
18 This temporal divide was first articulated by Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From 
Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” American Historical 
Review 104, no. 3 (Jun. 1999). Comparative cases in South and Southeast Asia include: Thongchai Winichakul, “Siam Mapped: 
The Making of Thai Nationhood,” The Ecologist 26, no. 5 (1996); Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997); Bernardo Michael, Statemaking and Territory in South Asia: Lessons from the Anglo-Gorkha War 
(1814-1816) (London: Anthem Press, 2012). 
19 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), 7–8; Peter Stern, “Marginals 
and Acculturation in Frontier Society,” in New Views of Borderlands History, ed. Robert H. Jackson, 1st, 157–88 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 157; Guillermo Wilde, “Guaraníes, 'gauchos' e 'indios infieles' en el 
proceso de disgregación de las antiguas doctrinas jesuíticas del Paraguay,” Universidad Católica Revista del Centro de Estudios 
Anthropológicos XXXVIII, no. 2 (Diciembre 2003): 102; Hal Langfur, The Forbidden Lands: Colonial Identity, Frontier Violence, and the 
Persistence of Brazil's Eastern Indians, 1750-1830 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 5; David J. Weber, The Spanish 
Frontier in North America, The Brief Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 9; Carina P. Lucaioli and Lidia R. Nacuzzi, 
eds., Fronteras: Espacios de interacción en las tierras bajas del sur de América (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 
2010); Carina P. Lucaioli and Sergio Hernán Latini, “Fronteras permeables: circulación de cautivos en el espacio santafesino,” 
Runa 35.1 (2014). 
20 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo mapuche: De la inclusión a la exclusión 
(Santiago, Chile: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos: Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 2003), 17; 
Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006); Guillaume Boccara, Los vencedores: Historia del pueblo mapuche en la época colonial, 1 ed (San Pedro de Atacama: Línea 
Editorial IIAM, 2007); traducido por Diego Milos; Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan, eds., Contested Ground: Comparative 
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These concepts have been necessary correctives to the rigid binaries of earlier studies, as they 
emphasize collaboration, exchange, kinship, and contested authority. They highlight the limits of imperial 
power and the frequent indistinguishability of lines between imperial and indigenous agents. At the same 
time, they underestimate the significance of territorial organization to analysis of interethnic relations. 
While some scholars have identified dialectics between inhabitants of interethnic borderlands and the 
natural environment, developing such concepts as “social ecology” or “ecological zones,” the potential 
impact of mapped lines has been altogether absent from recent borderlands studies.21 This reluctance to 
grant any historical efficacy to “artificial” lines is likely grounded in the belief that to acknowledge 
borderlines as significant would be to imply the consolidation of imperial sovereignty and native 
dispossession, or conversely, to dismiss native sovereignty and autonomy.22 If borderlines as territorial 
objectives derived from European epistemologies and ideals of governance, then they must not have been 
meaningful in areas that European empires did not effectively control.23 This tendency is nonetheless 
problematic, given the centrality of bordermaking – drawing lines on a map and then attempting to 
replicate them on the ground – to eighteenth-century Iberian territorial strategies in American borderlands. 
It also conceals the participation of native peoples in the production of these ostensibly European territorial 
                                                       
Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire, The Southwest Center Series (Tuscon: University of Arizona 
Press, 1998); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
21 Cynthia M. Radding, Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 3, 310; James S. Saeger, The Chaco Mission Frontier: The Guaycuruan Experience (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 2000), 21–25; Cynthia M. Radding, Landscapes of Power and Identity: Comparative Histories in the 
Sonoran Desert and the Forests of Amazonia from Colony to Republic (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), Chapter 3; James Brooks, 
Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute 
of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, University of North Carolina Press, 2002). See also: Steven W. 
Hackel, Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial California, 1769-1850 (Chapel Hill: 
Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2005); Langfur, The Forbidden Lands. 
22 For a historiographical overview on studies of boundary disputes in Latin America, see: Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 2–6. 
23 This reticence has distinguished studies of American borderlands from those in other parts of the world. Daniel Power and 
Naomi Standen, “Introduction,” in Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700, ed. Naomi Standen and Daniel Power, 1–
31 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). 
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arrangements. Lastly, it eschews a valuable lens of comparison between different regions, as mapped lines 
did not exist in all interethnic borderlands and often accounted for local peculiarities. 
 The present study proposes a third way of imagining mapped borderlines in the contested spaces of 
American borderlands before the nineteenth century. Rather than perceiving borders as powerful imperial 
arrangements imposed upon native lands or as powerless representations restricted to the worlds of lettered 
elites, I suggest that in some instances mapping borderlines did alter regional territorialities, but that such 
transformations necessarily depended upon the participation of independent indigenous communities. This 
occurred in two ways – by altering patterns of imperial action and by producing new possibilities for native 
peoples near the imaginary line. In the case of the Madrid and San Ildefonso lines, the demarcations 
dramatically altered the ways in which local imperial agents imagined regional space. They offered a new 
legal apparatus that incentivized and made possible the issuance of land titles in previously disputed lands, 
and led administrators to engage independent native peoples as if they were imperial subjects. At the same 
time, the continued dominance of native peoples over borderland spaces required that imperial agents 
solicit their support in order to make the borderline operative or, alternatively, to access the other side. 
Heightened imperial need in borderland spaces – to stop contraband, to apprehend unauthorized travelers, 
or to foil enemy incursions, for example – altered the opportunities available to native leaders and their 
communities, and for many it initially served as a means to expand their kinship, tributary, or commercial 
networks. While they undoubtedly did not share the bird’s-eye perspective of most imperial maps, they 
were conscious of and able to exploit the new patterns of movement of imperial agents and resources in the 
region. Given the heterogeneity and locality of indigenous communities, responses ranged from outright 
rejection of the presence of imperial agents to strategic collaboration in the development of new borderline 
territorialities. In nearly all cases, however, native responses served to reinforce borderlines as meaningful, 
if contested and incomplete, territorial arrangements. 
11 
 
 To imagine borderland spaces in this way requires alternatives to the categories of resistance or 
accommodation that tend to frame debates on native agency and imperial hegemonic power. Native peoples 
did not simply adapt to Iberian efforts; they altered the very structures of imperial governance, making 
bordermaking necessary and then transforming the meaning and form of mapped lines. Mapping was a 
response to the short territorial reach of imperial power and it alone did not produce borderlines. Rather, 
the drawing of lines was a declaration to which a variety of actors responded, and the collective responses of 
such people transformed imaginary lines into meaningful patterns of territorial movement and engagement. 
The maps generated by the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcations encoded the world and altered the ways 
in which imperial agents imagined and engaged it, engendering certain bordermaking practices – the 
founding of forts, strategic settlements, new contours of pact-making, and new commercial demands, to 
name a few.24 Native peoples in borderland spaces did not respond to visual documents, but rather to these 
new patterns of spatial engagement, mediating such efforts through incorporation, rejection, and 
transformation all at the same time. They recognized the new territorial tendencies and needs of their 
multiple imperial counterparts and, when possible, leveraged them to their advantage.25  
The eventual realization of borders as operative, if limited, territorial arrangements did not imply 
the vanquishing of native sovereignty, as multiple means of imagining territory, possession, and authority 
coexisted. The flood of migrants to populate or enforce the newly declared limits of imperial dominions 
simultaneously signified the realization of a new territorial arrangement (for imperial agents) and the 
                                                       
24 For maps as declarations, or “propositions,” see: Denis Wood, Rethinking the Power of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), 
39–52. For the human performance of a declared spatiality, see: Robert Kaiser and Elena Nikiforova, “The Performativity of 
Scale: The Social Construction of Scale Effects in Narva, Estonia,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26 (2008): 538–
45. For maps as encoding the world, see: John Pickles, A History of Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping and the Geo-Coded World 
(New York: Routledge, 2004), 52. 
25 The creative ability of native communities to utilize imperial need and desire for their own advantage was a sort of “mediated 
opportunism,” albeit in a context of indigenous sovereignty. Susan M. Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico's Colonial North: 
Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 6, 202. 
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incorporation of new kin, tributaries, or allies (for native peoples). Seemingly contradictory territorialities 
were able to operate at the same time, as the divergent territorial imaginations both shaped patterns of 
actions and the interpretations of their meaning. In fact, it was not the production of borderlines, but 
instead their dissolution that undermined native authority in some instances. As many local communities 
hitched their livelihood to their ability to mediate borderline territorialities, the rupture of such 
arrangements produced hostile, unpredictable, and ultimately uninhabitable worlds. 
In addition to shaping patterns of eighteenth-century movement and interaction, the Madrid and 
San Ildefonso mapping expeditions created discursive precedents that continue to shape the geographical 
imaginations of regional historiographies. Through compiling and ordering earlier accounts, and by 
producing voluminous natural histories and ethnographies, they generated a vast source base that continues 
to frame historical accounts. In reading against the ethnographic grains of such sources, scholars often 
overlook the origins of the geographic perspectives that they promulgate. The principal result has been to 
conceal the historical processes whereby such a spatial order developed, as both the acceptance of borders as 
irresistible imperial impositions and the rejection of borders as meaningless discourse present space as a 
neutral stage of historical action. By assessing the dynamic production of space, and the interplay between 
territorial imaginations and territorial action, the significance of mapmaking in interethnic borderlands 
comes into sharper relief.26 
 
 
                                                       
26 This imperative builds upon the work of critical geographers and historical materialists, who have considered the interplay 
between spatial imagination, sociospatial organization, unequal power relations, and uneven spatial development. See, for 
example: Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith; Edward 
W. Soja, “The Socio-Spatial Dialectic,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 70, no. 2 (1980); David Harvey, The 
Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990), Part III; Neil 
Brenner, “Critical Sociospatial Theory and the Geographies of Uneven Spatial Development,” in The SAGE Handbook of Economic 
Geography, ed. Andrew Leyshon et al., 135–48 (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 2011); Mezzadra and Neilson, Border as Method, or, 
the Multiplication of Labor. 
13 
 
A Regional Approach 
 In order to assess the relationship between imperial mapmaking and interethnic relations, I focus on 
the southernmost portion of the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcation efforts, an area that corresponds 
with present-day Uruguay, northeastern Argentina, and the far south of Brazil. During the sixteenth and 
much of the seventeenth centuries, the region was a backwater for Iberian endeavors, but in 1680, when a 
Portuguese expedition from Rio de Janeiro founded a small settlement – Colônia do Sacramento – along 
the mouth of the Río de la Plata estuary, it was thrust into the center of global juridical disputes.27 Over the 
course of the next seventy years, the two Iberian courts signed four separate treaties to arbitrate access to 
the area, while racing to establish settlements to fortify their claims. This corner of South America 
dominated deliberations in both Madrid and San Ildefonso, as half of the treaties’ articles regarding 
possession of specific lands referred to it: six of thirteen for the former and six of eleven for the latter.28 It 
was here, too, that the demarcation line varied most widely from treaty to treaty, a product of continued 
native control. Furthermore, the region is an instructive case in which historiographical imaginations of 
eighteenth-century territorialities continue to impede studies of indigenous pasts. Most scholarship casts the 
area primarily as an interimperial borderland where Spain and Portugal jockeyed for possession and the 
principal indigenous actors were missionized Guaraní-speakers, yet a closer analysis of territorial dynamics 
reveals that it was primarily an interethnic space where independent native peoples played central roles.29 
                                                       
27 Before 1680, the principal Spanish settlements – Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Corrientes – were extensions of riverine and 
overland trade routes that stretched from Peru and Paraguay and were restricted to the western portion of the region. Missionary 
endeavors in the 1620s and 1630s resulted in a short-lived Jesuit and Franciscan presence in the north and southeast as well. 
28 Other articles defined borderland practices, rather than specifying the borderline’s location. 
29 References to “Spain” or “Spanish” actors and “Portugal” or “Portuguese” actors are both for convention and an effort to focus 
on the complexities of native peoples. As has been shown elsewhere, both of these “polycentric monarchies” were a tapestry of 
localities and local loyalties frequently trumped national allegiance. Pedro Cardim et al., eds., Polycentric Monarchies: How Did 
Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony? (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012). 
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Despite the scores of geographical texts produced on the region during the eighteenth century, its 
jurisdictional ambiguity left it with no singular name or frame. Portuguese-language texts employed such 
terms as the Capitania de El Rey or the Continente do Rio Grande, while Spanish-language sources tended 
to identify the region as the “Other Coast” (“Otra Banda”) of the Río de la Plata, the Río Paraguay, or, later, 
the Río Uruguay, opposite their own settlements. Other common frames, such as the “Banda Oriental,” 
more closely represent retrospective nationalist territorial imaginations than discernible territorialities of 
the eighteenth century and before.30 The instability and subjective framings of these terms make them 
untenable for a discussion of regional dynamics that does not privilege imperial territorial perspectives. I 
therefore choose instead to frame the region according to the territorial reach of its independent indigenous 
communities. Still, to define the region according to the principal ethnic identifiers associated with it – 
Charrúa and Minuán – would be to accept such ethnonyms as meaningful for the people to whom they 
referred and to depict them as centralized polities. “Charruaría” or “Minuanía” are thus equally problematic 
names. I instead use the general term “Río de la Plata,” borrowing the name of the region’s principal 
watershed. This term possesses its own ambiguities – it has been used in other places to refer to the 
territorial limits of the homonymous Spanish viceroyalty or the non-Chilean Southern Cone – but 
nonetheless allows for an analysis of competing territorialities without privileging one or another.31 
                                                       
30 Ana Frega, “Uruguayos y orientales: itinerario de una síntesis compleja,” in Crear la nación: Los nombres de los países de América 
Latina, ed. José Carlos Chiaramonte, Carlos Marichal and Aimer Granados, 95–112 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 
2008). 
31 While the present study employs the “Río de la Plata” as a regional frame in order to assess changing territorial perspectives and 
practices, it is important to avoid fetishizing this space or scale. Any regional definition presents the risk of occluding flows and 
distant connections, as well as imagining hierarchical spatial scales in which power flows from small (global, continental) to large 
scale (regional, local), and large scales are seen as more real, tangible, or material. For a deeper discussion on the issue, see: Sallie 
A. Marston, John P. Jones III and Keith Woodward, “Human Geography Without Scale,” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 30, no. 4 (2005); Arturo Escobar, “The 'Ontological Turn' in Social Theory: A Commentary on 'Human Geography 
Without Scale,' by Sallie Marston, John Paul Jones II and Keith Woodward,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 32, 
no. 1 (2007).  
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Interimperial disputes over territorial possession in the Río de la Plata were mapped onto a 
complex interethnic landscape. While Portuguese, Spanish, and Jesuit-Guaraní authorities made juridical 
claims to regional lands, independent indigenous communities dominated the countryside through most of 
the eighteenth century. Organized into local and itinerant encampments (tolderías) of approximately fifty to 
one hundred inhabitants, autonomous native peoples limited imperial and missionary actions. Imperial and 
ecclesiastical writers employed a number of ethnonyms to name their indigenous counterparts – along with 
“Charrúas” and “Minuanes,” they mentioned “Bohanes,” “Guenoas,” “Machados,” “Martidanes,” “Yaros,” and 
others – although the use of such terms was uneven, varied according to locality, and changed over time. 
Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that such terms or arrangements were meaningful to the 
peoples to whom they referred, and no evidence appears to exist of anyone ever self-identifying in this 
way.32 Given the ambiguity of ethnic categories, as well as the heterogeneity, local patterns of authority, 
and conflict between communities, I utilize the term toldería as the principal means of identification, and 
where possible the names of individual caciques, treating ethnonyms as imperial modifiers rather than native 
identifiers. I most often discuss “Minuán tolderías” or “tolderías identified as Minuán,” rather than 
“Minuanes,” as a way to highlight the locality of territorial circumstances, authority, and processes of 
decision-making without dismissing the potential, if opaque, meaning of ethnonyms. Nonetheless, it is 
important to recognize the broad territorial networks of kinship, tribute, and allegiance that certain 
caciques were able to establish, and the overall authority that tolderías exercised over the region, amidst 
their differences and distinctions.  
 
                                                       
32 Jeffrey A. Erbig Jr. and Sergio Hernán Latini, “Across Archival Limits: Imperial Records, Changing Ethnonyms, and 
Geographies of Knowledge,” working paper. 
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Geographical Imaginations and Ethnohistory in the Río de la Plata 
A brief survey of the historiography of the region is instructive, as territorial assumptions have 
dramatically shaped narratives of indigenous pasts. Historians generally mark 1831 as an end date for 
tolderías in the Río de la Plata. In this year, republican forces of the newly independent republic of Uruguay 
orchestrated an ambush of a number of Charrúa communities near the Río Salsipuedes, in the north of the 
country. For most historians, the “Salsipuedes Massacre” (“Matanza de Salsipuedes”) was both a final episode 
in a decades-long genocidal campaign that began during the second half of the eighteenth century and the 
moment in which tolderías ceased to be active historical agents. Thereafter, scholars relegated independent 
indigenous communities to subordinate roles in an unfolding narrative of creole territorial advancement. 
Both historical and fictional accounts focused primarily on the realization and consolidation of national 
territories, discursively erasing non-sedentary peoples.33 Travelers to the region reiterated this general 
trope of indigenous disappearance either by recounting the elimination of mobile native peoples or by 
explaining that they simply had left the region, generally in a westward migration across the Río Paraná to 
the Chaco.34 During these years, the most extensive descriptions of tolderías were published transcriptions 
                                                       
33 Key historical texts of this moment included: Sota, Juan Manuel de la, Historia del Territorio Oriental del Uruguay Tomo I 
(Montevideo: Ministerio de la Instrucción Pública y Previsión Social, 1965); Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos 
Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, 2a ed Tomo II (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Bonaerense, 1856); Francisco Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación 
Española en el Uruguay Tomo Segundo (Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 1895); “Degollacion de Charruas,” Revista de la 
Biblioteca Pública de Buenos Aires Tomo II (1880). This historiographical tendency is perhaps most clearly seen in Luis Alberto de 
Herra’s La tierra charrúa, which despite its name only mentions charrúas as one of the many potential roots of the Uruguayan 
national type, or the “gaucho oriental.” Luis Alberto de Herrera, La tierra charrúa (Montevideo: Arca Editorial, 1968), 32–35. 
Literary works demonstrated similar tropes in their national self-reflections, treating native peoples alternatively as conquered 
barbarians or vanquished victims. Key authors included Juan Zorrilla de San Martin, Margariños Cervantes, and Eduardo 
Acevedo Díaz. Annie Houot, Guaraníes y charrúas en la literatura uruguaya del siglo XIX: realidad y ficción (Montevideo: Linardi y 
Risso, 2007), Parte II. 
34 Arsène Isabelle, Voyage a Buénos-Ayres et a Porto-Alègre par la Banda-Oriental, les Missions D'Uruguay et la Province de Rio-Grande-do-
Sul (de 1830 a 1834): Suivi de Considérations Sur l'état du Commerce Français à l'extérieur, et principalement au Brésil et au Rio-de-la-Plata 
(Havre: Imprimerie de J. Morlent, 1835), 98, 107-110, 303, 315, 369-71; Nicolào Dreys, Notícia descriptiva da Província do Rio-
Grande de S. Pedro do Sul, contendo: Além da topographia physica e política, e de hum ensaio de estatística local, informações sobre o estado 
actual da população, suas subdivisões, e sobre o carácter e costumes dos habitantes (Rio de Janeiro: Na Typ. Imp. e Const. de J. Villeneuve 
e Comp., 1839); com hum mappa reduzido do theatro da guerra presente, 182–183, 191-192; John Hale Murray, Travels in 
Uruguay, South America: Together with an Account of the Present State of Sheep-Farming and Emigration to that Country (London: 
Longmans & Co., 1871); Illustrated with Sketches, 65–66. 
17 
 
of Jesuit and imperial ethnographies, which were written during the colonial period, or the published work 
of naturalist travelers who reiterated the same ideas.35 
The turn of the twentieth century saw the first shift in historical and anthropological studies of the 
region, as tolderías began to receive increased attention.36 Building upon established narratives regarding 
the realization of contemporary spatial limits, historians imagined Charrúas, Minuanes, and others as 
prehistoric forebears or antiquated enemies, vanquished through military, territorial, or spiritual 
conquest.37 For them, native history was one of disappearance, either through forceful extermination or 
                                                       
35 Notable ethnographies published or utilized in the nineteenth century included the works of Lorenzo Hervás, Gonzalo de 
Doblas, Félix de Azara, José Saldanha, and Pierre François-Xavier Charlevoix. Although Hervás’s text was published in 1787, it 
was an important reference for ethnographic studies. Azara’s travel narrative, which contains his most extensive ethnographic 
discussion, was first published in France in 1809, but was not translated to Spanish until 1846. José Saldanha, who wrote the 
most extensive ethnographic account of Portuguese travelers, was not published until 1929, yet was representative of the same 
trend. Similarly, Pierre Françõis-Xavier Charlevoix’s work was first translated to Spanish in 1910. Lorenzo Hervás, Saggio pratico 
delle lingue: con prolegomeni, e una raccolta di orazioni dominicali in piu di trecento lingue e dialetti… (Cesena: Gregorio Biasini, 1787), 
85, 228; Gonzalo de Doblas, “Memoria histórica, geográfica, política y económica sobre la Provincia de Misiones de Indios 
Guaranis,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, Tomo Tercero, 
ed. Pedro de Angelis (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836); Félix de Azara, Viajes por la América Meridional, 2 vols. 
(Montevideo: Biblioteca del Comercio del Plata, 1846); José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido,” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio 
de Janeiro, 135–301 Volume LI (Rio de Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1929); Pierre François-Xavier Charlevoix, Historia del 
Paraguay (Madrid: V. Suárez, 1910). Notable naturalist travelers during the nineteenth century included the Frenchmen Alcide 
d’Orbigny and Auguste de Saint-Hilaire. The former drew extensively upon the work of Azara in his account of Charrúas and 
Minuanes and the latter only offered a few commentaries on customs and appearance. Each of these authors concerned 
themselves primarily with situating native peoples within the global taxonomies. Alcide Dessalines d'Orbigny, El Hombre 
Americano, Colección Eurindia (Buenos Aires: Editorial Futuro, 1944); Traducción de Alfredo Cepeda, 32, 38, 80-1, 276-80; 
Auguste de Saint-Hilaire, Voyage a Rio-Grande do Sul (Brésil) (Orléans: H. Herluioson, Libraire-Éditeur, 1887), 248-9, 277-8.  
François de Curel, the Frenchman who transported several Charrúa captives to Paris in 1831, also published an ethnographic 
study of Charrúas in 1833. This text was published in French, however, and was not translated to Spanish until 1996. François de 
Curel, Reseña sobre la tribu de los indios charrúas (Montevideo: Vintén Editor, 1996); Edición facsimilar París 1833, con un prólogo 
de Daniel Vidart; Antonio Díaz, Apuntos varios sobre los indios charrúas (Montevideo: Estado Mayor del Ejército, Departamento de 
Estudios Históricos, División "Histórica" 1977); Versión modernizada de José Joaquín Figueira. For more on imperial 
ethnographies, see: Guillermo Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII,” 
Horizontes Antropológicos 9, no. 19 (julho de 2003): 109–17; Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”; Erbig Jr., Forging Frontiers, 42–53. 
36 Gustavo Verdesio has argued that the consolidation of national control over regional territory enabled the inclusion of native 
peoples in academic texts. Expanding upon Ángel Rama’s idea that “once the social/cultural group that bothered the lettered city 
[disappears], it can be more or less harmlessly incorporated into the national cultural tradition,” he adds that Uruguayan 
intellectuals of the nineteenth century generally preferred to ignore native peoples entirely. Gustavo Verdesio, “An Amnesic 
Nation: The Erasure of Indigenous Pasts by Uruguayan Expert Knowledges,” in Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing 
the Nation in Nineteenth-century Latin America, ed. Sara Castro-Klarén and John C. Chasteen (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2003), 196–224, 203–5. 
37 Vicente G. Quesada, Los indios en las Provincias del Río de la Plata: Estudio Histórico (Buenos Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de 
Billetes de Banco, 1903), 41–45; Pacífico Otero, La orden franciscana en el Uruguay: Crónica histórica del Convento de San Bernardino 
de Montevideo (Buenos Aires: Cabaut y Cía, 1908), 2-6, 10-13, 47-8; Manuel Cervera, Historia de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Fe, 
1573-1583 Tomo Primero (Santa Fe: La Unión de Ramón Ibáñey, 1908), 193, 230-43, 253-4, 493-4, 499-500; Enrique Peña, 
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through a teleological transition from Indians to gauchos to acculturated republican subjects, a trope that 
continues to influence many macro-level and long-durée studies of tolderías in the region.38 Given tolderías’ 
positioning as peripheral or subordinate in historical accounts of creole expansion, the most detailed studies 
regarding them came from anthropologists. Beginning with José H. Figueira’s work presented at the 1892 
                                                       
“Don Francisco de Céspedes: Noticias sobre su gobierno en el Río de la Plata (1624-1632),” in Anales de la Academia de Filosofía y 
Letras Tomo V (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Coni Hermanos, 1916); Carlos Teschauer, História do Rio Grande do Sul dos dois 
primeiros séculos, 2a edição, 3 vols. (São Leopoldo, RS: Editora Unisinos, 2002); João Borges Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro: 
Povoamento e conquista XXXVII (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Militar, 1941), 9-24, 35; Carlos Teschauer, ed., História do Rio Grande 
do Sul dos dois primeiros séculos, 2a edição, 3 vols. (São Leopoldo, RS: Editora Unisinos, 2002); Luís Enrique Azarola Gil, Los 
Orígenes de Montevideo, 1607-1759 (Montevideo: Casa A. Barreiro y Ramos, 1940), 29-30, 123-133; Serafim Leite, História da 
Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, 10 vols. 6 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945), 453, 493-7, 525-7, 528-30; Juan E. Pivel 
Devoto, Raíces coloniales de la Revolución Oriental de 1811 (Montevideo, 1952), 50, 59, 66, 81; José María Mariluz Urquijo, La 
expedición contra los charrúas en 1801 y la fundación de Belén (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1952); Separata de la "Revista del 
Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay" Tomo XIX, 53-94; José María Mariluz Urquijo, La fundación de San Gabriel de Batoví 
(Montevideo, 1954); Apartado de la "Revista Historica"; Aurélio Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), 
Jesuítas no Sul do Brasil Volume III (Porto Alegre: Livraria Selbach, 1954), 66–71; Juan Alejandro Apolant, Génesis de la familia 
uruguaya (Montevideo: Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay, 1966); Moysés Vellinho, Brazil South: Its Conquest and 
Settlement (New York: Knopf, 1968); With a preface by Erico Verissimo. Translated from the Portuguese by Linton Lomas 
Barrett & Marie McDavid Barrett, 76, 129; Eduardo F. Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo 
hispánico), 2 vols. 1 (Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso, 1989); Eduardo F. Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda 
Oriental (período patrio), 2 vols. 2 (Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso, 1989); Juan Villegas, “La evangelización del indio de la 
Banda Oriental del Uruguay (siglos XVI-XVIII),” in Cristianismo y mundo colonial: Tres estudios acerca de la evangelización de 
hispanoamérica, ed. Johannes Meier, 69–112 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH & Co., 1995); Guilhermino 
Cesar, História do Rio Grande do Sul: Período Colonial (Pôrto Alegre: Editôra Globo, 1978), 20, 23-4, 29, 34, 37, 50, 61, 78, 86, 
91, 117, 209; Pedro Ari Veríssimo da Fonseca, Tropeiros de mula: A ocupação do espaço, a dilitação das fronteiras, 2a edição revista e 
ampliada (Passo Fundo: Gráfica Editora Berthier Ltda., 2004), 31-2, 38. 
38 Recent texts that emphasize elimination and disappearance include: Diego Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes: Interacción y 
destrucción, indígenas del Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2004); Fernando Klein, “El destino de los indígenas del 
Uruguay,” Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Cincias Sociales y Jurídicas 15, no. 1 (2007); Mario Consens, Extinción de los indígenas en el Río 
de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2010); Luís Fernando da Silva Laroque, “Os nativos charrua/minuano, guarani e 
kainkang: O protagonismo indígena e as relações interculturais em territórios de planície, serra e planalto do Rio Grande do Sul,” 
in Releituras da História do Rio Grande do Sul, ed. Claudio Knierim and Sandra Careli, 15–42 (Porto Alegre: CORAG, 2011), 20–
21. Scholars arguing instead for conquest and integration include: Daniel Vidart, El mundo de los Charrúas, 3a ed (Montevideo: 
Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1996) Oscar Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final (Durazno, Uruguay: 
Tierradentro Ediciones, 2004); Leonel Cabrera Pérez and Isabel Barreto Messano, “El ocaso del mundo indígena y las formas de 
integración a la sociedad urbana montevideana,” Revista TEFROS 4, no. 2 (2006); Leonel Cabrera Pérez, “La incorporación del 
indígena de la Banda Oriental a la sociedad colonial/nacional urbana,” Revista TEFROS 9 (Agosto 2011); Anderson Marques Garcia 
and Saul Eduardo Seiguer Milder, “Convergências e divergências: Aspectos das culturas indígenas Charrua e Minuano,” vivência 
39, no. 39 (2012).  This trope is also evident in the numerous publications that have focused exclusively on “the last Charrúas” – 
those individuals killed or captured in the Salsipuedes Massacre and the vanquished caciques taken to Paris to be displayed in a 
traveling menagerie. Ángel Vidal, La leyenda de la destrucción de los charrúas por el General Fructuoso Rivera (Montevideo: El Siglo 
Ilustrado, 1933); Apartado de la "Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay" Tomo IX, 1932"; Eduardo F. Acosta 
y Lara, “Un linaje charrúa en Tacuarembó: a 150 años de Salsipuedes,” Revista de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias, Serie Ciencias 
Antropológicas 1, no. 2 (1981); Annie Houot, Un cacique charrúa en París (Montevideo: Editorial Costa Atlántica, 2005); Darío A. 
Asenjo, “Nuevos datos sobre el destino de Tacuavé y la hija de Guyunusa,” Antropología Social y Cultural en Uruguay (2007); 
Cabrera Pérez and Messano, “El ocaso del mundo indígena y las formas de integración a la sociedad urbana montevideana”; Annie 
Houot, El trágico fin de los indios charrúas (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2013). 
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Exposición Histórico-Americana in Madrid, anthropologists sought to catalogue tolderías according to linguistic 
groups, macro-ethnicities, geographical locations, or archaeological patterns.39 Posing questions of national 
or subnational interest – who were our prehistoric forebears? when did they arrive? how did their cultures 
shape contemporary identities? who can claim them as patrimony? – their conclusions tended to reinforce 
national or subnational ideals. For example, as Guenoas were most commonly associated with the territory 
of Rio Grande do Sul and Charrúas purportedly inhabited Uruguay and the Argentine Mesopotamia, 
Brazilian scholars tended to define all tolderías as part of the “Guenoa macro-ethnicity,” while Argentine 
                                                       
39 José H. Figueira, “Los primitivos habitantes del Uruguay,” in El Uruguay en la Exposición Histórico-Americana de Madrid: Memoria de 
los trabajos realizados por la Comisión Nacional encargada de organizar los elementos de concurrencia, 121–219 (Montevideo: Imprenta 
Artística de Dornaleche y Reyes, 1892). Earlier studies did exist, including the works of Mario Ísola, Florentino Ameghino, and 
Pedro Stagnero, published in the 1870s and 1880s; however, the quatercentennial was a watershed moment in the union of 
ethnographic studies and national geographic imaginations. Florentino Ameghino, La antigüedad del hombre en la plata (Buenos 
Aires: La Cultura Argentina, 1918), 254, 257, 259, 260, 347; José Joaquín Figueira, Contribución al estudio de la bibliografía de los 
aborígenes del Uruguay: 'Los charrúas' de Pedro Stagnero y 'Cerros de las cuentas' por Mario Ísola (Montevideo, 1957), 33–40. Subsequent 
studies that followed this pattern include: Samuel Lafone Quevado, “Los indios chanases y su lengua. Con apuntes sobre los 
querandíes, yaros, boanes, güenoas o minuanes,” Boletín del Instituto Geográfico Argentino XVIII (1897); Rodolfo R. Schuller, Sobre 
el oríjen de los Charrúa: Réplica al doctor Jorje Friederici, de Leipzig (Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Cervantes, 1906); Publicado en los 
Anales de la Universidad de Chile, tomo CXVIII, numero de marzo i abril; Orestes Araújo, Etnología salvaje: Historia de los 
Charrúas y demás tribus indígenas del Uruguay (primera parte) (Montevideo: José María Serrano, 1911); Luis María Torres, Los 
primitivos habitantes del delta del Paraná Tomo IV (Buenos Aires: Imprensa de Coni Hermanos, 1911); Gabriel María Vergara y 
Martín, Diccionario etnográfico americano (Madrid: Sucesores de Hernando, 1922), 24, 36, 70, 136-7, 212; Samuel Kirlkand 
Lothrop, “Indians of the Paraná Delta, Argentina,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences XXXIII (January 1932): 102, 110-
117; Antônio Serrano, “Filiação Linguística Serrana,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XVI, 1o 
trimestre (1936); Antônio Serrano, Los Pueblos y Culturas Indígenas del Litoral (Santa Fe: El Litoral, 1955); Perea y Alonso, S., 
Apuntes para la Prehistoria Indígena del Río de la Plata y especialmente de la Banda Oriental del Uruguay, como Introducción a la Filología 
comparada de las Lenguas y Dialectos Arawak (Montevideo: Imprenta de A. Monteverde y Cía., 1937); Apartado del Boletín de la 
Sección Filológica del Instituto de Estudios Superiores; J.A.L. Tupí Caldas, “Etnologia Sul-Riograndense: Esboço fundamental,” 
Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXII, 2o trimestre (1942); Carlos Seijo, “Alrededor del trabajo de 
'El paradero charrúa del Puerto de las Tunas y su alfarería',” Revista de la Sociedad de Amigos de la Arqueología 11 (1951); Salvador 
Canals Frau, Las poblaciones indígenas de la Argentina: Su origen, su pasado, su presente (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1953); 
César M. López Monfiglio, El totemismo entre los charrúas, Cuadernos de antropología no. 1 (Montevideo: Centro de Estudios 
Arqueológicos y Antropológicos Americanos, 1962); Teodoro M. Vilardebó, Noticias sobre los charrúas (Códice Vilardebó), 2a ed. 
(Montevideo: Artes Gráficas Covadonga, 1963); Introducción y notas por Baltasar Luis Mezzera; Ponce de León, Luis R., 
“Minuanes o Guenoas: Eran nuestros indígenas en la época de fundación de Montevideo,” Boletín Histórico del Estado Mayor General 
de Ejército, 112-115 (1967); José Joaquín Figueira, De las “Memorias” del Brigadier General Don Antonio Díaz: apuntes varios sobre los 
indios charrúas del Uruguay (Montevideo: Estado Mayor del Ejército, Departamento de Estudios Históricos, División "Histórica" 
1978); Aníbal Barrios Pintos, Historia de los pueblos orientales: Sus orígenes, procesos fundacionales, sus primeros años, 2 vols. 
(Montevideo: Ediciones Cruz del Sur, 2008), 17–85. A subset of these scholars have focused on the relationship between 
Charrúa, Minuán, or Guaraní names or terms in regional topography. Aurélio Porto, “O minuano na toponímia rio-grandense,” 
Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul, 3o trimestre (1938) Luiz Carlos de Moraes, “O Vento Minuano,” 
Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XVII, 1-4 Trimestres (1947) Nelson França Furtado, Vocábulos 
indígenas na geografia do Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 1969). 
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and Uruguayan researchers deemed them part of the “Charrúa macro-ethnicity.”40 This general framework 
of anthropological studies has also remained intact in recent years, as scholars continue to focus on the 
overriding theme of national identity.41 
Despite having been produced over the course of nearly two centuries, these studies shared 
common geographical assumptions. First, they presumed that tolderías were neither active agents in the 
construction of territorial relations nor possessors of their own sense of territorial order. Thus most works 
either ignored portions of land until they became controlled by settlers or exaggerated the extent of 
imperial territorial control. This shaped interpretations of interethnic exchanges, as scholars cast 
competition for resources or indigenous claims of authority as native invasions or resistance to territorial 
order. Second, their geographical frames of analysis were inextricably linked to twentieth-century 
territorial units, as they imagined colonial jurisdictions as proto-national spaces. Scholars “[enumerated] the 
indigenous nations that inhabited Rio Grande,” searched for the “origin of the Indians that populated 
Uruguay,” narrated the “displacement of hunter Indians, who populated lands that would come to be 
Uruguayan,” or mapped ethnic locations within the frames of contemporary administrative units (Map I.1). 
As native peoples (“our Indians”) moved on and off national territories (“our lands”), they moved in and out  
                                                       
40 The term “Mesopotamia” refers to the Argentine provinces of Corrientes and Entre Ríos. The idea of a “macro-etnia guenoa” 
has exclusively appeared in Brazilian texts: Roberto Southey, História do Brazil Tomo Quinto (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria de B. L. 
Garnier, 1862), 531; Aurélio Porto, Dicionário Enciclopédico do Rio Grande do Sul Fascículo I, 1o Volume (Porto Alegre: Editorial 
Minuano Limitada, 1936), 23–25; Porto, “O minuano na toponímia rio-grandense”: 108; Porto, História das Missões Orientais do 
Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 66–67; Martha D. Hameister, “Para dar calor à nova povoação: Estudo sobre estratégias 
sociais e familiares a partir dos registros batismais da Vila do Rio Grande (1738-1763),” (Tese de Doutorado, Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2006), 73–74. The idea of a “macro-etnia charrúa” has appeared in texts such as: Lafone Quevado, 
“Los indios chanases y su lengua. Con apuntes sobre los querandíes, yaros, boanes, güenoas o minuanes”; Cervera, Historia de la 
ciudad y provincia de Santa Fe, 1573-1583, Tomo Primero and Serrano, “Filiação Linguística Serrana.” Still others have 
incorporated both groups into a “macro-etnia guaraní,” a more amorphous distinction, due to the geographical reach of 
settlements and their relationship with Jesuit missionaries and creole settlers alike. See, for example: Francisco Bauzá, Historia de 
la Dominación Española en el Uruguay Tomo Primero (Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 1895); Araújo, Etnología salvaje.  
41 Ítala Irene Basile Becker, Os índios charrua e minuano na antiga banda oriental do Uruguai (São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil: Editora 
Unisinos, 2002); Claudio Corrêa Pereira, Minuanos/Guenoas: Os Cerritos de bacia da lagoa Mirim e as origens de uma nação pampiana 
(Porto Alegre: Fundação Cultural Gaúcha, 2008); Susana Rodríguez and Rodolfo González, En busca de los orígenes perdidos: Los 
guaraníes en la construcción del ser uruguayo (Montevideo: Planeta, 2010). 
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Map I.1 – Ethnic Geographies and National and State Borders42 
of nationally inspired histories.43 Third, scholars used territorial positioning to define reified ethnic 
communities and narrate their territorial evacuation. They ascribed ethnonyms according to indigenous 
“habitat,” using rivers and other geographic features to distinguish distinct ethnic communities. They then 
                                                       
42 Clockwise, from left to right: José H. Figueira, “Los primitivos habitantes del Uruguay” in El Uruguay en la Exposición Histórico-
Americana de Madrid, 138; Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 62; Rodolfo M. Sosa, La 
nación charrúa (Montevideo: Editorial "Letras" 1957), 51. 
43 Osorio Tuyuty Oliveira de Freitas, A invasão de São Borja (Pôrto Alegre: Do globo, 1935), 14–15; Sosa, La nación charrúa, 53; 
Renzo Pi Hugarte, Los indios de Uruguay (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1993), 13–14; Raúl Penino and Alfredo F. Sollazzo, “El 
paradero charrúa del Puerto de las Tunas y su alfarería,” Revista de la Sociedad de Amigos de la Arqueología 1 (1927): 153–5; Herrera, 
La tierra charrúa, 35; Serafín Cordero, Los charrúas: Síntesis etnográfica y arqueológica del Uruguay (Montevideo: Editorial "Mentor" 
1960), 11; Curel, Reseña sobre la tribu de los indios charrúas, 11, 18. 
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assembled references to a given ethnonym in published source materials – from early explorers and 
chroniclers, from Jesuits, and from the demarcation expeditions – and in manuscripts from their most 
proximate archives, in order to devise theories of ethnic migrations. 
 These general trends become starkly apparent when we consider the various arguments about 
habitat and migration collectively. Between 1850 and 2009, at least thirty-two different texts explicitly 
theorized the locations and movements of Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, Yaros, and Guenoas. They either 
situated one of the named groups in a fixed location throughout the colonial period or traced their supposed 
migrations from the late sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century. While these theories made 
logical sense in the context of individual texts, mapping them together reveals both inconsistency and 
contradiction. The defined “habitats” of given ethnic communities appear in disparate locales throughout the 
region, rather than in the restricted sites posited by one author or another (Map I.2). Even in cases where 
multiple authors concurred on a group’s location, such as Charrúas along the northern shore of the Río de 
la Plata or Bohanes between Entre Ríos and Uruguay, their agreement often derived from the borrowing of 
arguments or the shared usage of the same archival collections. Similar incongruences emerge when we map 
together the various theories of ethnic migration. While individual authors’ discussions of regional 
migrations neatly display the abandonment or swapping of lands upon the arrival of a new ethnic 
community, or the extermination of one group by another, when taken collectively, they reveal impossible 
geographies (Maps I.3 & I.4). Not only did scholars never reach a consensus, but many authors arrived at 
diametrically opposed conclusions, with some suggesting migrations from Rio Grande do Sul or Entre Ríos 
to Uruguay and others positing the reverse. These discrepancies derived from scholars’ exclusive use of 
their nearest archival collections, as well as their imposition of contemporary territorial imaginations upon 
native pasts – nearly all of these theorized migrations traversed present-day boundaries. 
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Map I.2 – Theories of Indigenous “Habitat”. This map represents the collective ethnic geographies of 
authors that catalogued tolderías according to a fixed locale, or “habitat”. Native peoples are plotted according 
to their ascribed ethnonym and the geographic area where authors situated them. Label weights correspond 
with the number of authors that made a particular claim: 10 pt. for 1 author, increasing incrementally at 3 
pts. per additional author, and capped at 25 pts. for six or more citations.44 
                                                       
44 Twelve authors located Bohanes along the Río Arapey, near the Río Uruguay. Félix de Azara, Viajes por la América del Sur, 2a ed 
(Montevideo: Biblioteca del Comercio del Plata, 1850), 173-4, 181-3; d'Orbigny, El Hombre Americano, 276–80; Isabelle, Voyage 
a Buénos-Ayres et a Porto-Alègre par la Banda-Oriental, les Missions D'Uruguay et la Province de Rio-Grande-do-Sul (de 1830 a 1834), 98; 
José H. Figueira, “Los primitivos habitantes del Uruguay” in El Uruguay en la Exposición Histórico-Americana de Madrid, 138; Araújo, 
Etnología salvaje, 36–39; Teschauer, História do Rio Grande do Sul dos dois primeiros séculos, 58–69; Vergara y Martín, Diccionario 
etnográfico americano; Penino and Sollazzo, “El paradero charrúa del Puerto de las Tunas y su alfarería”: 153–4; Lothrop, “Indians 
of the Paraná Delta, Argentina”: 102, 110-117; Oliveira de Freitas, A invasão de São Borja, 22–25; Perea y Alonso, S., Apuntes para 
la Prehistoria Indígena del Río de la Plata y especialmente de la Banda Oriental del Uruguay, como Introducción a la Filología comparada de las 
Lenguas y Dialectos Arawak, 8; Seijo, “Alrededor del trabajo de 'El paradero charrúa del Puerto de las Tunas y su alfarería'”: 151–2; 
Canals Frau, Las poblaciones indígenas de la Argentina, 238–41; Serrano, Los Pueblos y Culturas Indígenas del Litoral, 59; Sosa, La nación 
charrúa, 49–60; Cordero, Los charrúas, 181–83; López Monfiglio, El totemismo entre los charrúas, no. 1, 6; Cesar, História do Rio 
Grande do Sul, 20; Curel, Reseña sobre la tribu de los indios charrúas, 22–24; Danilo J. Antón, El pueblo Jaguar: Lucha y sobrevivencia de 
los charrúas a través del tiempo (Montevideo: Piriguazú Ediciones, 1998), 157–60; Basile Becker, Os índios charrua e minuano na 
antiga banda oriental do Uruguai, 43–45; Fonseca, Tropeiros de mula, 32; Klein, “El destino de los indígenas del Uruguay”: 1, 6; 
Ernesto J.A. Maeder and Ramón Gutiérrez, Atlas territorial y urbano de las misiones jesuíticas de guaraníes. Argentina, Paraguay e Brasil 
(Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura, 2009), Map 1. 
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Map I.3 – Theories of Migration (Minuanes). This map represents the collective ethnic geographies of 
authors who articulated Minuán migrations. Arrows represent the before and after of theorized migrations, 
which authors described as unidirectional over the course of the colonial period, particularly the eighteenth 
century. Arrows are weighted at 1 pt. per author, and range from 1 to 7.45 
  
                                                       
45 Azara, Viajes por la América del Sur, 173-4, 181-3; Dreys, Notícia descriptiva da Província do Rio-Grande de S. Pedro do Sul, contendo, 
182–83; José H. Figueira, “Los primitivos habitantes del Uruguay” in El Uruguay en la Exposición Histórico-Americana de Madrid, 
138; d'Orbigny, El Hombre Americano, 276–80; Araújo, Etnología salvaje, 36–39; Félix de Azara, “Memória Rural do Rio da Prata,” 
in O Capitalismo Pastoril, ed. Décio Freitas, 55–73 (Porto Alegre: Escola Superior de Teologia São Lourenço de Brindes, 1980), 
173-4, 181-3; Teschauer, História do Rio Grande do Sul dos dois primeiros séculos, 58–69; Vergara y Martín, Diccionario etnográfico 
americano; José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 236–37; Lothrop, “Indians of the 
Paraná Delta, Argentina”: 102, 110-117; Caldas, “Etnologia Sul-Riograndense”: 308; Canals Frau, Las poblaciones indígenas de la 
Argentina, 238–41; Sosa, La nación charrúa, 49–60; Cordero, Los charrúas, 181–83; José Joaquín Figueira, Brevario de etnología y 
arqueología del Uruguay (Montevideo: Gaceta Comercial, 1965); Introducción de la Profesora María Matilde Garibaldi de Sábat 
Pebet, 5–21; Ponce de León, Luis R., “Minuanes o Guenoas”: 24; Pi Hugarte, Los indios de Uruguay, 65–67; Curel, Reseña sobre la 
tribu de los indios charrúas, 22–24; Vidart, El mundo de los Charrúas, 17–21; Antón, El pueblo Jaguar, 157–60. 
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Map I.4 – Theories of Migration (Charrúas). This map represents the collective ethnic geographies of 
authors who articulated Charrúa migrations. The same methodology has been followed as for Map I.3.46 
Rather than being concerned with understanding native peoples, then, scholars were primarily 
interested in demonstrating when they entered or exited the historical stage of a particular nation, 
province, or state. In the case of Minuanes, for example, a number of authors argued that they migrated 
                                                       
46 Azara, Viajes por la América del Sur, 173-4, 181-3; Isabelle, Voyage a Buénos-Ayres et a Porto-Alègre par la Banda-Oriental, les Missions 
D'Uruguay et la Province de Rio-Grande-do-Sul (de 1830 a 1834), 98; Dreys, Notícia descriptiva da Província do Rio-Grande de S. Pedro do 
Sul, contendo, 182–83; d'Orbigny, El Hombre Americano, 276–80; José H. Figueira, “Los primitivos habitantes del Uruguay” in El 
Uruguay en la Exposición Histórico-Americana de Madrid, 138; Schuller, Sobre el oríjen de los Charrúa, 39–41; Teschauer, História do Rio 
Grande do Sul dos dois primeiros séculos, 58–69; Vergara y Martín, Diccionario etnográfico americano; Lothrop, “Indians of the Paraná 
Delta, Argentina”: 102, 110-117; Caldas, “Etnologia Sul-Riograndense”: 308; Canals Frau, Las poblaciones indígenas de la Argentina, 
238–41; Cordero, Los charrúas, 181–83; Figueira, Brevario de etnología y arqueología del Uruguay, 5–21; Pi Hugarte, Los indios de 
Uruguay, 65–67; Vidart, El mundo de los Charrúas, 17–21; Klein, “El destino de los indígenas del Uruguay”: 1, 6. 
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from Entre Ríos to Montevideo sometime during the 1720s. The significance of this migration had little to 
do with pursuing Minuán cultural logic, but instead enabled authors to suggest that Spanish settlers of 
Montevideo had arrived first, and thus narrate a 1731 conflict between Minuanes and Montevideanos as a 
story of indigenous aggression.47 Similarly, in the case of the Charrúas, most scholars depicted a migration 
from the south of Uruguay to the north. This theory derived from the fact that sixteenth-century explorers 
encountered peoples that they identified as Charrúas around the deltas of the Río Uruguay and Río Paraná. 
By projecting these early and localized interactions upon the entirety of national space, scholars were then 
able to narrate the evacuation of lands with the advancement of an imagined Spanish frontier. In reality, 
there is no evidence to suggest that Charrúas ever occupied lands near Montevideo or the eastern part of the 
country. Such tendencies can be seen in each territorial unit of the map, as migrations accommodated 
narratives of creole territorial advancement and the achievement of contemporary units amidst belligerent 
indigenous enemies. As few scholars engaged beyond national or linguistic boundaries, these parallel and 
contradictory theories proliferated. 
 Despite the persistence of theses broader historical and anthropological tropes, the past two 
decades have also produced numerous revisions of indigenous pasts in the Río de la Plata. Building upon 
renewed efforts to identify and divulge primary source materials on tolderías, and employing 
ethnohistorical approaches, scholars in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil have deconstructed conceptual 
divides between settlers and neighboring tolderías.48 By zooming in on specific localities – Santa Fe, Santo 
                                                       
47 The idea that Minuanes arrived late to Montevideo was first mentioned in the writings of Félix de Azara, who has been a 
principal interlocutor for anthropologists and historians of the region. Félix de Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de 
la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara Tomo Primero (Madrid: Imprenta de Sanchiz, 1847), 145; Azara, Viajes por la América del 
Sur, 174. 
48 The past decade has seen numerous efforts to identify and transcribe sources: Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa 
final, 133–60; Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes Diego Bracco and José M. López Mazz, Charrúas, pampas y serranos, chanáes y 
guaraníes: La insurrección del año 1686 (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2006); José M. López Mazz and Diego Bracco, Minuanos: 
Apuntes y notas para la historia y la arqueología del territorio guenoa-minuán (Indígenas de Uruguay, Argentina y Brasil) (Montevideo: 
Linardi y Risso, 2010); Sergio Hernán Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico: Francisco García de Piedrabuena contra los 
'charrúas y otros infieles', 1715,” Corpus. Archivos virtuales de la alteridad americana 2, no. 2 (2do semestre 2012). 
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Domingo Soriano, Colônia do Sacramento, Montevideo, Rio Grande, Yapeyú, La Cruz, San Borja, and San 
Miguel, to name a few – they have emphasized economic, cultural, social, and biological exchange and 
downplayed ephemeral moments of interethnic conflict. These localized studies, whether focused on Jesuit-
Guaraní, Portuguese, or Spanish settlements, have demonstrated the development of kinship ties and 
interethnic pacts in all corners of the region.49 Other scholars have attempted to situate tolderías within 
broader regional forces, pointing to their roles in the development of informal economies, as they 
transported and sold livestock, guided outsiders through the countryside, and simultaneously engaged 
known contrabandists and local ranchers.50 These broader studies have also identified ways in which 
                                                       
49 Studies focusing on Jesuit-Guaraní settlements include: Erich L.W Edgar Poentiz, “Los infieles minuanes y charrúas en 
territorio misionero durante la época virreinal,” (1985); Ernesto J.A. Maeder, “El conflicto entre charrúas y guaraníes de 1700: 
Una disputa por el espacio oriental de las misiones,” ICADE, no. 20 (1992); Wilde, “Guaraníes, 'gauchos' e 'indios infieles' en el 
proceso de disgregación de las antiguas doctrinas jesuíticas del Paraguay”; Norberto Levinton, “Las estancias de Nuestra Señora de 
los Reyes de Yapeyú: tenencia de la tierra por uso cotidiano, acuerdo interétnico y derecho natural (Misiones jesuíticas del 
Paraguay),” Revista Complutense de Historia de América 31 (2005); Cesar Castro Pereira, “'Y hoy están en paz': relações entre os 
índios 'infiéis' da Banda Oriental e guaranis missioneiros no período colonial tardio (1737-1801),” (Trabalho de Conclusão de 
Curso, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, dezembro de 2008); Andres Azpriroz Perera and Adriana Dávila Cuevas, 
“Indios 'Infieles' y 'Potreadores': Sociedad colonial y poblaciones indígenas en las fronteras de la Banda Oriental. La fundación de 
Belén 1801,” (2009); Norberto Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas: Una frontera exclusivista-inclusivista,” Revista de História 
Regional 14, no. 1 (Verão 2009); Pedro Miguel Omar Svriz Wucherer, “Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay: Guerra y paz con los 
minuanes en el siglo XVIII,” Gazeta de Antropologia 2, no. 27 (2011). Studies on Portuguese settlements include: Fabrício Pereira 
Prado, A Colônia do Sacramento: O extremo sul da américa portuguesa no século XVIII (Porto Alegre: F.P. Prado, 2002), 84, 117, 125; 
Tiago Gil, “Sobre o comércio ilícito: A visão dos demarcadores de limites sobre o contrabando terrestre na fronteira entre os 
domínios lusos e espanhóis no Rio da Prata (1774-1801),” (2005): 10–13; Artigo apresentado nas II Jornadas de História Regional 
Comparada Porto Alegre, October 12-15 2005; Elisa Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio: Políticas indígenas e políticas 
indigenistas no extremo sul da América portuguesa (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2009), Capítulo 5; Martha D. Hameister, “'No 
princípio era o caos': a formação de um povoado na fronteira americana dos Impérios Ibéricos através do estudo das relações do 
compadrio,” Revista de História Regional 15, no. 2 (2010): 115. Studies on Spanish settlements include: Wilde E. M. Castro, Los 
indios Mansos de la Banda Oriental: Santo Domingo Soriano - Documentada (Montevideo: Impresora Editorial, 2000); Wucherer, 
“Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay”; Pablo Fucé, “Ceremonia persuasiva: El Gobernador, el Cabildo y la paz con los indígenas 
minuanes (Montevideo, 1730-1732),” BROCAR 30 (2006); Cabrera Pérez, “La incorporación del indígena de la Banda Oriental a 
la sociedad colonial/nacional urbana”. Studies of interethnic relations between Santa Fe and Charrúas are unique in their 
longevity. While earlier studies repeated many of the same tropes as other twentieth-century historians, analysis of peaceful 
exchange has been a constant throughout. Cervera, Historia de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Fe, 1573-1583, Tomo Primero, 422–
23; Juan Faustino Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe (Montevideo: Gómez y Compañía, 1926), 202; Agustín Zapata Gollan, Los 
chaná en el territorio de la provincia de Santa Fe, Publicaciónes del Departamento de Estudios Etnográficos y Coloniales No. 4 (Santa 
Fe: Ministerio de Gobierno e Instrucción Pública, 1945); Hebe Livi, “El Charrúa en Santa Fe,” Revista de la Junta Provincial de 
Estudios Históricos de Santa Fe, no. 49 (1978); Nidia R. Areces, Silvana López and Elida Regis, “Relaciones interétnicas en Santa Fe 
la Vieja: Rescate con charrúas,” in Reflexiones sobre el V Centenario, ed. Nidia R. Areces, 155–69 (Rosario: UNR Editoria, 1992); 
Nidia R. Areces et al., “Santa Fe la Vieja. Frontera abierta y de guerra. Los frentes Charrúa y Chaqueño,” Memoria Americana 2 
(1993); Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”. 
50 Tiago Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira: uma produção social de mercadorias,” Revista de la ABPHE 2003/95 Versión electrónica 
(2003); Azpriroz Perera and Dávila Cuevas, “Indios 'Infieles' y 'Potreadores'”. 
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tolderías negotiated between empires, using the specter of one to gain the upper hand in pacts with the 
other.51 Still others have analyzed the emergence of ethnographic writings about mobile native peoples, 
identifying connections between knowledge production and changing imperial policies vis-à-vis tolderías.52 
When taken collectively, localized studies and thematically driven histories constitute a significant 
reassessment of interethnic relations in the region, including an underlying critique of the spatial frames of 
older analyses. By adopting hyper-localized approaches or by focusing on patterns of interaction, revisionist 
accounts repudiate nationally inspired narratives of imperial territorial realization. Still, most of these 
studies have abandoned spatial analysis in their focus on dynamic interethnic relations, as they have adopted 
ambiguous concepts (zones, spaces, grounds) of borderlands studies or avoided discussions of territoriality 
altogether.53 Furthermore, revisionist retellings have not always translated into comprehensive regional 
assessments, as many scholars continue to rely exclusively on localized series of either Spanish- or 
Portuguese-language sources. As a result, despite greater emphasis on interaction and exchange, such 
models continue to position mobile native peoples as the Other to colonial actors. Without a broader 
conceptual reframing of territorial relations, which reads beyond the myopic gaze of local manuscript 
                                                       
51 Leonel Cabrera Pérez, “Los 'indios infieles' de la Banda Oriental y su participación en la Guerra Guaranítica,” Estudos Ibero-
Americanos XV, no. 1 (1989); Elisa Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados: as relações de 'amizade' entre os 
minuanos e os lusitanos no sul da América portuguesa (c. 1750-1800),” Varia História 24, no. 40 (jul/dez 2008); Weber, Bárbaros, 
85. 
52 Gustavo Verdesio, Forgotten Conquests: Rereading New World History from the Margins (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2001), Chapter 5. Guillermo Wilde, “Los guaraníes después de la expulsión de los jesuitas: dinámicas políticas y transacciones 
simbólicas,” Revista Complutense de Historia de América 27 (2001): 103–5; Norberto Levinton, “La burocracia administrativa contra 
la obra evangelizadora: una reducción de Charrúas fundada por Fray Marcos Ortiz,” Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas. Universidad 
del Norte Santo Tomás de Aquino (Agosto 2003); De las Primeras Jornadas de Historia de la Orden Dominicana en la Argentina; 
Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 109–24; Weber, Bárbaros; 
Fucé, “Ceremonia persuasiva”; Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”. 
53 The principal exception to this tendency has been works on the southernmost Jesuit-Guaraní missions, yet even these accounts 
reproduce binary models of analysis, in which “mission space” serves as a historical stage that tolderías enter into as interlopers in 
their engagement with sedentary settlers. Wilde, “Los guaraníes después de la expulsión de los jesuitas”: 74, 97-102; Lía 
Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata: Guaraníes, jesuitas e imperios coloniales (Buenos Aires: Fondo de la Cultura 
Económica, 2009), 70-1, 87, 90. 97-98, 100, 104, 106-7; Norberto Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas: Una frontera exclusivista-
inclusivista,” Revista de História Regional 14, no. 1 (Verão 2009); Julia Sarreal, “Globalization and the Guaraní: From Missions to 
Modernization in the Eighteenth Century,” (Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009), 79, 323-4. 
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collections to center tolderías’ regional strategies and movements, these important revisions will remain 
limited in scope. 
 By synthesizing and integrating these local studies of the Río de la Plata region, it is possible to 
develop a new regional analysis that acknowledges the broader territorial dynamics that shaped interethnic 
relations. If local settlements dotted the perimeter of the region, and if each of these sites shared an inward 
local frontier with neighboring tolderías, it follows that the region’s vast interior was dominated by 
Charrúas, Minuanes, and other independent native peoples. Some recent work has begun this effort, 
arguing that the Río de la Plata as a region developed through interethnic exchange, that non-missionized 
native peoples controlled the vast majority of regional space, and that the invisibility of native territorialities 
derives from their unintelligibility to imperial and national authors.54 Building upon this groundwork, one 
can begin to reassess interethnic relations in the region, and measure the impact of bordermaking initiatives. 
 
Sources and Methods 
 In order to develop a new geographical perspective, which centers tolderías and the rural spaces 
where the invisible borderlines ran, it is necessary to consider a wide variety of sources. This includes local 
town council (cabildo) reports, military journals from campaigns and daily logbooks from forts, baptismal 
and marriage records and administrative accounts from missions and towns, correspondence, diplomatic 
treatises, newspapers, maps, natural histories, and diaries from the demarcation expeditions, among others. 
While juridical jockeying for territorial possession, the eventual demarcation of a borderline, and 
subsequent efforts to populate it generated a long paper trail, source materials on tolderías are fragmented, 
geographically dispersed, episodic, and generally unpublished. As tolderías’ inhabitants left no written 
                                                       
54 Sergio Hernán Latini, “Repensando la construcción de la cuenca del Plata como espacio de frontera,” in Fronteras: Espacios de 
interacción en las tierras bajas del sur de América, ed. Carina P. Lucaioli and Lidia R. Nacuzzi, 69–99 (Buenos Aires: Sociedad 
Argentina de Antropología, 2010), 69-71, 74, 85, 90, 93; Verdesio, “Forgotten Territorialities”: 91–103. 
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records of their own, and as imperial and ecclesiastical settlements were largely restricted to the perimeter, 
the myopic territorial perspectives of lettered individuals mediated available information on native peoples 
in the region. Extant records thus reflect the frustrations and anxieties of imperial writers when faced with 
the presence or specter of neighboring tolderías, even as they project contiguous control over the territories 
that separated isolated settlements. As tolderías entered onto the stage of historical sources only through 
their interactions with the lettered city, the majority of their actions escape written accounts.55 
Records on tolderías have also had unique historical trajectories, which in turn mediate their 
accessibility. Given the numerous and ever-changing jurisdictional apparatuses that sought to administer the 
region, as well as the connectedness of local events to global projects, manuscript records regarding 
tolderías are spread across no less than twenty repositories in five countries.56 As a result, any single 
repository or series of local archival institutions contains a severely limited portion of available 
documentation. Furthermore, as no site of imperial recordkeeping was able to engage the region as a 
whole, materials available in any one institution or locale reflect the territorial myopia of its administrative 
forebear. “Higher order” administrative centers, such as Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro, contain a broader 
range of sources; however, they are limited to lands claimed and engaged by Spanish or Portuguese 
authorities, respectively.  
In an effort to read across the archival limits that continue to shape regional histories and to center 
borderland spaces, I consulted over 700 manuscripts regarding the Río de la Plata’s tolderías (Map I.5). 
Rather than filtering materials according to source type, I examined any source that mentioned tolderías or 
individuals identified by one of the operative regional ethnonyms. Then, as new a way of “drawing things 
together” and reading against imperial and national territorialities, I used Geographical Information Systems 
                                                       
55 Ángel Rama, The Lettered City (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Translated and edited by John Charles Chasteen. 
56 The referred-to manuscripts were found in archival repositories in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Portugal and Spain. Manuscript 
sources pertaining to juridical debates and demarcation expeditions, were consulted in Paraguay and the United States as well. 
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(GIS) to represent tolderías’ locations and movements over time.57 This recasting of territorial conditions 
served as a foundation to reinterpret the meanings of interethnic encounters and exchanges, as their 
narration in sources was mediated by changing notions of property, possession, and vassalage. It also 
enabled me to identify linkages between distant locales, as individual caciques and their tolderías moved 
between isolated settlements whose record-keepers were frequently unaware of their engagement with 
others. This attention to both archives of geographical knowledge and geographies of archival knowledge 
allows us to look at the region from the inside out and to assess the significance of spaces and peoples that 
have long been rendered invisible in source materials. The centering of what might be considered “native 
 
Map I.5 – Geographies of Manuscript Sources. This map represents the geographic locations of the 
nearly 700 manuscripts that mention tolderías in the Río de la Plata. Individual locations have been weighted 
proportionately according to numbers of manuscripts in a given city, ranging from 1 to 175. About 17% of 
these sources have been transcribed and published. While more sources will likely appear in the future, this 
represents every document consulted in this study or cited in other investigations.  
 
                                                       
57 Bruno Latour, “Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together,” www.bruno-latour.fr, no. 21 (1986). 
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grounds,” and their transformations over time, permits the development of new geographical imaginations 
that more adequately account for the centrality of tolderías to the production of regional space. 
 This dissertation traces territorial practices in the Río de la Plata region over the course of a long 
eighteenth century, marking the midcentury mapping expeditions as a key turning point. The first two 
chapters, which span from the 1680 founding of Colônia do Sacramento to the eve of the Madrid mapping 
expeditions, address the territorial practices of regional inhabitants prior to the invention of an 
interimperial divide. Chapter One examines the early modern and indigenous territorialities that defined 
the region in order to demonstrate that tolderías were the principal arbiters of access to and travel across it. 
Strings of Spanish, Portuguese, and missionary settlements, rather than constituting conterminous frontiers 
or provincial units, were relatively isolated points along fragile corridors or waterways, restricted to the 
perimeter of the region by neighboring tolderías. In order to access key regional resources, livestock in 
particular, imperial agents relied upon payments to or evasion of tolderías. For their part, tolderías 
competed with one another, and used imperial settlements as sources of trade goods or as sites of 
temporary refuge in moments of duress. Despite mutual interests and the absence of any singular authority, 
territorial order governed power relations between settlers and tolderías, and tilted in tolderías’ favor.  
Chapter Two builds upon this dynamic to examine the juridical battles that arose between Spain 
(and by extension the Jesuit-Guaraní missions) and Portugal as each sought to claim legal possession of 
regional lands. It inserts local interethnic relations, governed by territorial conditions, into these broader 
juridical debates to demonstrate the discursive gymnastics that each side employed as it claimed tolderías as 
vassals yet shirked responsibility for their actions. Given the tenuous and unenforceable nature of such 
claims, as well as growing confidence in the precision of geographical explorations and measurements, the 
two sides eventually agreed to combine mapmaking with treaty-making as a means to rectify their disputes 
and circumvent native actors in the determination of possession. The demarcations did not represent the 
realization of imperial territorial control, but rather prescriptive claims over space. Despite a wave of 
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extermination campaigns by local Spanish authorities at midcentury, the impact of such efforts was 
relatively limited, and at the time of the expeditions tolderías continued to control most of the region. 
 The next two chapters, which begin with the Madrid demarcations in 1752 and continue to the 
definitive end of efforts to map a borderline in 1806, explore the impact of bordermaking initiatives upon 
interethnic relations. Chapter Three follows the mapping expeditions commissioned under the Treaty of 
Madrid in the 1750s and under the Treaty of San Ildefonso in the 1780s and 1790s. It compares the detailed 
diaries of demarcation officers to the maps they produced in order to highlight contradictions between the 
two. Whereas treaty maps demonstrated stable landscapes and served as templates for future settlement 
initiatives, the events of the demarcations reveal the continued dominance of tolderías over regional lands. 
As mapping teams traversed the region to claim territorial possession for their imperial patrons, they found 
themselves paying tribute to Charrúa and Minuán caciques in exchange for safe passage. The chapter also 
provides a new reading of the oft-cited “Guaraní War,” in which Guaraní mission-dwellers allied with 
neighboring tolderías to challenge the Madrid line and stymied demarcation efforts for five years. While 
traditional and revisionist retellings of these accounts alternatively center Jesuits and Guaraníes as the war’s 
principal agents, I argue that tolderías arbitrated its outcome; it was only when tolderías withdrew their 
support for the rebels’ cause that the Luso-Hispanic armies and their allies were able to quell the uprising.  
Chapter Four addresses the ways in which the imaginary lines proposed by mapping teams 
transformed into territorial practices centered on the borderline. As the principal officers of the 
demarcation efforts transitioned into high-ranking posts in newly defined territorial units, they aimed to 
bring the lines they had drawn into being. Their efforts included strategic settlement campaigns to populate 
the border with settlers from the Azores and Canary Islands or emigrants from the missions. Post-
demarcation territorial initiatives promulgated new ideals of territorial order, which included sedentary 
subjects, private property rights, and well-regulated commercial practices. For Spain, these objectives 
translated into violent extermination campaigns against tolderías, whom officials perceived as unruly 
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subjects and whom they accused of aiding contrabandists. For Portugal, it engendered increased efforts at 
pact-making with caciques in an effort to safely access Spanish dominions without disrupting interimperial 
peace. Tolderías experienced these changing tendencies in different ways according to their territorial 
positioning. With the shift of Colônia do Sacramento to Spanish control, a statute of both treaties, 
neighboring tolderías found themselves bereft of once lucrative economic opportunities and the benefits of 
competing imperial foes. Conversely, those closest to the imaginary borderline were able to take advantage 
of imperial bordermaking initiatives. They utilized increased imperial desires to realize an operative 
borderline, the new economic opportunities that it produced, and the influx of migrants to expand kinship 
ties, develop commercial networks, extract payments, and gain refuge in times of duress.  
Chapter Five examines the eventual disappearance of tolderías, and by extension Charrúas and 
Minuanes, from the documentary record by 1831. It argues that rather than marking the end of a slow 
decline for tolderías, this discursive shift was due to three factors. First, over the course of the eighteenth 
century, ecclesiastical and imperial agents captured several thousand individuals in an effort to effect 
territorial removal. As many of these individuals were exiled to other parts of the region, either distributed 
to elite families or forcibly marched to missions, their separation from tolderías engendered ethnic 
indistinguishability in written records. Those who were once “Charrúa” or “Minuán” became simply 
“Indians” in record books, thus concealing their continued presence. Second, as many individuals moved 
back and forth between settlements and tolderías, developing commercial and kinship ties, they blurred the 
lines between the two. As ethnonyms referred to people clearly affiliated with tolderías, these individuals 
found themselves disassociated from such terms. Third, the eventual end to tolderías as possible living 
arrangements was a product of the dissolution of an operative borderline beginning in 1806. As tolderías 
living in such areas had initially extracted numerous benefits from their territorial positioning, the 
unpredictability of imperial agents and the crisscrossing of rival factions during struggles for independence 
made the countryside an increasingly uninhabitable space.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: AN ARCHIPELAGO OF PLAZAS AND TOLDERÍAS 
 
The Spanish Conquest [left] in its wake a scattering of cities, isolated and practically out of communication from 
one another, while the territory between the new urban centers continued to be inhabited almost solely by the 
dismayed indigenous populations. – Ángel Rama1 
 
Try to speak with Don Joaquín, chief of the Minuanes, to whom I have given gifts and whose conversion I have 
solicited. It was recently written to me that he has demonstrated kindness and friendship toward our people. 
Give him whatever gifts you have in order to ensure his friendship. – Manuel de Velazco y Tejada, Governor of 
Buenos Aires, 17102 
 
 
Fragile Peace 
 In early July 1731, two men set out from the San Borja mission. The first was the mission’s priest, 
Jesuit Miguel Ximénez, and the second was a Guenoa Indian named Francisco de Borja, whom Ximénez had 
taken as a guide. The two men and their party traveled for nearly a month, and floods and freezing rains 
waylaid them along their journey. They eventually arrived, drenched and exhausted, at several Guenoa 
encampments (tolderías) near the headwaters of the Río Piraí, where Borja’s kin and several prominent 
chiefs (caciques) resided. Borja and Ximénez bore a heavy diplomatic burden: they sought to broker peace 
between the Spanish settlement (plaza) of Montevideo and neighboring Minuán tolderías.3 If they failed, the 
                                                       
1 Rama, The Lettered City, 10. 
2 “Procurara hablar con D.n Joaquin cazique de los minuanes â quien he agasajado y solicitado su convercion, y ultimamente me 
escriven se ã mostrado con fineza y amistad de parte de nuestra jente, al qual regalara con lo que lleva procurando conserbar su 
âmistad” AGI - Contaduría, 1931, f. 24v. 
3 The term “plaza” refers to localized settlements, including cities, towns, fortresses, and missions. While contemporary usage of 
the term refers to an urban square, eighteenth-century authors also used it to designate settlements as a whole, particularly those 
that were fortified. Raphael Bluteau, Vocabulário Português e Latino, 8 vols. 6 (Coimbra: Colégio das Artes da Companhia de Jesus, 
1728), 665–66; Diccionario de autoridades Tomo V (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1737); Fuente electrónica elaborada por el 
Instituto de Investigación Rafael Lapesa y editado en Madrid por la Real Academia Española. For examples of this use of the term 
this way, see: AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 243, Carpeta 3, No 14; AGI - Buenos Aires, 46, f. 629-631v; AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Letters 
dated 1758-06-27, 1759-10-06, 1758-10-03, 1759-10-20, 1759-10-24, 1760-01-23); BNP - F. 1445; IHGB - Conselho 
Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.22, f. 404v-405v; Silvestre Ferreira da Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de 
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fighting that had broken out in the south would engulf the entire region, including their mission and the 
Guenoa tolderías (Map 1.1). 
Map 1.1 – Plazas and Tolderías of the Río de la Plata, 1675-1750 
 The conflict had begun a year earlier when one of Montevideo’s inhabitants had killed a Minuán and 
then run away to the Portuguese plaza of Colônia do Sacramento. When a commission of Minuanes went to 
collect the body of their fallen kinsman, Montevideo’s town council (cabildo) offered condolences and gifts, 
                                                       
Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colonia do Sacramento (Lisboa: Impres. da Congregaçaõ Camer. da S. Igreja de Lisboa, 
1748). 
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but no justice. In response, the tolderías attacked the city’s ranches, killing as many as twenty farmhands 
and blockading Montevideo’s residents from their primary food supply. The plaza responded in kind, 
seeking to break the blockade with the force of its militia. This strategy proved futile, however, as half of 
the conscripted fighters deserted to Colônia and the Minuanes took possession of their approximately 500 
horses.4 By April 1731, the arrival of the rainy season and the rising of the region’s rivers suspended the 
fighting temporarily; Minuanes maintained possession of the countryside, while Montevideo’s residents 
found themselves trapped within the city’s walls and its cabildo contemplated rationing food for the winter. 
Each side also sought to garner allies, as the principal cacique (Quireymbà), named Yapelman, called upon 
support from Guenoa tolderías in the north and Montevideo’s cabildo contacted the Governor of Buenos 
Aires, who in turn solicited aid from the Jesuit-Guaraní missions.5 
Jesuit authorities were wary of involving themselves in a conflict with the tolderías and sent 
Ximénez's and Borja’s envoy as a last-ditch effort to avert war. This endeavor certainly brought its own 
risks, however, as a trip by Ximénez to the tolderías the previous year had precipitated infighting and 
combat among the caciques. His return carried the potential of reigniting animosities that were still fresh in 
the minds of many. Likewise, Borja’s decision to follow Ximénez to the mission that year had generated 
animosity amongst his immediate family, and his presence served as another variable that could undermine 
peace. Indeed, there was at least one attempt on the lives of the two men during their stay, an event that 
both barely survived.6 Nonetheless, deliberations between Ximénez, Borja, and the caciques proved 
                                                       
4 AGI - Charcas, 214, (Buenos Aires, 1731-04-31); AGNU - Ex Museo y Archivo Histórico Nacional, Caja 1, n. 19, f. 1-9; AHU 
- Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 2, Doc 226; Azarola Gil, Los Orígenes de Montevideo, 1607-1759, 125–28.  
5 BNE - MSS 12.977-34, 26v-28; Jaime Cortesão, ed., Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri: Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Paraguai (1703-
1751), Manuscritos da Coleção De Ángelis VI (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1955), 165–70; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los 
charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, Chapter 3. 
6 The two men were cudgeled by a person sent by Borja’s family, who relented when Borja and Ximénez gave him “a gift of the 
items that Minuanes most value [un buen regalo de las cosas que ellos mas estiman].” Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 
162, 166-8, 247-8. Part of the missions’ apprehension toward war likely derived from their efforts to establish cattle reserves 
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successful in the end. The caciques shared the priest’s reticence toward a war that would bring missionary 
forces to their tolderías, since they were aware that it would be mutually devastating. Furthermore, 
Ximénez bestowed gifts upon them and caught their attention by traveling to their tolderías amidst perilous 
rainfall and floods.7 Once the waters subsided, they sought out other caciques from the south, including 
Yapelman, to whom they owed their allegiance. Upon arriving, Yapelman received more gifts from 
Ximénez and accepted his pleas for peace, citing the priest’s gestures of humility and submission as 
motivating factors. He refused the Ximénez’s invitation to sign peace accords in the missions, but promised 
to advise other tolderías throughout the region to respect the pact they had made.8 
 The conflict between the Minuán tolderías and the plaza of Montevideo demonstrates broader 
patterns of interethnic relations and territorial dynamics in the Río de la Plata. Principally, during the 
greater part of the eighteenth century, Minuanes, Guenoas, and other mobile native peoples were the 
primary arbiters of access to the region’s vast countryside. As local plazas, including Montevideo, Colônia, 
and San Borja, dotted the region’s perimeter, they depended upon peaceful relations with tolderías in order 
to access natural resources and sustain their local populations. For this reason, both Ximénez and the 
Cabildo of Montevideo first approached neighboring caciques with gifts before considering armed combat. 
The missions’ military forces certainly wielded the collective strength to engage Minuán and Guenoa 
tolderías, but experience had taught them that the results would be mutually disastrous. For their part, the 
ragtag militia assembled in Montevideo was entirely ill equipped and hardly a threat. Their desertion to 
Colônia represented an acknowledgment of the impossibility of their efforts.  
                                                       
near Yapeyú and San Miguel, as conflict with tolderías would have undermined this endeavor. Julia Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their 
Missions: A Socioeconomic History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), Chapter 3.  
7 Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 164–65. 
8 Jaime Cortesão, ed., Tratado de Madri: Antecedentes - Colônia do Sacramento, Manuscritos da Coleção De Ángelis V (Rio de Janeiro: 
Biblioteca Nacional, 1954), 314; Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 165-6, 168-70. 
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The dominance of tolderías over the countryside is also evident in Ximénez's and the Montevideo 
cabildo's lack of familiarity with the geography of the interior. Ximénez relied upon Francisco de Borja, a 
Guenoa, to serve as guide (baqueano), while Montevideo’s militia lost track of the tolderías once they 
withdrew from the walls of their city.9 In contrast, the Minuanes and Guenoas involved in this conflict 
knew where to locate Montevideo and the San Borja mission. Still, in spite of their relative dominance over 
rural space, tolderías were unable to monopolize access and were keenly aware of their own limitations. It 
was also in their best interest to pursue peace with their sedentary counterparts, in order to avoid the costs 
of war, to protect trade partnerships, and to maintain potential allies in a multipolar world. For this reason, 
the caciques who met with Ximénez and Borja sought to convince Yapelman to end the blockade. 
This brief account also demonstrates the importance of intermediaries between plazas and tolderías. 
Francisco de Borja was one of numerous individuals who transited the distant locales of the region and 
blurred perceived ethnic or imperial allegiances. His decision to abandon his toldería was one that many 
others in his position also made, much in the same way that many individuals under the aegis of missions or 
towns eventually ended up in tolderías. These go-betweens traversed ethnic and territorial divisions out of 
necessity, particularly in times of famine or war, or through captivity. By straddling two worlds, they 
simultaneously became conduits of exchange and sources of tension. In Borja’s case, his family struggle 
nearly undermined the peace that their toldería and several plazas desperately hoped to achieve. 
Most importantly, the 1731 conflict highlights incongruence between eighteenth-century 
territoriality and the anachronistic geographical imaginations of nationalist historiographies. This event is a 
centerpiece of Uruguayan national history, which scholars have used to demonstrate the military might of 
mission forces or the cunning diplomacy of Spanish officers. In these retellings, Minuanes have served as 
                                                       
9 Nearly all Spanish, Portuguese, and missionary incursions into the region’s countryside depended upon baqueanos. 
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villainous aggressors whose defeat was inevitable.10 Such narratives coincide with the broader assumptions 
of regional historiographies – principally the idea that tolderías were peripheral actors or anachronistic 
impediments to the progress of Iberian and missionary advancement – but raise key questions. If Minuanes 
were marginal actors, why were colonial officials so preoccupied with maintaining peace? If they wandered 
aimlessly, how did Borja know where to find them? If clear divisions existed between mobile and sedentary 
peoples, how did Borja and others move between the two worlds? How can we understand regional power 
dynamics without presupposing European dominance or romanticizing native peoples as ever-resistant 
actors? If local loyalties and material concerns frequently superseded imperial or indigenous bonds, what 
forces guided individual actions and historical events? How can we articulate such a multipolar world?  
The eighteenth-century Río de la Plata was an archipelago of plazas and tolderías. In geographic 
terms, plazas were stationary points on the ground, such as towns, forts, or missions, strung along narrow 
corridors, while tolderías were mobile encampments of independent native peoples. Both plazas and 
tolderías constituted localized centers of economic, social, and cultural activity. Each exhibited limited 
territorial reach, yet tolderías tended to control much larger stretches of land. As the former aimed to 
establish a stronghold over a single locale, the latter moved strategically to maximize their control of 
resources and arbitrate access to the countryside. Despite imperial propensities to project unified and 
consolidated territories in drawings and writings, contiguous territorial control did not exist. Such spatial 
visions instead reflected the myopia and ambition of plazas, while concealing indigenous actions and 
territorial imaginations. Placing the territorialities of plazas and tolderías on even ground provides a new 
and more effective means to understand the dynamics and processes that defined the region at the time.  
                                                       
10 Sota, Juan Manuel de la, Historia del Territorio Oriental del Uruguay Tomo II (Montevideo: Ministerio de la Instrucción Pública y 
Previsión Social, 1965), 26–28; Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, 53–55; Bauzá, 
Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo Segundo, 16–19; Azarola Gil, Los Orígenes de Montevideo, 1607-1759, 
Chapter 10; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 51–59; Fucé, “Ceremonia 
persuasiva”; Wucherer, “Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay”: 2, 18-12. 
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Dotting the Landscape 
The Río de la Plata was a region defined principally by flatlands, fluctuating waterways, and open 
pastures. Stretching from its homonymous estuary in the south to the Ibicuí and Jacuí river systems in the 
north, the region was bounded on the west by the Río Paraná and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean (Map 
1.1).  By the early decades of the eighteenth century, its inhabitants had developed a multipolar world 
organized around plazas and tolderías. Overlapping Spanish, Portuguese, and Jesuit-Guaraní settlements 
dotted the region’s perimeter, while Charrúas, Minuanes, and other mobile peoples moved their tolderías 
throughout its interior, arbitrating plazas’ access to resources. In this multipolar world, four dynamics 
defined territorial relations – locality, informality, mobility, and interdependence. 
 
Locality 
Unlike modern territorial states, early modern government relied upon contingent, reciprocal 
relationships to define sovereignty. Viceroyalties were not groups of consolidated provinces, but series of 
unaligned localities connected by their shared allegiances to a common ruler.11 The principal territorial 
designations of this region – Spanish governorships (gobernaciones) and Portuguese captaincies (capitanias) – 
did not imply complete possession or control, but instead constituted collections of discrete plazas tethered 
to a shared governor and in frequent competition with one another.12 Given their location on the fringes of 
                                                       
11 This early-modern structure of governance was seen throughout the Iberian empires. For examples from New Spain and the 
Andes, see: Helen Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516-1700 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1990); Tamar Herzog, Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito, 1650-1750 (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2004); Alejandro Cañeque, The King's Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico 
(New York: Routledge, 2004); Cardim et al., Polycentric Monarchies. 
12 Beginning in 1617, the Spanish grouped their plazas in the region into the Gobernación del Río de la Plata, administered from 
Buenos Aires, and the Gobernación del Paraguay, administered from Asunción. Both pertained to the Virreinato del Perú. The 
Portuguese plaza of Colônia do Sacramento, which was founded in 1680, pertained to the Capitania do Rio de Janeiro, while the 
plaza of Rio Grande, which was founded in 1737, pertained first to the Capitania de São Paulo, and later to the Capitania de São 
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competing empires, each plaza was of strategic importance for its respective governor, and therefore 
wielded significant amounts of leverage in negotiations with him. They also served as important centers for 
the social, economic, and political lives of colonial settlers, with cabildos as their principal governing 
bodies. Simply put, plazas functioned as a series of relatively autonomous points on the map, each with its 
own interests and needs. 
The localized interests exhibited by each plaza were largely due to its short territorial reach. While 
competing cabildos jockeyed for rights over broad swaths of land, in practice they were largely confined to 
their immediate countryside. Ranches did not extend far beyond a plaza’s population center, and most 
livestock roamed far beyond the reach of any single plaza. For this reason, colonial writers often 
differentiated their adjacent countryside, where livestock could be corralled and maintained, from lands 
beyond their control (tierra adentro), where wild cows, sheep, and horses proliferated.13 To sustain a plaza, 
it was necessary to send expeditionary parties to garner cattle, which clustered in distant ranges (vaquerías), 
and either slaughter them or herd them back to local ranches. At the turn of the eighteenth century, the two 
most important vaquerías were the Vaquería de los Piñares and the Vaquería del Mar; the former was 
located far to the north, near the headwaters of the Río Uruguay, and the latter was southwest of the Lagoa 
Mirim, near the Río Cebollatí (Map 1.1). Smaller cattle ranges also existed, but the combination of human 
extraction and natural predators, such as tigers and wild dogs, caused them to move over time.14  
                                                       
Vicente. All were part of the Estado do Brasil. During the second half of the eighteenth century, this administrative arrangement 
would change dramatically. 
13 See, for example: AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1746-02-13; Vívoras, 1746-09-16; Campo de Bloqueo, 1752-
10-19, 1757-08-06); AGNA - IX. 24-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-04-26). While wild cattle was the region’s most lucrative 
resource, there was also a significant amount of small-scale farming, particularly around Montevideo and Colônia do Sacramento. 
Jorge Gelman, Campesinos y estancieros (Buenos Aires: Editorial Los Libros del Riel, 1998). 
14 In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Jesuit-Guaraní missions sought to transport cattle from these vaquerías to 
lands closer to their plazas. Manuel Duarte, “A conquista da terra e a iniciação pastorícia no planato e nos fundos de Baqueria de 
los Piñares,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXIV, 4o Trimestre, No 96 (1944): 193; Norberto 
Levinton, El espacio jesuítico-guaraní: La formación de una región cultural, Biblioteca de Estudios Paraguayos - Volumen 80 (Asunción: 
Centro de Estudios Antropológicos de la Universidad Católica (CEADUC), 2009), 141. 
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Plazas’ efforts to procure and maintain livestock faced not only the challenge of distance but the 
dominating presence that numerous tolderías exerted over the countryside. Mobile peoples stood between 
plazas and the resources that they needed, monitoring and controlling the region’s vast plains. Assuming 
that herders from the plazas were able to locate and reach wild cattle and avoid detection, they then faced 
the onerous task of transporting herds back to their plazas. Furthermore, given that wire fencing did not yet 
exist, ranchers struggled to maintain their four-legged resources in the immediate environs of their plazas. 
In moments of peace, cows or horses were liable to wander away, and in moments of conflict, tolderías 
were able to extract them with ease.15 In order to gain access to cattle, therefore, plazas had to either 
maintain positive relations with tolderías or find a way to overpower them. Peace was generally preferable 
to conflict, as no individual plaza had the capacity to engage a collectivity of tolderías with force. Even the 
missions most often sought to avoid belligerent encounters, given that their populous militias found 
themselves exposed and outmatched when venturing into the countryside. 
Despite the historiographical proclivity to frame regional dynamics around expansive, if porous, 
imperial frontiers, the opposite conditions existed. The plazas that dotted the region’s perimeter did not 
constitute points along broader frontiers, but isolated populations situated along riverine corridors and 
surrounded by tolderías. Contemporary scholarship has begun to demonstrate this dynamic on a local scale, 
describing Santa Fe as isolated or Yapeyú having tolderías on all sides. The same was true for other plazas, 
such as the La Cruz mission, which was walled on all sides due to Charrúa attacks.16 As for tolderías, the 
                                                       
15 In an effort to claim herds of livestock, ranchers frequently branded them. These claims over property, while recognizable by 
tolderías, most likely did not constitute legitimate possession from their vantage point. 
16 Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 222–32; Livi, “El Charrúa en Santa Fe”: 35–6; Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas”; Andrés de 
Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y 
segundas partidas de la demarcación de límites en la América Meridional (Parte IV de IV),” in Colección histórica completa de los 
tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo 
de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros dias, vol.  10, ed. Carlos Calvo, 11 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 1862), 
43; Wilde, “Guaraníes, 'gauchos' e 'indios infieles' en el proceso de disgregación de las antiguas doctrinas jesuíticas del Paraguay”: 
104; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”. 
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territorial limits they faced derived not from imperial control, but from relations with other tolderías. It 
was not Santa Fe and Corrientes that formed a western limit for Charrúas, Yaros, and Bohanes, but instead 
the presence of Pampas, Querandíes, Abipones, Mocovíes, Tobas, Chiriguanos, Guaycurús, and other 
native peoples across the Río Paraná.17 In the same way, to the north of the Ibicuí and Jacuí rivers, one 
would have found Guaraní and Tupi-speaking peoples. 
These territorially based power relations belie traditional notions of imperial authority in the 
region. For example, colonial chroniclers and postcolonial writers have alike pointed to a 1702 massacre of 
Charrúas, Yaros, and Bohanes along the Río Yi as evidence of Spanish military superiority; however, the 
validity of this claim is dubious at best.18 While it is true that missionary forces killed large numbers of 
individuals, and took as many as 500 captives, they did not act alone. In this case and in others, Guenoa 
tolderías were key participants in the defeat of enemy tolderías, making the victory less a story of imperial 
dominance than one of strategic alliances.19 In addition, the so-called “Battle of the Yi” was not an encounter 
that pitted missionary forces and Guenoas against Charrúas and their allies, but rather an incident between 
several plazas and tolderías. Neither Guenoas nor Charrúas were a singular or homogeneous group. In the 
same way that a Spanish military defeat of Colônia was not a defeat of São Paulo, a victory over several 
tolderías did not imply the defeat of an entire perceived ethnicity. Indeed, during the same years as this 
incident, Guenoa tolderías attacked the Yapeyú mission and just two years later, Guenoas, Yaros, and 
                                                       
17 An alternate way of understanding this dynamics would be to suggest that the very ethnic categories that we continue to use to 
define native peoples are in reality products of Spanish travelers who positioned themselves between them. Travelers moving up 
and down the Rio Paraná potentially used the river to divide and conceptualize the numerous tolderías that frequented it, naming 
those on the western side (Banda Occidental) of the river Abipones and Mocovíes and those on the eastern shore (Banda Oriental) 
Charrúas. While more evidence is necessary to make this claim, clear geographical and ethnic divisions between native peoples 
did not exist in a way that was discernible to imperial eyes. Lidia R. Nacuzzi, Identidades impuestas: Tehuelches, aucas y pampas en el 
norte de la Patagonia, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2005); Pratt, Imperial Eyes. 
18 A detailed discussion of the Battle of the Yi can be found in: Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, Capítulo 4. 
19 RAH - Mata Linares, t. 101, f. 239-40; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 143. Güenoas also formed a key component of Francisco 
García de Piedrabuena’s 1715-1716 expedition against Charrúa tolderías in Entre Ríos. In this instance, Piedrabuena paid 
Güenoas in yerba mate, tobacco, and cloths in exchange for their aid. Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico”: 3–5. 
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Bohanes defeated mission forces that were attempting to blockade Colônia and others that were spying 
along the region’s southeastern coast.20 Finally, the massacre along the Río Yi was more the exception than 
the rule, as most other military expeditions (salidas) commissioned by plazas resulted in abbreviated 
skirmishes or no conflict at all.21 
 The years following the Battle of the Yi provide a more accurate picture of relations between plazas 
and tolderías, as they show the impact of territorial dynamics in the midst of a military stalemate. During 
these years, different mission plazas worked together in an attempt to extract cattle from the Vaquería del 
Mar and to establish ranches south of the Río Ibicuí, closer to home, thereby circumventing jurisdictional 
disputes with rival plazas and eliminating the need for long journeys. While few records exist to detail 
excursions from mission plazas to the Vaquería del Mar, the Jesuit Silvestre González’s 1705 diary 
demonstrates the trepidation that travelers had along the way following the Battle of the Yi. During their 
two-month journey, González and others from the San Borja mission remained constantly vigilant to detect 
Yaros “and other nations that have joined together to seek vengeance.”22 González’s account also points to 
his reliance upon Guenoa guides for their knowledge of the interior, as the mission troops sought to avoid 
contact with Yaros and other Guenoa tolderías. This dependency reveals González's and his team's lack of 
knowledge of the happenings of the countryside, as well as the diversity of Guenoas at the time, each with 
distinct relations with nearby mission plazas. By 1743, Guenoas represented approximately one-third of the 
                                                       
20 Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, 329–30 Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 224; Juan P. 
Fernández, Relación historial de las misiones de indios chiquitos que en el Paraguay tienen los padres de la Compañia de Jesús, 2 vols. 
(Madrid: Librería de Victoriano Suárez, 1895); Reimpresa fielmente según la primera edición que sacó à luz el P.G. Herrán, en 
1726, 42-42v. 
21 Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico”: 3; Sergio Hernán Latini and Carina P. Lucaioli, “Las tramas de la interacción colonial 
en el Chaco y la "otra banda": una campaña punitiva de principios del siglo XVIII,” Revista de Ciencias Sociales, no. 26 (2014). 
22 “(…) los infieles yaros y otras naciones que se han juntado con ellos para vengar las muertes que en los suyos hicieron los 
nuestros ahora cuatro años (…)” In his 16 page diary, González took frequent account of the presence or absence of signs of 
Yaros, Minuanes, and others in order to avoid contact. Silvestre González, Diario de viaje a las Vaquerías del Mar (1705), Primera 
Edición (Montevideo: Artes Gráficas Covadonga, 1966), 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 25. 
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San Borja mission; however, conflicts between the mission and other Guenoa tolderías never ceased.23 As 
missionaries sought to cross Guenoa-controlled lands to access the vaquerías, or to extract cattle from their 
tolderías, conflicts abounded. Journeys to the Vaquería del Mar in 1704 and 1706 proved disastrous, and 
attacks against tolderías in 1700, 1701, 1704, 1707, and 1708 led to retribution by Guenoas.24 
 The conflict of 1708 perhaps best expresses the control that tolderías maintained over the 
countryside and the relative stalemate vis-à-vis mission plazas in terms of military dominance. That year, 
Guenoas and Bohanes blockaded the various mission plazas from access to the vaquerías. In response, armed 
agents from the missions killed 41 members of a Guenoa toldería, and took numerous captives with them to 
the missions. Meanwhile, Guenoas and Bohanes killed 38 people in Yapeyú and Santa Cruz, and took with 
them 26 captives. Neither side was able to gain the upper hand, and safe passage to the vaquerías remained 
elusive for the various mission plazas.25 Considering these events in terms of plazas and tolderías reveals this 
balance of power, the relative containment of missionary plazas by native peoples, and the challenges facing 
Guenoa caciques.26 While missionaries complained that a blockade of the vaquerías would result in the 
starvation of their plazas, Guenoas had their own claims on regional resources. Maps drawn from the 
perspective of the missions demonstrate that Jesuit-Guaraní territorial claims reached as far south as the Río 
                                                       
23 Pereira, 'Y hoy están en paz', 22; AGI - Charcas, 384, “Petición del Procurador de la Compañía de Jesús, padre Juan José Rico” 
(s/f), visto en consejo en (1743-10-17). 
24 “Memoria para las generaciones venideras, de los indios misioneros del pueblo de Yapeyú,” in Misiones del Paraguay: Organización 
social de las doctrinas guaraníes de la Compañía de Jesús, ed. Pablo Hernández, 546–9 (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1913), 547–49; MM 
- Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C17, P9, No. 36; Barrios Pintos, Historia de los pueblos orientales, 39–43; Sota, Juan Manuel de la, 
Historia del Territorio Oriental del Uruguay, Tomo I, 160–61; Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, 
Tomo II, 229–30; AGI - Charcas, 263, (Madrid, 1716-05-12). 
25 Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 321–22. 
26 Incidentally, one of the principal Minuán caciques involved in these events was Yaguaretè, who was amongst the caciques that 
received Miguel Ximénez in 1731. “Memoria para las generaciones venideras, de los indios misioneros del pueblo de Yapeyú” in 
Misiones del Paraguay, 549. Yaguareté also received gifts from Spanish official Joseph García Inclán in 1714, in an attempt to garner 
aid for the then Spanish-controlled Colônia do Sacramento. AGI - Charcas, 264, f. 11-13. 
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Negro and the Río Yi (Map 1.2); however, tolderías controlled most of those lands throughout the 
eighteenth century.  
Tolderías' territorial dominance became especially clear when the Spanish and the Portuguese 
attempted to connect their disparate plazas. Since the sixteenth century, Santa Fe had served as a key point 
on the Spanish royal roads (caminos reales) that connected the viceregal capital in Lima to Buenos Aires and 
the misssions, while Corrientes was an intermediate point between Santa Fe and the Paraguayan capital of 
Asunción. Movement between these disparate locales required that travelers cross lands controlled by 
tolderías, and thus in moments of conflict they found themselves exposed to attacks, as occurred numerous 
times between 1707 and 1714.27 Most colonial accounts pointed to aggression on the part of Charrúas, 
Yaros, and Bohanes; however, proceedings from a viceregal investigation revealed a different story. In 
them, residents of Corrientes and Asunción argued that attacks along the rivers and in the countryside were 
a direct response to earlier raids on tolderías, in which missionaries had taken numerous captives.28 River 
travel had always been a negotiated enterprise, as tolderías positioned themselves alternatively as traders 
and blockaders. In 1691, for example, Jesuit father Antonio Sepp recounted a trip along the Río Uruguay in 
                                                       
27 Pedro Lozano, Historia de las Revoluciones de la Provincia del Paraguay (1721-1735) Tomo 1 (Buenos Aires: Cabaut y Cía, 1905), 
273. Along with roadways, attacks occurred along the Río Paraná and the Río Uruguay: Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos 
Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, 334; AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1708-02-24 & 1709-06-26; RAH - Mata 
Linares, t. 102, f. 55-56v; AGI - Charcas, 382, “Informe del fiscal” (Madrid, 1716-10-17). 
28 AGI - Buenos Aires, 235, “Responses to question #116 of inquiry.” The testimonies taken as part of the investigation into the 
Comunero Rebellion should be taken with caution, as most declarants had explicit enmity against the Jesuits. Nonetheless, these 
cases point both to the fragility of plazas and travelers and the rationales behind intercepting riverine travelers.  
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Map 1.2 – “Mapa de la gobernación de Paraguay, y de la de Buenos Aires”. Tolderías appear in 
this map as “infieles,” a common identifier to classify them collectively. According to this rendering, they 
were entirely outside of the realm of mission ranches (estancias).29 
  
which he bought horses from several Yaro tolderías, and later found his ships under siege by the tolderías of 
the cacique Moreira.30 Plazas depended upon peaceful relations with tolderías in order for their inhabitants 
to transit native lands without incident. 
                                                       
29 Guillermo Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, 2 vols. 2 (Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 
1936), Mapa XXIII. 
30 Anton Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, Biblioteca Histórica Brasileira (São Paulo: Livraria 
Martins Editora; Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1972); tradução de A. Reymundo Schneider, 50-1, 107-8. As Sepp does 
not clearly identify who the first group of Yaros were, it is unclear what their relationship was to Moreira. 
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The Portuguese tended to be more successful in this regard. Much like Santa Fe and Corrientes, the 
plazas of Rio Grande and San Miguel existed as a means to access cattle ranges and to form a bridge between 
Colônia do Sacramento and Laguna, further north along the Atlantic Coast. By 1703, Portuguese explorers 
had opened the “Coastal Route” (Caminho da Costa), a pathway that began in Colônia and continued along 
the coast to Maldonado, Rio Grande, and eventually Laguna, and within three decades, livestock traders 
(tropeiros) added a line of access from Rio Grande all the way to the markets of Sorocaba, near São Paulo.31 
The perpetual presence of military forces, combined with the Spanish foundation of Montevideo in 1725, 
made the first leg of this journey complicated for Portuguese tropeiros. For this reason, authorities from 
Laguna made numerous efforts to develop positive relations with the Minuán tolderías that dominated 
territories between Rio Grande and Colônia. Rather than trying to engage the tolderías with military force, 
Portuguese administrators chose instead to provide frequent payments, generally in the form of tobacco, 
yerba mate, and aguardiente. In exchange for these continued payments, Minuán tolderías provided guides 
for the travelers and defense against Spanish and missionary hostilities.32 The survival of this expansive 
network of trails, which simultaneously sustained Colônia and fed the Sorocaba markets, depended upon 
                                                       
31 João Borges Fortes, “Velhos Caminhos do Rio Grande do Sul,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul, 4o 
trimestre (1938): 210–5; Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 35; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental 
(periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 34. The rise in the demand of cattle and the growth of the Sorocaba market were directly linked to the 
mining boom in Minas Gerais, and thus the transport of cattle from the Rio de la Plata was a fundamental cog in a broader 
imperial machinery. The Caminho da Costa was the only route between Colônia and Rio Grande, and was a forty day journey. 
IEB - AL-068-004; BA - 51-v-37, f. 134. 
32 Brito Peixoto, Francisco de, “Relasam que remeto ao Exmo. Sr. Rodrigo Cezar Demezes, Governador General da Sidade de S. 
Paulo e suas Capitanias,” in Correspondencia e Papeis Avulos de Rodrigo Cesar de Menezes (1721-1728), ed. Archivo do Estado de São 
Paulo, 296–300, Publicação official de documentos interessantes para a história e costumes de São Paulo 32 (São 
Paulo: Typographia Andrade & Mello, 1901), 299–300; AHU - São Paulo-Mendes Gouveia (023-01), Caixa 3, Docs 293, 371, & 
374; AHU - Brasil Geral (003), Caixa 5, Doc 464; “Coleção de documentos sobre o Brigadeiro José da Silva Paes: Documentos 
sôbre a Colonia do Sacramento e expedição que foi a socorrer em 1737,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do 
Sul Ano XXVIII, 1-4 trimestres (1947): 4–6; "Carta de Cristovão Pereira de Abreu para Gomes Fr.e de Andrada datada do Rio 
Grande de S. Pedro 29 de Setembro de 1736” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXVI, 4o 
Trimestre, No. 104 (1946): 387–8; “Memoria dos serviços prestados pelo Mestre de Campo André Ribeiro Coutinho no 
Governo do Rio Grande de S. Pedro, dirigida a Gomes Freire de Andrada, em 1740,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do 
Rio Grande do Sul Ano XVI, 4o trimestre (1936): 245–6; Fortes, “Velhos Caminhos do Rio Grande do Sul”: 219; Fortes, Rio 
Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 13–15; Moysés. Vellinho, Capitania d'El-Rei: Aspectos Polêmicos da Formação Rio-Grandense (Rio de 
Janeiro: Editôra Globo, 1964), 142-3, 148; Vellinho, Brazil South, 129, 135. 
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Minuán collaboration. Even the Conselho Ultramarino in Lisbon recognized this need as an imperial 
imperative, and each time Minuanes demanded greater payments, the Portuguese acquiesced.33 
In this context of isolated plazas separated by mobile tolderías, local interests frequently superseded 
imperial or ethnic allegiances. While scholars have generally framed interethnic relations in the region in 
terms of Spanish, Portuguese, or missionary settlers versus Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, Yaros, or 
Guenoas, a more localized perspective better captures the multipolar world that these people inhabited. 
The relationship between the plaza of Santa Fe and the Yasú tolderías provides a clear example. Juan, 
Miguel, and Pedro Yasú were well-known Charrúa caciques who positioned their tolderías across the Río 
Paraná from Santa Fe during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Santa Fe was a consistent 
trading partner for the Yasús, who were in turn a key ally and source of labor for the plaza. In exchange for 
weapons, horses, and foodstuffs, the caciques supplied captives to the plaza. Not only did the list of captives 
include other Charrúas, but Santa Fe defied imperial prohibitions on human trafficking (rescate).34  
While trade items changed over the years, the close relationship between settlers in Santa Fe and 
the Yasús persisted. In 1713, for example, when a Charrúa attacked and injured a boy from Santa Fe, Juan 
Yasú wrote to the cabildo and promised that if the boy died, he would take the life of the delinquent.35 Two 
years later, the Cabildo of Santa Fe attempted to thwart an expedition ordered from Buenos Aires against 
the Yasús and other Charrúa tolderías and offered refuge to the Yasús and their kin. Local ties were so 
                                                       
33 ANB - 1A. Cisplatina, caixa 746, pac 2 (Lisboa, 1715-10-17); José Feliciano Fernandes Pinheiro, Anais da Província de São Pedro 
(História da Colonização Alemã no Rio Grande do Sul), Quarta Edição (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes Ltda., 1978), 196–200; AHU - Rio 
de Janeiro (017), Caixa 10, Doc 1122; Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 15–18; Brito Peixoto, Francisco de, 
“Correspondencia do Capitão-Mór da Laguna, Francisco de Brito Peixoto,” in Correspondencia e Papeis Avulos de Rodrigo Cesar de 
Menezes (1721-1728), ed. Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, 270–95, Publicação official de documentos interessantes para a história 
e costumes de São Paulo 32 (São Paulo: Typographia Andrade & Mello, 1901), 290; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem 
os seus aliados”: 617. 
34 Nidia R. Areces, ed., Reflexiones sobre el V Centenario (Rosario: UNR Editoria, 1992), 159–67; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras 
permeables”; AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg. I1, exp. 1. 
35 AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1713-12-30. 
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strong that when the expedition came upon several of the tolderías, they were discovered on ranches 
operated by individuals from Santa Fe.36 The plaza’s precarious position between Charrúas to the east and 
Abipones and Mocovíes to the west is one way to account for this persistent allegiance. Indeed, Santa Fe 
frequently found itself reduced to the limits of its plaza and depended upon peace with Charrúas to garner 
aid in conflicts against western foes.37 Nonetheless, the mutual participation in amicable relations 
demonstrates a deeper bond between the city and the Yasús. It was for this reason that Santa Fe’s defense of 
the Yasú tolderías in 1715 did not extend to other Charrúas in the region. 
This tendency toward local allegiance also manifested itself in other plazas in the region. In the 
1728 to 1729 investigations of a rebellion in Paraguay, for instance, residents of Corrientes showed 
themselves to be strong allies of local Charrúa tolderías. They accused Jesuits and Guaraníes of abducting 
Charrúa women and children, noting that at the moment of the raid, Charrúa men were working in some of 
the city’s ranches. They also complained that the missions’ aggression came at a moment in which 
Corrientes was at peace with local Charrúas, relying on them for livestock, river crossings, and cattle-based 
products.38 Corrientes was eventually able to restore relations with the tolderías, and thereafter their 
relationship contrasted sharply to that between tolderías and the missions:  “If anyone has a horse with a 
branding of the [Jesuits, the Charrúas] don’t let him slaughter cattle.”39 
In spite of their shared antagonism with Charrúas and other tolderías in the early decades of the 
eighteenth century, mission plazas did not operate as an organic whole. They too represented an 
                                                       
36 AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1715-12-07, 1715-12-08, & 1715-12-10; MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C17, P1, 
No. 40; Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 190.  For more on the Piedrabuena expedición, see: Latini, “Relatos del conflicto 
interétnico”; Latini and Lucaioli, “Las tramas de la interacción colonial en el Chaco y la "otra banda.” Santa Fe also opposed a 
1735 expedition against Charrúas. Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 232. 
37 RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, f. 402v; AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1710-10-11; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras 
permeables”. 
38 AGI - Buenos Aires, 235, “Responses to questions #115 and #116 of inquiry.” 
39 “Si uno tiene un caballo con una marca de los padres, no lo dejan coger ganado.” ibid., f. 89. 
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archipelago of plazas, and their internal rivalries often played out in the competition for resources. During 
Silvestre González’s trip to the Vaquería del Mar, for example, he and the other travelers from San Borja 
received more aid from Guenoa allies than from other missionaries. In the pages of his diary, he cited 
conflicts between his mission and representatives from San Miguel, Apóstoles, and other missions over 
ownership of the yerba mate and tobacco that they had brought and the cattle that they had corralled. At 
one point, individuals from la Concepción tried to trick González into returning to San Borja so that he 
would not partake in the division of cattle that they had gathered.40 
 Portuguese plazas did not tend to exhibit the same tensions with each other as their Spanish and 
mission counterparts. This may have been due to their smaller number, the perpetual threat of incursions 
from Buenos Aires and the missions, or their reliance on trade relationships with Minuanes and other 
tolderías. As advance posts in the extreme south of Brazil, these plazas relied heavily on imperial support 
from distant administrative and economic poles, such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, or Salvador da Bahia, 
and therefore their conflicts were vertical in nature. English travelers who arrived in Rio Grande in 1742 
observed one instance of this dynamic. Soon before the Englishmen’s arrival, the soldiers of the plaza had 
dismissed many of the ranking officers and appointed locals in their place. They then detained the Brigadier 
Governor from Laguna and would not let him leave until he promised to dispatch the clothes, provisions, 
and money that had been promised to them and resolved their grievances.41 Local interests, while not 
generating conflict with other Portuguese plazas, could supersede imperial fealty nonetheless. 
 
                                                       
40 González, Diario de viaje a las Vaquerías del Mar (1705), 20, 23-5. Recent scholarship has begun to recognize the lack of 
uniformity and frequent tensions amongst mission plazas, particularly in their competition for resources. See, for example. 
Wucherer, “Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay”: 6. 
41 Jacob A. Cummings, South America (Boston: Cummings, Hillard & Company, 1820), 173–76. 
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Informality 
The territorial organization of plazas and tolderías engendered particular types of spatial practices 
among regional inhabitants. Given the short territorial reach of individual plazas and the vast plains that 
separated them, neither Iberian empire exercised control over the region’s interior. This provided the 
opportunity for individuals desiring to break free from administrative control to create new lives for 
themselves, eschewing imperial responsibilities and alliances. Military deserters, criminals, traders, and 
others frequently found life in the countryside more welcoming than in a particular plaza. Few documents 
exist about these people, but this is more a result of the limited purview of colonial writers than the 
emptiness of rural spaces.42 Nonetheless, close look at records pertaining to the countryside offers glimpses 
of this world, where informal relations did not lend themselves to official regulation or recording. In these 
spaces, settlers who had abandoned Portuguese, Spanish, and mission plazas lived together unencumbered 
by the restrictions of imperial allegiances. They developed informal economies based on trade and short-
term or seasonal labor stints, at times working on the ranches of a given plaza or participating in cattle runs. 
Most importantly, they maintained close relationships with local tolderías, whether as inhabitants, 
neighbors, or tributaries, and occasionally functioned as arbitrators between them and individual plazas.  
Both Portuguese and Spanish authorities disapproved of this sort of lifestyle and made efforts to 
bring such people under official control. When Portuguese officials sent an expedition to scout potential 
sites for a settlement in Rio Grande in 1728, they stumbled upon one such group. In a letter to the 
Portuguese king, the Governor of Rio de Janeiro recounted that as his commissioned explorers entered into 
the river they found: 
                                                       
42 High-level authorities tended to refer to these individuals in general terms, indicating the limited knowledge that they had over 
rural inhabitants. See, for example: Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Serie II Tomo IV (Buenos Aires, 1927); 
publicados bajo la dirección del Archivo de la Nación, 273. 
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thirty Portuguese and sixty Castilians, and [Manuel de Antonio, the leader of the expedition] said 
that these were supposedly criminals from Buenos Aires, and bandits, which will be motive for 
Castile to allege that those lands belong to it on account of being inhabited by its vassals.43   
 
This encounter and the governor’s preoccupation highlight several important aspects of these informal 
living arrangements. First, while Portuguese officials hoped to found a new plaza along the Rio Grande, the 
supposedly vacant lands that they planned to use were already occupied. Second, the expeditionary team 
found individuals identified both as Spanish and as Portuguese, most likely according to their spoken 
language. This indicates that imperial rivalries carried little weight for individuals beyond the purview of 
either crown. Third, both the governor and his informant assumed that the Spaniards were criminals from 
Buenos Aires, though neither explained how he arrived at this conclusion. This is certainly conceivable, but 
it also demonstrates their association of informality with extralegal behavior, a trope that would become 
more common as the century wore on. Lastly, the governor feared that Spain would use the presence of its 
vassals as a means to claim regional lands. This concern points to the limited range of Portuguese and 
Spanish imperial projects, as well as their dependence upon informal relationships to engage the 
countryside. Indeed, after receiving news of these settlers, the governor sought to establish an even larger 
colony comprised of individuals who frequented the area.44 
These off-the-grid communities frequently depended upon tolderías or included individuals from 
them. In 1718, for example, the Governor of Buenos Aires complained of two populations established far 
away from Colônia, each comprised of Portuguese vassals and independent native peoples. Frustrated by 
                                                       
43 “(…) o Mestre della Manoel Antonio, fizera naquella campanha, e lhe declarára que nella andavão já coisas de trinta 
Portuguezes, e sessenta Castelhanos, e suposto dizia que estes era gente criminosa em Buenos Ayres, e bandoleiros, com tudo 
sera motivo para que Castella queira allegar que aquella Campanha lhe pertence por ser habitada dos seus vassallos” IHGB - 
Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.26, f. 68-68v. Also in: Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, ed., Documentos relativos ao 'bandeirismo' 
paulista e questões connexas, no periodo de 1721 a 1740: Peças históricas existentes no Archivo Nacional, e copiadas, coordenadas e annotadas, 
de ordem do governo do estado, Publicação official de documentos interessantes para a história e costumes de São Paulo 50 (São 
Paulo: Estabelecimento Graphico Irmãos Ferraz, 1929), 120–22. 
44 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.26, f. 71. 
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their consumption of cattle, the governor denounced the frequency of such communities: “[T]hese sorts of 
men, both from Portuguese and Spanish settlements often join together, and siezed by the liberty that they 
desire, [they] attempt to accompany the barbarians [tolderías].”45 Similarly, in 1734, a Portuguese writer 
noted that a number of Spanish settlers had “formed ties with the Indians that inhabit [lands near Maldonado 
and north of Montevideo] that they enter to hunt with the Indians and establish themselves in the 
countryside that [their tolderías] currently possess.” The text then pointed out the vast number of mestizo 
children that these relationships had come to produce.46 Given their position beyond the scope of local 
points of authority, other groups like these likely existed. From the few recorded cases, however, it is clear 
that trade and at times kinship with tolderías was a core attribute of their survival. 
In spite of their official complaints about informal communities, administrators from regional plazas 
often depended upon them to circumvent regulations and develop trade relations that transcended imperial 
divisions. Indeed, one of the key reasons the Governor of Rio de Janeiro wanted to establish a plaza in Rio 
Grande was to conduct “fraudulent” commerce with the missions.47 A 1723 arrangement between 
Portuguese officials from Laguna and Spanish settlers near Rio Grande provides an even more illustrative 
example. These settlers had originally come from Santa Fe and Colônia and hoped to broker trade with 
Laguna. They explained that merchants from Santa Fe were discontented with Spanish forces that had 
blockaded Colônia because they were impinging upon their city’s cattle supply. Establishing a trade 
                                                       
45 “(…) suelen juntarse diferentes hombres assi de ellos como de los de este Pays, que llevados de la libertad, que apetezen, 
solicitan acompañarse con los barbaros.” AGI - Charcas, 263, (Buenos Aires, 1718-07-04). These communities presumibly 
included women, despite their lack of mention in existing records. For similar cases, see: AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 
1723-03-14); Cayetano Cattáneo, “Relación del viaje realizado de Buenos Aires a la Misiones Orientales,” in La cruz y el lazo, ed. 
Esteban F. Campal, 175–94 (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1994), 184–85. 
46 “se ligarão com os Indios q' habitavão, q' entrarão a cazar com as Indias, e estabalecerse no Pais, q' actualm.te posiuem” BNP - 
F.R. 909, f. 64. 
47 Fraudulent (a fraude) trade refers here to contraband, or the trading across imperial lines. BNP - F.R. 909, f. 68v; Archivo do 
Estado de São Paulo, Documentos relativos ao 'bandeirismo' paulista e questões connexas, no periodo de 1721 a 1740, 121–22.  
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relationship between these merchants and Laguna would be of mutual interest, they argued. The ranking 
official from Laguna agreed, and he sent them back to Santa Fe to establish terms.48 
A closer analysis reveals how such an arrangement was achieved. While the principal actors in this 
account are Spaniards who had established themselves as traders in the countryside, these individuals were 
only able to position themselves as such because of their relations with mobile peoples. Before traveling to 
Santa Fe, this same group of traders acted as intermediaries between Laguna and Minuanes near Rio 
Grande. In fact, it was these individuals who delivered the first payments from the Portuguese to local 
caciques as they attempted to curry favor. These were also the same people who came back to Laguna 
expressing the caciques’ demands for greater payments, indicating that they had a preexisting relationship 
with the Minuán tolderías that were near Rio Grande.49 Otherwise, it would not have made sense for them 
to be the arbitrators of peace. In light of the dominance that Minuán tolderías exercised over the expansive 
plains that separated Laguna and Rio Grande from Santa Fe and Colônia, it was most likely the relationship 
that the traders held with local caciques that made their enterprise possible. 
 
Mobility 
 Estimates regarding tolderías’ total populations varied widely, as most lived beyond the myopic 
vantage points of imperial eyes and as observers applied their calculations to one of several imagined ethnic 
                                                       
48 In addition to proposing future trade, the Spaniards also requested license to sell the 800 livestock that they had with them. 
Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 16–17; Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, ed., Correspondencia e Papeis Avulos de Rodrigo 
Cesar de Menezes (1721-1728), Publicação official de documentos interessantes para a história e costumes de São Paulo 32 (São 
Paulo: Typographia Andrade & Mello, 1901), 299. For more on transimperial trade in the Río de la Plata during the first half of 
the eighteenth century, see: Fabrício Pereira Prado, “In the Shadows of Empire: Trans-Imperial Networks and Colonial Identity 
in Bourbon Río de la Plata (c. 1750 - c. 1813),” (Dissertation, Emory University, 2009), 44–47. 
49 AHU - São Paulo-Mendes Gouveia (023-01), Caixa 3, Doc 293; Brito Peixoto, Francisco de, “Correspondencia do Capitão-
Mór da Laguna, Francisco de Brito Peixoto” in Correspondencia e Papeis Avulos de Rodrigo Cesar de Menezes (1721-1728), 282–90; 
Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 13–18. These tolderías were associated with the Minuán caciques Agostinho, Manoel, 
Nicolão and Casildo, who exercised control over lands from Rio Grande to at least the south of the Lagoa Mirim. Acosta y Lara, 
La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 33; Fábio Kühn, Breve história do Rio Grande do Sul, 4a ed, 
Temas do novo século (Porto Alegre: RS Leitura XXI, 2011), 21. 
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categories, rather than to tolderías collectively. Nonetheless, when considering together the population 
estimates from numerous locales, tolderías accounted for somewhere between five and ten thousand people 
at any given time.50 Individual tolderías generally included about fifty to one hundred people, although they 
frequently joined with others to form encampments of several hundred occupants. The few imperial 
observers who entered tolderías noted that they included tent-like structures (toldos), cemeteries, herding 
grounds, and gathering places; they also viewed a wide range of economic activities, including cultivating 
honey, hunting, fishing, herding feral livestock, and domesticating horses.51 A scarcity of sources prohibits a 
detailed discussion of social organization, but it appears that each toldería had at least one cacique as well as 
spiritual leaders. The periodic union of distinct tolderías also indicated broad networks of kinship ties or 
political allegiance. Indeed, despite the hyper-locality of tolderías, certain caciques were able to garner 
support, broker agreements, and offer protection for multiple tolderías, each of which had their own 
cacique.  
This diversity and locality belies the broad ethnic categories ascribed to tolderías by imperial 
authors. No evidence exists to suggest that such “imposed identities” – Bohanes, Charrúas, Guenoas, 
Minuanes, Yaros, and others – were meaningful to the native peoples to whom they referred; rather, they 
reflected imperial observers’ attempts to catalogue inhabitants on a regional scale and define political 
relationships that would apply to broad populations.52 These large and homogeneous ethnic categories 
enabled imperial writers to assume uniformity of action by members of the same group. Yet the 
intermittent and contradictory uses of such terms in imperial writings occluded the local, material factors 
                                                       
50 For example: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 60v; AGI - Chile, 153, (Montevideo, 1724-08-29); AGI - Buenos 
Aires, 304, (Buenos Aires, 1749-09-05); AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31); Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de 
Madri, 64; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”: 123. 
51 José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 233, 236; Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado 
de Madri, 166; Pereira, Minuanos/Guenoas, 183. 
52 Nacuzzi, Identidades impuestas. 
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that shaped native interests, power dynamics, social organization, and actions. Indigenous communities that 
shared an ethnonym in imperial records frequently fought against one another, pacts made with individual 
caciques rarely included all peoples identified by the same ethnonym, and multiple ethnonyms were often 
ascribed to single communities.53 To understand tolderías’ dominance over the countryside amidst 
relatively small populations and localized social organization requires looking past supposed ethnic 
uniformity and focusing on material concerns and logics of mobility. 
 The mobile lifestyles of tolderías were strategic choices. While colonial authors associated mobility 
with vagrancy and laziness, this way of living maximized territorial control and access to resources and 
trade.54 Distant locales provided the opportunity to gather different resources at different times of the year. 
For this reason, tolderías frequently moved according to the season, returning to the same stopping points 
(paraderos) along the way in patterns of “seasonal nomadism.”55 One observer noted that Minuán tolderías 
“ordinarily go to the hills of Maldonado during the summer, and in winter retire to the part of the Río 
Negro that drains in the Uruguay, where they make drinks from honey,” while another explained that the 
highlands near Maldonado were “common habitation for the Minuanes during certain seasons because of the 
                                                       
53 Erbig Jr. and Latini, “Across Archival Limits”. 
54 Colonial officials frequently used the term “vagar” to define tolderías’ movements. This term was significant for its double 
meaning. On one hand, vagar as derived from the Latin vagari means to wander, generally implying without a particular 
destination. On the other hand, vagar as derived from the Latin vacare means to be idle or at leisure, much like the contemporary 
English “vagrant”. The union of these meanings in the term vagar demonstrated the association that colonial authors made 
between wandering and being idle, as opposed to sedentary and productive. In the case of the Río de la Plata, authors associated 
the perceived vagrancy of mobile peoples with the proliferation of cattle, which provided an easily accessible food source.  
55 Wucherer, “Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay”: 5. Lidia Nacuzzi has conceptualized Tehuelche movements in a similar way, 
focusing on fixed stopping points that Tehuelches frequented in Patagonia: Lidia R. Nacuzzi, “La cuestión del nomadismo entre 
los tehuelches,” Memoria Americana - Cuadernos de Etnohistoria, no. 1 (1991). In other instances, tolderías’ movements responded to 
human threats or served as a quarantine against smallpox epidemics. For example: Cayetano Cattáneo, “Relación del viaje 
realizado de Buenos Aires a la Misiones Orientales” in La cruz y el lazo, 187; Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los 
viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la demarcación de 
límites en la América Meridional,” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos 
diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta 
nuestros dias, ed. Carlos Calvo Tomo Octavo (Paris: A. Durand, 1866), 211–13. 
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many deer that they can hunt there.”56 As the hills of Maldonado were near the Vaquería del Mar and honey 
reserves existed near the Río Negro, these tolderías were able to maximize both resources. Occupying both 
locales at the same time would not have been a realistic possibility, as seasonal variance in precipitation 
often restricted movement. Flat as they may have been, the pampas of the Río de la Plata were dissected by 
a vast network of rivers and creeks that would rise and fall according to rainfall. Moments of heavy rainfall, 
most frequent in the autumn and winter months of April through September, caused sudden rises in the 
water table and transformed shallow streams into fast-moving currents that could not be traversed on foot. 
It was for this reason that Francisco Borja and Miguel Ximénez struggled to arrive at the Minuán tolderías in 
the winter of 1731, and why the caciques were forced to wait before they could contact Yapelman.57 
Knowledge of river crossings and changing currents was therefore essential for regional inhabitants, as it 
allowed them to herd livestock to particular locales and then maintain them there until waters subsided. 
 Awareness of the vacillations of river depth also provided mobile peoples with a strategic advantage 
over their sedentary counterparts. By positioning their tolderías relatively close to a particular plaza, they 
could time their raids on ranches to coincide with heavy rainfalls. This practice was particularly common 
around the area of Santo Domingo Soriano, which was located near the delta of the Río Negro and prone to 
inundations. On numerous occasions, outsiders entered into Soriano’s ranches, extracted livestock, and 
then quickly absconded to their tolderías. Over and over, the town reacted by putting together an armed 
force to recover the losses and enact punitive measures, only to find itself restricted by the rising water 
                                                       
56 “(…) los Binuanes, los cuales asisten de ordinario por el verano en las cercanías de las Sierras de Maldonado, y por el invierno 
se retiran a la parte del río Negro, que desagua en el Uruguay, donde hacen bebidas de miel de abejas.” AGI – Charcas, 237, 
“Copia de memorial conteniendo propuesta de José García Inclán, sobre poblar en Montevideo” (1720-11-08). Cited through 
Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 165–66. Also transcribed in: Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental 
(periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 241, and Ponce de León, Luis R., “Minuanes o Guenoas”: 28. “es havitacion comun de los minuanes a 
temporadas por la mucha casa de venados que ay en el” AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1750-01-27). 
57 Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 164–66. 
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table.58 The frequency of such events and the fact that outsiders were able to transport livestock across the 
same lands points to the calculated timing of such actions. Otherwise, the actions would have resulted 
either in the death of those responsible or armed incursions into the tolderías. A similar situation arose 
during the 1731 conflict in Montevideo, as the plaza’s inhabitants found themselves blockaded 
simultaneously by Minuanes and the rising tides of local waterways.59 
 River systems also channeled the movement of travelers, so by establishing their tolderías next to a 
particular ford (paso) or at the headwaters of a river, mobile peoples could best monitor the countryside.60 
Despite the region’s flat landscape, travelers rarely had the opportunity to cross the plains in a straight line. 
Even in moments of little rainfall, trepidatious currents forced people to follow coastlines until they found 
areas shallow enough to cross. Sifting through documents written from the region’s interior, therefore, one 
encounters the frequent mention of river crossings as key elements of the rural landscape. Travelers 
generally named these sites, implying their centrality to trade routes and their relative fixity. Often, they 
noted the presence of tolderías at the base of a given ford, and even named some fords to reflect this. One 
example is the “Paso del Cacique Queí,” which was occupied by Minuanes.61 Rivers provided sustenance 
and safety, as their lush surroundings offered wood, shelter, animals, and places to hide. At the same time, 
they allowed small numbers of people to control vast expanses of land. 
It is likely for this reason that so many mobile peoples established their tolderías near the falls of the 
Río Uruguay, near the modern-day town of Salto. Although twentieth-century damming has created a vast 
reservoir in the area, during the eighteenth century the river was fordable by foot. Numerous travelers 
                                                       
58 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Vívoras, 1746-09-16 & 1746-09-23).  
59 AGNU - Ex Museo y Archivo Histórico Nacional, Caja 1, n. 19, f. 3; AGI - Charcas, 214, (Buenos Aires, 1731-04-30). 
60 The same dynamic applied for highland passes, such as those that cut across the Cuchilla Grande in the east of the region. 
61 Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro Volume LII (Rio de Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1930), 418. 
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passed through this site on their way to Buenos Aires or the Jesuit-Guaraní missions and frequently 
encountered either Charrúa or Yaro tolderías encamped at the crossing.62 This also explains the location of 
Guenoa tolderías along the Río Piraí during the 1731 conflict with Montevideo, as this river was near the 
headwaters of the Río Uruguay, the Rio Grande, and the Rio Jacuí watersheds, making it a key conduit for 
rural travelers. Minuán tolderías’ patterns of seasonal migration to the hills of Maldonado, which divided 
rivers running to the Río Negro from those that emptied into the Lagoa Mirim and the Atlantic, followed 
this pattern as well. This hilly area, known as the Cuchilla General, became a sort of regional highway 
between Colônia and Rio Grande. 
The strategic location of tolderías also explains the permanent settlements that eventually came to 
occupy the same spaces. For example, long before the Spanish founded plazas in Montevideo and 
Maldonado, Minuanes used those areas as stopping points. While the selection of these sites by Minuanes 
could be attributed to either the large cattle reserves that existed there or to their connection to the 
Atlantic economy, it is clear that they were of strategic interest. By occupying them, tolderías could 
position themselves as intermediaries between foreign traders and other tolderías further inland.63 Over the 
course of the eighteenth century, Spanish, Portuguese, and missionary forces also strived to station troops 
along river crossings or headwaters that were previously occupied by mobile peoples. One key example was 
Batoví, which like the Río Piraí was a site that easily connected to a variety of watersheds. This paradero 
had been important to Minuanes long before it became a point of contestation for Spanish and Portuguese 
militaries; when Spanish settlers attempted to occupy the area, they encountered armed resistance and 
                                                       
62 Diego de Alvear, “Diario de la segunda partida demarcadora de límites en la América Meridional, 1783-1791 (continuación),” 
in Anales de la biblioteca: Publicación de documentos relativos al Río de la Plata con introducciones y notas, vol.  2, ed. Paul Groussac, 
10 vols., 288–360 2 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora de Coni Hermanos, 1902), 353–54; Levinton, El espacio jesuítico-
guaraní, - Volumen 80, 110. 
63 Montevideo and Maldonado are two of the principal natural harbors along what is now the Uruguayan coast. From the late 
seventeenth-century, Minuanes traded with European ships at these sites. AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12); AGI 
- Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 44, 49-50.  
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discovered numerous cemeteries at the site.64 In the same way, the Spanish sought to establish a settlement 
in Minas, near Maldonado, “to prevent enemy Indians from invading Montevideo’s farms and ranches, [and 
so that the Portuguese and other nations cannot] enter by land and invade Montevideo.”65 By closing this 
highland pass, the city would dramatically reduce its exposure to land-based attacks. 
 By positioning themselves in strategic locales, certain caciques could extend their influence 
throughout the region. After procuring peace with Miguel Ximénez in 1731, for example, the cacique 
Yapelman left the tolderías near the Río Piraí to “give the news to his vassals that were near the [Río 
Cebollatí, southwest of the Lagoa Mirim], and also to two other caciques that lived in the ranches of San 
Miguel [the mission].”66 Assuming that these were the furthest tolderías under his control, Yapelman’s reach 
extended from the Atlantic coast southeast of the Lagoa Mirim all the way to the mission ranches. Others 
demonstrated a similar range of influence. One of the first caciques that met with Miguel Ximénez that 
year, Yaguaretè, moved his tolderías in various locations between the Río Piraí and Colônia do 
Sacramento.67 Likewise, a cacique named Tacú, who was a key player in the peace negotiations between 
Minuanes and Montevideo, appeared at the plaza of Rio Grande several times in the following years, making 
pacts and developing kinship ties to Portuguese leaders.68 Charrúa caciques demonstrated similar patterns, 
bringing together numerous tolderías under their aegis. The Charrúa cacique Carabí and the Yasús provide 
                                                       
64 Celso Martins Schröder, “Batoví,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XVI, 1o trimestre (1936): 
111. Throughout the eighteenth century, travelers came across numerous cemeteries constructed by mobile peoples. BNB - 
09,02,003, f. 2; José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 183. 
65 “para impeder a los Yndios enemigos al que hagan sus inbasiones en las chacras y estancias de Montevideo, [y para que los 
Portugueses y otras naciones no puedan] internarse por tierra a imbadir a Montevideo.” AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo XV, 95. 
66 “dando aviso â sus vasallos que estaban azia el Cebellati, y tambien â otros dos Caziques que vivian en la Estancia de S.n Miguel” 
Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 169. 
67 “Memoria para las generaciones venideras, de los indios misioneros del pueblo de Yapeyú” in Misiones del Paraguay, 549 
Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 164; BNE - MSS 12.977-34, f. 26v; AGI - Charcas, 264, f. 11-13. 
68 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 53; IEB - AL-072-042; Hameister, “'No 
princípio era o caos'”: 114; Kühn, Breve história do Rio Grande do Sul, 21. 
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two clear examples, the former operating between Yapeyú and lands to the southwest and the latter 
between Santa Fe and Corrientes.69  
 The broad territorial reach of particular caciques implies a certain level of hierarchy among 
tolderías. Knowledge of regional geography would not have been enough to exercise such broad control, 
since such knowledge was not exclusive to any particular cacique or toldería, and while the use of force was 
certainly an option in expanding one’s control, no single toldería had a monopoly on violence or a clear 
advantage in this regard. Therefore, for a given cacique or toldería to develop an expansive range of 
influence, they had to meet the localized demands of other tolderías. This was most often achieved by 
providing protection or resources and trade items. In the 1731 case, for example, the four caciques that 
meet with Ximénez – Yaguaretè, Pastau, Guayancay, and the son of Coroya – had no direct involvement in 
the conflict.70 Nonetheless, the principal cacique, Yapelman, had the authority to call upon them and others 
throughout the region to join in the defense of tolderías near Montevideo. In spite of this clear hierarchy in 
the priest’s account, sources from Montevideo never once mention Yapelman’s name. Instead, they identify 
Tacú as their primary foe, a cacique who never appears in Ximénez’s account. Furthermore, after meeting 
in Montevideo to hear the plaza’s petition for peace, Tacú then returned to the tolderías to consult with 
other caciques.71 Thus, while Tacú and several unnamed caciques were those whose tolderías were directly 
in conflict with Montevideo, Yapelman was able to garner support for them through his authority over 
                                                       
69 Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico”: 4; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 321–22; Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 234. 
Charrúa caciques seemed to have shorter ranges of geographical influence than their Minuán counterparts; however, the dynamic 
of principal caciques that exercised authority over numerous tolderías appears to be consistent for both. The shorter territorial 
reach may be attributed to a greater population density in the Mesopotamian region (currently the Argentine provinces of Entre 
Ríos and Corrientes), but more research would be necessary to show that to be the case. 
70 Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 165–66. 
71 AGNU - Ex AGA, Libro 1, f. 99; Azarola Gil, Los Orígenes de Montevideo, 1607-1759, 128–29 Fucé, “Ceremonia persuasiva”: 
166–8. 
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tolderías throughout the region. In the same way, if there had been conflict between the northern tolderías 
and mission plazas, Yapelman would have had to provide support for their cause as well. 
 Principal caciques and their tolderías were also able to expand their influence through the provision 
of trade goods to both plazas and other tolderías. Throughout the region, as tolderías guided plaza residents 
to cattle ranges and then aided in the slaughter of cows and other animals, they received payment for their 
services. Likewise, when they sold horses, bulls, and leather within the plazas’ walls, they were paid in 
kind. Instances of such relationships exist in records from nearly every plaza in the region, including Rio 
Grande, Colônia, Yapeyú, La Cruz, Santo Domingo Soriano, and Santa Fe, and at times authorities even 
institutionalized annual payments.72 Moreover, when French and British traders approached the coast, 
Minuanes in particular were almost always present to exchange cattle and leather for other goods. When 
taken collectively, these transactions demonstrate a frequent, if not steady, supply of external goods 
acquired by individual tolderías. 
Payments to tolderías varied and almost never appeared itemized in account books, making it 
impossible to trace any specific flow of goods. Nonetheless, it is clear that they included yerba mate, 
tobacco, fabrics, hats, staffs, swords, knives, firearms, and sugar. Without knowing the quantity of goods 
procured by tolderías, it is difficult to surmise their intention in any specific transaction. Indeed, many 
payments by plazas appear to have been symbolic, especially when given in exchange for safe passage or 
protection. These payments were generally in smaller amounts and directed at caciques themselves. For the 
caciques, they likely signified recognition by the plaza of their authority over regional lands. Thus, when 
                                                       
72 See, for example: AGI - Charcas, 382, (Madrid, 1716-10-17); AGI - Charcas, 226, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-10); AGPSF, Acta 
de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1732-01-22; AHU - Rio Grande (019), Caixa 1, Doc 18; Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, Documentos 
relativos ao 'bandeirismo' paulista e questões connexas, no periodo de 1721 a 1740, 92; Lozano, Historia de las Revoluciones de la Provincia 
del Paraguay (1721-1735), Tomo 1, 273; Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, 50–51; Acuerdos del 
Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo IV, 313; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 126–27; Emilio A. Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del 
Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 2a ed (Buenos Aires: Librería Editorial Platero, 1979), 74–75; Fernandes Pinheiro, Anais da Província 
de São Pedro (História da Colonização Alemã no Rio Grande do Sul), 196–200. 
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representatives from Laguna offered payment to Minuán caciques in exchange for the ability to settle near 
Rio Grande, the caciques had the freedom to reject their offer.73 They had no physical need for the items 
that Portuguese settlers possessed, but wanted a level of payment that acknowledged their authority. Still, 
certain non-symbolic trade goods flowed from plazas on the perimeter towards the interior. For example, 
in their attack on Yapeyú’s ranches in 1701, Guenoas used firearms that they had acquired from the 
Portuguese in Colônia. Three years later, in an attack on Santo Domingo Soriano, they used guns acquired 
not only from Colônia, but also from the missions.74 
The flow of external trade goods to the region’s interior shaped relations between tolderías. As 
competing groups jockeyed for regional control and allegiances, the capacity to proffer demanded goods 
was a strategic advantage. This was evident in a conversation recorded in 1693 by Spanish captain Gabriel 
de Toledo. While making a journey from Corrientes to Colônia, Toledo came upon a Charrúa toldería, 
where he was received by Francisco, a Spanish-speaking cacique with whom he had friendly relations. 
Toledo asked Francisco for news on an ongoing conflict between his tolderías and their Guenoa enemies.75 
In response, Francisco gave the following account: 
[Our tolderías] are always in a bad state and now very concerned that [the Guenoa Indians] will 
defeat and destroy us, now that they have become friends with the Portuguese settled in the Islands 
of San Gabriel [Colônia do Sacramento], because with their support will no doubt destroy [us]. 
 
                                                       
73 For details on pacts between the Portuguese and Minuanes near Rio Grande, see: AHU - São Paulo (023), Caixa 1, Doc 67; 
AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 39, Doc 9058; Archivo do Estado de São Paulo, Correspondencia e Papeis 
Avulos de Rodrigo Cesar de Menezes (1721-1728), 290; Fortes, Rio Grande de São Pedro, XXXVII, 15–18; “Memoria dos serviços 
prestados pelo Mestre de Campo André Ribeiro Coutinho no Governo do Rio Grande de S. Pedro, dirigida a Gomes Freire de 
Andrada, em 1740”: 237–46; Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo IV, 313. 
74 Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, 229–30; AGI - Charcas, 263, (Madrid, 1716-05-
12). 
75 In Toledo’s report, the Charrúas enemies appeared as “Indios Yanuras.” This was likely a reference to peoples more frequently 
identified as “Guenoas,” given the phonetic proximity of the two words, the geographical location of the people in question, and 
the fact that the ethnonym “Yanura” does not appear in any other source. 
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Given that the Charrúas and Guenoas were in a state of war and therefore not communicating with each 
other, Toledo pressed further as to how Francisco could possibly know this, to which the cacique replied: 
We have news from other Indians on the frontier [between Charrúas and Guenoas], who are afraid 
of both [of us]. Having seen them with several knives, beads, and other trade items, I asked them 
where they had acquired the said goods. They then said to me that they had been provided by the 
Guenoa Indians, and that they had many of them, along with rolled tobacco and several types of 
cloth.76 
 
Francisco went on to explain that Guenoas acquired these items from the Portuguese in exchange for horses 
and meat, and lamented that this privileged trade position enabled them to inflict damage on Charrúa 
tolderías.  
In the competition between Charrúa and Guenoa caciques for the allegiance of tolderías wedged 
between them, territorial dynamics were paramount. Despite the internal conflicts and diversity previously 
discussed, tolderías identified as “Charrúa” appeared more frequently along the west of the Río Uruguay, 
while those identified as “Guenoa” and “Minuán” tended to be to the east.77 As each sought to expand their 
range of influence and control, Charrúa caciques and those further east jockeyed to garner the support of 
tolderías situated between them. From Francisco’s account, it appears that the two principal means of 
building such connections were military might and the provision of desired goods. For tolderías wedged 
between Charrúa, Guenoa, and Minuán geographic strongholds, this meant constantly negotiating their 
position. Unable to compete directly with either group, they instead played one against the other.  
                                                       
76 “(…) siempre andaban de malos y oi mui rezelosos de que los bençiesen y destruisen por la ôcaçion, de Averse Amistado con 
Los portugueses que estan poblados en las islas de San Gabriel que con su fomento, no duda los destruiran. y Preguntando por 
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de San Gabriel a trueque de Cavallos y carnes con que los asistian y que Ellos Les daban los dhos Generos y los regalaban y 
acarisiaban mucho: y que de esta notiçia se hallaban bastantam.te Rezelosos de que faborezidos de los Portugueses Les harían 
daños mui considerables (…)” AGI - Charcas, 262, f. 16-16v. 
77 Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 58, 156-68. 
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Guenoa tolderías had gained the upper hand over Charrúas in the provision of trade goods, and the 
lynchpin of their success was their trade relationship with the Portuguese in Colônia. Positioned more 
toward the coast, Guenoas were more able to integrate themselves into the Atlantic economy and thus 
provided goods that Charrúa tolderías could not. In the same investigation that produced Gabriel de 
Toledo’s account, for example, others testified that Guenoa tolderías were trading cows and horses in 
Colônia for tobacco, knives, sugar, and cloth.78 While Charrúa tolderías had access to tobacco and knives 
through their relationships with Santa Fe, Corrientes, or mission plazas, they likely could not provide the 
same range of goods as their rivals. Recognizing the utilitarian and symbolic value of such items, Francisco 
and other Charrúa caciques found themselves outmatched in the competition over intermediate tolderías. 
Given the advantage that Guenoas held because of their relationship with Colônia, it is unsurprising 
that over the next few decades other tolderías sought to establish direct partnerships with the plaza. By 
1703, Colônia’s governor, Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral, reported positive relations (boa correspondência) 
with Yaros, Guaraníes, Serranos, Chanás, Bohanes, and Charrúas, in addition to those already established 
with Guenoas.79 By circumventing Guenoa intermediaries, other tolderías could access valuable trade goods 
and strengthen their position. They sought similar partnerships throughout the region. Charrúa tolderías 
already possessed long-standing commercial relations with Santa Fe and Corrientes, but those wedged 
between Charrúas and Guenoas did not have the same territorial advantage. They instead pursued trade 
with missionary embarkations traveling up and down the Río Uruguay, acquiring such items as tobacco, 
breads, yerba mate, knives, pins, and metal fishhooks in exchange for horses.80 These commercial ties 
                                                       
78 AGI - Charcas, 262, f. 1v-3v, 7v-8. 
79 Sebastião da Veiga Cabral, Descrição Corogràfica e Coleção Histórica do Continente da Nova Colônia da Cidade do Sacramento 
(Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1965); Apartada de la Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay - Tomo XXIX, 
19; AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Doc 26; Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo 
Primero, 414. 
80 Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, 50–53. 
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allowed individual tolderías to maintain their livelihoods without submitting to the hierarchical relations 
that others sought to establish. 
 
Interdependence 
 The perpetual competition amongst tolderías and plazas generated a multipolar world in which no 
single group was able to assert unilateral dominance. For this reason, individual plazas and tolderías 
continually sought to establish bonds with others that shared similar interests. As noted, these pacts often 
superseded imperial or ethnic ties and came about primarily through local interests. They also tended to be 
short-lived, as the plurality of local aims and constant changes in territorial conditions simultaneously 
produced new opportunities and points of conflict. While scholars have traditionally sought to explain these 
trends in terms of allegiances between ethnicities and empires, they are better understood as the negotiation 
of shared or competing interests between individual plazas and tolderías.81 Whether for access to resources 
and trade goods or for defense, plazas and tolderías developed fragile relations of mutual dependency in the 
face of a plurality of competitors. 
 Relations between Colônia do Sacramento and local tolderías demonstrate the ways in which 
interests could align. From the moment of its founding in 1680, Colônia served as the furthest Portuguese 
settlement in the extreme south of Brazil. Across the river from Buenos Aires and separated from the rest of 
Brazil by Jesuit missions, Colônia’s inhabitants relied heavily upon local tolderías for their survival. From 
the beginning, they offered payments to tolderías in an effort to preemptively win their support before 
                                                       
81 The exact delimitation of purported alliances has varied by author; however, scholars have often argued for a bilateral division 
between the Portugueses/Minuanes and the Spanish/Guaraníes. Charrúas have fallen on either side of the imperial divide. This 
structuring of interethnic relations presupposed hierarchies between imperial patrons and indigenous clients, as well as the 
uniformity of imperial or ethnic categories. As a result, in their repeating of the perspectives of colonial authors, scholars 
manifested their same frustrations with native peoples, deeming them unfaithful partners or untrustworthy allies. Recent 
scholarship has challenged this tendency by focusing on the temporality of pacts or the ways in which native peoples negotiated 
between empires. See: Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas”; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”.  
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Spain had the chance to do the same. These pacts consistently proved beneficial to Colônia, whether to gain 
advance warning of Spanish and Jesuit-Guaraní military movements or for access to the countryside and its 
resources.82 As the years passed and the Spanish attempted to blockade this plaza, its relationship with 
tolderías became essential for the sustenance of its residents. Indeed, in a letter written in 1715, the City of 
Buenos Aires lamented the impossibility of permanently unseating the Portuguese from Colônia, given their 
relationship with Charrúa, Minuán, and other tolderías. If these ties were not somehow broken, they feared 
that Colônia would be able to gain access to the river’s entire northern bank and all its major ports.83 
 Consequently, one of Buenos Aires’s principal strategies for breaking the Portuguese hold on 
Colônia was to garner the favor of Minuán tolderías. Indeed, from the first years of the plaza’s foundation, 
Spanish troops reached out to “disobedient Indians” in order to convince them not to trade with Colônia or 
guide its inhabitants to local cattle ranges.84 By 1705, Spain was able to take control of the plaza, but the 
Treaty of Utrecht returned it to Portuguese in 1715. It is not surprising, then, that over the next decade, 
Buenos Aires sent no less than six commissions to curry the favor of Minuán caciques. In each of these 
instances, representatives of the Spanish governor offered payments of yerba mate, tobacco, and other 
products in the hope that the Minuanes would cease to provide a lifeline to Colônia.85 This strategy was not 
                                                       
82 Simão Pereira de Sá, Historia topographica e bellica da Nova Colonia do Sacramento do Rio da Prata (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia 
Leuzinger, 1900); Editada pela primeira vez pelo Lycêo Litterario Portuguez, do Rio de Janeiro, e copiada do original de Simão 
Pereira de Sá, 18–19; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 29, doc A; Cabral, 
Descrição Corogràfica e Coleção Histórica do Continente da Nova Colônia da Cidade do Sacramento, 55-6, 68-70; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando 
os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 617; Prado, A Colônia do Sacramento, 117. 
83 AGI - Charcas, 263, (Buenos Aires, 1715-12-16). Tapes also broke the blockade on occasion. AGI - Buenos Aires, 533, 
(Buenos Aires, 1736-03-20). 
84 “yndios que no estan a la ôbediençia.” AGI - Charcas, 278, (Madrid, 1683-12-17). Unobedient here can be interpreted here as 
applying to native peoples who have not been baptized or who do not accept royal authority. In either case, the author is 
explicitly referring to the region’s mobile tolderías. 
85 AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1722-05-31) & f. 11-13; AGI - Contaduría, 1932, (1717-12-04) cited in López Mazz and 
Bracco, Minuanos, 101; AGI - Charcas, 237, (San Lorenzo, 1720-11-08); AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12); AGI - 
Contaduría, 1937, (Buenos Aires, 1722-01-13); Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo IV, 313; Acuerdos del 
Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Serie II Tomo V (Buenos Aires, 1928); publicados bajo la dirección del Archivo de la Nación, 
222–23. 
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always successful, given that the Portuguese opened their coffers as well, but in the race to secure Minuán 
favor, Spanish authorities occasionally gained the upper hand. In 1737, for example, a Portuguese military 
officer wrote from Maldonado:  
All of the countryside is full of Indians called Tapes, and Minuanes. They communicate with the 
Portuguese and with the Spanish, whichever provides a better coexistence….At present, they are 
found to be friends of the Spanish because the countryside is full of them impeding the Portuguese 
from taking cattle to Colônia.86 
 
Native support was indispensable for Iberian colonial projects, given the ephemeral nature of interethnic 
agreements. With Colônia, and later Montevideo, hanging in the balance, both empires recognized that 
without Minuanes on their side they would never be able to establish a foothold on the northern shore of 
the Río de la Plata. This conflict frequently gave Minuanes the upper hand in pact-making, and savvy 
caciques continually played one side off the other in order to extract greater payments.87 
 While the Portuguese and the Spanish jockeyed for control of Colônia, Charrúa, Minuán, Guenoa, 
Bohan, and Yaro tolderías sought to use the plaza as a means to gain an upper hand on their competitors and 
as a counterbalance to the plazas of their various locales. Following the Battle of the Yi, for example, 
numerous tolderías sought refuge in Colônia while they recovered and regrouped. Although the plaza’s 
residents were wary of taking on refugees, its leadership was cognizant that developing ties with tolderías 
was in their best interest.88 Tolderías sought similar refuge in plazas throughout the region, generally 
remaining in the proximities of a particular locale for a number of months. While official records do not 
                                                       
86 “Toda aquela Campanha esta cheya de sentios hinos [indios?/gentio] a q' chamão tapes, e outros minuanes hinos. E outros se 
comonicão com os Portuguezes, e com os Castilhanos, e o mais he com quem lhes fas mayor comveniencia (..) estes ao prezente 
se achão com amizade com os espanhoez, por andar aquella campanha cheya delles de empidir os Portuguezes, p.a lhe não 
passarem gados a Colonia.” BNP - F. 1445, f. 56. Other examples of tolderías participating in attacks on Colônia include: AHU - 
Serviço de Partes (030), Caixa 4, Doc 611; “Documentos sobre a Colônia do Sacramento: Cópia feita em 1938 por Artur da 
Motta Alves e propriedade da Biblioteca Riograndense, da Cidade do Rio Grande,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio 
Grande do Sul Ano XXV, 3o trimestre, No 99 (1945): 41–2. 
87 AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1722-05-31); Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 621–7. 
88 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.23, f. 79v-80; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 130. 
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always provide a clear picture of the motivations that tolderías had for their brief stays, it is most likely that 
these respites related to wars with other mobile peoples or a seasonal lack of resources. Plazas were 
generally able to provide security over their locale, and at times had cattle reserves that they could offer. 
This occurred in 1748 and 1749, as numerous tolderías simultaneously sought refuge in plazas throughout 
the region. During those years, a conflict between Charrúa and Minuán tolderías seems to have spilled over 
to the entirety of the region’s countryside. Charrúas presented themselves in Yapeyú and the Spanish 
blockades of Colônia, while Minuanes sought refuge in Rio Grande. Each group cited the aggression of the 
other as their primary motive for seeking shelter and requested clothing and sustenance for the upcoming 
season. Each of the plazas acquiesced.89 
 This strategy of using plazas as temporary refuge also explains why mobile peoples established 
settlements, known as reductions (reducciones), with missionaries from time to time. Such arrangements 
provided mission plazas the opportunity to pursue spiritual goals and strategic alliances, and at the same 
time offered tolderías respite from their external conflicts (Map 1.1). During the latter part of the 
seventeenth century into the eighteenth, a number of reductions appeared, only to dissolve within several 
months or years. They included San Andrés (Guenoas/Yaros, 1657), Jesús María (Guenoas, 1682), San 
Joaquín (Charrúas/Yaros, 1690-1693), and San Joseph (Charrúas, 1743), among others. Each of these 
reductions operated as a distinct settlement; however, they were all near either San Borja or Yapeyú.90 Few 
                                                       
89 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo de Bloqueo, 1748-03-26, 1748-05-21; Buenos Aires, 1748-04-16); “Registro de atos oficiais no 
presídio do Rio Grande (1737-1753),” Anais do Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul Volume 1 (1977): 258; Leite, História da 
Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, vol.  6, 528–30; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 619. In the case of 
Charrúas, they also faced in 1749 the first of several campaigns coordinated by the Governor of Buenos Aires. It is likely for this 
reason that a number of Charrúa tolderías chose to forge peaceful ties with Minuanes rather than to seek refuge in Spanish or 
missionary plazas. AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16); AGNA - IX. 23-3-4, cited in: Diego Bracco, “Los 
errores Charrúa y Guenoa-Minuán,” Jarbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas 41 (2004): 132–3. 
90 AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, Documento 4390/1, #11; Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. 
Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara, Tomo Primero, 165; Southey, História do Brazil, Tomo Quinto, 531; Bauzá, Historia de la 
Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo Primero, 174; Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, vol.  2, Lámina 
XXXII; Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 67; Aníbal Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al 
alambrado: Contribución a la historia rural uruguaya, Biblioteca Uruguaya 5 (Montevideo: Ediciones del Nuevo Mundo, 1967), 58; 
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records exist of these sites, but since provisions would have been necessary to sustain them, being close to 
established missions made logical sense. Furthermore, if these arrangements came about in moments of 
duress for the tolderías, they would likely have needed to tap into existing missions’ reserves. 
In some instances, the urgency of a given toldería’s need caused it to latch onto an already existing 
mission rather than founding one separately. This occurred in the Franciscan settlement of Santo Domingo 
Soriano, which Bohanes used during the summer of 1702 to 1703 as a refuge. Arriving in November 1702, 
the Bohanes sought military protection from Minuán tolderías, which the mission’s administrators willingly 
provided in the hope that their guests would eventually form a reduction of their own. By April 1703, 
however, local officials learned that the Bohanes had not only reconciled with their Minuán counterparts, 
but that they had made plans to leave the mission and take a number of its women with them. In response, 
the mission’s authorities proposed founding a new settlement nearby for the Bohanes, in order to separate 
them from Soriano’s inhabitants. Eventually, the Bohan tolderías left, leaving Soriano’s bewildered 
administrators to complain that they had done so “for their own motives, without cause, reason, or 
pretext.”91 
Other reductions appear to have existed as well, though the scarcity of source materials makes it 
difficult to provide a precise estimate of how many. In a map drawn in 1749 by Jesuit Joseph Quiroga, for 
example, the priest marked a missionary settlement that had been established with Minuán tolderías near 
the headwaters of the Río Negro (Map 1.3). Due to the newness of the establishment, however, Quiroga 
noted that it and others could not be located with exactitude. Two years earlier, the Jesuit José Cardiel had 
lamented the failure of a Guenoa reduction along the Río Uruguay, suggesting that despite their best efforts, 
                                                       
Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, 103–5; Levinton, El espacio jesuítico-guaraní, - Volumen 80, 
110–11; Vidart, El mundo de los Charrúas, 20–21; Wucherer, “Disputas a orillas del río Uruguay”: 7. 
91 “(…) hallaron que se habían ido de su motivo, sin más causa, razón ni pretexto” AGNA - IX. 41-1-3, exp. 4, (Buenos Aires, 
1703-10-08), transcribed in: Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 249–50. 
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the priests had been unable to overcome the Guenoa’s barbarism. In the end, they had left the settlement 
and returned to their kin in the countryside.92 Considering these brief references alongside the tangible 
benefits that temporary settlements provided for mobile peoples, it is likely that more appeared than have 
been accounted for. The brevity of their existence produced a scant paper trail, yet was indicative of the 
strategies employed by their mobile inhabitants.93 
 
Map 1.3 – Joseph Quiroga, “Mapa de las Misiones de la Compañia de Jesus,” 1749. Quiroga’s 
map shows a “Red.n de Minuanes” near the headwaters of the Río Negro, between Guenoas and Minuanes, 
and beyond the immediate territorial reach of any mission plaza. The reduction does not appear in maps 
produced in subsequent years.94 
 
                                                       
92 AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, Documento 4390/2, #5. 
93 It is also possible that some of the sites of these reductions were already paraderos of mobile peoples. This would explain both 
the openness of a given toldería to staying in a fixed location for a period of time and the eventual abandonment of the locale in a 
relatively short period of time. 
94 Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, vol.  2, Mapa XVI. 
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Conclusion 
 In April 1731, with winter fast approaching, the Governor of Buenos Aires, Bruno de Zavala, 
drafted a letter to the Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias) in Spain. In it he contrasted Montevideo’s 
situation with that of Colônia do Sacramento. The residents of Montevideo, who had provoked the 
blockade of their plaza by local tolderías, were facing a decision about whether to begin rationing food. 
They were unable to access their ranches, and as a consequence, could not sustain themselves. 
Furthermore, this blockade prevented Buenos Aires from meeting its business agreements. The Real 
Asiento of Great Britain had requested 50,000 leather hides for purchase, and without access to the 
countryside surrounding Montevideo, the Spanish were unable to meet the demand.95 Meanwhile, the 
residents of Colônia not only had access to the riches of the countryside, but were able to travel freely 
between their plaza and other parts of Brazil to the north.96 Time was short and the stakes were high. 
 The failures of Montevideo’s militia earlier that year had caused Zavala to reach out to any allies he 
could. He had first turned to Jesuit authorities of the mission plazas, which resulted in the Miguel 
Ximénez’s journey in August of that year. Not content to rely on this singular strategy, however, Zavala 
also turned to a less expected ally. While the Jesuit was pleading his case to Guenoa caciques in the north, 
Zavala made an arrangement with Charrúa tolderías in case peace negotiations broke down. If the situation 
was not settled by spring, 300 Charrúas would join together with soldiers from Buenos Aires to force the 
Minuán tolderías near Montevideo to end their blockade. He announced this contingency plan during a 
                                                       
95 Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Serie II Tomo VI (Buenos Aires, 1928); publicados bajo la dirección del Archivo de 
la Nación, 286–87; Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 79. 
96 AGNU - Ex Museo y Archivo Histórico Nacional, Caja 1, n. 19, f. 3-4. 
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September session of Buenos Aires’s cabildo, noting that he had been giving them payments already for at 
least a month.97 
 In the end, peace prevailed over further warfare. Following their meeting with Ximénez, a 
delegation of nine Minuán caciques returned to their tolderías near Montevideo to end the conflict. In 
response, Buenos Aires prepared its own peace delegation, which arrived in February 1732. The first round 
of negotiations in Montevideo failed, and Minuán caciques rejected the entry of a Spanish delegation into 
their tolderías. Nonetheless, by the end of March, an agreement had been reached. The Spanish offered 600 
pesos' worth of gifts to the caciques, including yerba mate, tobacco, knives, and metal bits for their horses. 
The Minuanes agreed to allow Montevideo’s inhabitants to return to their ranches, but they refused to 
return the 500 horses that they had confiscated the year before.98 In short, Montevideo proffered material 
payments and accepted its own losses in exchange for access to the countryside. 
 The 1731 conflict between Minuán tolderías and the Spanish plaza of Montevideo was not the 
triumph of Spanish diplomacy or military might, but rather a typical episode that reinforced broader 
territorial dynamics. Given Montevideo’s short territorial reach and dependence upon Minuanes for safe 
access to the countryside, it is unsurprising that the Spanish peace commission was willing to accept an 
agreement that materially favored the tolderías. Payment to tolderías was a common practice that was 
almost never reciprocated, indicating a hierarchy of territorial control. Likewise, the governor’s reaching 
                                                       
97 Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo VI, 399. The deal with Charrúa tolderías was brokered by Domingo 
Monzón, who in return received a land title (merced). AGNU - Escribano de Gobierno y Hacienda (EGH), 1823, exp. 46, f. 16v-
18v; Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado, vol.  5, 20. Buenos Aires had implemented similar strategies in the past, when 
dealing with tolderías closer to its own city walls. In 1725, amidst another request of the Real Asiento of Great Britain for 
leather, Buenos Aires reached to 100 “indios amigos” in order to procure safe access to the countryside. Acuerdos del Extinguido 
Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo V, 516. 
98 Acuerdos del Extinguido Cabildo de Buenos Aires, Tomo VI, 433-5, 459-61, 465-70, 645-8; Azarola Gil, Los Orígenes de Montevideo, 
1607-1759, 129–32; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 55–58; Fucé, 
“Ceremonia persuasiva”: 166–9. The pacts included promises to reopen commerce between Minuanes and Montevideo, 
including provisions to allow Minuanes to enter into the plaza to sell goods. Verbal agreements were also made regarding the 
enactment of justice for the wrongdoings of individuals on both sides; however, there is little evidence to show that such an 
arrangement was ever enforced. 
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out not only to mission plazas but to Charrúa tolderías demonstrates the persistent jockeying for strategic 
alliances that transcended ethnic or imperial limits. If paying Minuanes proved unsuccessful, paying 
competing tolderías for aid was a logical alternative. For their part, Minuán caciques sought a solution that 
would acknowledge their control over the countryside without forcing them to engage in further combat. 
The plaza of Montevideo posed little threat, but combined forces from Buenos Aires, mission plazas, and 
Charrúa tolderías would have been a formidable foe. Receipt of payments combined with the symbolic 
humility of Ximénez in traveling to their tolderías was enough for them to achieve both of their aims.  
 Although cognizant of the control that tolderías exerted over the Río de la Plata’s countryside, 
Portuguese and Spanish administrators were unsatisfied with their own positions. While positive relations 
with native peoples allowed them access to the resources that they needed, neither side could gain the 
upper hand on its imperial foe. In addition, the overlapping settlements of Colônia and Montevideo 
prevented either empire from acquiring legal possession of the region. This structural issue grew 
increasingly apparent as decades passed, and both sides deemed it unsustainable. As a result, both the 
Spanish and Portuguese developed competing discourses of regional possession that belied the territorial 
practices in which they engaged on a daily basis. This dissonance between territorial discourse and 
territorial practice would be the motor behind the radical changes that occurred during the eighteenth 
century’s middle decades.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: FROM PLAZAS TO PROVINCES 
 
Empires did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of holes, stitched together out of 
places, a tangle of strings….Although empires did lay claim to vast stretches of territory, the nature of such 
claims was tempered by control that was exercised mainly over narrow bands, or corridors, and over 
enclaves and irregular zones around them….Together these patterns and practices produced political 
geographies that were uneven, disaggregated, and oddly shaped – and not at all consistent with the image 
produced by monochrome shading of imperial maps. – Lauren Benton1 
 
It is possible, that those of us who are soldiers of Christ…go out in conquest not of a plaza, but rather of 
entire provinces. – José Cardiel2 
 
 
“Disobedient Vassals” 
 On September 24, 1703, the Portuguese Governor of Colônia do Sacramento, Sebastián Xavier da 
Veiga Cabral, penned a letter to his Spanish counterpart in Buenos Aires to demand justice and reparations. 
One month earlier, Colônia’s chaplain, Padre Manuel González, had been killed while on the ranch of one 
of the plaza’s inhabitants. The assailants had entered the ranch to rob sheep, horses, and a slave, and in the 
process, they ran the priest through with lances and killed or gravely wounded nine others. The ensuing 
Portuguese investigation concluded that the aggressors were one of two groups – a troop from Santa Fe 
who had recently delivered horses to the nearby guardpost of San Juan or Charrúas and Bohanes who had 
been in Santo Domingo Soriano (Map 2.1).3 In response to these accusations, the Governor of Buenos 
Aires, Alonso Juan de Valdez y Inclán, opened his own investigation, taking declarations from no less than 
23 individuals. Like Cabral, he aimed to identify the culpable parties; however, he also sought to liberate 
                                                       
1 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 2. 
2 “[Pues es possible, q los q' somos soldados de xpto, los que andamos en conquista no de una Plaza, sino de Prov.as enteras...]” 
AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, Documento 4390/1. 
3 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, exp. 4, f. 4-13, 16-17.  
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Buenos Aires from responsibility.4 The case hinged on three questions: who killed the priest? were they 
Spanish vassals? did the murder occur on Spanish or Portuguese lands? 
 
Map 2.1 – Important Sites in the Case of Manuel González 
It quickly became apparent to both Spanish and Portuguese investigators that the troop from Santa 
Fe had not been involved. Numerous witnesses verified that these soldiers had been in San Juan at the time 
of the murder, that no one had separated from the troop, and that they had not returned to Santa Fe with 
                                                       
4 ibid., exp. 4, f. 7-15v. 
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any slaves.5 Thereafter, Spanish investigators turned their attention to the Charrúas and Bohanes, and 
sought to determine their whereabouts at the time of the murder. They immediately ruled out the Charrúas 
as suspects, as the convoy from Santa Fe had passed their tolderías on their initial journey to Santo Domingo 
Soriano, but Bohanes were a more difficult case. Earlier in 1703, ten Bohan tolderías had sought refuge in 
Soriano because they were embroiled in a conflict with Minuanes, and the plaza’s authorities had convinced 
them to set up camp across the Río Uruguay.6 The travelers from Santa Fe had seen them soon before they 
arrived at Soriano at the end of June, but the tolderías had left the area before González’s murder. It was 
not until early October that Soriano’s magistrate (corregidor) had received news of the Bohanes’ 
whereabouts, 35 leagues west in the Bajada de Santa Fe. That left open a window of about three months 
where they were beyond the plaza’s purview, including the date of González’s death. Although the Bajada 
de Santa Fe was in the opposite direction of Colônia and the Bohanes were traveling on foot, this evidence 
was not conclusive enough to eliminate them as suspects.7  
Investigators therefore turned to whether or not the Bohanes were vassals of the Spanish Crown. 
Cabral suggested that they were, since they had established themselves in Soriano and several had been 
baptized. Each of the witnesses questioned by Spanish authorities testified that they were not. They pointed 
to the fact that the tolderías had only been seeking refuge in Soriano and not looking to settle on a reduction 
(reducción).8 Several testimonies acknowledged that the Bohanes had expressed interest in becoming 
Christians and giving their obedience to the king, which meant establishing themselves permanently at the 
                                                       
5 ibid., exp. 4, f. 18-46v, 64-5. 
6 See: Chapter 1. 
7 ibid., exp. 4, f. 18-46v, 71-83. 
8 A “reducción” was a settlement of newly incorporated native peoples. The use of this term was significant because it treated 
sedentism as a necessary condition for order, reason, and Christianity. The act of forming a reducción, to “reducirse,” literally 
meant “to be ordered” or “to be brought to reason,” while ecclesiastical officials frequently sought to convince tolderías to 
“reduce themselves to the holy faith” (reducirse a la santa fe). ibid., exp. 4, f. 39-42; Joanne Rappaport and Tom Cummins, Beyond 
the Lettered City: Indigenous Literacies in the Andes (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 221. 
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new site and accepting a church, priest, and corregidor. Yet by the time that officials had gone to discuss 
permanent settlement with them, they were already gone. Without settlement, they could not consider the 
tolderías obedient subjects. The deponents identified other tolderías as possible suspects, including 
Minuanes, Yaros, and other “nations,” but unanimously declared that they too were subject to neither the 
Spanish Crown, nor the Catholic faith, nor laws of reason. In fact they argued, these tolderías were enemies 
of both Iberian crowns and that when patrolling the countryside, Spanish soldiers always had to be on alert 
for attacks from them. Devoid of a fixed population, they recognized no law.9 
Following his investigation, Inclán drafted an internal report that claimed that no subject of the 
Spanish Crown was among the guilty.10 In a letter to his Portuguese counterpart, however, he argued: 
The Bohan Indians that were in the reduction of Santo Domingo Soriano (and not Charrúas as Your 
Lordship has called them), although they are vassals of the King [of Spain] my lord since they inhabit his 
lands, are not obedient because they go about the countryside untamed [levantados] and idle. They took 
refuge there by chance, fleeing from the Minuanes, and sought shelter for Christian and political 
reasons…saying that they wanted to be Christians and restore their obedience to the King…[but] 
they left of their own will in the middle of July and…they passed near Santa Fe more than a month 
ago…I take from this that they did not execute the execrable sacrilege to which your Lordship 
refers and even if they have committed it, being Vassals of the King that go about untamed, and not having a 
fixed location, our government is not obliged to remunerate the damages that Your Lordship anticipates. 
(emphasis added)11  
 
This final report diverged from the testimonies collected, as it identified Bohanes as vassals to the Spanish 
King, since they inhabited his lands. This is unsurprising, given that Spain and Portugal were embroiled in a 
decades-long dispute over legal possession of the Río de la Plata that had begun with the founding of 
                                                       
9 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, f. 18-46v. 
10 ibid., f. 46v-47. 
11 “Los Yndios bohanes que estubieron en la reducion de Santo Domingo Soriano (y no charruas como a VS le an dho) aunque son 
vassallos del Rey mi sr respetto de havitar sus tierras, no estan a la obediencia por que andan por essas campañas lebanttados y 
vagos acojieronse alli por cassualidad huyendo de los minohanes, ampararonse por razon cristiana y política…diciendo querian ser 
christianos, y restituirse a la obedencia del Rey…se fueron de boluntad propria por mediado de Jullio…sacando de estto que 
ellos no executaron el exacrable sacrilejio que VS refiere y que aun que lo ayan cometido siendo Vassallos de su Magestad que 
andan lebanttados, y no tienen asistencia firme no esta este gobierno obligado a sattisfacer los daños que VS previene.” ibid., f. 
49-49v. 
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Colônia. To suggest that Bohanes were not vassals would be to acknowledge a lack of territorial possession, 
but to claim their vassalage would require Inclán to accept responsibility for their crimes. He therefore 
added the caveat that the Bohanes were “disobedient vassals” because they wandered about the countryside, 
a designation he extended to all tolderías in the region. He stated that these “barbarian bandits” were 
“subjects that have not been able to be subjected to obedience and are enemies of all Christians,” thereby 
denying any accountability for their actions.12  
 Inclán even used González’s death as a foundation for his own complaints against Cabral. He 
accused the governor of selectively defining tolderías’ vassalage according to his immediate needs. In 
seeking reparations for the killing of the priest, Colônia’s authorities sought to identify them as Spanish 
vassals. Conversely, in moments when it was useful to identify tolderías as vassals to the Portuguese Crown, 
they were quick to claim them as subjects. Inclán did not directly state under what circumstances the 
Portuguese would want to define mobile native peoples as vassals, but he was most likely referring to the 
issue of land claims. If Portugal claimed sovereignty over them, then it could also claim possession of the 
lands that they inhabited. González’s death illuminated this contradiction because it occurred on a ranch 
located beyond the range of Colônia’s artillery, and thus beyond the plaza’s jurisdictional limits.13 If Cabral 
wanted to claim these lands for Portugal, he would have to accept responsibility for the activities of native 
peoples who controlled them and find his own solution for protecting his people. To emphasize this point 
and demonstrate Spanish territorial authority, Inclán offered to secure the countryside and sent a troop of 
thirty soldiers to survey the coastline between San Juan and Maldonado. In the end, however, the troop 
maintained its distance at each sign of tolderías and apprehended no one.14 
                                                       
12 “…salteadores Yndios Varbaros que aun que por estar en tierras de su magestad son subditos destte gobierno no se an podido 
sujectar a la obidencia y son enemigos de todos los christianos.” ibid., f. 50-50v. 
13 ibid., f. 51-53v. 
14 ibid., f. 54-9, 86-7. In addition to commissioning troops to patrol the countryside, Inclán continued his investigation into the 
whereabouts of the Bohan tolderías. He sent an official to Santa Fe to collect depositions of the members of the troop that had 
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 The death of Padre Manuel González and the investigation that ensued demonstrate the key 
contradiction of regional dynamics in the Río de la Plata region during the early eighteenth century. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, both Portuguese and Spanish authorities were restricted to the localities 
of their plazas, while mobile native peoples moved their tolderías throughout the countryside to maximize 
their own territorial control. Nonetheless, the two Iberian crowns debated dominion over regional lands on 
a bilateral basis, since land possession by independent native peoples was incomprehensible to them. As a 
result, imperial diplomacy generated a dissonance between the materiality of local territorial relations and 
broader claims of territorial possession. Local events like the death of Padre González revealed this discord 
because they forced imperial authorities to adopt elaborate explanations of their relationship with mobile 
native peoples. The desire for dominion forced the two crowns to claim tolderías as imperial subjects; 
however, their incapacity to control such peoples made this a risky proposition, as governments were 
ultimately responsible for the actions of their vassals. 
 In order to understand the nuances of Spain’s and Portugal’s perpetual conflict over possession of 
the Río de la Plata, it is therefore necessary to examine the role of mobile native peoples in it. As plazas of 
both empires projected visions of possession over lands that they did not effectively control, they relied 
upon relationships with tolderías for secure access to the countryside and upon the perceived vassalage of 
tolderías to make juridical claims. Lordship over people implied dominion over their lands. Lack of 
territorial control continually proved problematic for imperial designs, as no plaza could claim exclusivity 
in their relations with mobile peoples and as tolderías sought exchange not only with Iberians, but also with 
other foreigners who touched upon the region’s shores. Given these circumstances, Spain and Portugal 
                                                       
delivered the horses to Soriano. According to these individuals, they had met with the Bohanes along the Río de Nogoyán on their 
return to Santa Fe in the beginning of August. The Bohanes had few horses at the time of their encounter and later took shelter 
with Spaniards near the Santa Fe. The last reports were that they had been seen in the company of Yaros near the Paso del Alcaraz 
on the road north to Corrientes. This evidence was certainly useful for absolving the Bohanes of responsibility for the murders; 
however, given Inclán’s position about their status as disobedient vassals, it was of little import for the question of reparations. 
The second round of depositions was principally a symbolic gesture of Spanish dominion over the region. ibid., f. 67-83. 
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simultaneously sought to claim territorial possession through juridical measures and to transform mobile 
peoples into Christian subjects by making them sedentary. As the decades wore on, however, this discursive 
competition for dominion and vassalage would be addressed through mapping. Jurists began to consider 
territorial possession a matter to be determined through cartography and observation, rather than 
relationships with local peoples. These tensions and transitions built up to mid-century, ushering in new 
patterns of interethnic engagement. 
  
Articulating Possession 
Beginning in 1680, with the Portuguese founding of Colônia do Sacramento, the two Iberian 
crowns began to jockey not only for access to the Río de la Plata region, but also for possession of it.15 They 
deployed armies of soldiers and jurists, equipped with cannons and pens, in an attempt to solidify their 
claims and eventually gain exclusivity. Along the way, these individuals produced myriad diplomatic 
treatises and war reports that made the case for their respective crowns’ legitimate possession of the region. 
Despite these ambitious territorial imaginations, both sides depended upon positive relations with tolderías 
in order to maintain their coastal footholds and to access the countryside they claimed on paper. This 
incongruity between juridical aims and material relations engendered a perpetual struggle to claim 
possession through discursive acrobatics and strategic settlement. As they competed to garner tolderías’ 
support, Spain and Portugal sought juridical avenues both to dislodge one another and to keep foreigners 
from the northern shores of the Río de la Plata. Iberian diplomats justified their territorial claims through a 
range of logics, including papal donations and natural limits, but over time tended toward projecting 
                                                       
15 Possession here refers to legal rights over land, including the right to trade, extract resources, settle, or proselytize. Up 
through the first half of the eighteenth century, however, it did not necessairly imply sovereignty over subjects within a particular 
territorial unit. While a particular crown might claim the right to police a given geographical area, that right did not imply 
exclusivity of access or signify that foreigners or native peoples living within such space were vassals/subjects of that crown. 
Sahlins, Boundaries, 81, 84, 89, 93-4. 
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possession from coastal settlements to the vast countryside. By claiming key entry points to the continental 
interior, such as harbors or rivers, and then claiming independent tolderías as imperial subjects, the dueling 
monarchies could claim possession of lands effectively controlled by native peoples.16  
Colônia’s founding was a watershed moment that linked the Río de la Plata to global debates over 
legitimate territorial possession. It ushered in dueling logics of possession between Spain and Portugal and a 
constant feedback loop between juridical debates and physical settlements. In particular, it represented the 
first direct challenge in the region to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which had guided Iberian claims to 
territorial possession in the Americas for nearly two centuries, in favor of possession through settlement. 
For the next seventy years, both Iberian crowns founded strategic settlements in the region in order to 
establish territorial claims. They chose the sites of such settlements not only for their sustainability and 
material benefits, but also as a means to fortify their particular juridical arguments. New international 
standards for possession and new geographical knowledge would guide the locations of new plazas, which in 
turn would shape the historical narratives jurists and negotiators would use to fortify their framing of 
legitimate territorial possession.17 
Situating Colônia’s founding in a longer history of settlement and juridical jockeying helps bring 
this dynamic into focus. From the time of European arrival to the Americas, Spain and Portugal sought to 
establish rules as to which crown could claim which lands. The earliest iterations of this effort were 
                                                       
16 As Lauren Benton has demonstrated, early-modern travelers in the Americas used river estuaries as the principal markers for 
claiming possession. By controlling these access points to continental interiors, Iberians could most effectively prevent 
competitors from gaining local footholds. This partly explains the detailed information on coastal rivers in sixteenth and 
seventeenth-century maps of the Americas, and motivations that both crowns had to keep their geographic information secret. 
Controlling river estuaries did not always imply control or even access to interior lands, as Iberians depended upon the 
knowledge and good will of local guides in order to move beyond the coast. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 41–59.  
17 By establishing a foothold across the Río de la Plata estuary from Buenos Aires, the Portuguese sought to access clandestine 
trade routes that brought silver from Potosí to the Atlantic, to reestablish older trading links to the Río de la Plata region, and to 
consolidate broader efforts at territorial occupation. By using Colônia as a means to claim territorial possession, Portugal sought 
to acquire joint navigation rights of the Río de la Plata and access to the terrestrial resources between the plaza and the rest of 
Brazil. Moniz Bandeira, O expansionismo brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Philobiblion, 1985), 55; Prado, A Colônia do Sacramento, 23–35, 
44. 
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numerous papal bulls and the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which established an imaginary line dividing the 
Atlantic to separate one imperial realm from the other.18 From the beginning, however, the ever-
accelerating exploration undertaken by both sides served to muddle the situation. On one hand, the 
constant flow of soldiers, settlers, and priests, each of whom served as the physical embodiment of Iberian 
sovereignty, resulted in complex human geographies that could not be easily untangled.19 On the other, 
increased geographical knowledge revealed the shortsightedness of European treaties, as treaties projected 
dominion upon a world imagined through maps. As navigators charted coastlines and cosmographers 
measured the globe with ever-increasing precision, they exposed the imprecision of previous agreements. 
Although this phenomenon did not come to a head in the Río de la Plata until the late seventeenth 
century, its articulation in the region was influenced by earlier conflicts further north and across the 
Atlantic. In particular, during the 1630s, Jesuits from Córdoba and Asunción competed with bandeirantes 
from São Paulo for the souls and labor of people living in regions known as Guayrá and Tape (Map 2.2). 
Early bandeirante victories led to the Jesuit evacuation of both regions, while the eventual arming of the 
missions’ inhabitants prohibited further advances. By 1641, a de-facto division had been produced along the 
Río Uruguay, with missions to the west and bandeirantes to the east.20 This division would be a significant 
baseline for each side as they articulated future claims of possession in the region. 
                                                       
18 The 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza extended the Tordesillas line around the globe by defining an antimeridian in the Pacific Ocean. 
For a detailed discussion on the treaty and the antimeridian, see: Barrero García, Ana María, “Problemas en torno a la aplicación 
de la línea de demarcación: La cuestión de las Molucas,” Anuario Mexicano de Historia del Derecho, no. 5 (1993). 
19 In the early-modern world, people, rather than mapped lines, defined imperial sovereignty. Subjecthood was defined by an 
individual’s relationship with a sovereign, rather than by living within a certain geographical unit, and that subjecthood was 
portable. In this way, as Iberian vassals traveled to the Americas, they developed corridors and enclaves of jurisdictional authority 
for their crown, rather than the large bounded units depicted in contemporary atlases. The legal result of the movement of 
imperial subjects was overlapping jurisdictions and isolated centers of jurisdictional reach. Therefore, early-modern territorial 
possession and jurisdictional reach encompassed plazas, rather than province. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 2-23, 30-33, 37-8; 
Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 33–68. This was the case not only for ultramarine possessions, but also within Europe itself, where 
the union of clear borders and territorial sovereignty did not occur until the eighteenth century. See: Sahlins, Boundaries; Standen 
and Power, Frontiers in Question; Jordan Branch, “Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change,” 
International Organization 65 (Winter 2011): 9–19.  
20 Historians often point to the Battle of Mbororé, which occurred on March 11, 1641, as a turning point in relations between 
missions and bandeirantes. It was at this moment that the Spanish crown began to arm mission dwellers, who would later turn 
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Map 2.2 – Missions of Guayrá and Tape until 1641. This map shows approximate locations of the 
missions (crosses) and towns (points) pertaining to Guayrá (red) and Tape (purple). All of these settlements 
were to the north or east of the Río Uruguay and all had been abandoned by 1641. The Río Ibicuí in the south 
designates the northern reaches of the Río de la Plata region.21 
 
In the wake of this conflict, European affairs produced direct challenges to the Treaty of Tordesillas 
and new means of claiming possession. Whereas the unification of Iberian sovereignty from 1580 to 1640 
had blurred the lines between Spain and Portugal, its schism required a new articulation of territorial 
difference. Spain continued to rely upon the Tordesillas line to justify its claims, while Portugal developed 
two counterarguments. First, as the treaty had specified that an imaginary line be drawn 370 leagues 
                                                       
into the most potent military force in the region. See: Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 
Capítulo IV; Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata, 81–91. 
21 Mission locations are adapted from: Maeder and Gutiérrez, Atlas territorial y urbano de las misiones jesuíticas de guaraníes. Argentina, 
Paraguay e Brasil. 
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westward from the Cape Verde Islands, Portugal questioned which island of the archipelago should be taken 
as a starting point and what sort of leagues (nautical, terrestrial) should be used as a measure.22 Second, 
mapmakers and jurists suggested that Brazil represented a continental entity different from the rest of South 
America. This geographical concept, known as the “Brazil Island” (Ilha Brasil), claimed that a vast waterway 
that began in the Amazon River, continued through the Pantanal, and ended with the Río de la Plata 
constituted as a natural limit between the two realms (Maps 2.3 & 2.4).23 These arguments dovetailed with 
the end of the Thirty Years’ War, as the Treaty of Westphalia challenged on an international level the 
legitimacy of the papal bulls upon which the Treaty of Tordesillas was based. As the north of Europe 
rejected the authority of the Pope, the Catholic arguments of proselytization employed by Spain to justify 
its dominions also came under attack.24 
                                                       
22 See: ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 920, v. 1, “Autos Acordados Entre as Coroas da Espanha e Portugal Sôbre Limites da 
América” (1681); BA - 51-v-37, f. 17v, 44v-50; BA - 54-xiii-16, n. 16, f. 1-8. The Treaty of Tordesillas stipulated that a line be 
measured to divide Portugal and Spain’s territorial rights; however, this demarcation never occurred. Jaime Cortesão, História do 
Brasil nos velhos mapas Tomo I (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Instituto Rio Branco, 1971), 154–55. 
23 While the notion of an “Ilha Brasil” dates back as far as Gaspar Viegas’s 1519 Atlas de Lopo Homem, and perhaps even earlier, its 
juridical weight reached its apex during the middle of the next century. Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo I, parte 
III; Jaime Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas Tomo II (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Instituto Rio 
Branco, 1971), 135; Kantor, “Usos diplomáticos da ilha-Brasil”: 71. Examples of the use of “Ilha Brasil” in discussions of 
possession include: BA - 50-v-37, f. 359-64; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 728, v. 1, f. 76; Sá, Historia topographica e 
bellica da Nova Colonia do Sacramento do Rio da Prata, 7. 
24 For more on debates between Hugo Grotius and Serafim de Freitas, see: Kantor, “Usos diplomáticos da ilha-Brasil”: 77–9. 
Spanish jurists continued to defend the rights of the Pope to donate lands belonging to “infieles”; however, over the course of the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, this argument gave way to the idea of possession through occupation. José María 
Mariluz Urquijo, “La valoración de la bulas alejandrinas en el siglo XVIII,” Anuario Mexicano de Historia del Derecho, no. 5 (1993); 
Josué Caamaño-Dones, “La concesión a Castilla de la soberanía sobre las Indias y el deber de evangelizar,” (Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid, 17/06/2005), 13–18; Marco Moretti, International Law and Nomadic People (Central Milton Keynes: 
Author House, 2012), Chapter 1. For more on the impact of Westphalia on New World mapmaking, see: Fernando Camargo, 
“Las relaciones luso-hispánicas en torno a las Misiones Orientales del Uruguay: de los orígenes al Tratado de Madrid, 1750,” 
Fronteras de la Historia 8 (2003): 220; Kantor, “Usos diplomáticos da ilha-Brasil”: 77–8; Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 234–35. 
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Map 2.3 – Texeira, Luís, Mapa das Capitanias hereditárias: Carta general do Brasil, c. 1574. This 
map demonstrates the concept of an Ilha Brasil. Texeira, a Portuguese Jesuit, aligned the Tordesillas line with 
the Amazon River and the Río de la Plata.25 
                                                       
25 Luís Texeira, Mapa das capitanias hereditárias: Carta general do Brasil, inserida em Roteiro de todos os sinais (Acervo da Biblioteca 
Nacional da Ajuda, Lisboa, c. 1574). 
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Map 2.4 – Blaeu, Willem, Americae nova tabula, 1665. This map also demonstrates the concept of an 
Ilha Brasil. Blaeu, a Dutch cartographer, discarded the Tordesillas line, but connected the Río de la Plata with 
the Amazon River to divide Brazil from the rest of South America.26 
 
                                                       
26 Willem J. Blaeu, Americae nova tabula (Amsterdam, 1665); Wikimedia Commons, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia
/commons/0/01/Americae_nova_Tabula_-_Map_of_North_and_South_America_%28Willem_Blaeu%2C_1665%29.jpg 
(accessed February 23, 2015). 
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Given persistent challenges to the Treaty of Tordesillas, the notion of territorial possession through 
papal donation carried less and less weight over time. Instead, the Iberian crowns and their competitors 
began to rely upon the occupation or utilization of particular lands in order to have their claims recognized 
internationally. The founding of Colônia thus represented a Portuguese effort to solidify its claim to lands 
north and east of the Río de la Plata estuary. While diplomats relied upon the natural limits of an Ilha Brasil 
and the ambiguity of the Tordesillas line to justify their efforts, once the plaza was established, they began 
to espouse the idea of possession through settlement (uti possidetis) as well.27 Missionaries and Spanish 
administrators responded with a flurry of strategic settlements of their own. Jesuits ventured back across 
the Río Uruguay and founded seven new plazas, while Spain and Portugal brought settlers from the Canary 
Islands and the Azores respectively to establish settlements along the coast (Map 2.5).28 The presence of 
Charrúas, Minuanes, and other mobile peoples restricted all parties to the region’s perimeter, yet it did not 
prevent them from debating who had the legal right to access its interior. Each settlement thus served the 
dual purpose of being an access point to the region and evidence of territorial possession, however limited 
the effective reach of an individual plaza actually was.  
Plazas alone were not enough to claim possession. They instead served as bits of evidence that 
jurists could draw upon to develop arguments of natural or historical rights. Advocates for Spanish or 
Portuguese possession of the Río de la Plata also hearkened back to early expeditions to the region that 
carried the banner of their crown. They pointed to vestiges of short-lived settlements and the erection of  
                                                       
27 Uti posseditis, which in Latin means “as you possess,” is a concept of international law that suggests that settlement rights take 
priority over earlier accords when determining territorial possession. 
28 In this region, Jesuit settlements constituted dominion for the Spanish Crown. Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del 
Plata, 87, 97, 103-4; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.26, f. 40v-41v, 217v-220v; MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C18, 
P1, No. 12; “Registro de atos oficiais no presídio do Rio Grande (1737-1753)”: 261–72; Camargo, “Las relaciones luso-
hispánicas en torno a las Misiones Orientales del Uruguay”: 240. 
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Map 2.5 – Principal Plazas founded Between 1680 and 1750. Between the founding of Colônia do 
Sacramento and the Treaty of Madrid, Portuguese (P), Spanish (S), and Jesuit (J) authorities sought to 
establish plazas east of the Río Uruguay. Plazas without dates were founded before 1680. 
 
crosses or stone markers by travelers as proof of territorial possession.29 In addition, they scoured earlier 
treaties and maps for words or images that would justify their current territorial claims.30 Their arguments 
                                                       
29 For example: BA - 54-xiii-16, n. 157; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 144; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 
1.1.25, f. 281; Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova 
Colonia do Sacramento, 1–5. 
30 See: AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 3, Doc 325; IEB - Projeto Brasil Ciência, 14 C 4; L 19 700; BA - 51-v-
37, f. 43v-44v; BA - 54-xiii-16, f. 1-11v. Acts or “ceremonies” of possession varied widely and were constantly disputed. 
Examples include settlement, trade, public declarations, gestures of proselytization, physical marks upon the landscape, and 
mapping. Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) While certain crowns used some practices more than others, acts of possession varied more according to 
contemporary juridical conditions and local contexts than particular national traditions. Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 25–33. It 
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differed in evidence and conclusions yet shared the common trope of stringing together instances of travel 
or settlement to argue that the other side had impinged upon their lands. Spanish advocates pointed to the 
foundation of Colônia as an egregious infraction by the Portuguese, while writers sympathetic to 
Portuguese interests made the same point with regard to mission settlements.31 These contradictory claims 
highlight the ambiguity of what constituted an act of possession or evidence of first arrival. 
To understand the parallel juridical narratives promulgated by Lisbon and Madrid, one must 
consider not only what constituted an act of possession, but also how far territorial possession actually 
reached. The early eighteenth century was a transitional moment in this regard, as Enlightened ideas of 
bound provinces began to supplant early modern notions of isolated plazas. In accordance with early 
modern European territorialities, the possession of a plaza did not necessarily imply the possession of the 
adjacent countryside or all of the lands bounded by a geographical feature or a line on a map. Since 
sovereignty flowed through interpersonal relationships rather than rigid territorial jurisdictions, the idea of 
bounded territories divided by borderlines was not an operative concept. As a result, subjects of a particular 
crown could establish settlements that overlapped with those of another crown, as commonly occurred in 
lands that were distant from a metropolitan center. In fact, it was not until the final years of the seventeenth 
century that any European peace accords commissioned cartographers to map a large-scale interimperial 
border. This normative mode of perceiving space would shift, however, during the first half of the 
eighteenth century, as imperial border demarcations became an ever more common practice.32  
                                                       
was the responsibility of travelers sponsored by one crown or another to make their claims as visible as possible and it was the 
task of jurists to articulate why particular historical acts constituted legitimate claims. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 54-5, nt. 
40. For more on the use of historical narratives to justify possession in the Río de la Plata, see: Verdesio, Forgotten Conquests, 75. 
31 For example: ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 728, v. 1, f. 10v-11. Portuguese royal authorities made similar complaints 
regarding the Guardia de San Juan, the plaza of Montevideo, and Spanish attempts to populate Maldonado. AHU - Nova Colónia 
do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Docs 27 & 78; BA - 49-x-7, f. 138-139v; BA - 51-v-37, f. 138; BUC - MS 509; BUC - MS 509, f. 
138; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.3, f. 86-93; Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de 
Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colonia do Sacramento, 1–5. 
32 In 1699, the Ottoman State and the Holy League agreed to a joint demarcation effort of a political boundary, which took place 
between 1700 and 1703. Over the course of the eighteenth century, other crowns followed suit.  Abou-el-Haj, “The Formal 
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The case of Colônia do Sacramento was emblematic of this broader epistemological transition. 
Prior to the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, diplomats and administrators did not imagine the Río de la Plata as a 
territorial state in the modern sense. Spanish plazas throughout the region did not share allegiance with one 
another, territorial disputes between them were commonplace, and instances even exist of the erection of 
stone markers to indicate the jurisdictional limits of one versus another.33 Likewise, from the founding of 
Colônia, it was unclear whether this plaza represented the terrestrial extension of Brazil or an isolated 
enclave. The 1681 Provisional Treaty of Lisboa, which was the first to deal with the situation of Colônia, 
sought to resolve the ambiguity of regional possession by offering Portugal and Spain shared access to the 
regional countryside. It utilized a “tiro de um canhão” (cannon shot) as a standard measure to limit the reach 
of Colônia’s territorial exclusivity. Rather than an exact limit, this measure was a general estimate – used in 
the same way as a foot, a league, or a musket shot – given that the distance of cannon fire would depend 
upon the size of the ball and the angle of the cannon.34 In the case of Colônia, this measure would be an 
issue that would arise regularly during jurisdictional disputes, as occurred after the death of Manuel 
González.35 More importantly, the concept of a “tiro de um canhão” signified that Colônia was an enclave 
                                                       
Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703”; Sahlins, Boundaries, 93–102; Standen and Power, Frontiers in Question; 
Madalina Valeria Veres, “Redefining Imperial Borders” in History of Cartography. 
33 In 1721, representatives from Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, various mission plazas agreed to construct boundary stones near the Río 
Uruguay and near Colônia to indicate the territorial rights of their respective plazas. The principal right was to access cattle 
within their given jurisdictions. AGI – Charcas, 221, “Reunión de los apoderados de los pueblos de Misiones, de la ciudad de 
Santa Fe, y de la de Buenos Aires” (Buenos Aires, 1721-01-28). 
34 Examples of the uncertainty of this distance include: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, 43v-47v. The concept of a 
“tiro de um canhão” was applied as a measure at other moments in the region as well, such as during deliberations for the 
demarcation of limits near Castilhos on December 3, 1752. IHGRGS - Arquivo Visconde de São Leopoldo, f. 1-10. 
35 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.23, f. 86; IHGRGS - Arquivo Visconde de São Leopoldo, f. 10v-12; RAH - Mata 
Linares, t. 107, f. 29; BA - 54-xiii-16, n. 155, f. 1-15. 
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and that its presence along the Río de la Plata’s Northern Shore (Banda Norte) did not imply exclusive access 
to the countryside.36 The Treaty of Lisbon’s seventh article stated: 
The citizens of Buenos Aires will enjoy the use and exploitation of the same site, its cattle, wood, 
game, fishing, and charcoal, as it did before a population was established there, without any 
difference, being present in the same site whenever they want with the Portuguese in peace and 
friendship, without any impediment.37 
 
Both Spanish and Portuguese subjects would share the right to access the countryside surrounding Colônia 
and its resources. Diplomats and administrators would continually refer to this idea over the course of the 
following decades, marking a clear distinction between the jurisdiction of the plaza and the right to access 
resources in the rural countryside (Map 2.6).38 
 During the early decades of the eighteenth century, coexistence in the Río de la Plata became 
increasingly problematic for Spanish and Portuguese administrators. The lack of unilateral territorial 
possession or control by one side or the other permitted third parties to attempt to establish themselves 
along the coast, particularly after the 1715 Treaty of Utrecht solidified the standard of uti possidetis.39 Spain 
                                                       
36 The “Banda Norte” refers to the northern coast of the Río de la Plata estuary. Its geographical extent was ambiguous as its 
implied western boundary ranged from the Río Paraná to the Río Uruguay and its northern boundary was never defined. 
37 “Os visinhos de Buenos Ayres gozaráõ do uso, e aproveitamento do mesmo sitio [os campos perto da Colônia do Sacramento], 
seus gados, madeira, caça, e lavradores de carvão, como antes, como antes, que nelle se fizesse a povoação, sem diferença 
alguma, assistindo no mesmo sitio todo o tempo, que quizerem com os Portuguezes em boa paz e amizade, sem impedimento 
algum” Transcribed in: Jaime Cortesão, ed., Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750), Parte III: Antecedentes do Tratado, 
Tomo I (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Instituto Rio Branco, 1951), 45–51 See also: BNP - COD. 13212
//11. 
38 See, for example: IEB - AL-046-091, f. 183v-185; BUC - MS 548, f. 253-5; IHGRGS - Arquivo Visconde de São Leopoldo, f. 
10v-16; Sá, Historia topographica e bellica da Nova Colonia do Sacramento do Rio da Prata, 98–99; Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o 
Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colonia do Sacramento, 72–73; Sá, Historia 
topographica e bellica da Nova Colonia do Sacramento do Rio da Prata, 98–99. 
39 This treaty was perhaps the strongest rebuke of the concept of the papal donation and the clearest step in favor of uti possidetis 
as the standard for territorial possession. It undermined Spain and Portugal’s ability to project possession from isolated plazas 
upon entire regions and required instead the establishment of permanent settlements in places such as Montevideo, Maldonado, 
and Castillos Grande. While French ships in particular had occasioned these harbors to trade with tolderías now for decades, the 
uptick in trading activity that occurred between 1715 and 1720 was likely due to these new jurisdictional conditions. 
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Map 2.6 – Sá Almeida e Menezes, Rodrigo Annes de, “[Território da Colónia do Sacramento],” 
1726. This map was part of a compendium compiled by the Portuguese Secretary of State. It demonstrates 
the Tordesillas line’s ambiguity and the lands referred to in the 1681 Treaty of Lisbon.40 
 
and Portugal were not the only European empires that maintained relations with native peoples in the 
region. Spurred on by the drive for known resources (cattle) and suspected resources (mines), French and 
English ships also dropped anchor in the Río de la Plata’s coastal harbors.41 French traders established direct 
                                                       
40 Sá Almeida e Menezes, Rodrigo Annes de, [Território da Colónia do Sacramento] (1726); BNP - Cod. 1985. Map 26, http://
purl.pt/103/1/catalogo-digital/registo/026/026_cod1985_fl1.jpg (accessed February 23, 2015). 
41 While cattle was certainly the dominant resource that attracted traders to the region, numerous eighteenth-century sources 
allude to the existence of mines. Many believed that Jesuit missionaries had discovered secret mines in the area that they hoped to 
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relationships with Minuanes and Guenoas in the coastline’s three other natural harbors – Mondevideo, 
Maldonado, and Castillos Grande. The first reference to such relations occurred in 1683; however, they 
likely began much earlier. Over the course of the next sixty years, at least thirteen reported incidents 
emerged of French traders slaughtering cattle or trading for leather with Minuanes, Guenoas, and others 
(Table 2.1). Given the short range of Iberian territorial reach in the area, many more likely occurred. 
DATE PLACES SHIP NAME/CAPTAIN PARTNER 
1683-11-08 Maldonado El Señalado Armas de Francia 
/ Captain Mr. La Visconte 
Guenoas; "otros 
aliados" 
1705-00-00 Banda Norte [ - ] Guaraníes 
1706-00-00 Maldonado Nantes / Mr. D'Escaseau [ - ] 
1706-00-00 Islas de Flores (Maldonado) Falmouth of St. Malo [ - ] 
1708-00-00 Maldonado Atlas [ - ] 
1717-05-27 Montevideo; Maldonado; 
Rio Grande; Santa Catarina 
Petit Danican Minuanes 
1717-06-23 Maldonado; Isla de Flores 2 ships Minuanes 
1720-05-25 Maldonado; Castillos 
Grande 
4 ships / Étienne Moreau Guenoas 
1720-09-25 Maldonado [ - ] Minuanes 
1721-08-26 Castillos Grande; 
Maldonado; Montevideo 
2 ships "gentio livre" 
1721-08-31 Montevideo; Maldonado [ - ] Charrúas, Bohanes, 
Yaros, otros 
1721-09-12 Montevideo; Maldonado [ - ] Minuanes 
1722-01-01 Banda Norte [ - ] Minuanes 
Table 2.1 – Reported Trade between Tolderías & French Ships42 
                                                       
shield from foreigners. The prospect of discovering mines heightened exchange between Minuán and Guenoa tolderías and 
foreign ships. See: AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Doc 20; BA - 51-v-37, f. 25v, 137; IHGB - Conselho 
Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 280; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 180v-181, 182, 185v. 
42 AGI - Escribanía, 884, “Comisión a Antonio de Vera y Mujica para proceder contra José de Herrera y Sotomayor,” partially 
transcribed in López Mazz and Bracco, Minuanos, 38–39; González, Diario de viaje a las Vaquerías del Mar (1705), 11; William 
Betagh, A Voyage Round the World: Being an Account of a Remarkable Enterprize, begun in the Year 1719, chiefly to cruise on the Spaniards 
in the great South Ocean. (London: Printed for T. Combes at the Bible and Dove in Pater-noster Row, J. Lacy at the Ship near 
Temple Bar, and J. Clarke at the Bible under the Royal Exchange, 1728), 329-30, 336-8, 533; Mémoire pour servir d'addition & 
d'éclairciffiment à la Relation abrégée, &c. qu'on vient de donner au Public, fur l'abominable conduite des Jésuites, dans les payt 
& domaines d'outre-mer dépendans des Royaumes d'Espagne &. de Portugal, 24; AGI - Escribanía, 877A, f. 10v-59; RAH - Mata 
Linares, t. 102, f. 168-9, 355-6; Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 70; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, 
Arq. 1.1.25, f. 43-52, 59v-62, 298-90; Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, Tomo Primero, 455–62; Pedro 
Lozano, Historia de la conquista del Paraguay, Rio de la Plata y Tucuman, Biblioteca del Rio de la Plata Tomo 3 (Buenos Aires: Casa 
Editoria "Imprenta Popular" 1874), 472–76; Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, Libro 
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In response to the French presence, officials from Colônia and Buenos Aires repeatedly sought to 
broker deals with tolderías, requesting that they desist from trade with foreign ships and prevent foreigners’ 
access to the countryside. Occasionally these pacts proved successful, as individual caciques agreed not only 
to avoid new trading partnerships, but also to patrol the coast and report the presence of foreign ships.43 
Most often, however, the plurality of tolderías and their unique interests made such agreements elusive. If 
French traders could provide more attractive payments than their Portuguese or Spanish competitors, there 
was no good reason for a toldería to avoid trading with them. A direct link to the Atlantic economy 
afforded caciques access to better returns on their leather and the opportunity to obtain lucrative objects of 
material and symbolic value. 
English ships also explored the coastline, using the ambiguity of possession as an avenue to access. 
While both Portugal and Spain considered unsanctioned foreign ships to be pirates, ship captains could 
claim that they believed they were on the lands of the other crown and therefore beyond the offended 
party’s jurisdiction.44 More importantly, these interlopers increased the Iberian crowns’ desire for 
exclusivity over the countryside of the Banda Norte. Without legal exclusivity, neither side could issue 
secure land titles and thus advance regulated settlements far beyond the reach of their plazas. Nor could 
they restrict access to outsiders through juridical means. Officials began to see the issue of territorial 
possession as less a question of legal access to resources and more a question of legal ownership of resources 
as property. Access permitted sharing, but ownership implied exclusivity. 
                                                       
IV, Capítulo IV; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 180-181v; AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31); 
AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12); Ponce de León, Luis R., “Minuanes o Guenoas”: 29. 
43 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 59v-62, 280-90; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 
618–9. 
44 One such case occurred in 1741, when John Bulkeley, John Cummins, and other English sailors encountered Spanish fishermen 
near Montevideo. John Bulkeley and John Cummins, A Voyage to the South/Seas, in the Years 1740-1 (London: Printed for Jacob 
Robinson, 1743), 166. 
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Spanish authorities made the first efforts to gain exclusivity over the Banda Norte, employing both 
military and juridical tactics. They undertook numerous invasions to dislodge Portuguese settlers from 
Colônia, and between 1705 and 1715, they were even able to occupy it themselves.  More often, they 
sought to blockade the plaza and contain Portuguese settlers within its stipulated limits. To this end, they 
established the guardpost of San Juan and coordinated between plazas to extract livestock from Colônia’s 
vicinity. While generally a wartime measure, the blockade became institutionalized following the return of 
the plaza to the Portuguese in 1737.45 The success of this effort required collaboration between various 
Spanish and missionary plazas, but it was also contingent upon the continued favor of local tolderías. For 
that reason, Spanish officials pursued deals with local caciques to lend support to their efforts or to withhold 
support from the Portuguese in Colônia. Such favor proved elusive, as it required continual payments to 
caciques or kinship ties. By offering payments and attempting to foster close ties to Minuán and Guenoa 
tolderías themselves, Portuguese administrators in Colônia maintained a lifeline that the blockade could not 
prevent. Only in the few moments when local tolderías decided to favor particular Spanish plazas did the 
Portuguese find themselves without recourse.46 
 If military might could not dislodge the Portuguese from Colônia, juridical measures could at least 
serve to fix the limits of the plaza and contain settlers within it. Here, mapping was the key. Thus by the 
1730s, the King of Spain had ordered the mapping of a clear limit between the plaza and what lay beyond. 
All Portuguese possessions outside of the plaza’s jurisdiction would be burnt, its vassals would be sent back 
                                                       
45 Prado, A Colônia do Sacramento, 94. It was not until the 1730s that Portuguese negotiators would seek territorial exclusivity for 
themselves. Cortesão, Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750), Parte III, 481. 
46 From the first years of the founding of Colônia, authorities in Buenos Aires sought to separate local tolderías from the 
Portuguese in Colônia, with little success. AGI - Charcas, 278, “Parecer y voto dado al gobernador de Buenos Aires” (1683-02-
03); Cortesão, Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750), Parte III, 352.  Some Spanish traders also sold horses and other 
goods to residents of the Portuguese plaza in spite of the blockade: Cabral, Descrição Corogràfica e Coleção Histórica do Continente da 
Nova Colônia da Cidade do Sacramento, 11. These efforts proved successful on several occasions: AHU - Nova Colónia do 
Sacramento (012), Caixa 3, Doc 325; BNP - F. 1445, f. 56. 
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to the plaza, and sentinels would patrol the countryside to keep the population contained.47 This became a 
centerpiece of the policy of the Governor of Buenos Aires, Miguel Salcedo, vis-à-vis Colônia, and it also 
signified a clear rejection of the shared use of rural space in favor of Spanish exclusivity. A deviation from 
the policies of previous governors, this shift incited a sharp rebuttal from Portuguese authorities in Colônia 
and culminated in war between 1735 and 1737.48 
 
Possessing Maps 
 The eighteenth-century drive for territorial exclusivity in the Río de la Plata region and other 
ultramarine territories brought mapmaking to the forefront of territorial disputes. While professional 
engravers had always held a role in interimperial debates over jurisdiction, through the end of the 
seventeenth century their principle aim was to compile travel accounts or navigation charts and project 
them onto the globe as a geographic whole. Wary of the circulation of detailed information regarding their 
foreign lands, Iberian diplomats often chose to withhold accounts of their continental interior from 
international debates.49 As uti possidetis supplanted the Treaty of Tordesillas as the principal foundation for 
claiming territorial possession, however, mapping took on new juridical value as a means to demonstrate 
                                                       
47 MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C18, P1, No. 2, f. 4, 6v-7; Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. Miguel de 
Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colonia do Sacramento, 72–75. 
48 AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 3, Docs 304 & 312; Sylva, Relação do sitio, que o Governador de Buenos Aires D. 
Miguel de Salcedo poz no anno de 1735 à Praça da Nova Colonia do Sacramento, 23-40, 85-101; Sá, Historia topographica e bellica da Nova 
Colonia do Sacramento do Rio da Prata, 116–18. Following the Treaty of Utrecht in 1715, Portuguese diplomats also offered claims 
of jurisdictional exclusivity. See, for example: IEB - AL-136-27-11; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.3, f. 86-93; BA - 
49-x-7, f. 138-139v. 
49 Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, 135. For a detailed explanation of the factors shaping Iberian decisions to 
conceal or divulge geographical information, see: Portuondo, Secret Science It is also certain that by the eighteenth century, 
imperial knowledge of the South American continent was deeply lacking. The famous Relaciones Geográficas employed by Spain, 
for example, focused principally on New Spain. Those that did pertain to South America were almost entirely from the Andes, 
with no responses at all from Chile, Paraguay, the Guianas, the Río de la Plata, or Brazil (which was under the Spanish crown at 
the time via the Iberian Union). Clinton R. Edwards, “Geographical Coverage of the Sixteenth-Century Relaciones de Indias 
from South America,” Geoscience and Man XXI (1980); Mundy, The Mapping of New Spain, Chapter 3. The Jesuit maps of South 
America, which were developed principally in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were not always accessible for royal 
courts.  
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one’s own claims. Furthermore, advances in mapping technologies, such as gridded maps with accurate 
longitudinal measurements, provided imperial authorities the opportunity to visualize continental interiors 
as never before. Rather than theorizing where dividing lines should run, mapmakers could directly observe, 
measure, and represent territorial features as a means to fortify their claims. 
 The competing logics of territorial possession employed by Spain and Portugal generated lineages of 
competing cartographies. Although their maps were engraved and printed in numerous European cities, 
from Paris to London to Amsterdam, mapmakers in the half-century after the founding of Colônia adopted 
one of two representative styles. Printers like Nicolas Sanson located the interimperial divide as far north as 
São Paulo, hearkening back to divisions that existed between the Jesuit missions and Portuguese 
bandeirantes (Map 2.7). By contrast, maps such as Guillaume de L’Isle’s Carte du Paraguay, du Chili, du 
Detroit de Magellan, &c, depicted Brazilian territorial possession extending contiguously to Colônia (Map 
2.8); L’Isle’s map was even published at times in hybrid form, as printers used the original plates while 
redrawing the border (Map 2.9). Early eighteenth-century maps, whether favoring Portuguese or Spanish 
logics of possession, were nonetheless incongruent with regional territorial conditions, as contemporary 
mapping conventions could not account for overlapping settlements or shared territorial access. As 
engravers published maps based upon written travel accounts, they generally assumed the completeness of 
territorial possession and drew imaginary lines to encompass the aggregated plazas founded by one crown or 
the other. 
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Map 2.7 – Sanson, Nicolas. Amerique Meridionale, 170950 
 
                                                       
50 Nicolas Sanson, Amerique Meridionale: divisée en ses principales parties (Paris: Chez H. Jaillot joignant les Grands Augustins aux 
deux Globes, 1709); BNB - Arc.015,11,032on Cartografia, http://objdigital.bn.br/acervo_digital/div_cartografia/cart354233
.jpg (accessed February 23, 2015). 
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Map 2.8 – L’Isle, Guillaume de. Carte du Paraguay, 170351 
  
                                                       
51 Guillaume de L'Isle, Carte du Paraguay, du Chili, du Detroit de Magellan &c.: dressée sur les descriptions des P.P. Alfonse d'Ovalle, et 
Nicolas Techo, et sur les relations et memoires de Brouwer, Narbouroug, Mr. de Beauchesne &c (Paris: chez l'auteur le sieur Delisle sur le 
Quay de l'Horloge, 1703); NL - Baskes oversize G1015 .L57 1700, [plate 89]. 
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Map 2.9 – L’Isle, Guillaume de. Carte du Paraguay, 171052 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
52 Guillaume de L'Isle, Carte du Paraguay, du Chili, du Detroit de Magellan &c. (Amsterdam: Pierre Mortier, 1710); BNB - ARC.
008,06,004on cartografia, http://objdigital.bn.br/acervo_digital/div_cartografia/cart530258.jpg (accessed February 23, 
2015). 
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 Amidst this cartographic ambiguity, Spain and Portugal began in the 1730s to hire scientists to 
demarcate their remote borderlands. The Castilian crown concentrated its efforts in the Amazon region, 
supporting a French geodesic mission that was led by Charles Marie de la Condamine. Although the French 
scientists’ principal aim was to measure the circumference of the globe along the Equator, La Condamine’s 
trip along the Amazon River lent cartographic weight to Spain’s land claims in the area.53 For their part, 
Portuguese authorities financed the “New Atlas of Portuguese America” (Nova Atlas da América Portuguesa) 
project. Like the Spanish, they hoped to fortify their territorial claims in the Americas by sending surveyors 
to measure lands in their favor; however, they relied upon Jesuit mathematicians rather than French 
scientists. The Novo Atlas project, which began in 1729, commissioned Domenico Capassi to map the 
north of Brazil and Diogo Soares to map the south.54 
 These projects were significant for a number of reasons. First, they demonstrated that not all 
mapmaking was the same. Whereas cosmographers and engravers had produced maps of overseas territories 
for centuries, their works no longer carried the same weight as maps that resulted from on-the-ground 
measurements and observations. Indeed, the French and Jesuit expeditions aimed to use the precision of 
their geographic renderings to cast doubt upon previous perceptions of disputed territories.55 Second, these 
expeditions reveal the extremely limited geographical knowledge that each side had of the Río de la Plata 
                                                       
53 Part of La Condamine’s justification for his journey up the Amazon was the inaccuracy of the Jesuit Samuel Fritz’s 1691 map of 
the region, which was the most well-known at the time. Safier, Measuring the New World, 76–81; Magalhães, “Mundos em 
miniatura”: 84 The diplomatic usage of the expedition’s maps and measurements came principally from Jorge Juan and Antonio 
de Ulloa, Spanish officials who had participated in it as intermediaries between the Crown and the French scientists. Jorge Juan 
and Antonio de Ulloa, Disertación histórica y geográfica sobre el meridiano de demarcación (Madrid: Instituto Histórico de Marina, 
1972); Reprint of 1749 edition, 69–88. 
54 Though contracted in 1722, Capacci and Soares did not leave for Brazil until 1729. Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, 
Tomo II, 175–76 André Ferrand de Almeida, A formação do espaço brasileiro e o projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa (1713-
1748) (Lisboa: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2001), 100–112; Magalhães, 
“Mundos em miniatura”: 80–2 The reliance on foreign mapmakers by the Iberian crowns was due to a general inferiority of 
Spanish and Portuguese cosmography through the first half of the eighteenth century. Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”: 12.  
55 The Soares expedition produced the first measurements of longitude in the Río de la Plata region, in 1730, followed by the 
Spanish Jesuit Miguel Quiroga, in 1748 Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, 198–200. 
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countryside and of the South American interior in general. Soares’s maps focused entirely on the Río de la 
Plata’s coastline, highlighting access points to the interior rather than the nuances of the rural landscape 
itself, while Spanish authorities relied on Jesuit missionaries, whose geographic knowledge was principally 
of lands to the north.56 For this reason, as late as the 1750s, the Spanish commander of the blockade of 
Colônia solicited the help of the Jesuit Joseph Quiroga to help him map the area, complaining that there was 
no reliable map available of lands of the Banda Norte.57 
 The short territorial range of these mapping endeavors was due to the limited geographical 
knowledge of the informants they depended upon. Spanish administrators relied upon Jesuits in the north of 
the region, whose geographic pursuits focused on waterways that would take them from Buenos Aires to 
Paraguay rather than through the Río de la Plata countryside.58 For his part, Soares utilized the knowledge 
of individuals with experience traveling in the region (práticos de país) as a source base for his maps, 
contracting them to answer questionnaires (notícias práticas) about local lands: 
I now have a large compilation of reports, itineraries and maps from the best pioneers from São 
Paulo and Cuyabá, Rio Grande, and [the Río de la] Plata, and I continue to look for others with the 
aim of beginning a map, because foreign ones are full of errors, not only with respect to the 
countryside, but also in the elevation and longitudes of this entire coast.59 
 
He acquired detailed descriptions of lands north of the Río de la Plata – the Jesuit missions, cattle markets 
in Santa Catarina and São Paulo, and cattle ranges near what is now Porto Alegre – but details on lands 
                                                       
56 A detailed list of maps produced by the mathematical expedition can be found in Almeida, A formação do espaço brasileiro e o 
projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa (1713-1748). 
57 AGN-A – IX. 4-3-2, “Carta de Francisco de Graell a Joseph Quiroga” (San Borja, 1759-01-28). 
58 David Buisseret, “Spanish Colonial Cartography, 1450-1700” in The History of Cartography, 1148, 1168By this time, the most 
detailed maps of the continental interior of South America had been produced by Jesuits. Nonetheless, their geographic 
renderings focused principally on the areas of their missions. See: Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, vol.  2. 
59 “Tenho ja junto uma grande copia de noticias, vários Roteyros e mapas dos melhores sertanistas de S. Paulo e Cuyabá, Rio 
Grande, e da Prata, e vou procurando outras a fim de dar principio a algûa carta, porque as estrangeiras andam erradíssimas, não 
só no que toca ao Sertão, mas ainda nas Alturas e Longitudes de toda esta Costa.” Transcribed in: Almeida, A formação do espaço 
brasileiro e o projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa (1713-1748), 120. 
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between Rio Grande and Colônia do Sacramento ran thin.60 He lamented, “as my entire yearning was to see 
this countryside, I decided to also draw, with necessary caution, a small map of it, but it was not possible to 
complete it with the exactitude that I desire.”61 Whereas coastal calculations were reliable, the 
mathematician relied upon guesswork to draw the countryside in the final versions of his maps (Map 2.10). 
                                                       
60 The purpose of this endeavor, then, was to compile Portuguese knowledge of the region, which would serve as a correction to 
the unreliable maps produced to this point by other imperial travelers. In particular, Soares communicated with Cristóvão 
Pereira, a military officer whose close relations with Minuanes enabled him to chart a pathway between Colônia and Rio Grande.  
“O Rio Grande do Sul na cartografia antiga,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXVI, No 103, 3o 
Trimestre (1946): 297 The various noticias práticas have since been copied numerous times. They can be consulted at IHGB – 
Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.21, f. 142-198, esp. f. 180-2. Those relating to the Río de la Plata have also been transcribed in  
“Notícias práticas do novo caminho que se descobrio das Campanhas do Rio Grande, e nova Colonia do Sacramento para a Villa 
de Coritiba no anno de 1727 por ordem do Governador e General de S. Paulo, Antonio da Silva Caldeira Pimental,” Revista do 
Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro tomo LXIX, parte 1 (1908): 236–59; “Notícias praticas de Costa e povoações do Mar do Sul 
e resposta que deu o sargento-mór de praça de Santos Manoel Gonçalves de Aguiar as perguntas que lhe fez o Governador e 
Capitão General da cidade do Rio de Janeiro e Capitania do Sul Antonio de Brito e Menezes sobre costa e povoações do mesmo 
nome,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro tomo LXIX, parte 1 (1908): 290–309 Other reports from Pereira to 
Soares include: AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 2, Doc 237. The little information on the Río de la Plata that 
did appear in these sources focused principally on trade with native peoples and on rumors about mines or cattle further inland. 
In addition, these reports may have included manuscript maps. Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, 202–3 While 
Soares did not mention specific maps as sources, it is likely that he consulted the 1719 works of Bertolomeu Pays de Abreu. 
These maps, too, demonstrate the limited scope of Portuguese territorial knowledge beyond the coast at the time. See, for 
example: Abreu, Bertolomeu Pays de, Demonstração da costa desde Buenos ayres athê a Villa de Santos, 1719 (BNB – Manuscritos 049, 
05,003). 
61 “como a minha ancia toda era o ver estas campanhas, animei-me a tirar tambem com a cautela que me pareceu precisa, hum 
pequeno mappa dela, que me não foi possível concluir com a exacção que desejo.” AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-
01), Caixa 33, Doc 7623, transcribed in: Almeida, A formação do espaço brasileiro e o projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa 
(1713-1748), 120. 
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Map 2.10 – “[Carte manuscrite de l'embouchure de Rio da Prata],” 1740. This map is likely the 
one to which Soares referred above, given the latitude and longitude measures that frame it. It includes details 
near the coastline, including principal trade routes, but only general information further inland.62 
 
 
Paying Tribute While Soliciting Vassalage 
 The broad juridical debates about imperial possession and dominion, while discussed in royal courts 
and other European forums, ultimately depended upon global conditions, particularly in the Americas. The 
claims exerted by Spain under the authority of papal bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas were predicated 
upon the advancement of Christianity, much like Portuguese claims along the West African coast. Likewise, 
                                                       
62 [Carte manuscrite de l'embouchure de Rio da Prata] (1740); BNF - Cartes et Plans, GE DD 2987, n.o 9450, http://gallica.bnf.fr/
ark:/12148/btv1b59060846 (accessed February 23, 2015). For more on this map, see: Almeida, A formação do espaço brasileiro e o 
projeto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa (1713-1748), 125. 
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the concept of uti possidetis was grounded in the idea that newly claimed lands must be vacant. In each of 
these debates, the status of indigenous inhabitants of the Americas, specifically those who had not accepted 
Christianity, was a determining factor. Did the papal donation give Spain dominion over the lands of 
peoples who refused conversion to Christianity, and what authority did the Pope have to grant this 
concession? Could native peoples even possess land and exercise dominion over it? 
 While sixteenth-century debates aimed to define the terms of just warfare as a means to 
appropriate people and territory, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century challenges to the legitimacy of the 
papal donation opened up the question of how to determine if native peoples had dominion. The de facto 
exclusivity that the Castilian Crown enjoyed early on in most of the Americas led Spanish theologians to 
outline the terms of just appropriation of land and labor. For example, Francisco de Vitoria argued that 
native peoples in the Americas conceivably held dominion over their territories and rejected the notion that 
their resistance to Spanish declarations of possession (El Requerimiento) constituted just cause to seize their 
lands and claim dominion over them. Instead, he articulated specific statutes that would legitimate such 
seizure, particularly if it meant defense of the innocent against tyranny.63 Similarly, Bartolomé de las Casas, 
in his famed debate with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1552, outlined six just causes for waging war against 
nonsubjugated Indians and seizing their labor and property.64 By the seventeenth century, however, as 
                                                       
63 Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 233–92 Vitoria’s writings were part of 
a broader attempt to regulate the standards of territorial possession enacted in the Americas. The Laws of Burgos and the 
Requirement were issued by the crown in 1512 and 1513 respectively in an attempt to establish standards of just war. They did 
not, however, belie the logic of the papal donation as a means to claim territorial possession. See: Lewis Hanke, The Spanish 
Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), 1–36. Vitoria, on the other 
hand, contended that even if the pope had dominion over peoples throughout the world, he was not authorized to claim their 
property, including lands. Vitoria, Political Writings, 258.  Internal debates in Spain over just cause for the claiming possession 
over the lands of “infieles” became increasingly limited. See: Mariluz Urquijo, “La valoración de la bulas alejandrinas en el siglo 
XVIII”: 170–1; Caamaño-Dones, “La concesión a Castilla de la soberanía sobre las Indias y el deber de evangelizar”, 15–16; 
Jonathan D. Amith, The Möbius Strip: A Spatial History of Colonial Society in Guerrero, Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005), 77–85.  
64 Domingo Muriel, Elementos de derecho natural y de gentes (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Coni Hermanos, 1911); traducción del 
Doctor Luciano Abeille; publicado bajo el seudónimo Ciriaco Morelli, 104, 314, 348-9. 
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Catholic proselytization began to wane as sufficient cause for Iberian exclusivity, theorists debated standards 
for imperial possession and considered the ways in which native peoples could demonstrate possession 
themselves. Some, like Hugo Grotius and Wolfgang Adam Lauterbach, considered agriculture to be the 
foundation of all territorial claims – to claim land was to exploit it – while Cornelius de Pauw and others 
contended that hunting or fishing equally constituted territorial exploitation and dominion.65 
 The lynchpin to these debates was whether or not the indigenous Americans in question had 
adopted a sedentary lifestyle of cultivation. For Catholic theologians and jurists, Christianity and sedentism 
were synonymous terms, or more precisely, mobility signified infidelity. For this reason, one of the 
principal terms for identifying mobile peoples was “infidel Indians” (indios infieles). The process of 
conversion, in addition to baptism, involved forming a reduction or settling within an extant community, 
where one could both practice catechism and cultivate the earth. To convert indios infieles, therefore, was 
to “reduce them to the faith” (“reducirlos a la fe”), a concept that highlighted the indistinguishability of 
sedentism and Christianity.66 Furthermore, sedentism clarified for jurists the submission of native peoples 
to papal authority, which flowed through the crown, priests, and imperial officials. Such individuals could 
more readily be identified as vassals, and their lands and properties as pertaining to their imperial patron.67 
 For those who questioned the validity of the papal donation and sought to standardize acts of 
possession, the question of sedentism was also a key issue. If the Pope did not have the right to claim 
                                                       
65 ibid., 99. Despite offering primacy to sedentary peoples, Grotius did acknowledge mobile people’s claims. Moretti, 
International Law and Nomadic People, 25–30. These debates produced varying juridical contexts in the Americas, and in many 
instances, hunting or herding did not constitute legitimate claims to possession. Tamar Herzog, “Colonial Law and 'Native 
Customs': Indigenous Land Rights in Colonial Spanish America,” The Americas 69, no. 3 (2013): 311; Amith, The Möbius Strip, 71-
5, 98-103. 
66 Other means of expressing this idea included “reduzir a nossa obedencia” or “reduzir á doutrina e aldêa,” the former 
emphasizing vassalage and the latter emphasizing sedentism. IHGB – Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 44, 49v, 60, 61. 
Muriel, Elementos de derecho natural y de gentes, 313–15. For more on the relationship between conversion and territorial 
possession, see: Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 70–95. 
67 Imperial subjects did not necessarily share this juridical perspective. While individuals or communities may have accepted the 
authority of a royal court, this did not necessarily imply the cession of land rights. 
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dominion over lands belonging to “infieles,” then the resistance to or acceptance of Catholicism would 
shape whether or not they were vassals of an Iberian crown. In instances in which the independence of a 
particular community of native peoples was apparent, however, how could someone else claim their lands? 
Did the statutes of natural law protect their dominions? Over time, jurists demonstrated increased reticence 
toward acknowledging the rights of people who were not firmly established in a single location.68 
Nonetheless, many others saw herding or commerce as legitimate indicators of possession. In agreement 
with de Pauw, the Jesuit Domingo Muriel wrote:  
Not all of the human flock has the idea or much less the intention to become a legitimate possessor 
[of land] by means of their occupations of the regions in which they roam, and with exclusion of all 
others. But once vacant land has been occupied, property and dominion are acquired not only 
through new or intense cultivation, but also by means of herding cattle and by commerce.69  
 
Here and in other occasions, Muriel contended that while mobile peoples did not necessarily seek territorial 
exclusivity themselves, their occupation of a given place coupled with the herding of cattle or trade served 
as a legitimate determinant of their property and dominion. Imperial occupation, therefore, did not 
necessarily supersede that of mobile peoples in terms of natural rights, even when the establishment of 
colonies went unopposed.70 
                                                       
68 José María Mariluz Urquijo, El régimen de la tierra en el derecho indiano (Buenos Aires: Perrot, 1968), 28–29. Although the 
question of mobility vs. cultivation was always present in juridical debates, it became increasingly important in the eighteenth 
century. The idea of “terra nullius” emerged when earlier arguments, which justified territorial usurpation based upon incivility 
or the rejection of Christianity, waned. As settlement became a principal standard for determining possession, increasing 
numbers of jurists came to agree that uncultivated land was subject to no sovereign. Moretti, International Law and Nomadic People, 
Chapter 1.  
69 “No todo rebaño humano tiene la idea y menos la intención de hacerse posesor legítimo por medio de sus ocupaciones de las 
regiones en que yerra y con exclusión de los demás. Pero una vez que la tierra vacante ha sitio ocupada, la propiedad y el dominio 
se adquieren no solamente por medio de la cultura empezada ó intensa, sino también por medio del pastoreo de los ganados y del 
comercio.” Muriel, Elementos de derecho natural y de gentes, 99 Other jurists who shared Muriel’s opinión included Samuel 
Fufendorf, Christian Wolff, and William Blackstone. Moretti, International Law and Nomadic People, 24-30, 39. 
70 Muriel, Elementos de derecho natural y de gentes, 128, 131, 315, 348-9 While Muriel suggested that such claims to dominion were 
weaker than those exercised by sedentary peoples, and did not necessarily imply exclusivity, he nonetheless acknowledged their 
right to conserve their territories. Levinton, El espacio jesuítico-guaraní, - Volumen 80, 138, nt. 417. 
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 These juridical debates, although they never directly mentioned Minuanes, Charrúas, or other 
mobile peoples in the Río de la Plata, did have a direct impact on the thinking of Iberian administrators. 
Along with fomenting a race to establish strategic settlements, the juridical context of the early eighteenth 
century conditioned the meanings ascribed to interethnic relations. Knowing that tolderías effectively 
controlled the majority of regional space, administrators and diplomats alike sought to demonstrate that 
their imperial patron could still claim possession of it, either by delegitimizing the rights of native peoples 
or claiming them as subjects. Evidence of direct discussions of this issue is difficult to come by, and for that 
reason imperial attitudes are best understood through an assessment of the strategic actions of regional 
administrators. Nonetheless, one instance in which a high-ranking official opined on the juridical status of 
mobile peoples occurred in 1721, when the governor of Buenos Aires complained about trade between 
Yaros, Bohanes, Charrúas and foreign ships. 
It would be good if Your Lordship would order the Governor of this Plaza to oblige said Indians, by 
force or willingly, to abandon that countryside, over which they have no right, because they are like 
gypsies, vagabond wanderers, that have no fixed lands, house, or home, and only inhabit the 
countryside because of the cows [that are there].71  
 
His complaint demonstrates the key contradictions that plagued Iberian claims to the Río de la Plata’s 
northern shore. Since he was unable to claim the tolderías in question as vassals to the Spanish crown, 
Buenos Aires’s governor sought to delegitimize their rights to the region’s countryside. The logic that he 
employed asserted that given their mobility, Yaros, Bohanes, and Charrúas were not legitimate possessors. 
Instead, they were mere “inhabitants” of the land, a refrain that city officials repeated many times over.72 
                                                       
71 “seria bien que V.Sh. mandase ãl Governador de esta Plasa, que obligasse ã dichos indios, por fuersa, õ de grado, ã desamparar 
ãquellas campañas, a que no tienen derecho ãlguno, porque son como los gitanos, gente Bagamunda, que no tienen tierras fijas, 
casa, ni õgar, y solo las habitan, por el cebo de las Bacas...” AGI - Charcas, 264, (Buenos Aires, 1721-08-31). Although García 
Ros identifed Yaros, Charrúas, and Bohanes as the arbiters of trade and access to the countryside, it is more likely in this case that 
he was referring to Guenoa or Minuán tolderías that had been trading there for some time. See, for example: IHGB - Conselho 
Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 280-90; AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1721-09-12). 
72 AGI - Charcas, 263, (Buenos Aires, 1699-12-19 & 1715-12-16). 
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 There were two problems with this logic. First, it implied that if the tolderías had no territorial 
claim, Spain was the region’s legitimate possessor. This notion was most certainly rooted in the 1681 and 
1715 treaties, which had limited Portugal’s jurisdictional exclusivity to a cannon shot from the plaza of 
Colônia do Sacramento. By denouncing the rights of the tolderías because of their lack of settlements, 
however, the governor of Buenos Aires affirmed the notion that settlements should serve as a standard for 
determining territorial possession. In 1721, Spain had not yet founded the plazas of Maldonado and 
Montevideo, and thus had no foundation for its own claim. It is likely for this reason that the early signs of a 
French trading post in this area caused consternation across the river. Second, in seeking royal support for 
the expulsion of the tolderías from the area, the governor assumed that Spain had the right and capacity to 
police it. In doing so, he rejected the reports of individuals who had been in the field, which suggested that 
that the tolderías collectively had as many as 3,000 archers – a force too strong to topple. He dismissed such 
claims as exaggeration and argued that coercion was both advisable and feasible.73 
 While Iberian administrators dismissed tolderías as inhabitants of regional lands rather than 
possessors, they nonetheless relied upon them for access to the countryside. For imperial authorities, 
therefore, pact-making served the dual purpose of currying favor with particular caciques and creating the 
legal framework to identify them as vassals. The 1731 treaty between the plaza of Montevideo and Minuán 
tolderías provides a good example. The peace accord between included payments from  the former to the 
latter in exchange for access to the ranches that lay outside its walls. At the same time, however, the 
written agreement contained clauses that declared the tolderías to be subjects of the Spanish Crown. This 
nuanced language was likely of little importance to the caciques present at the parley and certainly had no 
direct impact on their relationship with the plaza; however, it was of the utmost importance to Spanish 
                                                       
73 As discussed in the previous chapter through the near abandonment of Montevideo in 1731, however, such an attitude was 
inaccurate and potentially disastrous. 
113 
 
authorities who were eager to claim possession over regional lands.74 By claiming the tolderías as vassals of 
the Spanish crown, they could delegitimize Portuguese territorial claims that were similarly framed. 
 Up through the first half of the eighteenth century, then, Spanish and Portuguese officials sought to 
incorporate regional tolderías into their imperial projects. Peace accords, such as that of 1731, provided 
legal language for imagining native peoples as imperial subjects; however, Iberian administrators more 
frequently sought to entice their mobile counterparts into settling on a reduction. Most of these efforts 
proved unsuccessful, as caciques likely interpreted the frequent payments given to them as an affirmation of 
their own authority rather than an incentive to subjugate themselves.75 Moreover, in those instances where 
tolderías settled in a fixed locale and developed a relationship with a priest, they did so for trade or for 
temporary shelter, and their seasonal movements made such arrangements ephemeral. This, combined with 
the heterogeneity of tolderías in the region, made the idea of reducing all of them an elusive task.  
 The possibility of establishing reductions was integral to the interimperial struggle over Colônia. In 
1715, after ten years of Spanish occupation, the Treaty of Utrecht transferred the plaza back to the 
Portuguese. Frustrated over the loss, the Governor of Buenos Aires considered retaking the plaza. 
[By controlling Colônia] we will have the advantage of dominating all of that countryside, and the 
reduction of the infidel Indians that inhabit it. If we do not, those provinces and the 30 Missions of 
the Company of Jesus will remain exposed to being easily lost to whichever nation settles and 
fortifies itself [there].76  
 
                                                       
74 Fucé, “Ceremonia persuasiva”. A transcription of the peace accords is available in: Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la 
Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 57–58. 
75 Intercultural exchanges such as these frequently produced misunderstandings in which both sides interpret an action through 
their own cultural norms. See: White, The Middle Ground, x; James Lockhart, Of Things of the Indies: Essays Old and New in Early 
Latin American History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 99. Records of payments from Iberian officials to caciques do 
not indicate indigenous perceptions; however, given the material dependency of Iberian settlements plazas upon tolderías at the 
time, it is more likely that caciques interpreted these offerings as tribute than affirmations of imperial authority.   
76 “y que de esta forma se conseguira la conveniencia de señorear todas aquellas campañas, y reducion de los yndios infieles que 
avitan en ellas; Y de lo contrario quedaran aquellas Provincias y mas de 30 pueblos de las Misiones, de la Compañía, expuestas a 
perderse con gran facilidad poblandose y fortificandose otra qualquiera nación.” AGI - Charcas, 263, (1ª carta, Buenos Aires, 
1716-05-13). 
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By controlling Colônia, Spain would be the lone imperial power with a foothold in the region. All that 
remained for it to consolidate its control would be to convince regional tolderías to settle on reductions.  
The particular advantage of dominating all of that countryside [is] having the possibility of reducing 
to our Holy Faith the infidel Indians that inhabit it, who if they joined together with the Christians 
and Spanish would be enough to oppose whatever insult our enemies might attempt.77 
 
Now, with Colônia back in Portuguese hands, caciques could once again negotiate between the two crowns 
and reducing them would be more difficult. The region was again exposed to foreign powers, as the 
Portuguese presence left juridical debates in the air and mobile tolderías with multiple trading partners. 
 Portuguese officials attempted the same strategy upon their return to Colônia. For them, local 
tolderías represented not only a lifeline to their plaza, but also the best chance at preventing future Spanish 
or French settlements in Montevideo and Maldonado. Thus, in 1718, Colônia’s governor wrote to the 
Ultramarine Council (Conselho Ultramarino) in Lisbon: 
[W]hat would help more than anything is if we were to have on our side the Indians of that district 
[Montevideo] because these are the ones that facilitate the Castilians in their undertakings there and 
the ones that obtain [cattle] for them. For this reason it is necessary to take great care and industry 
in acquiring them, in exchange for several items that are given to them, which they hold in great 
esteem yet for us are a small price, and attempt to reduce them to a village under the governance of 
the Jesuits, or another reformed religion.78  
 
Days later, the governor made a pact with several Minuán caciques – Chacadar, Francisco, and Loya. In 
exchange for the caciques’ promise to guard the coastline against foreign ships, the Portuguese would pay 
200,000 reais in goods and help them locate a relative who had been sent to Rio de Janeiro. According to 
the Governor’s official report, the agreement also included a Minuán promise to live under the protection 
                                                       
77 “...la particular combenensia de señorear todas aquellas campañas teniendo possibilidad de redusir a n.ra Santa Feê a los yndios 
ynfieles que las abitan, los quales si se reunisen con los cristianos y españoles bastarían â oponerse a qualquier ynsulto que los 
enemigos pudiessen yntentar…” ibid., (2ª carta, Buenos Aires, 1716-05-13). 
78 “...contribuirá mais que tudo se tivermos da nossa parte os Indios daquelle districto, porque estes sam os que facilitam aos 
Castelhanos, as suas empresas n'aquella parte e os que lhes conseguem, para o que será preciso pôr grande cuidado e industria em 
adquiril-os, a trôco de algumas cousas que se lhe dêem, que sendo para elles de grande estimação, para nós são de pouco preço, e 
procurar reduzil-os á doutrina e aldêa debaixo do Governo dos padres da companhia, ou deoutra religião reformada.” IHGB - 
Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 49-49v. 
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of the Portuguese king and to be baptized.79 This accord, much like the later one between Montevideo and 
Minuán caciques, represented the dissonance between imperial ambitions and material territorial 
conditions. While the Portuguese governor sought to produce evidence of Minuán vassalage, Chadacar, 
Francisco, and Loya would have had little reason to interpret the arrangement in such terms. The act of 
baptism, if it indeed ever occurred, would have been a ceremonious signification of such ties rather than an 
act of submission. Likewise, the offering of payment would probably have been understood to be either a 
reciprocal act of giving or the recognition of Minuán authority in the region.80 The plaza offered 200,000 
reais again in 1727 in the hope that this time Minuán caciques would agree to settle; however, the results of 
this venture were the same as the first.81 
 More often than not, missionaries rather than secular officials undertook the labor of advancing 
reductions. From as far back as the 1620s, Jesuits, Mercedarians, Franciscans, and other orders sought to 
establish reductions with Bohanes, Charrúas, Guenoas, Minuanes, and Yaros, much as they had with 
Guaraní-speaking peoples. A survey of ecclesiastical records reveals at least seventeen attempts between 
1623 and 1736, in addition to the numerous Charrúas and Guenoas who alighted in Yapeyú and San Borja, 
respectively (Table 2.2). Much like Iberian officials in Colônia, Montevideo, or Rio Grande, church leaders 
hoped to use the reductions simultaneously as a means to subjugate and proselytize tolderías, to gain access 
to the rural countryside, and to stake a claim over regional space against competing plazas. 
  
                                                       
79 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 59-62; AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 17, Doc 3580; 
AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 1, Doc 52. For more on Minuán motives in this particular case, see: Frühauf 
Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 618–9. 
80 In the end, the Portuguese governor did provide payments, yet it appears that the baptisms never did occur. IHGB - Conselho 
Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 237-8. For more on the issue of baptism and Minuán caciques, see: Hameister, “'No princípio era o 
caos'”: 114-115, 125. 
81 AHU - Nova Colónia do Sacramento (012), Caixa 2, Doc 180. 
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FROM TO NAME ETHNONYM ORDER LOCATION 
1623 1623 [Never founded] Charrúas; 
Yaros 
Jesuit Mouth of Río Uruguay 
1624 [1631] San Francisco de 
Olivares 
Charrúas Franciscan Mouth of Río Negro 
1624 [1631] San Juan de Céspedes 
[San Antonio de los 
Chanáes] 
Chanás Franciscan Mouth of Río Negro 
1655 1655 [Never founded] Guenoas Jesuit Near Río Uruguay 
1657 [1658] San Andrés* Yaros Jesuitas Arroyo Ibarapita-guazú 
1660 [ - ] Santo Domingo 
Soriano 
Chanás; 
Charrúas 
Franciscan Mouth of Río Negro, 
west of Río Uruguay 
1664 1666 Doctrina de Franciso 
de Rivas Gavilán** 
Guaraníes Mercedarian Itacurubi, near San 
Javier, Uruguay 
1664 [ - ] [n/a]** Charrúas Mercedarian Sauce de Luna, cerca 
del arroyo Pay Ticú 
1678 1678 [Never founded] Guenoas Jesuits Near La Cruz & 
Yapeyú 
1682 1682 Jesús/Santa María de 
Guenoas 
Guenoas Jesuit Mouth of Río Ibicuy 
1683 1683 [Never Founded] Guenoas Jesuit Between Santo Tomé, 
Yapeyú, & La Cruz 
[1683] [1683] San Andrés* Guenoas Jesuit Santa Tecla/Aceguá 
1693 1693 San Joaquin Charrúas; 
Yaros 
Jesuit Arecifes o Ytus del Río 
Uruguay 
1703 1703 [Never founded] Bohanes Franciscan Old site of Soriano 
1724 1724 [Never founded] Minuanes Franciscan Montevideo 
1726 1726 [Never founded] Minuanes [n/a] Colônia do Sacramento 
1736 1736 [Never founded] Minuanes [n/a] Rio Grande 
1750 1750 [Never founded] Minuanes Jesuit Montevideo 
1750 1750 Estancias del Bojurú Minuanes [n/a] Rio Grande 
1750 1794 Nuestra Señora de la 
Concepción de Cayastá 
Charrúas Franciscan North of Santa Fe 
Table 2.2 – Reductions and Attempted Reductions in the Río de la Plata, 1623-175082 
                                                       
82 *It is unclear whether San Andrés de Yaros and San Andrés de Guenoas represented the same reduction, two separate attempts 
at a reduction at the same site, or confusion amongst Jesuit sources. In Fúrlong, map XXXII, the reduction is labeled “San 
Antonio de Guenoas y Yarros.” **It is possible that the two 1664 Mercedarian reductions were instead one. Nicolás del Techo, 
Historia de la Provincia del Paraguay Tomo 3 (Madrid: A. de Uribe y Companía, 1897), 135–137, 240; Sergio Hernán Latini, 
“Reducción de charrúas en la "Banda del Norte" a principios del siglo XVII: ¿Logro del poder colonial o estrategia indígena de 
adaptación?,” Memoria Americana 21, no. 2 (julio-diciembre 2013); Coni, Historia de las vaquerías del Río de la Plata, 1555-1750, 65; 
Bracco, “Los errores Charrúa y Guenoa-Minuán”: 124–5; Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas”: 62–3; Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía 
jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, vol.  2, Mapas XX & XXXII; Francisco Jarque, Insignes missioneros de la Compañía de Jesus en la provincia de 
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By the 1730s, nearly all of the plazas that dotted the perimeter of the Río de la Plata were 
undertaking efforts to entice its numerous tolderías to settle on reductions.83 In 1736, as Colônia was under 
siege, Portuguese officials hoped to strengthen their position in the plaza of Rio Grande. Although they had 
been in contact with Minuán caciques for years, offering payments in exchange for the ability to transit 
between Rio Grande and Colônia, they made a new push toward establishing a formal reduction alongside 
the plaza. This settlement never materialized, however, as many of Rio Grande’s Portuguese inhabitants 
were fearful of the nearby tolderías, as they had come to take horses from them not long before.84 More 
                                                       
Paraguay: Estado presente de sus missiones en Tucuman, Paraguay y Rio de la Plata que comprende su distrito (Pamplona: Juan Micòn, 
1687), 383–84; Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 383–84; Cayetano Cattáneo, “Relación del viaje realizado de Buenos Aires a 
la Misiones Orientales” in La cruz y el lazo, 184; BNB - De Ângelis, MS 508 (22), doc 526; Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la historia 
civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, 2a ed Tomo I (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Bonaerense, 1856), 294–95; AGNA - IX. 6-9-7, 
(1743-04-30); Segura, Juan José Antonio, Historia Eclesiástica de Entre Ríos, 1a edición (Nogoyá: Imp. Nogoyá, 1964), 17; César 
Blás Pérez Colman, Historia de Entre Ríos: Epoca colonial (1520-1810) 1 (Paraná: Imprensa de la Provincia, 1936), 80; Sallaberry, 
Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 166; AGI - Charcas, 150, (Asunción, 1678-03-31); López Mazz and Bracco, Minuanos, 19, 24-39; Azara, 
Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara, Tomo Primero, 165; José H. Figueira, “Los 
primitivos habitantes del Uruguay” in El Uruguay en la Exposición Histórico-Americana de Madrid, 153, 155; AGNA - VII. Biblioteca 
Nacional 289, (4390/1, #12; 4390/2; #5); Porto, História das Missões Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Volume III, 67, 305; 
Lorenzo Hervás, Catálogo de las lenguas de las naciones conocidas, y numeracion, division, y clases de estas segun la diversidad de sus idiomas 
y dialectos, tomo 1 (Madrid: Ranz, 1800), 196–97; Sepp von Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, 103–5; 
AGNA - IX. 41-1-3, (Buenos Aires, 1703-10-08); AGI - Chile, 153, AGI – Chile, 153 (Montevideo, 1724-08-29 & 1724-09-15, 
Buenos Aires, 1726-09-15); AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 23, Doc 5305; João Borges Fortes, “O 
Brigadeiro José da Silva Paes e a fundação do Rio Grande,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano XIII, 
3o Trimestre (1933): 49, 62; “Memoria dos serviços prestados pelo Mestre de Campo André Ribeiro Coutinho no Governo do 
Rio Grande de S. Pedro, dirigida a Gomes Freire de Andrada, em 1740”: 245–6; “Carta de Cristovão Pereira de Abreu para 
Gomes Fr.e de Andrada datada do Rio Grande de S. Pedro 29 de Setembro de 1736,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do 
Rio Grande do Sul Ano XXVI, 4o Trimestre, No. 104 (1946): 357–8; “Copia da carta de Cristovão Pereira de Abreu a Jose da Silva 
Paes (?), datada do Rio Grande de Sam Pedro aos 5 de Dezembro de 1736,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande 
do Sul Ano XXVI, 4o Trimestre, No. 104 (1946): 416–9; “Coleção de documentos sobre o Brigadeiro José da Silva Paes”: 4–6; 
“Registro de atos oficiais no presídio do Rio Grande (1737-1753)”: 235-6, 258; Leite, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, 
vol.  6, 528–30; AGI - Charcas, 378, (Buenos Aires, 1751-04-26); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1750-07-22, 1750-09-06, 
1750-09-10, & 1750-10-27); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 182–84; Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 301–2. 
83 Santa Fe and Corrientes were the principal exceptions to this rule, a point likely explained by their distance from disputed 
territories. By the Treaty of Utrecht in 1715, Portugal no longer claimed dominion over territories west of the Río Uruguay. 
84 “Carta de Cristovão Pereira de Abreu para Gomes Fr.e de Andrada datada do Rio Grande de S. Pedro 29 de Setembro de 
1736”: 357–8; “Copia da carta de Cristovão Pereira de Abreu a Jose da Silva Paes, datada do Rio Grande de Sam Pedro aos 5 de 
Dezembro de 1736”: 416–9; “Coleção de documentos sobre o Brigadeiro José da Silva Paes”: 4–6. Despite Portuguese efforts, 
only one family of Minuanes accepted baptism. “Memoria dos serviços prestados pelo Mestre de Campo André Ribeiro Coutinho 
no Governo do Rio Grande de S. Pedro, dirigida a Gomes Freire de Andrada, em 1740”: 245–6; Fortes, “O Brigadeiro José da 
Silva Paes e a fundação do Rio Grande”: 49, 62; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 618. 
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importantly, the Minuán caciques were simultaneously negotiating with Spanish authorities and therefore 
had little incentive to stay.85  
 Spanish authorities in Montevideo had been supporting similar efforts at reductions since the first 
Iberian attempts to establish a plaza there. In 1724, Franciscan friar Pedro Jerónimo de la Cruz proposed 
the idea of a reduction for what he calculated to be the 2,000 Minuanes who lived nearby, yet local caciques 
rejected the offer. De la Cruz cited his advanced age as the reason for the caciques’ reticence; however, 
there was little promise of material benefit for them.86 By 1743, imperial authorities renewed their efforts 
to establish a Minuán reduction in the proximities of the plaza. Their plan, put forth by Jesuits in Buenos 
Aires, was to send Christian Guenoas from the San Borja mission to persuade the tolderías that were nearest 
to Montevideo. It also included a specific effort to define the legal status of the Minuanes in the event that 
they accepted the proposal. 
It should be judged convenient that from the City of Montevideo, where [they would be] reduced 
to a more political lifestyle, [the Minuanes] will have fewer obstacles to receiving the gospel, which 
without a doubt will be achieved if the said Indians are assured under your Royal Word that they 
will neither serve nor be entrusted to the Spanish (an idea that they extremely abhor) but rather 
attached to the Royal Crown, in order to protect them in a proper and gentle vassalage.87 
 
In this way, Jesuit leaders aimed to incorporate local tolderías as vassals to the Spanish crown without 
subjecting them to local authorities. They sought to gradually win their allegiance through material support. 
In response to this plan, the Crown authorized the installation of a Jesuit residency in Montevideo the 
                                                       
85 Field reports by Portuguese soldiers revealed that Minuán tolderías were simultaneously patrolling the countryside with 
Spanish soldiers and entering and leaving Montevideo. Minuanes near Rio Grande also maintained close ties to Guaraníes from 
the easternmost missions. BNP - F. 1445, f. 56; “Coleção de documentos sobre o Brigadeiro José da Silva Paes”: 16–7 Bracco, 
Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 126–27; Hameister, Para dar calor à nova povoação, 19. 
86 AGI - Chile, 153, (Montevideo, 1724-08-29 & 1724-09-15). 
87 “Jusgasen comben.te de la Ciu.d de Montevideo, donde reducidos â vida mas politica, tendran menos embarazo p.a recivir el 
evangelio, lo que no duda se conceguirá si se les asegura â dhos Yndios debajo de V.R.l Palabra, de la no servirán, ni seran 
encomendados ãl español (lo que sumam.te aborrecen) sino solo agregados ã V. R.l Corona, p.a protexerlos en un devido y suave 
vassallaje.” AGI - Charcas, 384, “Petición del Procurador de la Compañía de Jesús, padre Juan José Rico” (s/f, pero visto en 
consejo 1743-10-17); Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, Capítulo 5, nt. 8, 12; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la 
Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, Capítulo 6. 
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following year.88  As was the case with Rio Grande, however, there was little incentive for the tolderías to 
settle on a reduction and develop a dependent relationship with the local plaza. By the century’s midpoint, 
the success of gradual incorporation through payment seemed improbable. 
 Jesuit authorities also developed new strategies to try to attract Charrúa and Guenoa tolderías to 
the northern and western portions of the region. In 1747, José Cardiel drafted a report outlining the 
difficulties that he and others had faced in the reduction of tolderías and strategies to overcome them. 
Basing much of his assessment on time that he had spent visiting Charrúa tolderías near Yapeyú in 1743, 
Cardiel argued: 
We have found two kinds of Indians in this province: those on foot [who are farmers] and who live 
in houses and towns with obedience to their caciques, and those on horseback, with neither houses 
nor towns nor crops nor obedience to their caciques. [They live as] lazy vagabonds their entire lives 
without a fixed locale, always living on what they hunt or steal….Converting the first has not come 
at a great cost because they have a certain sort of rationality and order, nor has the formation of 
their towns been expensive since they are accustomed to the work that their houses and farms 
demand. From the beginning, they devoted themselves to the [work] that a town demands. Such 
have been the Guaraníes and the Chiquitos. The second [kind], because of their lack of rationality 
and order, their innate inertia, and the horror that they have of all kinds of work, even if it is for 
their own good, have made the Apostolic men whine and sweat for more than a century without 
having any effect.89 
 
Convinced that if only they could see the benefits of a sedentary lifestyle firsthand, Charrúas, Guenoas, and 
others would choose to stay permanently on reductions themselves, Cardiel proposed the founding of 
settler colonies in the midst of lands controlled by certain tolderías. Each colony would be comprised of 
upwards of 200 individuals from the Guaraní missions and would be provisioned with food, clothing, and 
                                                       
88 AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 183, docs. 1182 & 1188. 
89 “Dos especies de indios son los q' encontramos en esta Prov.a: unos de a pie, y Labradores, ô chacareros, como aqui se dice, q' 
viven en casas y Pueblos con obediencia â sus Caciques. Y otros de acaballo, sin casas, ni Pueblo, ni sementeras, ni obediencia â 
sus caciques, vagos, y vagabundos toda su vida sin sitio fixo; y viviendo siempre dela caza, y del hurto….Los 1.os por tener algun 
genero de racionalidad y policia, no ha costado mho el convertirlos; ni han sido mhos los gastos en la formacion de sus Pueblos; 
pues como acostumbrados al trabaxo, q' piden sus casas y chacras, desde el principio se dieron â las fabricas, y trabaxos q' pide un 
Pueblo. Tales han sido los Guaranís, y los Chiquitos = = = = = Los 2.os por su falta de racionalidad y policia, por su inata 
inercia, y por el orrible orror, q' tienen â todo trabaxo, aunq' sea p.a su bien son los q' han hecho sudar y gemir a los varones 
Apostolicos por mas de un siglo sin conseguir efecto.” AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, 4390/1; Levinton, El espacio 
jesuítico-guaraní, - Volumen 80, 111–12; Levinton, “Guaraníes y Charrúas”: 64. 
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goods taken from the other missions. He hoped that by forming a province of new plazas in the region’s 
interior, rather than restricting them to the perimeter, tolderías would have more incentives to remain in 
the same location permanently.90 Much like the cases of Colônia, Rio Grande, and Montevideo, this plan 
never came to fruition. 
 
1749 to 1752: Interimperial Peace and Interethnic Violence 
 In 1749, a sharp change occurred in interimperial and interethnic relations in the region. Iberian 
diplomats for the first time articulated new standards for determining territorial possession – treaty maps – 
as they negotiated what would become the Treaty of Madrid. As the competing arguments over the papal 
donation versus uti possidetis had failed to resolve the perpetual territorial disputes, and nationally 
sponsored mapping expeditions were insufficient to garner international recognition, negotiators now put 
their faith in the union of diplomacy and mapmaking (Table 2.3). While these deliberations were taking 
place far away in royal courts, the Río de la Plata became once again embroiled in interethnic violence. 
Spanish and Portuguese officials reported armed combat between tolderías, and soon after, in both 
Montevideo and the western portion of the region, Spanish soldiers engaged in fighting as well. As a result, 
the next three years saw both a dramatic reconfiguration of relations between regional tolderías and an 
increased number of caciques negotiating the possibility of reductions.   
                                                       
90 AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 289, 4390/1 & 4390/2. 
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YEAR TREATY SIGNIFICANCE FOR RÍO DE LA PLATA 
1494 Tordesillas Set theoretical division between Spanish & Portuguese dominions at 370 leagues 
west of Cape Verde Islands 
1529 Zaragoza Produced an antimeridian of the Tordesillas line 
1668 Lisbon Spanish & Portuguese vassals could cross imperial frontiers (Article 3) 
1681 Lisbon (1) Colônia do Sacramento recognized as Portuguese possession (Articles 2 & 3) 
(2) Common use of countryside (Article 7) 
1701 Lisbon Spain renounces rights over lands arbitrated in 1681 treaty (Article 14) 
1715 Utrecht (1) Lands/plaza of Colônia do Sacramento returned to Portuguese (Articles 5-8) 
(2) Uti posseditis replaces papal donation as standard measure of possession 
1737 Paris (1) Colônia do Sacramento affirmed as Portuguese 
(2) Principal of uti posseditis guides treaty 
1750 Madrid 
[Permuta] 
(1) Mapping replaces uti posseditis as standard measure of possession (Article 1) 
(2) Portugal and Spain exchange Colônia do Sacramento for the Siete Pueblos 
Orientales in affirmation of territorial exclusivity (Articles 13 & 14) 
(3) Demarcation expeditions sent to region to define border (Article 22) 
Table 2.3 – Treaties Guiding Territorial Possession in the Río de la Plata up to 1750 
 
 The combined distrust for earlier accords and unilateral mapping endeavors led Portuguese and 
Spanish diplomats to seek a new means to determine legitimate territorial possession. Despite their 
disagreement about how to divide possession, they were unanimous in their diagnosis of the problem. 
Representatives of the royal court in Lisbon contended: 
[Following the Treaty of Tordesillas, the Spanish] never catalogued their conquests nor demarcated 
their limits, nor detailed this imaginary line, the division with Portugal from North to South. For 
this reason, the two crowns possess an undivided America, with neither being able to say with 
certainty what is theirs, beyond that which they have settled. And in this way, Castile can say with 
much certainty that Cuyabá, Mato Grosso, and Pará are theirs, and Portugal that Buenos Aires, 
Tucumán and Paraguay pertain to it; the demarcation will be the proof and certainty of each of 
these claims.91 
 
                                                       
91 “[Depois do Tratado de Tordesilhas, os espanhóis] nunca tombarão as suas conquistas, nem demarcavão os seus limites, nem 
carrevão a tal linha imaginaria, divizão com Portugal do Norte a Sul, de que sucede estarem as duas coroas possuindo a America 
como por indivizo, sem nenhum poder dizer de certo o que he seu, senão o que tem povoado, e neste sentido pode dizer Castela 
com tanta certeza, que o Cuyabá, Mato Grosso, e Para superior são seus. Como Portugal, que Buenos Ayres, Tucuman e o 
Paraguay lhe pertence, pois a falta de demarcação será a prova e a certeza tanto a huns como a outros.” IHGB - Arquivo, lata 168, 
doc 4, f. 65. Numerous Portuguese diplomats also expressed this distrust toward Spanish-sponsored mapping expeditions. See, 
for example: IHGB - Arquivo, lata 50, doc 7; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 30v. 
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The perpetuity of borderland disputes between the two empires in South America was due to the fact that 
they had never sent mapmakers to draw the Tordesillas line on the ground. Even Jorge Juan and Antonio de 
Ulloa, Spanish participants in the La Condamine expedition to the Amazon, agreed. 
It is always necessary to utilize a map, or maritime chart, based in the exactitude that is determined 
by observations of longitudes in the most notable and principal places. [One should] not rely on the 
uncertainty and variety of those that are only made from diaries and nautical routes, nor on [those] 
that can be believed to be partial, for being national, to the interests of one of the two crowns.92 
 
Certainly numerous maps had been produced over the years in an attempt to add clarity to the issue, but 
these works were considered untrustworthy. Those drawn from engravers’ tables in European cities relied 
upon imprecise diaries and journals from missionaries or travelers, while those produced by direct 
observation and state-of-the-art measurement lacked the necessary transparency for them to be reliable.  
 Negotiators also agreed on the remedy, and by January of 1750 they had all signed the treaty. The 
main statutes relevant to the Río de la Plata were as follows. Portugal would cede the plaza of Colônia do 
Sacramento to Spain, which in return would order the evacuation of the “Siete Pueblos Orientales,” the 
Jesuit-Guaraní missions that had been established to the east of the Río Uruguay. In addition, the two 
crowns would finance joint mapping expeditions to determine a new line between their respective South 
American dominions. This borderline would replace all previous standards of determining territorial 
possession, as noted in the treaty’s first article. 
The present treaty will be the only foundation and rule that should be followed in the future for the 
division and limits of dominions in all of America and in Asia. In virtue of this, whatever right or 
action that the two Crowns may have claimed will be completely abolished, whether derived from 
the bull of Pope Alexander VI, of blessed memory, and the treaties of Tordesillas, Lisbon, and 
Utrecht, from the sale [of the Moluccas] authorized in Zaragoza, or from any other treaties, 
conventions or promises. All of that, as much as it deals with the line of demarcation, will be of no 
value or effect, as if that and all the rest has never been determined. And in the future the said line 
will no longer be negotiated, nor will it be used to make decisions, however difficult they may be, 
                                                       
92 “es preciso valernos siempre de algun Mapa, ò Carta Marítima, bastando para la exactitud, que se hallen determinadas por las 
Observaciones con fixeza las Longitudes en aquellos parages mas notables, y principales: y para no incurrir en la poca certeza, y 
variedad de aquellas, que solo se fabricaron arregladas à los Diarios, y Derroteros de los Nauticos, ni en el defecto de las que 
pueden creerse parciales, por ser Nacionales, à los interesses de alguna de las dos Coronas.” Juan and Ulloa, Disertación histórica y 
geográfica sobre el meridiano de demarcación, 71–72. 
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that occur about the limits, but instead the frontier that is prescribed in the present articles, [will be 
used] as an invariable rule and much less subject to controversies.93 
 
To realize this initiative, teams of engineers, geographers, and cosmographers from both sides would meet 
together and walk the border in one another’s presence. They would be required to sign off on the same 
maps, which would then be used as the standard measure for future disagreements. 
 The Treaty of Madrid represented a marked shift in the way that imperial negotiators not only 
determined possession but also how they imagined it, a shift from plazas to provinces. Each earlier accord 
had considered plazas to be the key markers of imperial possession, with dominion extending out from 
them according to juridical antecedents, natural limits, or relations with native peoples. It was possible to 
have overlapping settlements, as occurred in the Río de la Plata, which is why the dueling Iberian empires 
sought to prevent new settlements by competitors. Each new plaza altered not only the physical but also the 
juridical landscape. In this context, maps served as representations of possession that had been determined 
through other means. The Treaty of Madrid employed the reverse logic – maps were not simply 
representations of territorial possession, but rather legal determinants of it. In this way, the borderline 
superseded the plaza as the key marker of the limits of imperial dominion, effectively eliminating the 
possibility of overlapping settlements, shared territorial access, or unclaimed lands. Territorial possession 
was henceforth unilateral, exclusive, and “without interruption,” at least in juridical terms.94 
                                                       
93 “El presente tratado será el único fundamento y regla que en adelante se deberá seguir para la división y límites de los dominios 
en toda la América y en Asia; y en su virtud quedará abolido cualquier derecho y acción que puedan alegar las dos Coronas, con 
motivo de la bula del Papa Alejandro VI, de feliz memoria, y de los tratados de Tordesillas, de Lisboa y Utrecht, de la escritura de 
venta otorgada en Zaragoza, y de otros cualquiera tratados, convenciones y promesas; que todo ello, en cuanto trata de la línea de 
demarcación, será de ningún valor y efecto, como si no hubiera sido determinado en todo lo demás en su fuerza y vigor. Y en lo 
futuro no se tratará más de la citada línea, ni se podrá usar de este medio para la decisión de cualquiera dificultad que ocurra sobre 
los límites, sino únicamente de la frontera que se prescribe en los presentes artículos, como regla invariable y mucho menos 
sujeta a controversias.” Full-text of the treaty is available here.   
94 Cortesão, Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid (1750), Parte III, Documento XCII. Several scholars have pointed to the 
Treaty of Madrid as the moment in which uti possidetis finally became standard means to claim territorial possession. From this 
perspective, the Treaty of Utrecht represented the moment in which negotiators, geographers, and jurists alike began to replace 
the imaginary Tordesillas line with the notion of natural limits. Dauril Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil, with Special 
Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1799 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 68; 
Camargo, “Las relaciones luso-hispánicas en torno a las Misiones Orientales del Uruguay”: 237-8, 244–246; Íris Kantor, 
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 This new logic and vision of territorial possession thrust mapmakers into the center of the 
interimperial dispute, making them the principal arbiters and giving their deliberations unprecedented 
weight in determining where to locate the division. Certainly, the diplomats who had congregated in 
Madrid to draft the treaty determined which territories to exchange and provided general guidelines for 
where to draw the line. They even developed a guide map, known as the “Mapa das Cortes,” which 
commissioned officials would carry with them as they traversed continental interiors.95  Nonetheless, 
mapmakers bore the burden of hashing out details and transforming the theoretical parameters of the 
treaty’s geographic vision into something compatible with local landscapes. Ultimately, the maps that they 
collectively underwrote would supersede the “Mapa das Cortes” as the principal determinants of the limits 
of one division or another. In short, the treaty maps were not simply representations, but rather legal 
documents that would guide imperial land policy throughout the rest of the colonial period. 
The Treaty of Madrid also marked a shift in the ways in which Spain and Portugal discussed the 
territorial possessions of mobile peoples. While the concept of plazas allowed for the legal possibility of 
land possession through herding or trading, the concept of provinces did not. Instead, this way of seeing 
                                                       
“Soberania e territorialidade colonial: Academia Real de História Portuguesa e a América Portuguesa (1720),” in Temas 
Setecentistas: governos e populações no império português, ed. Andrea Doré and Antonio Cesar de Almeida Santos, 233–9 v. 1 
(Curitiva: UFPR/SCHLA, 2009); Kantor, “Usos diplomáticos da ilha-Brasil”: 80; Magalhães, “Mundos em miniatura”: 85; 
Furtado, O mapa que inventou o Brasil, Capítulo 9. This narrative certainly explains how negotiators determined the placement of 
the new dividing line for the Treaty of Madrid. The concept of uti possidetis justified the drawing of the line in a way that 
incorporated new settlements, and in this way represented an end to the imaginary Tordesillas line. Nonetheless, settlements 
were not the only determining factor in where to draw the new line, as negotiators took into account historical narratives of 
possession, as well as earlier maps and treaties, when making their case. Furthermore, the concept of uti possidetis was discarded 
when determining what to do with Colônia do Sacramento and the Siete Pueblos Orientales. The significance of the treaty, then, 
was not the definitive victory of uti possidetis, but rather the first juridical attempt to determine a hard line between the two 
empires and to produce territorial exclusivity. From this point forward, uti possidetis would be a factor in arbitrating territorial 
disputes; however, the retention of new settlements depended upon their proximity to extant treaty lines. The borderline could 
be adjusted, as it was in 1777 and 1804, yet it could not be erased. 
95 For more on the Mapa das Cortes, see: Cortesão, História do Brasil nos velhos mapas, Tomo II, Capítulo 2; Luís Ferrand de 
Almeida, Alexandre de Gusmão, o Brasil e o Tratado de Madrid (1735-1750), História Moderna e Contemporânea 5 (Coimbra: 
Universidade de Coimbra, 1990); Mário Olímpio Clemente Ferreira, “O Mapa das Cortes e o Tratado de Madrid a cartografia a 
serviço da diplomacia,” Varia História 23, no. 37 (Junho 2007); Magalhães, “Mundos em miniatura”: 85–6; Furtado, O mapa que 
inventou o Brasil. 
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space relied squarely on cartographic measurement and demanded complete territorial control. It deemed 
usufruct rights subordinate to drawings on paper. By extension, then, native peoples could no longer be 
considered legitimate possessors of land, or even independent agents. As a result, imperial officials began to 
envision them as vassals, whether they had accepted reductions or not. 
 1749 was also an important moment for local interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata, as plazas in 
nearly all corners of the region gained traction in their efforts to establish reductions. During the next three 
years, Charrúa or Minuán caciques approached local officials in São Miguel, Montevideo, Yapeyú, and other 
plazas to discuss the possibility of establishing settlements, a direct result of the spike in interethnic 
violence. In São Miguel, the Minuán caciques Xiclano, Tacú, Agostinho, and Casildo discussed with the 
local commander the possibility of establishing a settlement near the plaza of Rio Grande.96 They 
represented as many as 80 families and 400 people in total, to whom Portuguese officials provided food, 
clothing, and other items. The initial plan for a large settlement fell apart, as settlers in Rio Grande resisted 
the idea and the Minuán caciques refused a modified plan. Nonetheless, as many as 83 Minuanes were 
baptized in Rio Grande between 1749 and 1753, and a number of them remained as salaried workers in 
Borujú, a nearby ranch that belonged to the Portuguese crown.97 Furthermore, many of those who 
ultimately did not choose long-term settlement, including Tacú, developed kinship ties with individuals in 
the plaza.98  
                                                       
96 More specifically, the Minuán caciques negotiated with Pedro Pereira Chaves, the commander of the Guarda do Chuí, which 
was an outpost near São Miguel. 
97 “Registro de atos oficiais no presídio do Rio Grande (1737-1753)”: 235-6, 258; Leite, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, 
vol.  6, 528–30. Also transcribed in Guilhermino Cesar, ed., Primeiros cronistas do Rio Grande do Sul: estudo de fontes primárias da 
história rio-grandense acompanhado de vários textos, 2a edição (Porto Alegre: Ed. da UFRGS, 1981), 140–45 See also: “Autos 
principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780),” Revista do Museo e Archivo Publico 
do Rio Grande do Sul, no. 23 (1930): 494; Hameister, Para dar calor à nova povoação, 22-3, 190-1, 279-89, 299; Hameister, “'No 
princípio era o caos'”: 100–102, 109-116; Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 238–40; Kühn, Breve história do Rio Grande 
do Sul, 21. 
98 The sacrament of baptism thus served principally as a means to establish kinship ties, rather than to signify conversion or 
vassalage. Such was the case with Tacú and the family of Antônio Simões and Maria Quitéria Marques de Souza. Maria Quitéria 
baptized and served as godmother for Faustina, Tacú’s daughter, and through this relationship that this fostered with Tacú, 
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 One year after the four caciques approached the Portuguese guards, another toldería was in 
dialogue with Montevideo regarding the possibility of a settlement there. Canamazán, the principal cacique 
involved in the negotiations, and 39 other Minuanes spent the second half of 1750 waiting as the plaza 
scrambled to find priests to administer the reduction. Meanwhile, Montevideo’s authorities had begun to 
collect money and cattle from their residents in support of the new settlement.99 By the beginning of the 
next year, however, the Minuanes’ patience had worn thin and they left with a number of other tolderías 
that frequented the area. Their path now took them east, in the direction of São Miguel, though it is unclear 
whether they intended to meet with Portuguese officials or other Minuanes, or hoped to exploit local 
resources during the summer months.100 
 While Canamazán and his toldería waited near Montevideo, a number of others approached the 
priests of Yapeyú to discuss the possibility of a reduction there. Although details of this exchange are thin, it 
appears that as many as 145 Charrúas had arrived at the plaza. Furthermore, according to reports, Minuán 
and Guenoa tolderías had gone to San Borja and other mission plazas with the same objective in mind.101 In 
the case of Yapeyú, Jesuit and Guaraní authorities were skeptical of the sincerity of the Charrúas’ interest in 
a reduction. They feared that this was simply a ploy that would allow them to take advantage of the 
mission’s seasonal harvest, only to leave thereafter and join together with nearby Minuán tolderías, with 
                                                       
Simões was granted access to the local countryside. Other families developed similar relationships with Agostinho. Hameister, 
“'No princípio era o caos'”: 110-114-115. 
99 They were prepared to offer as many as 265 cows, 510 sheep, 110 silver pesos, yerba, and eight months’ worth of jerky if the 
toldería would accept a settlement. Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 301–2. 
100 It is indeed possible that the Minuán tolderías near Montevideo had ties to those who presented themselves to the Portuguese 
guard in São Miguel, or that they were one and the same. At the same time, according to Francisco de Gorriti, that area was 
“habitación común de los minuanes a temporadas” because of the quantity of deer there was to hunt. AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, 
(Montevideo, 1750-07-22 & 1750-09-06); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 182–84; AGI - Charcas, 378, (Buenos Aires, 1751-
04-26); Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 301–2. 
101 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Buenos Aires, 1750-10-12; Las Vívoras, 1750-11-09); Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 266. 
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whom they had been previously.102 It is unclear whether or not any of the Charrúas stayed at Yapeyú, but it 
appears that most of them eventually left. According to the testimony of a former resident of the mission, 
the Charrúas they had since joined together with Minuán and Bohan tolderías somewhere near the Rio 
Queguay.103 
 After so many years of refusing settlement, why would tolderías throughout the region 
simultaneously see reductions as a viable option? Traditional explanations have focused on the military 
might of Spanish forces vis-à-vis their native counterparts, pointing to campaigns that left from Santa Fe, the 
Campo del Bloqueo, Corrientes, Yapeyú, and Montevideo between 1749 and 1752. According to such 
accounts, these expeditions expelled Charrúas from lands west of the Río Uruguay and gave Montevideo 
control of the Banda Norte.104 There is certain merit to this narrative, as Buenos Aires demonstrated a shift 
in interethnic policy in the region and several expeditions were successful. After decades of attempting to 
attract local tolderías to settle on reductions via “gentle methods” (métodos suaves), Buenos Aires’s Governor, 
José de Andonaegui, gave the following order to Montevideo in 1749: 
I am informing the commander of that plaza on this occasion the following in order that [the 
Minuanes] either be reduced to a town and to our Holy Faith living in peace or, in the event that 
they continue with their hostilities, that [the commander] go out to punish them and ruin them, 
ending them once and for all.105 
 
Several months later, he issued a similar order to authorities in Santa Fe. 
 
                                                       
102 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1750-11-15); Bracco, “Los errores Charrúa y Guenoa-Minuán”: 133. 
103 AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-11-13), f. 794. 
104 For example: Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucuman y Paraguay, Tomo II, 96–100 Sallaberry, Los charrúas y 
Santa Fe, Capítulo 10; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, Capítulos 4-6; Livi, “El 
Charrúa en Santa Fe”: 36–40; Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 264–71. 
105 “le prevengo en esta ocasion al Comandante de esa Plaza lo correspond.te afin de que o se reduzcan [a los Minuanes], al 
Pueblo, y anra S.ta Fe viviendo en Paz, o en caso de permanecer haciendo hostilidades, pase à castigarlos, y arruinarlos, acavando 
con ellos de una vez:” AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 2, Carpeta 19, No. 3. 
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[You will direct yourselves] to the center of where the said infidel Indians are, whom you will 
punish, putting them to the knife in the event that they resist and making all who turn themselves in 
prisoners of war.106 
 
This was certainly not the first time that Spanish authorities engaged local tolderías militarily; however, the 
simultaneous effort from nearly all of their principal plazas to kill or capture entire tolderías was unique.107 
Armed militias and mounted guards undertook months-long campaigns with great violence. According to 
official reports, in April 1751, Montevideo’s forces attacked Minuán tolderías in an area known as the 
Calera del Rey, near Maldonado, killing 120 people and taking 82 captives back to the plaza. Among the 
dead was Canamazán, who only a few months earlier had been discussing the possibility of a reduction. The 
expeditions that took place near Santa Fe yielded similar results, killing more than 150 Charrúas and forcing 
339 more to establish a reduction known as “Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Cayastá.”108 
 Despite the high death toll and large numbers of captives taken, when considered on a regional 
scale, the expeditions were not as devastating as scholars have claimed. First, they did not represent military 
superiority, but rather a shift in military strategy toward total warfare, since tolderías’ vassalage was no 
longer necessary for claims of territorial possession. In the years preceding and following these expeditions, 
Charrúa, Minuán, Yaro, and Bohan tolderías also had their share of victories.109 The difference in number of 
                                                       
106 “dirijiendose al zentro donde esten los referidos Yndios Ynfieles a los que castigaran pasandolos a cuchillo en caso de resistirse 
y a los que se rindieren los haran prisioneros de Guerra.” Cortesão, Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri, 298 See also: AGPSF, Acta de 
Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1750-11-03, f. 123. 
107 This effort was not simply the result of a top-down order based exclusively upon interests from Buenos Aires. Rather, 
administrators in a number of plazas demonstrated a desire to replace pact-making with aggressive military engagement. AGNA - 
IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-07-11); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 86-7, 117; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 127–30; 
Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 241–53. 
108 AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 111-115, 182-6; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 228–30; AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de 
Santa Fe de 1750-02-03, 1750-11-03, & 1752-01-19. Unlike earlier reductions, Cayastá was comprised of prisoners of war, who 
were forcibly marched to its location and kept under guard. AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1750-03-07, 1750-08-03, 
1750-09-10, 1750-09-11, 1750-09-25, 1750-11-03 (several), 1750-11-09, 1750-11-26, 1751-01-07, 1755-09-09; AGI - 
Charcas, 378, (Buenos Aires, 1751-04-26). 
109 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Vívoras, 1748-02-04; Campo del Bloqueo, 1749-05-22, 1749-07-21, 1756-02-24, & 1757-08-06; 
Montevideo, 1750-10-27 & 1751-01-19); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 47, 88-9, 111-113; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo 
IV, 129; AGI - Charcas, 215, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-09-07). 
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casualties and captives, however, was because tolderías were more interested in claiming cattle or a few 
prisoners, while Spanish militias sought extermination. A close look at the description of individuals slain or 
captured in these skirmishes reveals large numbers of men and women of all ages, implying that the forces 
commissioned from Santa Fe and Montevideo were raiding tolderías rather than strictly engaging armed 
fighters. In fact, many of their successes were due to their ability to surprise the tolderías they attacked, 
having gained information on their whereabouts by capturing and torturing individuals who were alone.110  
Secondly, the devastation that Spanish forces enacted was restricted to a handful of tolderías. While 
any population estimate for tolderías in the region is a matter of guesswork, due to a lack of reliable 
sources, at this time there were likely at least 5,000 or 6,000 individuals living in them. Killing or capturing 
close to 500 people was certainly devastating to the tolderías that they lived in; however, such violence did 
not consume or even involve the large majority of Charrúas, Minuanes, and others. Documents from other 
parts of the region reveal large numbers of tolderías that were not subject to these campaigns.111 Even 
amongst the tolderías that frequented Montevideo and Santa Fe, those impacted by Spanish military 
campaigns represented only a portion.112 For this reason, by 1752, Spanish settlers near Santa Fe 
                                                       
110 Both the expeditions against Charrúas near Santa Fe and those against Minuanes near Montevideo produced significant 
numbers of captives. This issue is discussed in chapter 5. In the 1751 expedition from Montevideo, officials captured a “cacique 
bonbero" near the arroyo Taquarí, extracted information from him about local tolderías, and then killed him. Later that day, they 
attacked the toldería, killing not only armed fighters, but also “chinas y criaturas.” They also took 91 captives. AGNU - Falcao 
Espalter, tomo I, 185. 
111 The Minuán tolderías near São Miguel, Rio Grande, and the Jesuit-Guaraní missions provide several clear examples. There 
were also numerous Charrúa tolderías further north, near Corrientes and Yapeyú, not to mention the Yaro and Bohan tolderías 
who do not figure into any of these accounts. Finally, the union of tolderías near the Rio Queguay appears to have included many 
who were not seeking refuge from Spanish campaigns.  
112 According to Juan Faustino Sallaberry, there were three principal Charrúa tolderías around Santa Fe at this time: those 
associated with the Yasú family, those associated with the cacique Campusano, and one other. These tolderías occasionally 
conflicted with one another, and support shifted between them and with Santa Fe. For Sallaberry, the Yasú tolderías were most 
likely those who were defeated by Francisco Vera Mujica in 1750. Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 232, 234, 249, 262-3, 287-
9. The vanquished tolderías were from between the Río Gualeguay and the Río Uruguay. AGI - Charcas, 378, (Buenos Aires, 
1751-04-09). Nonetheless, the three caciques who went to Cayastá were named Naigualau, Gleubille, and Duimalnyé, none of 
whom appear to be Yasús. AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe, 1750-01-03. Regardless, it appears that the expeditions 
commissioned by Buenos Aires’s governor did not engage every toldería in the region, but rather a few. Furthermore, at least the 
tolderías associated with Campusano moved back and forth across the Río Uruguay, evidenced by a skirmish between them and 
Spanish forces led by Francisco Bruno de Zavala in 1749 near the Río Queguay. AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1749-
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complained about their exposure to attacks by Charrúa tolderías, and respondents to a 1756 questionnaire 
noted that Charrúas continued to live in Santa Fe’s jurisdiction. Similarly, in 1751, months after the 
expedition from Montevideo, Minuán tolderías were again attacking Spanish settlers. The situation was 
problematic enough that the city proposed financing a permanent guard to protect the plaza.113 In short, the 
expeditions, though violent and devastating for some, were both restricted to the localities of certain plazas 
and to limited numbers of tolderías. They could not possibly have generated enough regional disruption to 
cause tolderías throughout the region to simultaneously consider reductions. 
 A more plausible explanation to this question can be found in the tolderías themselves. Tolderías 
throughout the region frequently competed with one another, and their interest in linking onto a plaza was 
usually the result of wartime duress. This was likely again the case at the eighteenth century’s midpoint, as 
suggested by dialogue between the Minuán tolderías and Portuguese officials in São Gabriel. For one thing, 
the tolderías arrived in São Gabriel at the beginning of June 1749, nearly two years before troops would 
leave from Montevideo to engage them and approximately four months before the Governor of Buenos 
Aires would authorize an expedition against Charrúas.114 More importantly, however, the Minuanes were 
explicit in their reasons for being there. 
                                                       
05-22); Aníbal Barrios Pintos, “Caciques Charrúas en Territorio Oriental,” Almanaque del Banco de Seguros del Estado 70 (1981): 
87–8. It is likely that they would have crossed the Río Uruguay again at some point or another following the mid-century 
conflicts. For these reasons, the notion that the expeditions from Santa Fe expelled Charrúas from territories between the Río 
Paraná and the Río Uruguay is almost certainly an overstatement. 
113 AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1752-02-17; IEB - AL-068-002; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 86-7, 228-30, 
235-41. Some scholars have also questioned the completeness of Charrúas’ expulsion from Santa Fe. Sallaberry, Los charrúas y 
Santa Fe, 264; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 1–2. 
114 This would also explain the violence near the plazas in the years leading up to Spanish expeditions, as local authorities 
complained about theft of cattle and crop yields. If nearby tolderías were under duress due to conflict with other tolderías, this 
would be a likely response in order sustain themselves. 
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They arrived at the beginning of June 1749…Minuán Indians, who are the most valiant of the 
countryside, now in small numbers because the Indians called Tapes, and others called Charruas, in 
much greater numbers, are finishing them off and destroying them.115 
 
Instead of mentioning Spanish assaults, these tolderías pointed to conflicts with both Charrúas and Tapes. 
Moreover, they mentioned being outnumbered by their foes and therefore in need of aid. Spanish officials 
in Santo Domingo Soriano also claimed that neighboring tolderías were outnumbered by others, only in 
reverse. According to Soriano’s corregidor, nearby Charrúa tolderías were joining together with Minuanes, 
in part because the latter were greater in number.116 
 Not all tolderías sought relationships with local plazas during these years. Rather, as indicated by 
the official in Soriano, many instead joined with other indigenous communities. In particular, a large 
number of Charrúa, Bohan, and Minuán tolderías congregated somewhere around the Rio Queguay. While 
a lack of documentary evidence makes it impossible to know the exact nature of their relationship, officials 
in Montevideo, Yapeyú, and Santo Domingo Soriano all expressed concern. Despite their successes against 
a handful of tolderías, they feared larger retribution by this new coalition.117 The coming together of 
Charrúas, Minuanes, and Bohanes is significant for a variety of reasons. Principally, it represents the first 
documented instance of Charrúa and Minuán tolderías joining with one another. Beginning at this moment, 
Charrúas and Minuanes appeared together with ever-increasing frequency, to the point that by the end of 
                                                       
115 “Chegaram no princípio de Junho de 1749…os Índios Minuanos, com serem os mais valorosos da campanha, eram já em 
pequeno número, porque os Índios, chamados Tapes, e outros chamados Charruas, em muito maior número, os andavam 
acabando e destruindo.” Leite, História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil, vol.  6, 528–29. 
116 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16). 
117 Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 270, nt. 47-50. Preoccupation about the union of Bohan, Charrúa, and Minuán tolderías 
was greatest in Santo Domingo Soriano, given that it was the plaza closest to the Río Queguay, where they had joined together. 
Nonetheless, plazas throughout the region reported on what they saw to be an alliance between tolderías. It is unclear from the 
sources whether certain tolderías were seeking refuge with others, or whether they sought mutual aid and peace. AGNA - IX. 4-
3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16, 1750-09-06, & 1750-09-29; Vívoras, 1750-10-13 & 1750-11-09); AGNA - IX. 2-1-
4, (Montevideo, 1750-12-30, 1751-01-26, & 1751-11-13); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 47; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 2, 
Carpeta 35, No. 8, (Montevideo, 1751-10-09); AGI - Charcas, 221, (Buenos Aires, 1752-09-07). 
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the century some outside observers struggled to differentiate one from the other.118 This intermingling did 
not extend to all Minuán or Charrúa tolderías, but it nonetheless constituted a change from earlier patterns 
of engagement. This broader union was also significant for tolderías in the region not identified as Charrúa 
or Minuán. By the end of the 1750s, the ethnonyms “Bohan,” “Yaro,” and “Guenoa” disappeared from 
colonial sources altogether. Later travelers posited that this was due to Charrúa or Minuán aggression, yet it 
is more likely that this shift was a product of intermixing and ethnogenesis, however imbalanced power 
between tolderías may have been.119 After the end of the decade, no further evidence exists of tolderías 
seeking refuge in plazas during conflicts with other tolderías. Rather, strengthening ties with other tolderías 
appears to have been a more logical strategy.120 
 
Conclusion 
The events of 1749 to 1752 were a turning point in interimperial and interethnic relations in the 
Río de la Plata. As Iberian negotiators reinvented the way that they would claim territorial possession, local 
administrators reimagined themselves vis-à-vis mobile native peoples. The jurisdictional certainty and 
exclusivity that went hand-in-hand with clearly defined borders generated a new context for interethnic 
relations. Territorial possession ceased to flow through native peoples, imagined as vassals; instead, Iberian 
officials began to imagine vassalage as the product of living within certain territorial limits. These shifts 
coincided with transformations in the ways in which plazas would relate to neighboring tolderías. Most 
notably, peaceful attempts to incorporate mobile native peoples into imperial projects were no longer a 
necessary or feasible strategy and imperial authorities directed their efforts to stamping out mobile lifestyles 
                                                       
118 Azara, Viajes por la América del Sur, 182. 
119 Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara, Tomo Primero, 169–70. 
120 It is also possible that Bohan, Guenoa, and Yaro ceased to be significant terms to colonial writers. This would not imply their 
being vanquished, only an imperceptibility to outside observers. 
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by any means possible. For Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, and others, these years brought crisis and 
reconfiguration. Broader conflicts between tolderías presented two logical possibilities for caciques: they 
could seek refuge with plazas or they could forge new and more lasting ties with other tolderías. Increased 
aggression from Spanish plazas only added to the problem, and most likely impelled more tolderías to build 
bonds with one another than with them. Indeed, the only instance in which tolderías followed through on a 
proposed settlement was the case of the Minuanes in São Gabriel with the Portuguese. 
By the time the dust settled on the turmoil that engulfed the Río de la Plata during these years, 
mapmakers from Spain and Portugal had disembarked in its ports. Their presence would have a much more 
dramatic effect than the Spanish military campaigns on territorial relations in the region, both immediately 
and in the long run. For the first time, imperial agents would make the long journey from the Atlantic 
Coast of Castillos Grande, near São Miguel, to the mission strongholds deep inside the continent and 
document their path. Their activities at once revealed the key contradiction of Iberian territorial claims –
Spain and Portugal sought to divide between themselves territories that neither of them effectively 
controlled – and set the stage for new territorial conditions in the region. A close reading of the vast corpus 
of documents left by these expeditions provides valuable insight into the deep changes occurring in the Río 
de la Plata at the time.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: LIMITED LANDS 
 
All that I have referred to could be much better understood with a map…because the lands that I exhibited 
in this account are little known or entirely unknown for the [upcoming] drawing of the line and all are 
dangerous and inhabited by nations of savages and infidels. – Francisco João Rocio1 
 
Borders, then, are essential to cognitive processes, because they allow both the establishment of taxonomies and 
conceptual hierarchies that structure the movement of thought…Cognitive borders, in this sense, often 
intertwine with geographical borders. – Sandro Mezzadra & Brett Nielson2 
 
 
Taxing Demarcations 
On New Year’s Day 1787, two men approached the encampment of a Portuguese mapping team 
near the southern limit of Brazil. They came on behalf of a local Minuán toldería and sought both 
refreshments and permission for the rest of their kin to approach; they had been following the Portuguese 
troop for some time. The commanding Portuguese officer was wary of the Minuanes’ intentions and 
claimed that he and his compatriots were simply passing through the area and that they did not have any 
refreshments to give. Furthermore, he suggested, such a meeting was in no one’s best interest, as it would 
force all sides to brandish arms and could potentially result in fighting. Even though he traveled with a 
heavily armed guard, he was well aware that his troop was outmatched. Despite these protests, the next day 
a small group of Minuanes appeared and halted the mapmakers’ march. They were unarmed, and among 
them were five caciques and their wives. Claiming possession over local lands, they declared it their right to 
“tax all travelers” who went through it and demanded aguardiente, wine, sugar, salt, knives, tobacco, yerba 
                                                       
1 “Todo o referido se pode muito melhor compreender à vista da carta…porque o terreno central ao que acabei de expor nesta 
relação é bem pouco ou nada conhecido na passagem da raia e todo emboscado e habitado de nações selvagens e infiéis.” Francisco 
João Roscio, “Compêndio Noticioso,” in O Capitalismo Pastoril, ed. Décio Freitas, 105–40 (Porto Alegre: Escola Superior de 
Teologia São Lourenço de Brindes, 1980), 140. 
2 Mezzadra and Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor, 16. 
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mate, cloth, and hats in exchange for safe passage. The Minuanes remained in the Portuguese encampment 
the entire day and evening, and did not let the mapmakers continue on their way until the next morning.3 
Following this encounter, the Portuguese travelers sought to avoid further incidents by setting up 
their camp in local ranches belonging to nearby Guaraní missions. This strategy proved successful for a short 
while, but on January 13 they were confronted by another Minuán cacique and members of his toldería. In 
this instance, the travelers had set up camp in a ranch named San Miguel, which belonged to the San Borja 
mission. The site did not deter the Minuanes from approaching, and though they were unarmed, the 
Portuguese officer had learned from his previous experience and offered payment immediately. The 
following day, the mapmakers continued along their way and crossed the Río Ibicuy. Here, a third Minuán 
cacique approached and required payment. Having exhausted the vast majority of their resources in their 
earlier encounters, the Portuguese found themselves left with no choice but to surrender a portion of their 
horses and oxen. Though they eventually made it to the San Borja mission, the mapmakers had struggled to 
complete their journey and arrived in shambles.4 
These encounters between Minuán tolderías and Portuguese mapmakers occurred during the 
demarcation efforts of the 1777 Treaty of San Ildefonso. This treaty, in the same spirit as the 1750 Treaty of 
Madrid, required that Portugal and Spain commission joint mapping expeditions to determine a border 
between Brazil and Spain’s South American viceroyalties. The officer in question, Francisco João Roscio, 
was one of a number of Spanish and Portuguese geographers and engineers who rushed across the 
countryside between Santa Tecla and San Borja in 1786 and 1787 (Map 3.1). He would later become 
Governor of the Capitania do Rio Grande de São Pedro. Although Roscio did not name a single cacique in 
his account, the diaries of other demarcation officials indicate that his encounters were most likely with 
                                                       
3 “estão na posse de taxar todos os passageiros” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 22v. 
4 ibid. 
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Saltein, Maulein, Tajuí, Batu, and Miguel Ayala Caraí. These caciques stopped every Portuguese and 
Spanish demarcation party that came through the area during those years. While the location of their 
encounters varied slightly, the result was the same. Each mapping team had to provide tribute payments to 
the caciques and host them in their encampment in order to be able to continue on their way.5 
Map 3.1 – Key Sites of the Madrid and San Ildefonso Demarcations 
 
                                                       
5 These caciques are mentioned by name in the accounts of the Spanish officer Diego de Alvear and the Portuguese officer José de 
Saldanha, who passed through the area in 1786 and 1787 respectively. Diego de Alvear, “Diario de la segunda partida 
demarcadora de límites en la América Meridional, 1783-1791 (continuación)” in Anales de la biblioteca, 343–44; José de Saldanha, 
“Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 234-5, 241. 
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The interactions between geographers and representatives of tolderías in the Río de la Plata were 
generally brief, occupying only a small number of pages in official reports.6 Nonetheless, these incidents 
illuminate the central contradiction of the demarcation projects commissioned under the two Luso-Hispanic 
treaties. Portuguese and Spanish officials divided and claimed borderland territories that neither of them 
effectively controlled. As geographers traversed the region’s open plains to declare possession for their 
royal patrons, they encountered native peoples who asserted their own authority over regional space. 
Expeditionary officers were generally dismissive of tolderías in their written accounts, but their offering of 
goods in exchange for passage represented recognition of the effective control that Minuanes, Charrúas, and 
other wandering peoples exercised over the imperial borderlands. Their accounts are thus integral to 
understanding one of the defining elements of the region in the eighteenth century: Iberian attempts to 
superimpose a new territorial logic upon a landscape shaped by early-modern and indigenous 
territorialities.  
Although overlapping plazas and mobile tolderías had established territorial order in the Río de la 
Plata through the first half of the eighteenth century, this means of organizing space was incongruent with 
Enlightenment-era modes of claiming territorial possession, particularly the notions of jurisdictional 
                                                       
6 Officers from the Treaty of San Ildefonso’s mapping expedition that noted interactions with Minuano caciques in their diarios 
include Diego de Alvear, Félix de Azara, Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral da Câmara, José Cabrer, Bernardo Lecocq, Andrés de 
Oyarvide, Alexandre Eloy Portelli, Francisco João Roscio, José de Saldanha, and José Varela y Ulloa. See: Diego de Alvear, 
“Diario de la segunda partida demarcadora de límites en la América Meridional, 1783-1791 (continuación)” in Anales de la 
biblioteca, 342–55; Félix de Azara, Geografía, física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay y misiones guaraníes (Montevideo: Museo 
Nacional, 1904), 118–19; AGNA - VII. Lamas 17, 2620; "Diario de la Segunda Subdivicion de Limites Española, por Joseph 
Maria Cabrer" f. 264-71; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, 22-3, 87-8; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, 
v. 10, f. 96-7v, 100, 194-5; Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto 
Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la demarcación de límites en la América Meridional” in Colección 
histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina 
comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros dias, 191-2, 196, 211-213; José de 
Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 231, 239, 241, 261, 281; José Varela y Ulloa, “Plano 
para ejecutar la demarcación de esta América,” in Diario de la primera partida de la demarcación de limites entre España y Portugal en 
América, 2 vols., 130–47, Publicaciones de la Real Sociedad Geográfica (Madrid: Imprenta del Patronato de Huérfanos de 
Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1920-1925 [i.e. 1930]), 151, 316; José María Cabrer, Diario de la Segunda Subdivicion de 
Limites Española entre los Dominios de España y Portugal en la America Meridional; Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Livro 1, f. 
264-7.  
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exclusivity, complete territorial ownership, and clearly defined borders. This tension resulted in perpetual 
warfare and strategic settlement between the two Iberian crowns, as they sought to dislodge one another 
and to produce enough evidence to justify their juridical claims of land ownership through the new language 
of territorial possession. Portuguese and Spanish officials competed to curry favor with local tolderías, 
offering frequent payments in exchange for access to the countryside and for alliances against their 
competitors. Meanwhile, Minuán, Charrúa, Guenoa, Bohan, and Yaro tolderías exploited the tensions 
between Iberian plazas to garner resources and to find refuge in moments of internal conflict. While they 
collectively arbitrated access to the rural countryside, individual tolderías benefitted from positive relations 
with local plazas as they sought an upper hand against competitors. 
The Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso represented a rupture from this means of organizing space 
and constituted full-fledged attempts to impose Enlightenment-era logic upon a complex local landscape. 
Rather than accommodating shared access to regional lands, or acknowledging usufruct rights, these treaties 
aimed to expand jurisdictional claims over the entire region, divide Spanish and Portuguese dominion in 
two, and produce a clearly-defined border to separate one realm from the other. To realize this vision, 
however, required mapping expeditions that would observe and measure the local landscape, extrapolate 
on the general stipulations of the treaties according to local conditions, and determine just where the 
dividing line should run. Without mapping expeditions, the treaty would not carry the necessary legal 
weight and precision. 
The mapmakers sent to the Río de la Plata embodied this new territorial vision, and their 
expeditions served as the moment when old and new ways of organizing space came to a head. Encounters 
between demarcation teams and local peoples varied widely, but always contained the possibility of violent 
conflagrations such as the so-called “Guaraní War” of the 1750s, which responded directly to the Madrid 
agreement. Despite these risks, mapmakers sought to impose a new territorial vision upon a landscape that 
belied it. As part of this effort, they garnered and organized knowledge of both the physical landscape and 
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the local inhabitants, and presented it in ways that incentivized new styles of government and new patterns 
of interethnic relations. By analyzing the events of these expeditions and the corpus of geographical and 
ethnographic knowledge they produced, it is possible to articulate the tensions inherent in their project. 
This chapter assesses both the limitations of the mapmaking efforts and the changes they 
engendered. It begins by providing a logistical overview of the mapping expeditions to demonstrate that 
commissioned officials depended upon local peoples for protection, sustenance, guidance, labor, and 
information. I then turn to an analysis of mapping practices, or the expeditions' social interactions. As 
imperial officials sought to reorder lands they knew very little about, local agents mediated and frustrated 
their efforts, forcing them to skip over certain areas or abandon their work altogether. Mapmaking did not 
occur in laboratories, and officials often found themselves caught up in local conflicts. At the same time, 
these imperial agents left their own footprint upon the landscape and generated responses from regional 
actors. In order to understand the ways in which local inhabitants experienced the expeditions, therefore, I 
examine both large-scale events, such as the Guaraní War, and more mundane interactions. Rather than 
treating native peoples and other local actors as a fixed part of a landscape, I focus on their interests and 
strategies and couple their actions to the outcome of the expeditions.7  
Despite being limited by a variety of actors, the mapping expeditions nonetheless compiled and 
produced a vast corpus of knowledge. Thus I also assess mapping form, or the discursive depiction of regional 
space that the expeditions generated. Focusing not only on maps, but also on diaries and correspondence, I 
treat the expeditions as key discursive moments. Here one finds not only new geographical and historical 
perspectives, but some of the first and most frequently cited ethnographies of native peoples in the region. 
These mindsets would come to determine imperial policy vis-à-vis tolderías during the second half of the 
                                                       
7 The demarcation expeditions, like other mapping or scientific expeditions were socially and culturally embedded performances 
that occurred in local contexts rather than laboratories. Focusing on the “social and material processes” of the demarcation 
expeditions allows us to identify the agency of local actors, link their actions to the final form of geographic texts, and consider 
the impact of the expeditions upon local dynamics. Safier, Measuring the New World. 
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century, and tropes of them continue to structure analyses of the regional past. Juxtaposing the social event 
of the mapping expeditions with the body of knowledge that they produced reveals the centrality of native 
peoples to the demarcation efforts and the importance of these events to the broader dynamics of the 
region’s past. 
 
Imagining Borders 
 During the second half of the eighteenth century, Spain and Portugal signed two separate treaties to 
demarcate an interimperial borderline in South America. The first of these accords, negotiated in Madrid in 
1750, represented a monumental shift in imperial logics of determining territorial possession. The two 
Iberian courts agreed to send joint mapping expeditions to walk and measure the border together, 
something that had never been done before. Although negotiators of earlier treaties had utilized maps and 
nautical charts to make their respective claims of territorial possession, none of these pacts had required or 
resulted in new maps. The Madrid agreement, otherwise known as the Treaty of Permuta, was therefore 
the first to link together mapmaking and treaty-making, a precedent that diplomats would follow for the 
next century and a half.8 Even so, it took a second accord, agreed upon in San Ildefonso in 1777, for the 
logic of mapped borders to become a permanent cornerstone of American territorial organization. Local 
resistance and renewed Iberian tensions had undermined the Treaty of Madrid’s fragile peace, but the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso produced a lasting territorial vision that would reshape and structure knowledge and 
policies for years to come.  
                                                       
8 The name “permuta,” which means “exchange” or “transfer,” derives from the centerpiece of the Treaty of Madrid: the exchange 
of the Jesuit-Guaraní missions that were east of the Río Uruguay, the so-called “Siete Pueblos Orientales,” for Colônia do 
Sacramento in order to make possible an interimperial borderline. This was the first treaty that commissioned joint mapping 
expeditions to the Americas, but it was part of a broader eighteenth-century trend to superimpose boundary lines upon frontiers 
as markers of territorially derived sovereignty. See: Abou-el-Haj, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 
1699-1703”: 467; Sahlins, Boundaries; Standen and Power, Frontiers in Question; Madalina Valeria Veres, “Redefining Imperial 
Borders” in History of Cartography. 
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The mapping expeditions for the Treaty of Madrid and the Treaty of San Ildefonso occurred in the 
1750s and the 1780s respectively. For the former, the first and second Portuguese and Spanish mapping 
teams, called “subdivisions,” met along the Atlantic coast in Castillos Grande in 1752 and continued as far as 
Santa Tecla the following year. Santa Tecla’s occupants, in protest of the transfer of their mission from 
Spanish to Portuguese dominions, refused to offer them support, effectively forcing the demarcation teams 
to abandon their efforts (Map 3.2).9 Three years of warfare ensued, which pitted Iberian militias and their 
local allies against Guaraní mission-dwellers and numerous Charrúa, Minuán, Bohan, and Guenoa tolderías, 
but the demarcation resumed in 1758 and was completed before the decade’s end. By 1761, however, a 
new agreement signed in El Pardo annulled the Treaty of Madrid and undermined the legal might of its 
mapping projects.10 The demarcation efforts of the Treaty of San Ildefonso began in the Río de la Plata in 
1784 near São Miguel. After two years along the Lagoa Mirim, the Luso-Hispanic mapping teams began to 
work their way inland toward the Guaraní missions in 1786 and 1787. This was where they emptied their 
coffers in payments to Minuán tolderías. The principal mapping efforts ended in 1791; however, the 
demarcation of several disputed areas remained incomplete into the nineteenth century.11 
 
                                                       
9 At this time, Santa Tecla was a ranch pertaining to the San Miguel mission, one of the Siete Pueblos Orientales. 
10 Despite an absence of a standing interimperial accord, local officials sought to maintain a functional division through a de facto 
agreement in 1763. Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 45–48. Nonetheless, during these years, Colônia do Sacramento returned to 
Portuguese control, the Siete Pueblos Orientales transferred back to Spain, and the line moved through military engagements. 
Administrators even took down the stone pillars erected during the demarcations. While the division was meaningful to local 
officials, this agreement was in lieu of a new treaty and never meant to be permanent. Within four years of the de facto 
agreement, officials complained that the lack of a demarcation left the question of possession uncertain. AGNA - IX. 3-2-1, 
(Montevideo, 1761-08-25); IHGB - Arquivo, lata 168, doc 4, f. 63-5. 
11 The first subdivision completed their work in 1789, and the second subdivision ended their demarcation in 1791. ANB - 86. 
Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 362-362v; IHGB - Arquivo, lata 108, doc 20, f. 1. 
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Map 3.2 – Itineraries of the Demarcation Teams. This map demonstrates the approximate paths taken 
by the first and second subdivisions of the treaties of Madrid (blue) and San Ildefonso (purple) and the third 
and fourth Spanish subdivisions of both treaties (green). 
 
 The method of these two treaties was simple. First, negotiators met together in Europe with 
individuals knowledgeable about South American geography to design a base map of the continent. They 
drew upon well-known and widely circulated maps to shape its final form, particularly for disputed areas, 
such as the Amazon River and the Río de la Plata. For the Treaty of Madrid, this base map was known as the 
“Map of the Courts” (Mapa das Cortes) and while the Treaty of San Ildefonso’s negotiators produced no 
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official map of their own, they too relied upon the Mapa das Cortes, as well as Juan de la Cruz Cano de 
Olmedilla’s Mapa Geográfico de América Meridional, to frame their debates (Maps 3.3 & 3.4).12 Second, 
officials drafted instructions for where the borderline should be drawn, according to the dimensions and 
shape of the continent represented in the base maps. Third, teams of trained mapmakers walked the border 
and drew a line, carrying the base maps and instructions as guidelines for their efforts.13 Each mapping 
expedition began their travels with conferences to negotiate the nuances of the interimperial limit and to 
establish the itineraries for their respective teams. For the earlier treaty, these meetings occurred in 1752 in 
Castillos Grande, and for the latter, officials met in 1783 in the plaza of Rio Grande and again in 1784 at the 
southern tip of the Lagoa Mirim.14 Here, the rough edges of the general treaty began to emerge and the first 
borderline disputes in the region occurred.15 
 This strategy for inventing a legal border placed an enormous amount of decision-making power in 
the hands of commissioned officers in the field. Although the Mapa das Cortes and the Cruz Cano map 
provided general frames of reference, they were scaled to the continent or Brazil as a whole and did not 
include the nuance necessary to guide travelers through the borderlands. Likewise, the mapmakers’ 
instructions offered abstract itineraries rather than specific directions. For example, the fourth article of the 
                                                       
12 Ferreira, “O Mapa das Cortes e o Tratado de Madrid a cartografia a serviço da diplomacia”; André Ferrand de Almeida, “O 
Mapa Geográfico de América Meridional, de Juan de la Cruz Cano y Olmedilla,” Anais do Museu Paulista 17, no. 2 (jul-dez 2009); 
Furtado, O mapa que inventou o Brasil. 
13 The walking of limits to claim possession resembles earlier practices carried out on local scales. See, for example: Kathryn 
Burns, Colonial Habits: Convents and the Spiritual Economy of Cuzco, Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 52–53. 
14 AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 2, Doc 127; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 5, f. 63-6; IHGB - Arquivo, lata 
109, doc 8, f. 9; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 28v. 
15 In the case of the San Ildefonso expedition, the conferences set the stage for a protracted and antagonistic mapping effort. Both 
sides took advantage of the multi-year gaps between the signing of the treaty and its execution to visit parts of the regional 
countryside and to scour administrative archives for evidence that would support their territorial claims. See, for example: Félix 
de Azara, “Correspondencia oficial e inédita sobre la demarcación de límites entre el Paraguay y el Brasil,” in Colección de obras y 
documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol.  4, ed. Pedro de Angelis (Buenos 
Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836), 1–17; Francisco João Roscio, “Compêndio Noticioso” in O Capitalismo Pastoril. 
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Map 3.3 – “Mapa das Cortes,” 174916 
 
                                                       
16 Mapa dos confins do Brazil com as terras da Coroa da Espanha na America Meridional (1749); BNB - ARC.030,01,009, http://
objdigital.bn.br/objdigital2/acervo_digital/div_cartografia/cart1004807/cart1004807.pdf (accessed February 23, 2015). 
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Map 3.4 – Cruz Cano de Olmedilla, Juan de la, Mapa Geográfico de América Meridional, 177517 
 
                                                       
17 Juan de La Cruz Cano y Olmedilla, Mapa geográfico de America Meridional (Madrid, 1775); BNB - ARC.033,06,008, http://
objdigital.bn.br/acervo_digital/div_cartografia/cart485821.jpg (accessed February 23, 2015). 
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Treaty of Madrid stipulated: 
The confines of the dominions of the two Monarchies will begin in the reef that is formed along the 
[Atlantic Coast] by the stream that runs from the hill of Castillos Grandes. From this hillside the 
frontier will continue in a straight line along the highest summits of the hills whose rivers run on 
one side to the north of the aforementioned stream, or to the Lagoa Mirim, or Miní, and on the 
other side to the Atlantic Coast south of the river or to the Río de la Plata. In this way, the summits 
of the hills will serve as the dividing line for the dominions of the two Crowns. The frontier will 
continue this way until finding the principal origin and headwater of the Río Negro, and above it it 
will continue to the principal origin of the Río Ibicuí, continuing below this river until it drains into 
the Río Uruguay on its western bank. Portugal will keep all of the tributaries that drain into the 
aforementioned lagoon or into the Rio Grande and Spain will keep all of the waterways that drain 
into the Río de la Plata.18 
 
The proposed treaty line thus ran across the headwaters of distinct waterways, which included both known 
rivers and unnamed tributaries. Though drawing a division in this way made logical sense for treaty-makers, 
since it divided river systems, it was vague and imprecise. Which of the numerous streams that ran from 
Castillos Grande did the treaty mean to indicate? If the headwaters of the two watersheds did not reach one 
another, where in the intermediate space should the line go? Which peaks should serve as points along the 
division, when many stood side by side rather than in a straight line? Which of the Río Negro’s and the Río 
Ibicuí’s many tributaries constituted their “principal origin”? The Treaty of San Ildefonso offered vagaries of 
its own: 
Along the continent, the line will go from the shores of the aforementioned Lagoa Mirim, then 
along the first southern stream that enters into the lagoon’s channel and that runs closest to the 
Portuguese fort of São Gonçalo, from which, without exceeding the limits of the aforementioned 
                                                       
18 “Los confines del dominio de las dos Monarquías principiarán en la barra que forma, en la costa del mar, el arroyo que sale al 
pie del Monte de los Castillos Grandes; desde cuya falda continuará la frontera, buscando un línea recta lo más alto, o cumbre de 
los montes, cuyas vertientes bajan por una parte a la costa que corre al norte de dicho arroyo, o a la Laguna Merin, o del Miní, y 
por la otra, a la costa que corre desde dicho arroyo al sur, o al río de la Plata. De suerte que las cumbres de los montes sirvan de 
raya del dominio de las dos Coronas. Y así se seguirá la frontera, hasta encontrar el origen principal y cabecera del Río Negro, y 
por encima de ellas continuará hasta el origen principal del río Ibicuí, siguiendo, aguas abajo de este río, hasta donde desemboca 
en el Uruguay por su ribera oriental, quedando de Portugal todas las vertientes que bajan a la dicha laguna, o al Río Grande de 
San Pedro; y de España, las que bajan a los ríos que van a unirse con el de la Plata.” “Tratado firmado en Madrid á 13 de Enero de 
1750, para determinar los límites de los estados pertnecientes á las Coronas de España y Portugal, en Asia y América,” in Colección 
de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol.  3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 
5 vols., 331–42 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900). 
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stream, Portugal’s belongings will continue along the headwaters of the rivers that run towards the 
mentioned Rio Grande and towards the Rio Jacuí.19 
 
Spanish and Portuguese mapmakers dedicated hundreds of pages of correspondence to dispute the meanings 
of these instructions, halting the demarcation efforts for years at a time as they sought a general agreement. 
Since the borderland was of strategic interest to both sides, and commissioned officials were ultimately 
representatives of their respective crowns, the details mattered. Moreover, it was not until the mapping 
expeditions that either treaty began to carry any real weight. In their correspondence, diaries, and 
drawings, mapmakers were not simply executing a prescribed treaty, but writing and drawing the treaty 
into existence. As they set up makeshift conference rooms along the Río de la Plata’s countryside, the 
borderline remained open for negotiation.  
Each subdivision comprised between 75 and 150 people and worked with a parallel subdivision 
representing the other crown. Portugal and Spain commissioned six subdivisions each for the Treaty of 
Madrid and seven for the Treaty of San Ildefonso. In total, each demarcation effort employed upwards of 
one thousand people. Half of them crossed through the Río de la Plata: while the first and second 
subdivisions focused on determining a border in the region, the third and fourth Spanish subdivisions passed 
through on their way to Paraguay, Moxos, and Chiquitos. These last two began their travels in Buenos Aires 
and then continued north through the region along the Rio Paraná (Map 3.2). Although they would not 
meet with their Portuguese counterparts until they arrived at the borderlands between Paraguay and São 
                                                       
19 “por la parte del continente irá la línea desde las orillas de dicha Laguna de Merin, tomando la dirección por el primer arroyo 
meridional, que entra en el sangradero o desaguadero de ella, y que corre por lo más inmediato al fuerte portugués de San 
Gonzalo: desde el cual, sin exceder el límite de dicho arroyo, continuará la pertenencia de Portugal por las cabeceras de los ríos 
que corren hacia el mencionado Río Grande y hacia el Yacuí...” “Tratado preliminar sobre los límites de los estados 
pertenecientes á las Coronas de España y Portugal, en la América meridional, ajustado y concluido en San Lorenzo, á 11 de 
Octubre de 1777,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol.  3, 
ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 343–55 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900). 
148 
 
Paulo, they nonetheless began their work of collection and observation while in the Rio de la Plata.20 They 
too depended upon local plazas, hosts, and guides to help them navigate the region’s western corridor. 
The chief administrators of these expeditions included military officers, diplomats, naval engineers, 
cosmographers, geographers, priests, surgeons, and accountants. Authorities in Lisbon or Madrid appointed 
them for their expertise, for previous service to the crown, or for their noble standing. These individuals 
authored the principal sources that exist regarding the expeditions, and it is through their gaze that 
historians have come to understand these events. Their ultimate goal was to transform the theoretical guide 
maps into useable maps of a local scale. In addition, they sought to negotiate the specific details of the 
borderline in a manner favorable to their crown. Thus they not only took great pains to interpret the 
treaties’ language to their advantage, but mined local archives and consulted with informants as they 
scoured for bits of evidence to support their claims. Furthermore, these officials kept a running record of 
their itineraries to provide a description of the local landscape. Their diaries included geographical, 
hydrological, and cosmological measurements, coordinates for key rivers, fords, and peaks, and 
descriptions of local people and wildlife. This information, along with the guide maps, would serve not only 
to stake a claim over the borderland, but as a tool for future administration and investment. 
 The handful of lettered elites who commanded the parties represented only a tiny fraction of the 
overall labor force. A close look at the expeditions’ accounting ledgers reveals a large body of American 
actors that occupied nearly three-quarters of the salaried posts.21 Likewise, a detailed reading of the day-by-
day diaries written by commanding officers demonstrates that local agents performed the vast majority of 
the expeditions’ work, and served as key sources of information. While ranking officials debated the terms 
                                                       
20 The third and fourth Portuguese subdivisions traveled inland from São Paulo towards Paraguay and did not pass through the Río 
de la Plata region. 
21 See, for example: AGNA - XIII. 15-4-4; AGNA - XIII. 15-4-5; AGNA - XIII. 15-4-6; AGNA - XIII. 15-5-1; AGNA - XIII. 15-
5-2; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.1, f. 107. Many of these laborers were from the Guaraní missions. Sarreal, The 
Guaraní and Their Missions, 152. 
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of the treaty and geographers measured river courses or plotted mountaintops, local guides (baqueanos) 
corrected errors in the “Mapa das Cortes” and other maps that the demarcation teams carried.22 In addition, 
armies of laborers carried chests of books and instruments, built and navigated boats, blazed trails to local 
peaks, and set up mobile campsites. Some led the way through fields and forests, while others managed and 
maintained lumbering carts full of foodstuffs, tools, or the large marble markers they would later erect to 
signal the limits. Still others tended to the hundred or so head of cattle that traveled with the teams, 
searching for pastures to graze and rationing their meat. Lastly, they provided safety for the demarcation 
officials, as troops of armed guards walked or rode alongside the rest. These largely unnamed individuals 
even saved the lives of demarcation officials, as occurred in 1785 when a team of swimmers rescued a 
drowning Portuguese captain.23 
 Support for the demarcation efforts also came from local plazas, rural settlers, and native 
communities along the way. Administrators from both sides assured that supplies, provisions, and laborers 
reached the mapmaking teams. In fact, operational oversight of the southernmost portion of the Treaty of 
Madrid mapping expedition was one of the first responsibilities of the newly-created post of Governor of 
Montevideo in the 1750s. In addition to logistical support, local officials shared historical and geographical 
records with demarcation officers, whether by identifying informants or providing access to their archival 
repositories. Where administrators’ knowledge ended, native communities occassionally filled in the gaps. 
In some instances, caciques even demonstrated information from their own mapping and record-keeping 
devices. 
                                                       
22 BNB - 09,3,012, f. 35-6; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 37-37v. Demarcation officials also carried maps 
drawn by Jesuits and other geographers, and the San Ildefonso subdivisions carried the maps and diaries produced by the Madrid 
demarcations. ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 494, pac. 1, f. 2-3v; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 239-239v; 
ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, 153-153v; BNB - I-28,28,18, f. 12v-13; BNB - 04,4,003, f. 12v-13; BNB - 
5,4,035; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 30-30v. Despite the number of maps that they carried, they still tended to 
rely upon guides for information. For example: BNB - 05,4,003. 
23 BNB - 09,4,14, f. 80v-83v. 
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The same three Mbayá caciques have informed me that, six years ago, the Portuguese established a 
fort not far from the east coast of the Río Paraguay, to the north of their lands. [It was there that 
the Mbayás] killed 164 Portuguese four years ago. Belén’s priest adjusted this number according to 
the knots and signs that the Indians showed him.24  
 
Further away from the purview of regional plazas, rural ranchers served as the primary support of the 
mapping expeditions. It was frequently from these sites that the expeditions’ geographers or 
mathematicians took their measurements of latitude and longitude.25 The fragile enterprise of mapmaking 
depended upon local peoples at every turn. 
 
Walking the Line 
As the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcation teams traveled through the Río de la Plata, they 
found themselves limited by the social and territorial contexts that they hoped to order. A close reading of 
the vast paper trail generated by these endeavors reveals the stakes of the expeditions and their dependency 
upon local peoples to accomplish their task. Mapmakers embodied an idealized restructuring of 
territorialities and social interactions, and local inhabitants recognized the threats and possibilities that their 
efforts posed. As the Iberian envoys lengthened the gaze of imperial authorities, they often rubbed against 
unsanctioned commerce or settlements. They also entered into territories over which neither crown had 
effective control, assuming that a prescriptive treaty would provide them with the security and capacity to 
complete their tasks. The reactions of local actors ranged from support – sharing information, trading, 
                                                       
24 “Los mismos tres caciques Mbayás me han informado, que no lejos de la costa oriental del rio Paraguay, y al norte de sus 
tierras, formaron los Portugueses, hace seis años, un presidio ó fortaleza donde los Mbayás fueron fingiendo paces, y 
engañándolos, mataron á 164 Portugueses cuatro años há.  El cura de Belen ajustó este número por los ñudos y señales que le 
mostraron los indios.” Félix de Azara, “Correspondencia oficial e inédita sobre la demarcación de límites entre el Paraguay y el 
Brasil” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, 3–7. 
25 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 306. 
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guiding, laboring – to armed resistance, as occurred during the Guaraní War, and their actions limited the 
scope and success of the mapmaking efforts.26 
 The demarcation expeditions provided the first textual accounts of the nuances of the region’s rural 
landscape. Beyond measuring and cataloguing physical features, mapmakers also stumbled upon vestiges of 
the activities of tolderías and other rural actors. Their depictions of these findings provide key information 
about the territorial practices that had escaped the records of local plazas for decades. For one thing, the 
demarcation teams generally walked along extant paths rather than blazing new trails, as the conditions of 
the natural landscape and previous patterns of usage forced them through particular corridors. The third 
and fourth subdivisions traveled principally along the royal roads that hugged the Río Paraná on their way to 
Paraguay. Meanwhile, the first and second subdivisions marched along more precarious pathways, many of 
which smugglers frequented or tolderías controlled (Map 3.2).27 It is likely for this reason that the former 
two experienced little conflict, while the latter brushed up against illicit trade networks or native peoples 
who brought their activities to a halt. 
 The accounts left by demarcation teams of both treaties indicate that tolderías continued to be the 
principal arbiters of borderland space. While recent scholarship has used the mapmakers’ journals to 
identify elaborate contraband networks, tolderías presented a more tangible threat to the success of the 
mapmaking expeditions.28 Imperial officials on the expeditions sought to exert their authority over 
                                                       
26 Examples of collaboration include: BNB - 09,3,012, f. 127-30; Costa, “Viajes en la frontera colonial”: 121. Attacks against the 
demarcation teams, but unrelated to the Guaraní War, included: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f.73v; IHGB - 
Arquivo, lata 762, pasta 31, f. 1-5; Alejandro N. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su labor en el Río de la 
Plata,” Itsas Memoria. Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco 6 (2009): 750–1. 
27 José Varela y Ulloa, “Plano para ejecutar la demarcación de esta América,” in Diario de la primera partida de la demarcación de 
limites entre España y Portugal en América, 123–47; Gil, “Sobre o comércio ilícito”. 
28 Tiago Gil, Infiéis Trangressores: os contrabandistas da 'fronteira' (1760-1810) (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2007), 173–
74Such cases reveal the preexistence of trade networks along these rural pathways, and the newfound effort to define unregulated 
commerce as contraband and to police it. This initiative would have limited success, due in part to the entrenchment of trade 
economies in the borderland area and the investment of high-ranking officials in their perpetuation. 
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borderland traders, yet they actively avoided interactions with tolderías, attempting instead to move 
stealthily through the countryside. The sites of encounters between mapmakers and rural actors, even 
during the latter expedition in the 1780s, indicate that creole contrabandists tended to restrict themselves 
to lands adjacent to the Lagoa Mirim.29 Once the demarcation teams moved inland, such actors disappeared 
from their accounts. The mapmakers' alternative strategies – exerting imperial sovereignty over 
contrabandists versus rushing through the countryside to evade tolderías – contour the limits of Spanish and 
Portuguese territorial reach.30  
 Despite the demarcation teams’ best efforts to avoid tolderías, the corridors that directed their 
itineraries funneled them through river and highland crossings and made engagement inevitable. As they 
traversed the countryside, mapmakers mentioned toponyms that referred to native histories; they also 
discovered physical evidence of territorialities that existed beyond the vision and reach of local plazas. They 
camped at “Minuanes Crossing” (Paso dos Minuanos), crossed the “Minuanes Stream,” (Arroyo dos Minuanos), 
and paid tribute to caciques near the “Chief River” (Río Caciquey). The travelers marked on their maps the 
“Baumaxahate Stream” (Arroyo Baumaxahate), which according to some authors meant “cold peak” in 
Minuán, as well as the “Aceguá Hill” (Cerro Aceguá), also deemed a Minuán term. They noted other features 
that referred to known caciques and their kin: the “Arroyo de Zapata” and the “Arroyo de Batú.” They 
found cemeteries at the peaks of highland hills, came upon abandoned ranches where tolderías had evicted 
occupants, and crossed a waterway where an Indian woman had been found dead after being attacked by a 
tiger, the “Stream of the Dead Indian Woman” (Arroyo de la India Muerta). The San Ildefonso teams even 
                                                       
29 AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-03-26, 1785-04-01, 1785-04-07, 1785-05-24; Rio Grande 1785-09-06); AGI - 
Buenos Aires, 73, (Charqueada en al Piratini, 1786, 02-02; Campamento do Pavaó, 1786-01-12); ANB - 86. Secretário de 
Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 65-78v, 86-91v, 94-9, 307v; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 31-9, 54v-56v. 
30 It also explains the heavy imbalance of time that they dedicated to mapping the Lagoa Mirim area (2 years) versus lands 
between there and the Jesuit missions (five months). ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 10, 52-129, 190-196. 
153 
 
identified vestiges of the decisive battle of the Guaraní War, including markings on trees and a cemetery 
where rebel fighters had buried their dead.31 
Sometimes engagement was more direct. In October 1752, the Spanish and Portuguese teams had 
their first contact with tolderías while encamped near the southern tip of the Lagoa Mirim. A number of 
Minuanes slipped into the Spanish team’s camp during the dark of night and absconded with 200 horses. In 
response, soldiers stationed in the nearby Portuguese fort of São Miguel set out to recover the horses, but 
were unable to apprehend the perpetrators. Instead, they raided and took 28 captives from a nearby 
toldería, whose relationship with the original thieves was suspect. One month later, this time further north, 
Minuanes again entered the expedition’s encampments and extracted horses. A similar pattern of events 
transpired, as a subsequent imperial raid abducted 32 people from what appears to have been other 
tolderías.32 These encounters were overshadowed by events that occurred a few months later at Santa 
Tecla, when Guaraní leaders from the San Miguel mission refused to provide aid or supplies to the 
demarcation teams. This confrontation prompted the disbanding of the mapping expeditions and three years 
of war.33 Nonetheless, Guaraní protest of the mapping expeditions cannot be separated from the events that 
preceded it. By the time that the demarcation teams arrived to Santa Tecla, their supplies had already been 
depleted, leaving them no choice but to abandon their efforts. 
                                                       
31 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 354, 364, 371, 395v; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 22; 
BNB - 09,02,003, f. 2; Francisco João Roscio, “Compêndio Noticioso” in O Capitalismo Pastoril, 107; José de Saldanha, “Diário 
resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 183, 187, 204; IEB - YAP-011, f. 13; Carlos Calvo, ed., Colección 
histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina 
comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros dias Tomo Octavo (Paris: A. Durand, 
1866), 197; Porto, “O minuano na toponímia rio-grandense”; Sosa, La nación charrúa, 31–34; Furtado, Vocábulos indígenas na 
geografia do Rio Grande do Sul. 
32 IEB - YAP-011, f. 9v, 11v-12; “Diário compilado da 1a tropa,” in Collecção de notícias para a história e geografia das nações 
ultramarinas que vivem nos dominios portuguezes ou lhes são visinhas, Tomo VII, 45–123 (Lisboa: Academia Real das Sciencias, 1841), 
31. 
33 Following the events in Santa Tecla, Portuguese teams returning to Rio Grande and the Spanish retreating to Montevideo and 
Colônia do Sacramento. IEB - YAP-011, 25–27.  
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These incidents point to a central role for tolderías in the territorial conflict generated by the 
Treaty of Madrid, which culminated in the 1753 to 1756 Guaraní War. Traditional and revisionist accounts 
have defined the war as a struggle between Jesuit-Guaraní missions and Luso-Hispanic armies, and none 
have considered tolderías to have been significant participants.34 Some have acknowledged the presence of 
tolderías in this armed uprising – pointing to their resistance to the transmigration of the seven missions or 
to their later alliance with Guaraníes – yet they unanimously frame it as a bilateral battle between imperial 
and mission interests.35 Reflecting deeper upon these two areas of toldería participation reveals that the war 
was as much a result of impingement upon tolderías’ territorialities as a Jesuit or Guaraní struggle for 
autonomy. In particular, the relocation of the “Siete Pueblos Orientales” – San Borja, San Nicolás, San Luis, 
San Lorenzo, San Miguel, San Juan Bautista, and Santo Ángel – would have placed many of them on lands 
controlled by tolderías. In addition, as the war began and Luso-Hispanic armies attempted to invade the 
missions, they too had to cross tolderías’ lands. In order to explain how the war began and how it played 
out, it is thus necessary to consider it the broader territorial framework of plazas and tolderías.  
 The Guaraní War might not have occurred or reached the scale that it did had it not been for the 
tolderías’ resistance to mission relocation. Faced with the terms of the Treaty of Madrid, several of the 
Siete Pueblos’s first response was not protest or armed uprising, but attempts to move their missions. 
Inhabitants of the San Luis, San Borja, and San Juan missions sought to establish new settlements along the 
                                                       
34 Traditional histories argued that Jesuits had orchestrated the uprising and that their subsequent expulsions were its principle 
outcome. Revisionist accounts have focused on Guaraní leadership and action, often in defiance of the conciliatory attitude of 
Jesuit missionaries. Magnus Mörner, The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America., 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1965); Tau Golin, 
A Guerra Guaranítica: Como os exércitos de Portugal e Espanha destruíram os Sete Povos dos jesuítas e índios guaranis no Rio Grande do Sul, 3a 
(Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 1998); Barbara A. Ganson, The Guaraní 
under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del 
Plata; Eduardo Santos Neumann, “Fronteira e identidade: confrontos luso-guarani na Banda Oriental, 1680-1757,” Revista 
Complutense de Historia de América 26 (2000). Still, some work has centered tolderías’ actions: Cabrera Pérez, “Los 'indios infieles' 
de la Banda Oriental y su participación en la Guerra Guaranítica”; Pereira, 'Y hoy están en paz', 25–26. 
35 Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 2–3; Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 276–85; Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata, 
227-32, 259, 264-5, 268, 271. 
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Río Miriñay, the Río Queguay, and the Río Negro respectively, sites designated by imperial authorities 
(Map 3.5).36 Charrúa tolderías controlled the first, while Charrúa, Minuán, and Bohan tolderías had joined 
together and controlled the others. The Jesuit father Bernardo Nusdorffer described the the first journey by 
residents of San Luis to the Rio Miriñay in the following terms: 
The Charrúa cacique Gaspar Cossero had come to Yapeyú to protest…On the way from La Cruz to 
Yapeyú, a Charrúa who saw the residents of San Luis (Lusistas) forcefully removed the poncho that 
one of them was wearing…[the Lusistas] did not want to go to war with the Charrúas, who were 
upset and threatening to kill all of them.37 
 
Following these threats: 
 
The Lusistas wanted to return to their mission because they did not want to have war with the 
Charrúas....some wanted to join other missions, others wanted to look for other lands in the 
Paraná in order not to meddle anymore in the Charrúas’ lands....I went myself to where [the 
Charrúas] were, and I divided among them a large amount of yerba mate and tobacco….After 
receiving all of it they returned to their horses and weapons...insolently asking for more...[The 
Lusistas] left quiet and peaceful lands, which belonged to their mission, and they did not want to be 
troubled with war; so from then on they were determined to return [to their mission].38 
 
While the population of San Luis was not pleased with the need to uproot and establish a new mission, they 
complied nonetheless. It was not until the refusal of Charrúa tolderías to accept their settlement that they 
                                                       
36 MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C18, P2, No. 23; Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), Manuscritos da 
Coleção De Ángelis t. VII (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, Divisão de Publicações e Divulgação, 1969), 144, 164, 168-9, 
176-80, 193, 197, 208, 264; Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 143, 386, 405; Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española 
en el Uruguay, Tomo Segundo, 84-8, 93-4; Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado, vol.  5, 60; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 2; 
Levinton, “Las estancias de Nuestra Señora de los Reyes de Yapeyú”: 37–8; Pereira, 'Y hoy están en paz', 27–32. While the 
transplantation of mission plazas had not occurred during the lifetime of anyone involved in this move, it was not without 
precedent. Seventeenth-century conflicts with bandeirantes had resulted in numerous relocation projects throughout the mission 
complex.  
37 “el Casique Charrua D." Gaspar Cossero avia venido al Yapeyu protestando…En el camino desde la Cruz a Yapeyu un Charrua, 
q.uo viò a los Luisistas, quito por tuerza el poncho a un Luisista….eilos no querian tener guerra con los Charruas, q estaban de 
malas y les decian q los avian de matar a todos los Luisistas” Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. VII, 164–
65. 
38 “[Los lusistas] querian bolverse a su Pueblo, q ellos no querian tener guerra con los Charruas....unos querian juntarse con otros 
pueblos; unos querian buscar otras tierras en el Parana para no meterse mas en tierras de Charruas...yo mismo fui adonde estaban 
assentados [los charrúas], y les dividi bastante Yerba y Tabaco...despues que recibieron todo todos se pusieron otra vez con sus 
armas a cavallo...pidiendo con insolencia mas...[Los lusistas] dexaban tierras quietas y pacificas, quales eran las de sus Pueblos; y 
no querian estar en inquietas y ocasionadas â guerra; y assi que ellos estavan desde aora determinados â volver [a su pueblo].” 
ibid., 164-5, 168-9, 176-7, 179. 
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turned on their heels and went back home. Migrants from San Borja and San Juan faced similar protests 
when they attempted to move, and they too returned to their missions.39 
 
Map 3.5 – “Mapa de las estancias que tenían los pueblos misioneros,” c. 1752. This map shows 
the proposed sites of translocation for the San Luis (upper left quadrant), San Borja (bottom left quadrant), 
and San Miguel/San José (bottom right quadrant) missions.40 
 
For several of the Guaraní missions, resistance to the Treaty of Madrid was not because they would 
have to uproot their plazas, but because there were no empty lands to where they could relocate. Although 
                                                       
39 Around this time, there was also a proposal to divide the Yapeyú mission in two, which Yapeyú’s leadership opposed because 
the new mission plaza would be located near the Río Queguay, in lands controlled by Charrúas. This was the same site chosen for 
the new San Borja mission. Levinton, “Las estancias de Nuestra Señora de los Reyes de Yapeyú”: 44. Although the Río Miriñay 
and the Río Queguay were the principal sites targeted for new settlements, the missions’ residents also considered locales along 
the Río Paraná and the Río Paraguay. In the end, they considered that these sites were also unfit for new settlements because they 
were controlled by Abipones and Payaguás respectively. Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. VII, 144–45. 
40 Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, vol.  2, Mapa XXIV. 
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the Rio Miriñay, the Rio Queguay, and the Rio Negro were well within projected Spanish territorial limits, 
Charrúas, Minuanes, and Bohanes continued to claim and control these lands. Even when the migrants from 
the missions garnered armed support from other plazas, their forces were not enough to sway the opinions 
of local tolderías.41 Recognizing this, the Guaraníes returned to their missions and prepared to face imperial 
armies. For them, this was a more manageable challenge than to wage armed conflict against their Charrúa, 
Minuán, or Bohan neighbors. As they formalized their protests, Guaraní caciques would certainly point to 
their ancestral claims over the missions and the logistical difficulties of moving to new sites; however, their 
actions point to the lack of available lands as their principal motive for resisting.42 
Those of us from San Luis, having received word to move [our mission], went to a faraway land, 
complying with the will of our Holy King. Having gone there two times, we all became very tired, 
and we lost all of our goods. Neither the caciques nor the Indians liked [the move], and the infidel 
Charrúas and Minuanes did not want us to found [a new mission] in that land, saying to us ‘there 
are no lands for you who have no master. Your God has not made lands for you now, and if you 
want to enter into these lands it will have to be with war.’ With their spears pointed at us, we 
returned to our mission and there remained, as there were no more lands to be sought out. You see 
here how we have traveled to comply with the King’s will, and we ask him that, according to what 
he has offered to us as vassals, he maintain us in our lands.43 
 
Rather than suggesting that there were no grounds for them to move, Guaraní caciques instead argued that 
there were no grounds for them to move to. They had attempted to relocate to seemingly open lands and 
                                                       
41 Militias from Yapeyú, Corrientes, and Santa Fe supported San Luis’s inhabitants as they attempted to move to the Rio Miriñay. 
42 Guaraní histories, religion, and epistemologies were certainly rooted in the local landscape of their missions, giving them 
numerous reasons to be against the transmigration. Nonetheless, in their official opposition, they pointed to the presence of 
tolderías as the principal factor in their turning back. Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, 95; Levinton, El 
espacio jesuítico-guaraní, - Volumen 80. 
43 “Nosotros los de San Luiz estando al aviso de que nos mudasemos, fuimos a una tierra mui lexana, cumpliendo la voluntade de 
nuestro Santo Rey; haviendo ido dos vezes, todos nos cansamos mucho; y perdemos todos nuestros bienes, mas no gostando los 
Caziques, y los Indios juntamente, y no queriendo los Infieles Charruas, y Mosanes que fundassemos en aquella tierra disiendonos 
no hay tierra para vosotros que no tenga dueno, no á echo aora no mas Dios Nuestro Señor las tierras para vosotros si quereis 
entrar en ellas ha de ser con guerra, y a punta de lanza nos volvimos a nuestro pueblo, y nos quedamos, no haviendo mas tierras 
que poder buscar, ves aqui como hemos andado por cumprir la voluntad del Rey, y le pedimos que segun lo que nos tiene 
ofrecido como a Vassallos suios nos mantenga en nuestra tierra.” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.31, 25-26v. 
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found that local tolderías would not accept their establishment. Refusing to be on the front lines against 
tolderías, the only option that remained for the mission dwellers was to resist transmigration. 
 In response to Guaraní refusal to support the mapping expeditions, Spanish and Portuguese officials 
abandoned the demarcation efforts and prepared for military assault. Portuguese forces would engage the 
missions from Rio Grande and Viamão in the east, while Spanish soldiers would approach from the south, 
along the Rio Uruguay. For the next three years, warfare engulfed the north of the Río de la Plata region. 
Imperial forces and their allies pitted themselves against fighters from the missions and whatever support 
they could garner. Here again, tolderías served as important actors. Despite resistance to the encroachment 
of the mission plazas upon their lands, by the end of 1753, Charrúas, Minuanes, Bohanes, and Guenoas had 
all begun to collaborate with Guaraní forces against the imperial armies. Whether spying, participating in 
battles, or commandeering horses and supplies, they provided invaluable allies to the resistance efforts.  
Why did many tolderías eventually align with the mission-dwellers in their uprising against imperial 
armies, particularly after mission forces had participated in the campaigns against them from 1749 to 
1752?44 One possible explanation is kinship ties. Charrúas, Minuanes, and Guenoas all had kin living in 
Yapeyú, San Borja, and other missions, and it is possible that they sought to lend them aid out of affinity or 
obligation. Indeed, Minuán spies provided advance warning to their kin in San Miguel as Portuguese forces 
planned to march upon their mission.45 At the same time, however, many Minuanes eventually abandoned 
the resistance efforts, while others shifted their support to the Portuguese. Kinship ties may have been 
strong, but the support of local tolderías did not necessarily extend to the entire population of a given 
mission plaza. A second potential explanation is that Charrúas, Bohanes, Guenoas, and Minuanes hired 
themselves out as mercenaries to the mission armies. It is true that their involvement in the war came at the 
                                                       
44 Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. VII, 164–65. These campaigns were discussed in Chapter 2. 
45 Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 620–1. 
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request of Guaraní leadership, and that they received numerous payments over its duration.46 Still, yerba 
mate, tobacco, and a handful of other items probably would not have been enough for members of these 
tolderías to risk themselves in armed combat. Given the dynamics of plazas and tolderías that defined the 
region up to this point, these payments more likely served as a symbolic recognition of the authority such 
tolderías carried over the countryside. Offering goods was akin to a request for actions that Guaraní fighters 
could not undertake themselves.  
Rather than merely kin, clients, or hired aid, tolderías’ decisions to participate in the war derived 
from their position as arbiters of the countryside. For the most part, fighters from tolderías took up arms in 
their own lands rather than traveling deep into mission territories. Their skirmishes with imperial troops 
occurred as royal soldiers and militias attempted to cross lands that their tolderías claimed and controlled. 
As Spanish forces marched north from Buenos Aires along the Río Uruguay to Yapeyú in 1754, Charrúas, 
Minuanes, and Guenoas came at the request of the mission’s residents, routing the imperial army handily 
and forcing them back to Buenos Aires and Montevideo (Map 3.6). In the East, Minuanes, Guenoas, and 
Guaraníes halted Portuguese forces near the fort of Jesús Maria José, along the Rio Pardo.47 This territorial 
dynamic was also evident in the rebels’ strategizing. 
The Priest named Antonio, who is from the La Cruz Mission, has on his own called upon and given 
payment to infidel Indians [known as] Charrúas, Bohanes, and Minuanes, who were commanded by 
an Indian of the same nation named Don Joseph. [Antonio] gave them yerba mate, tobacco, and 
other objects so that they would survey the countryside, its entrances, and its exits, and that they 
would promptly report on whatever news they had, and that they would incorporate themselves 
into the Guaraní forces to help them in the defense of their missions.48 
                                                       
46 Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 417-418, 429; Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. VII, 
230–31. 
47 AHU - Rio de Janeiro (017), Caixa 73, Docs 16897 & 16898; AHU - Rio de Janeiro (017), Caixa 78, Doc 18205; Rodrigues 
da Cunha, Jacinto, “Diário da expedição de Gomes Freire de Andrada às Missões do Uruguay,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e 
Geográphico do Brazil Tomo XVI (1853): 200; Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 475, 497-8; Tadeo X. Henis, “Diario 
histórico de la rebellion y guerra de los pueblos guaranís, situados en la costa oriental del Río Uruguay, del año de 1754,” in 
Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol.  5, ed. Pedro de Angelis 
(Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836), 4, 21-2. 
48 “El R. P. Cura nom.do Antonio que lo es del Pueblo de la Cruz, este por si mismo tenia congregado y Gratificado a Indios 
Ynfieles parcialidades Charruas, Bojanes, y minuanes dandoles Yerva, tavaco, y otros efectos, Cuias parcialidades las 
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Although Charrúas, Minuanes, and Bohanes provided auxiliary support for Guaraní militias near the mission 
plazas, their primary activity was to monitor the countryside’s “entrances and exits” – pathways to the south 
and east of the missions that led them to tolderías’ lands. Given that river fords, headwaters, and highland 
passes funneled travelers through the countryside, the rebels knew that imperial armies would have to pass 
through these lands on their way to the missions. In this way, mission interests coalesced with tolderías’ 
territorial control. 
 [The Guaraníes] have distributed their armadas along the headwaters of the Río Ibicuí and the falls 
of the Río Piraí, where they remain with infidel Indians, Charrúas and Bohanes, with the purpose of 
not letting any Portuguese enter.49  
 
Charrúas, Minuanes, and Bohanes had maintained their tolderías in this area for decades in order to control 
flows of people and goods along the rural highway. To guard these key crossings was not simply to protect 
mission plazas, but to maintain their claims over the countryside. 
By the end of the war, numerous tolderías had begun to side with the imperial invaders, and 
eventually the missionaries found themselves defeated. Spanish and Portuguese military officials recognized 
the need to garner safe passage across the countryside if they hoped to procure victory, and in early 1755, 
imperial forces near Santa Tecla invited Minuán and Guenoa caciques to parley. There they lavished the 
caciques with gifts, including clothing and money, seeking to procure their support. Responses from the  
                                                       
Commandava vn Indio de la misma nacion llamado d.n Jph solo con el fin de que / reconozca las Campañas sus entradas, y 
salidas, y q.e de todo dize pronpto auiso de qualquer resulta, y se incorporase con los Cuerpos de Yndios Guaranies para ayuda de 
ellos en defensa de sus Pueblos.” AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo III, 127, 130-1. 
49 “teniendo repartidas sus Armadas a las Puntas del Yvicui, y Cahidas del Rio Pareg, dondes mantienen con indios infieles, 
Charruas y vojanes para opocito de no dexar entrar Portugueses alguno.” ibid., 126. 
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Map 3.6 – “Plano del Rio de la Plata”, [n.d.]. This map demonstrates the trajectories of the imperial 
armies and the sites of key events in the Guaraní War. The letters “A” and “B” represent Spanish and 
Portuguese marches in 1754, respectively, and where tolderías and Guaraníes turned them back. The letters 
“C” and “D” demonstrate their marches to Santa Tecla in 1755, where they parlayed with Minuán and Guenoa 
caciques and then passed through to the missions.50 
 
                                                       
50 Plano del Rio de la Plata que comprende los Pueblos de Misiones y Linea que se puso para dividir las Jurisdiciones entre los dos Monarcas de 
España y Portugal aunque despues en el año 1759 se quedaron las cosas como se estavan (s/f); AGMM - ARG-8,2. 
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Minuanes and Guenoas varied; most refused to lend aid, but others used the opportunity for the benefit of 
their own tolderías. In particular, the cacique Moreira agreed to return with his closest kin to the 
countryside near the Rio Cebollatí and São Miguel. While he offered to aid the imperial efforts personally, 
he leveraged that moment to find an exit for his tolderías and to reestablish peace with his Portuguese 
counterparts. Moreira´s tolderías were precisely those that the armies of the demarcation teams had 
attacked in 1752. For that reason, he and his kin had agreed to aid the missions´ resistance efforts and had 
waylaid imperial armies ever since.51 Hoping to avoid the tolls of the imminent battles between imperial 
and missionary forces, he and others absconded from the war and returned to the foothills where they had 
been before.52 
 Moreira's actions demonstrate how internal motivations and territorial dynamics also shaped many 
tolderías’ decisions to avoid or exit the war. Moreira and his tolderías had not participated because of 
kinship ties with the missions´ inhabitants, nor had they done so for any sort of pan-indigenous identity. 
Rather, the conflict that they had experienced as the demarcation teams came into their lands gave them 
common cause with the mission plazas. Once they restored peace with imperial forces, there was no longer 
any need to continue in the war. Other caciques made similar decisions, especially after receiving payments 
from imperial armies and watching them move on to mission territories. Some even sought to convince 
their kin who had been living on the missions to abscond before the fighting reached them.53 Tolderías 
                                                       
51 Following the skirmishes with the demarcation team, Moreira and his kin had taken the horses to the Yapeyú mission. AHU - 
Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 78, Doc 18218; Do Tratado de Madri à conquista dos Sete Povos (1750-1802), t. 
VII, 137, 188; “Diário compilado da 1a tropa” in Collecção de notícias para a história e geografia das nações ultramarinas que vivem nos 
dominios portuguezes ou lhes são visinhas, 72. 
52 AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e Almeida (017-01), Caixa 78, Doc 18218; Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 505, 
510-511, 519-20; Tadeo X. Henis, “Diario histórico de la rebellion y guerra de los pueblos guaranís, situados en la costa oriental 
del Río Uruguay, del año de 1754” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de 
la Plata, 40; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 102–3; Frühauf Garcia, “Quando 
os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 622. 
53 A Minuán named Molina convinced at least 60 Minuanes from San Miguel to abandon the mission before the war started. Anais 
da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 502–3. Other examples include: ibid., 430; AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 1, Doc 90. 
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whose lands were neither affected by the mission relocation projects nor by the subsequent military 
marches tended to avoid the war from the beginning, and many maintained peaceful ties with neighboring 
plazas throughout.54 A number of tolderías fought alongside Guaraní militias through the end of the war, yet 
as more and more chose indifference or aid to imperial forces over time, the rebels’ cause was lost.55  
 In 1758, two years after the war ended, the Iberian demarcation teams resumed their activities. In 
particular, the new personnel sought to draw a line between Santa Tecla and the Rio Uruguay.56 Using maps 
that they had taken from several mission archives, the demarcation parties eventually completed their 
assignment. Still, the end of this undertaking did not signify the consolidation of regional territorial control 
by the competing empires. The comparison of treaty maps to written accounts again reveals that the 
finalized maps represented idealized visions of what imperial authorities hoped the region would look like, 
rather than how it actually looked from the ground. 
According to reports that I had from the area, a large number not only of Tapes, but of Charrúas 
and Minuanes, have taken shelter [in lands south of the missions near the borderline]...[According 
to one of the expedition’s maps], those lands were neither vast nor were there Indians in them.57 
 
Indeed, one of the results of the war was an influx of refugees from the missions to lands controlled by 
Charrúa and Minuán tolderías.58 This produced new competitors for the tolderías, but also provided 
                                                       
54 During the 1750s, some Charrúa tolderías maintained ties with residents in Corrientes, while others negotiated settlement in 
Santo Domingo Soriano. IEB - AL-068-002; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, 1757-05-18; Campo del Bloqueo, 1757-04-26, 1757-06-09, 
1757-08-05, 1757-08-06; Santo Domingo Soriano, 1757-07-01; AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, 1757-02-24; Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-02-
27, 1758-09-10, 1758-11-06; 1760-01-22 & 1760-04-24; Buenos Aires, 1760-03-06 & 1760-08-09. 
55 Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 418-20, 445, 519–520, 535, 541; Tadeo X. Henis, “Diario histórico de la rebellion 
y guerra de los pueblos guaranís, situados en la costa oriental del Río Uruguay, del año de 1754” in Colección de obras y documentos 
relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, 40, 53. 
56 AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 1, Docs 42 & 74; Caixa 2, Docs 116 & 142. 
57 “segundo as noticias que tive ali, viviam abrigados, não só bastante numero de Tapes, mas tambem Charruas e Minuanes: estes 
erão os Indios e aquelle o terreno indiviso... e se V. E. me diz que do plano que lhe remeti feito pelo Coronel Don Miguel 
Angelo de Blasco se manifesta não ser aquelle terreno vasto nem nelle haber Indios.” Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro 
Volume LIII (Rio de Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1931); publicados sob a administração do diretor Rodolfo Garcia, 318–
19. 
58 Historians most often associate outward migration from the missions with the expulsion of the Jesuit order in 1767. José María 
Mariluz Urquijo, “Los Guaraníes después de la expulsión de los jesuitas,” Estudios Americanos 6, no. 25 (1953); Wilde, “Guaraníes, 
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caciques with an opportunity to expand their kinship networks and increase their spheres of influence. At 
the same time, however, another vestige of the war was the establishment of forts and settlements in 
borderland spaces, most notably the Portuguese in Rio Pardo and the adjacent Sao Nicolau, populated by 
former residents of the Siete Pueblos. If only slightly, the demarcation of a border in the 1750s did alter the 
regional dynamic of the Río de la Plata, though not according to imperial designs. 
 By 1761, the death of Fernando VI and the subsequent ascension of Charles III to the Spanish throne 
precipitated the annulment of the Treaty of Madrid. In juridical terms, the Siete Pueblos returned to Spain 
and Colônia to the Portuguese. Over the course of the next fifteen years, Iberian militaries would once 
again turn their guns on one another, with Colônia, São Miguel, and Rio Grande being occupied by Spain 
and Santa Tecla falling to Portugal. It would not be until the peace accord of 1777 that a dividing line again 
became the legal standard and not until the 1780s that demarcation teams reappeared in the region. This 
time, the imaginary line was further north, and while Colônia again returned to Spanish control, the eastern 
missions did not transfer to the Portuguese. By this point, the Jesuit order had been expelled from both 
Portuguese and Spanish dominions, and the missions were under duress. Armed resistance was neither of 
interest nor a possibility. 
 The San Ildefonso demarcation produced little armed backlash in the region. Instead, it revealed the 
consolidation of territorial control by tolderías in lands adjacent to the borderline, as well as the continued 
lack of territorial knowledge or engagement by Spanish or Portuguese administrators beyond the isolated 
locales of their individual forts. Establishing fortresses in Santa Tecla and Rio Pardo did not imply control 
over or knowledge of the borderlands. For this reason, once the demarcation parties moved north from 
                                                       
'gauchos' e 'indios infieles' en el proceso de disgregación de las antiguas doctrinas jesuíticas del Paraguay”: 86–8; Ganson, The 
Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, 125–36; Robert H. Jackson, “The Post-Jesuit Expulsion Population of the 
Paraguay Missions, 1768-1803,” Colonial Latin American Historical Review 16, no. 4 (2007); Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser 
índio, Capítulo 3; Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, Chapter 6. Still, this trend began during the crisis over the Siete Pueblos. 
See, for example: Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 147, 203, 207-8. 
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Santa Tecla toward the missions in 1785 and 1786, they encountered powerful and well-known caciques 
and found themselves obliged to pay in exchange for safe passage.59 In addition for taxing travelers, Minuán 
caciques objected to the imprint that the demarcation teams left upon the local landscape. For example, in 
1787, Spanish and Portuguese officers discovered that a number of Minuanes had been toppling the stone 
markers they had erected to signal the imperial limits. It would take further parleying to convince local 
caciques to permit the marble obelisks to remain in position. This occurred along the headwaters of the Rio 
Piraí and the Río Jacuí, lands that tolderías continued to control three decades after the end of the Guaraní 
War.60  
If the Santo Ildefonso expeditions did not incite a regional war, they did brush up against local 
territorialities. They revealed a concentration of Minuán tolderías in particular in the vast spaces 
surrounding imperial forts and mission plazas. All along the newly-designed imperial limits, other native 
peoples exhibited similar territorial claims. Impinging upon them imperiled the demarcation teams, who 
thus sought to travel without detection.61 In the end, native protection of these unmapped territorialities 
proved more of an impediment to the demarcation efforts than the call to arms that had occurred three 
decades before. As late as 1797, Portuguese officials complained of a lack of knowledge of lands between 
Porto Alegre and Sao Martinho (Map 3.1), due to the presence of independent native peoples: 
Along the continuation of the line from here northward [from São Martinho], there are many 
impediments to finding firm points to determine what currently pertains to the dominions of 
Portugal. The highlands that cross this location and the closed forests that cover them and continue 
more or less thickly on their northern side, largely occupied by savage Indians, and transited little 
to none by the Portuguese, making this terrain unknown for the object that I discuss.62 
                                                       
59 See note 6. 
60 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 10, f. 194. 
61 See: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, 73v, 84; Costa, “Viajes en la frontera colonial”; Erbig Jr., Forging Frontiers, 
Chapter 3. 
62 “Na continuação da Raya d'aqui para o Norte [de São Martinho] me-he mais embaracozo encontrar pontos firmes para 
determinar, o que actualmente pertence aos Dominios de Portugal. A cordilheira que atravessa nesta situação, os Bosques 
serrados, de que hé corberta, e que seguem mais ou menos expessos da parte Septentrional, ocuppados em grande parte por 
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Three years later, the Spanish Commander General of the Countryside, Felix de Azara, complained that his 
office, “lacked an exact drawing of the countryside and its frontier [with Brazil].”63 Here and in other areas 
along the imaginary imperial limits, administrators lamented the perpetuity of empty spaces of imperial 
knowledge and oversight. Belying the images presented in the maps produced by the demarcation teams, 
textual accounts revealed instead the hollowness of the borderline. 
 
Geographies of the Future and Ethnographies of the Past 
 Even as they incited a regional war and brushed against existing territorial structures, the Madrid 
and San Ildefonso mapping expeditions served as a key moment in the production of geographical and 
ethnographic knowledge about the Río de la Plata. The discursive shift they exemplified and to which they 
contributed had two central components: the invention and normalization of the idea of the border and the 
reifying of the region’s indigenous communities within geographical and taxonomical categories. Although 
the attitudes and sensibilities that they promoted were part of broader epistemological shifts in the Atlantic 
World, the mapping expeditions were the principal means through which Iberian administrators 
discursively incorporated the Río de la Plata into these Enlightenment-era ideological frameworks. In both 
legal and epistemological terms, they ushered in a new era of engagement with the region for Portuguese 
and Spanish officials. Simply put, they enabled and impelled administrators to think in terms of provinces 
rather than plazas, and to imagine tolderías not as allies but as subjects. 
 When considered within the longue durée of regional writings, the body of knowledge produced 
through the demarcation efforts stands out as a significant discursive moment for geographic and 
                                                       
Indios Salvagens, e os poucos, ou nenuns transitos destes sertoens pellos Portuguezes fazem este terreno desconhecido para o 
objeito, de que trato.” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 13, f. 142. 
63 “carece tanvien esta Comandancìa de un Plano exacto de la Campaña y su Frontera.” AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Cerro Largo, 1800-
02-13). 
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ethnographic knowledge. Sixteenth-century chronicles (crónicas) conceptualized the region principally as a 
pathway to Paraguay. Their geographical perspective was restricted to the riverine channels that ran 
between Buenos Aires and Asunción – principally the the Río de la Plata estuary and the Río Paraná – or the 
narrow terrestrial corridor that cut across the north of the region, connecting the Paraguayan capital 
eastward to the Atlantic coast. For this reason, early maps of the region and the South American continent 
alike provided oversized and detailed renderings of the two rivers while demonstrating little consistency in 
their depictions of the region’s countryside (Map 3.7).64 Knowledge of regional lands remained limited 
despite larger imperial efforts to systematize geographical information on the Americas, such as Spain’s 
Relaciones Geográficas, as administrators in the Río de la Plata met such endeavors with indifference.65 During 
these years, imperial narratives of engagement with native peoples consisted of episodic accounts of trade or 
warfare. Rather than offering systematic ethnographies, travelers limited themselves to ascribing ethnonyms 
according to the territorial locations where they encountered native peoples.66   
                                                       
64 At the time, many mapmakers considered the Río Paraná part of the Río de la Plata and thus labeled it as such. 
65 Edwards, “Geographical Coverage of the Sixteenth-Century Relaciones de Indias from South America”; Sergio Hernán Latini, 
“Repensando la construcción de la cuenca del Plata como espacio de frontera” in Fronteras. 
66 Examples include: “Memoria de Diego García,” in Historia del puerto de Buenos Aires: Descubrimiento del río de la Plata y de sus 
principales afluentes, y fundación de las más antiguas ciudades en sus márgenes, ed. Eduardo Madero (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Buenos 
Aires, 1939), 401, 404; “Declaración de Francisco Ortiz de Vergara,” in Documentos históricos y geográficos relativos a la conquista 
rioplatense, ed. José Torre Revello 1 (Buenos Aires: Tallares Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1941), 118; Ulrich Schmidl, Viaje al Río de la 
Plata (Buenos Aires: Claridad, [1567] 2009), 93–99. 
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Map 3.7 – Hulsius, Levinus, Nova et exacta delineatio Americae, 1602.67 
 
 As Jesuit missionaries began to engage the northern portion of the region in the seventeenth 
century, they developed their own corpus of written and drawn accounts. Their maps and reports served 
until the mid-eighteenth century as the most detailed renderings of local peoples and lands, and they 
demonstrated key shifts from the writings of earlier explorers. Specifically, as priests and friars attempted 
to garner support for new mission settlements, they aimed to locate non-missionized peoples and new 
resources. Beyond the administrative records of individual mission plazas, the Society of Jesus developed a 
voluminous archive of maps and descriptions of engagement with local tolderías. Their drawings of regional 
lands almost always included ethnonyms, as they sought to map the location of non-Christian peoples that 
                                                       
67 Levinus Hulsius, Nova et exacta delineatio Americae partis avstralis (Noribergae: Leuinum Hulsium, 1602); Library of Congress, 
Map Collections, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g5200.rb000009 (accessed February 23, 2015). 
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they would eventually bring into the fold of Christendom (Map 3.8).68 In spite of these more detailed 
accounts, however, missionaries did not attempt to categorize tolderías in the region according to any 
universal ethnographic framework. Furthermore, their geographic knowledge was limited to the lands near 
their missions and the various networks of roadways that connected them. 
 
Map 3.8 – Deyá, Ignacio, Mappa Paraquariae, 174669 
 
                                                       
68 See: Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, vol.  2. 
69 ibid., Mapa XLVI.  
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 During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Iberian cartographic production turned 
to claiming resources and defining pathways. As Jesuits and Spanish and Portuguese administrators debated 
regional possession and sought to identify the locations of resources, much of their mapmaking focused on 
coastal charts or regional roadways. Here again, both drawn and written sources revealed the limited 
territorial visions of their authors. Jesuits provided details on the mission complex to the north of the 
region, while imperial officials drew coastlines and harbors. Despite competing claims for territorial 
possession, maps drawn in the region did not include borderlines, as they were not operative concepts at 
the time. Prior to the demarcation expeditions, the borderline was the product of European engravers’ 
tables rather than American travelers' accounts. Jesuits continued to highlight native peoples’ perceived 
locations, as proselytization remained a possibility. Imperial authors were less consistent with their 
representations; however, they often discussed tolderías as potential trading partners. Still, until the 
demarcation efforts, no systematic effort had catalogued regional tolderías according to ethnic categories. 
 The lacuna of geographical and ethnographic information made the demarcation efforts duly 
important for imperial administrators. Along with producing evidence of a legal border, mapmakers aimed 
to compile and organize information on the regional landscape in a usable format for future governance. 
Thus they scoured local archives and interviewed countless informants along the way. The principal officers 
of the demarcation efforts were familiar with extant records, frequently citing earlier chronicles, route 
descriptions (roteiros), Jesuit histories, and oral testimonies as evidence of their claims. In framing this 
information, however, they presented an entirely new territorial vision that included fixed borders and 
provincial units. A close analysis of the details of this new structuring of knowledge also reveals new 
attitudes vis-à-vis tolderías in the region. Whereas earlier accounts depicted them as active trading partners 
or potential converts, the demarcation officials focused particularly on their nomadism and portrayed them 
as impossible subjects. By inscribing mobile peoples upon the landscape as obdurate, unchanging actors, 
mapmakers positioned them for the first time as obstacles to the realization of idealized territorial states. In 
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making the border and claiming all lands on one side or another, the demarcation teams redefined 
interethnic relations, presupposing that tolderías were vassals by virtue of living within the dominion of one 
of the two Iberian crowns.  
 The Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping expeditions generated geographical information in a variety 
of formats. In addition to continual correspondence with their counterparts, with imperial administrators, 
and with each other, the demarcation officials left day-by-day journals (diarios) of their activities. These 
voluminous tomes were meant to produce a level of detail that could not be captured by the treaty maps, a 
point expressed by Portuguese geographer José de Saldanha. 
The painter, with a delicate brush can represent Nature, but cannot express circumstances, news, 
and movements of events. This is the part reserved for the historian....An extensive diary, which 
we compose in the countryside, is indispensable for the exact configuration of the drawings.70 
 
The diarios included the systematic identification of rivers, highland peaks, and crossings, all of which the 
geographers catalogued according to latitude and longitude coordinate systems. In addition, they contained 
descriptions of local plants, animals, and terrain, which the travelers used to suggest sites for future 
settlements or economic ventures. The aim of this meticulous note-taking was not only to produce a 
border, but to collect, catalogue, and evaluate undocumented natural resources. Lastly, mapmakers 
georeferenced local histories, using the occasion of crossing a given geographical feature to recount events 
that had occurred there. This purpose of this gesture was generally to reinforce their respective claims 
through historical lineages of land usage. 
 The thousands of pages that detailed the countryside would have been relatively useless if not 
combined with the graphic representations of the treaty maps, which enabled readers to imagine the region 
as a unified whole. Accordingly, demarcation officials took care in their diarios to refer back to key points 
                                                       
70 “Pode o Pintor com o delicado pincel representar a Natureza; mas não expresar as circunstancias, noticias, e movimentos dos 
socessos. Esta hé a parte reservada ao Historiador...Hum extenso Diario, qual o que compomos na Campanha, hé indespensavel 
para a exacta configuração dos Planos.” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 10, f. 131. 
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or sections of their maps. They meant their textual and visual sources to be read side by side. Saldanha thus 
measured his call for detailed texts: 
Nevertheless, this text continues to be tiresome to read, because of the multitude of additions of 
material, and similar to an annotation of laws of the superficial structure of the Earth. Thus, it is 
easy to see the need to construct another that does not simply summarize the previous one. The 
formation of a new map could also be of use, moreover, if several brief notes of the country’s 
natural history are added to it.71 
 
In addition to providing a drawn, simplified version of the diarios, treaty maps served to demonstrate the 
border as an extant or achievable territorial structure. Whereas the written accounts aimed to guide 
travelers, the maps were the foundation of both Spain’s and Portugal’s legal claims to a border. Without 
them the treaties would have had little juridical and practical weight. For this reason, according to the 
instructions given to the demarcation teams, the chief officers of each side signed off on the final versions of 
the treaty maps.72  
 The principal objective and product of the demarcation efforts was the discursive realization of an 
interimperial limit. Unlike earlier maps and written geographies, the corpus of drawings and texts 
produced by the mapping expeditions was legally binding and therefore set a new precedent for the 
imagining and administration of regional lands. Following the Treaty of Madrid, every subsequent peace 
agreement that sought to order territorial possession in the Río de la Plata included the concept of a fixed 
border.73 Despite the Treaty of Madrid’s eventual annulment, diplomats and mapmakers of the San 
                                                       
71 “…porem elle fica sendo fastidioso á Leitura, pella multidão de adicçõens proprias da materia, e semilhante a huma Postilla das 
Leys da Estructura superficial da Terra. Daquî se vê facilmente a percisão de se construîr outro, em o qual não somente se resuma 
aquelle, podendo servir tambem á formação de novo Mappa, mas ainda se lhe ajuntem algumas breves notas sobre a Historia 
Natural e do Paýs.” ibid. 
72 The various maps produced by the demarcation teams included both small-scale renderings of the region as a whole and large-
scale drawings of specific points of contestation along the borderline. In addition to key plazas, these maps also located on their 
grids the various stone markers that the expeditions erected. For example: “Gráfico de los lugares donde se hallaban ubicadas las 
marcas fronterizas que separaban las jurisdicciones portuguesas de las españolas,” AGNA - VII. Lamas 32 [2635]; RAH - Mata 
Linares, t. 19, f. 105. 
73 The lone exception to this rule was the 1761 Treaty of El Pardo, which annulled the Treaty of Madrid. 
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Ildefonso expeditions used its maps as a precedent for their own negotiations. The materials produced by 
the San Ildefonso demarcation teams would in turn serve as the principle reference point for peace accords 
between Spain and Portugal in 1801 and for postcolonial border disputes between Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay through much of the nineteenth century.74 
 The realization of a discursive and legal border to divide the Portuguese and Spanish dominions 
came not only through agreements, but also through conflict. In addition to providing a visual and written 
foundation for the imagining of a border that bisected the region, the treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso 
and their demarcation efforts transformed abstract conflicts over broad territorial possession into 
concentrated border disputes. Both treaties proposed the existence of a borderline and both mapping 
expeditions recorded the ceremonial performance of it, but it was the subsequent disagreements over its 
exact location that reinforced agreement on its existence. In order to debate possession of strategic locales, 
representatives of the two crowns necessarily accepted that the border was a real entity and that they, 
rather than tolderías, were legitimate possessors. It was only in this way that both sides could claim to have 
inhabited and possessed native lands along the borderline since “time immemorial.” The response to the idea 
of the border was thus as significant as the initial proposal of its existence. 75 
 The Treaty of San Ildefonso was particularly acrimonious for representatives of the two Iberian 
crowns. For this reason, the demarcation took nearly two decades to complete, with various multi-year 
gaps. It was most likely due to this enmity that the treaty became a principal legal precedent for years to 
                                                       
74 It is precisely for this reason that many of the diarios of the demarcation teams were transcribed and published in the nineteenth 
century. Examples include: Pedro de Angelis, ed., Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las 
provincias del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836); ilustrados con notas y disertaciones; Carlos Calvo, ed., 
Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America 
Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros dias, 11 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 
1862); Melitón González, ed., El limite oriental del territorio de Misiones (República Argentina) t. 1 (Montevideo: Imp. a vapor de El 
Siglo, 1882). 
75 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 112; ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2, (Buenos Aires, 1793-07-
10). 
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come. The case of the Rio Piratiní serves as a clear example. During the Treaty of Madrid negotiations, this 
river, was clearly on the Portuguese side of the line, but the Treaty of San Ildefonso transformed the Lagoa 
Mirim into neutral waters and required that the “first southern stream that drains into its main tributary” 
serve as the dividing line as the border reached into the continental interior (Map 3.1).76 In the decades 
between the two treaties, contraband traders had developed vast commercial networks in the area, and the 
Portuguese military had settled a fort called São Gonçalo along the river. When the San Ildefonso 
demarcation teams arrived in the area in 1784, they disputed whether the Rio Piratiní was indeed the 
“northernmost tributary,” or whether there existed another above it. This particular conflict brought about 
accusations on both sides, with Portuguese officers chastising their Spanish counterparts for “suddenly 
embarking” on demarcation activities, “despotically” commandeering goods, and evicting settlers. Spanish 
officers retorted that the Portuguese were “lovers of formalities” and unnecessarily delayed their tasks.”77 
Eventually, the parties would continue along their pathways to the missions, only returning to the issue a 
decade later, again to no avail. This dispute produced on the one hand a vast array of arguments – historical, 
geographical, cartographic, pragmatic, and otherwise – to justify the competing claims, and on the other 
hand a rush to establish settlements along one side of the river or the other. In the 1790s, the Spanish 
founded three forts along the nearby Rio Jaguarão to fortify their claims, while the Portuguese issued land 
titles (sesmarias) along the Piratiní’s coast.78 While future conflicts would alter the exact location of the line, 
the line itself persisted as a legal concept shaping administration and settlement in the area. 
                                                       
76 “el primer arroyo meridional, que entra en el sangradero o desaguadero de ella” “Tratado preliminar sobre los límites de los 
estados pertenecientes á las Coronas de España y Portugal, en la América meridional, ajustado y concluido en San Lorenzo, á 11 
de Octubre de 1777” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, 
Artículo IV. 
77 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 13, 20v, 65-78v. 
78 AGNA - IX. 24-2-4, f. 39, 48, 50, 53; AHRS - Informações sobre pedidos de terras, Maço 1, #62; AHRS - F1246, 140-142v, 
190-191v; AHRS - F1247, 60-1, 100-101v, 183-184v, 189v-190, 250v-252, 247v-259, 288-289; AHRS - F1248, 1-2v, 22-3, 
188v-190v, 216v-218, 277-279v, 289v-290; AHRS - F1249, f. 259v-261. Similar disputes emerged regarding the location of the 
Río Pepirí-guazú, the existence of the Rio Igurey and the Rio Corrientes, and whether the Portuguese forts of Coimbra and 
Albuquerque were on their side of the divide. See: “Informe del Virrey Arredondo á su sucesor Melo de Portugal, sobre el estado 
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 Along with the geographical information that they produced through their diarios and their maps, 
demarcation officials sought to provide detailed descriptions of the native peoples they encountered. 
Particularly during the San Ildefonso expeditions, Spanish and Portuguese travelers added thorough 
descriptions of indigenous communities – including physical characteristics, languages, customs, historical 
anecdotes, and geographical locations – to their episodic encounters. In doing so, they generated some of 
the first ethnographic accounts of tolderías in the region, as they sought to classify Charrúas, Minuanes, and 
others according to rigid ethnic categories and situate them within the universal taxonomies of Carl 
Linnaeus, Georges-Louis Leclerc, and likely Lorenzo Hervás.79 Whether submitting their accounts and 
maps to imperial authorities or publishing them for broader circulation, members of the Iberian 
demarcation teams used this discursive opportunity to posit new possibilities and limitations for relations 
with tolderías.  
Demarcation officials’ initial gesture was to remove mobile native peoples from their maps. Unlike 
earlier maps, which regularly included ethnonyms associated with tolderías, those generated by the Madrid 
and San Ildefonso expeditions represented the region as two consolidated imperial dominions. Three factors 
likely explain the change. First, the demarcation teams were principally concerned with visualizing the 
border in their maps and producing a general guide for administrators who read their textual accounts. This 
intention served as the principal filter for what they included in their maps – rivers, stone markers, physical 
features, settlements – and what they did not. Second, in keeping with the standards of Enlightenment-era 
                                                       
de la cuestion de límites en 1795,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de 
la Plata, vol.  3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 383–414 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900). 
79 See, for example: José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 231; Azara, Geografía, 
física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay y misiones guaraníes, xcvi-xcvii, 392; Diego de Alvear, “Relacion geográfica é histórica de 
la provincia de Misiones, del Brigadier D. Diego de Alvear, Primer Comisario y Astrónomo en gefe de la segunda division de 
límites por la corte de España, en América,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias 
del Río de la Plata, vol.  3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 479–553 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900), 7. The San 
Ildefonso expedition can be considered a starting point for the production of “state ethnographies” by Spanish and Portuguese 
officials. Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 109–17; Sirtori, 
“Nos limites do relato”. 
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mapmaking, the treaties’ commissioned geographers were reluctant to draw lands they did not directly 
observe themselves. For this reason, in map after map drawn and signed by demarcation officials, territories 
between the Río Uruguay and the walked borderline appeared as empty spaces. These were precisely the 
lands controlled by Charrúa, Minuán, and other tolderías in the 1750s and the 1780s (Maps 3.9 & 3.10).80 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the expeditions’ maps were prescriptive rather than representative. 
They revealed the geographical imaginations of their authors as they walked the countryside, but also served 
as models of what the region could become. The treaty maps were both legal precedent and templates for 
future settlement programs, and thus reflected the ambitions of imperial officials. 
Given these purposes and the standards of contemporary cartography, mobile native peoples had no 
place in the maps produced by the demarcation teams. The only instances in which they did appear were in 
an 1801 map by the Spanish lieutenant Diego de Alvear and another from the same year by the Portuguese 
geographer José de Saldanha, both of whom participated in the San Ildefonso expeditions. Alvear’s map 
indicated the site of a cemetery most likely belonging to Minuanes, while Saldanha’s map marked a “Minuán 
settlement” along the borderline.81 These references were certainly the exception and were most likely 
included because of the fixity of these sites on the map. The cemetery was a significant site because it sat 
upon a hilltop from which one could survey in all directions, while the settlement referred to a site where 
several Minuán tolderías had established themselves around that time. Saldanha probably considered this 
settlement a permanent fixture and for that reason included it in his map. 
                                                       
80 The exception was when the demarcation teams rushed through Minuán lands. Despite taking few measurements, they had to 
draw a line in order to preserve their maps’ discursive and juridical validity. For Enlightenment mapping conventions, see: David 
N. Livingstone, The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), Chapter 4; 
Matthew H. Edney and Mary Sponberg Pedley, eds., The History of Cartography: Cartography in the European Enlightenment 4 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Forthcoming). These formulaic standards resembled other types of imperial writing. 
Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), Chapter 1. 
81 Alvear, Diego de. “Plano Reducido o Esférico,” 1801 (AGMM - ARG-3,6); Saldanha, José de. “Mappa corographico da 
Capitania de S. Pedro,” 1801 (IHGRGS). 
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Map 3.9 – “Mapa Geographico del Terreno que demarcaron las Primeras Partidas,” 175982 
 
                                                       
82 Mapa Geographico del Terreno que demarcaron las Primeras Partidas de Sus Magestades Catholica y Fidelissima (1759); MNM - 43-A-2. 
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Map 3.10 – Azara, Félix de. “Mapa esférico de grande parte del Virreinato,” 179883 
 
                                                       
83 Félix de Azara, Mapa esférico de grande parte del Virreinato de Buenos Aires (1798); MM - 23-5-4. 
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Despite the evacuation of tolderías from nearly all of the Madrid and San Ildefonso treaty maps, 
demarcation officers frequently acknowledged tolderías in their written accounts. While the military 
expeditions of the Guaraní War recorded engagement with Charrúa, Minuán, Bohan, and Guenoa fighters, 
members of the San Ildefonso demarcation teams penned systematic accounts of regional inhabitants. They 
catalogued tolderías according to ethnicity and defined the possible relations that contemporary and future 
administrators could have with them.84 While the nuances of their discussions varied, those authors offering 
taxonomical ethnographies of the region’s mobile peoples emphasized several characteristics. Spanish 
officials tended to accentuate tolderías’ mobility as evidence of primitivism and to cast doubt upon the 
possibility that they would ever adopt a sedentary, agricultural lifestyle. Alvear wrote of Minuanes: "Their 
greatest glory is their free and wandering lifestyle, they are given to drunkenness and lust, polygamy is 
common between them, especially among the caciques.” He offered a similar assessment of Charrúas.  
The Charrúas are another of the ancient American nations whose wild, ferocious, and bellicose 
character has kept them from negotiation and communication. Their customs and lifestyle differ 
little, if at all, from those of Minuanes.85  
 
Azara highlighted the repeated failure of efforts to missionize Minuanes, noting that despite missionaries’ 
best efforts, “they returned to their wandering and free lifestyle.”86 He concluded: 
                                                       
84 The most prolific of these imperial authors were Félix de Azara, Diego de Alvear, and Francisco de Aguirre for Spain, and José 
Saldanha and João Francisco Roscio for Portugal, yet other accounts existed. Spanish officials sought to cast tolderías as 
unredeemable “others, while Portuguese officials offered more favorable assessments. Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la 
formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 109–17; Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”: 14–25. 
85 “Su mayor gloria es su vida libre y errante, son muy dados a la embriaguez y a la lujuria, y entre ellos es corriente la poligamia, 
especialmente entre los caciques...Los charruas son otra de las naciones antiguas de esta América cuyo carácter agreste feros y 
belicoso, les ha mantenido siempre retirados de todo trato y comunicación [y sus] costumbres y género de vida, en poco, o nada 
difieren de los minuanes.” Paul Groussac, ed., Anales de la biblioteca: Publicación de documentos relativos al Río de la Plata con 
introducciones y notas, 10 vols. 2 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora de Coni Hermanos, 1902), 344–45. 
86 “estos volvieron á su vida errante y libre” Azara, Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de 
Azara, Tomo Primero, 165. 
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If the governors were to reflect upon the fruitlessness of their predecessors’ efforts to reduce the 
barbarians, they would give up on their efforts to have them all form reductions...and they would 
look for other ways to make use of them.87   
 
Portuguese ethnographies tended to agree that tolderías lived “in a truly free state,” yet refuted their 
Spanish counterparts’ association of mobility with violence. For example, Saldanha argued: 
It is certain that [Minuanes] are not as cruel as the Tape Indians. It has never been reported that the 
Minuanes killed a Portuguese or Spaniard, even though they found them alone or lost in the 
countryside, as Guaraníes have done numerous times.88 
 
These ways of defining tolderías reflected contrasting imperial experiences and interests in the region. More 
importantly, these descriptions represented a shift from earlier approaches in their framing of possible 
relations with indigenous neighbors.  
While early chroniclers had recounted their own interactions with regional inhabitants, and Jesuits 
had identified them as potential converts, the San Ildefonso mapmakers positioned Minuanes, Charrúas, and 
others as antiquated actors who imperiled the realization of the territorial states they hoped to achieve. 
Rather than understanding the seasonal and situational movements of tolderías as strategic responses to 
environmental or social conditions, demarcation officials identified mobility as an essential characteristic of 
tolderías. It represented a refusal to accept civility and Christianity, which were considered achievable only 
through a sedentary lifestyle. Unlike Guaraníes, who had moved from the irrationality of mobility to the 
rationality of sedentism, therefore becoming desirable imperial subjects, tolderías in the region were 
unchanging and an obstacle to the achievement of territorial states.89 In this way, the umbrella concept 
                                                       
87 “Si los gobernadores reflexionasen el ningún fruto que han sacado sus antecesores en la reducción de los bárbaros, desde luego 
depondrían el afán que todos tienen de formar reducciones...y buscarían otros caminos de sacar utilidad de los bárbaros.” Azara, 
Geografía, física y esférica de las provincias del Paraguay y misiones guaraníes, 368. 
88 “em hum estado propriamente livre...Hé certo que elles não são tão crueis como os Indios Tapes nao consta que os Minuanos 
jámis matassem algum Portuguez, ou Hespanhol, posto q. o encontrassem só os perdidos pela campanha como costumão varias 
vezes fazer os Guaranis.” José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 235–36. 
89 Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 114–7; Frühauf Garcia, As 
diversas formas de ser índio. 
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“infidel” (infiel) transformed from an identifier of potential converts to a marker of mobility. While the 
term had always been linked to what imperial and ecclesiastical writers perceived as a failure to accept 
agricultural lifestyles, for the mapping expeditions it signified the impossibility of moving from mobility to 
sedentism. It was no longer a strategy, but rather a condition. As mapmakers employed a broad territorial 
perspective, they began to classify tolderías in the region according to ethnonym and then compare them to 
those of other locales. Thus, they were able to include not only Charrúas and Minuanes under the marker of 
infiel, but also Abipones and Mocovíes of the Chaco, or Tupíes that lived to the north and east of the Jesuit 
missions. The more demarcation officials traveled and corresponded with one another, the more evidence 
they produced to support the paradigmatic division between sedentism and mobility.  
 In addition to perceiving mobility as an immutable ethnic characteristic, officials also associated it 
with illicit behavior. This included laziness, drunkenness, violence, and theft, which writers understood as 
essential characteristics of particular ethnicities, rather than individual decisions or products of social 
conditions. Defined in this way, native peoples from regional tolderías were not only unfit subjects, but 
enemies of the empire. Spanish authors in particular linked Charrúas and Minuanes with contrabandists, 
thereby casting them as clandestine actors against the desired imperial order. The principal officer of the 
Spanish demarcation efforts, José Varela y Ulloa, explained: “That is how [the Portuguese] did it, allying 
themselves with the Charrúas and the Yaros and beginning to harass the Jesuit missions in the North, in 
which they found enough resistance to contain their advances.”90 As the Guaraní missions were peaceful 
centers of colonial life, Charrúas and Yaros, allied with Portuguese agents, acted as aggressive and hostile 
neighbors. They were among the principal obstacles to the consolidation of the countryside. 
                                                       
90 "Y así lo hicieron [los portugueses], aliándose con los charrúas y los yaros y comenzando á hostilizar la reducciones jesuíticas del 
Norte, en las que encontraron resistencia suficiente para contener su avance" José Varela y Ulloa, Diario de la primera partida de la 
demarcación de limites entre España y Portugal en América, 2 vols., Publicaciones de la Real Sociedad Geográfica (Madrid: Imprenta del 
Patronato de Huérfanos de Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1920-1925 [i.e. 1930]), 36. 
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 While Azara, Alvear, and Saldanha were explicit in their taxonomical approach, others focused 
more on narrating historical engagements between tolderías and the projects of regional plazas. This style of 
description more closely resembled earlier Jesuit accounts, from which the demarcation officials derived 
much of their information.91 Still, rather than using the regional past as a means to identify future subjects 
or neophytes, the mapmakers referred to it as evidence of the need to extirpate tolderías from the 
countryside. The anecdotal accounts presented in their writings positioned tolderías as the principal 
impediment to the connecting of the region’s distinct plazas, which was one of the primary objectives of the 
mapping expeditions. The narrative aim of these historical accounts, then, was the expulsion of tolderías 
from the countryside in order to make way for ranches and farms, which were growing rapidly at the time. 
Francisco de Aguirre, the ranking officer of the fourth Spanish division, demonstrated this tendency clearly 
in his discussion of Minuanes: 
The risk posed by the Minuán Indians impeded the settlers [of Montevideo] from traveling far [from 
the plaza] for many years. They caused harm as enemies until José Joaquin de Viana, the favorably-
remembered governor of this plaza, made an expedition in which he annihilated them and the few 
that remained submitted to peace. And in spite of the natives, they distributed titles for ranches and 
nowadays there is a [Spanish] population 80 leagues or more from this area.92 
 
For Aguirre, Minuanes had been the principal obstacle to the advancement of Montevideo, but the military 
expeditions commissioned at mid-century liberated the countryside and enabled the city’s expansion.  
 In the mapmakers’ accounts there was thus a clear relationship between geography and 
ethnography. As both Spanish and Portuguese authorities aimed to draw a stable border and set up future 
                                                       
91 See, for example: AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 38; AGNA - VII. Biblioteca Nacional 106; BNB - 04,4,003, 12v-13; IEB - 
AL-136-27-12, f. 56-7; IEB - YAP-011, f. 41-42v; Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 249, 285; Azara, Viajes por la 
América del Sur, 39–42. 
92 "El riesgo de los indios minuanes estorbó alejarse mucho los pobladores, por algunos años; hacian daño como enemigos hasta 
que el Sr. D. José Joaquin de Viana, gobernador de buena memoria en esta plaza, hizo una expedicion en que los aniquiló y los 
pocos que quedaron se sometieron á la paz. Y sin embargo por parte de los naturales, se fueron repartiendo las mercedes de 
estancias y en el dia hay poblacion á 80 y mas leguas de este recinto". Paul Groussac, ed., Anales de la biblioteca: Publicación de 
documentos relativos al Río de la Plata con introducciones y notas, 10 vols. 4 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora de Coni 
Hermanos, 1908), 144. 
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projects to realize it, they identified tolderías as one of the principal obstacles to this goal. Since their maps 
represented idealized visions of achievable territorial space, they did not include tolderías in their images. 
Their written accounts presented Minuanes, Charrúas, and others as rigid antagonists who both resisted 
sedentary subjecthood and impeded the full exploitation of the countryside. This general sentiment was 
perhaps best expressed by Alvear in his description of Minuanes: 
Seven or eight tolderías of Minuán Indians inhabit the shores of these streams, the remains of the 
ancient nation of this name that from the time of the conquest dominated the Campos de Vera, 
which is north of the Río de la Plata [estuary]. And since then, they have remained independent, 
and have refused to receive the light of faith. Until recently, the residents of Montevideo and 
Maldonado tolerated their being nearby, and the Minuanes even served as a relief in the labors of 
their ranches. But afterward, several delinquents and criminals joined together with them, people 
of all castes and perversion, corrupting them and making them accustomed to thievery, violence, 
and other disorder, which they would commit at every step of the way against travelers. For this 
reason, it became necessary to pursue them with armed forces until they were evicted from those 
regions. They took refuge in these lands, where they live today, with little correction of those 
vices.93 
 
For him, Minuanes were not simply rigid opponents of imperial and ecclesiastical aims, but also a waning 
relic of irrational lifestyles incompatible with the region’s future. 
 The situating of tolderías as unchanging and irrational wanderers not only represented a break with 
earlier discursive patterns, but carried clear implications for future interethnic relations in the region. In 
particular, it ruled out the possibility that they might become imperial Christian subjects. At the same time 
that imperial officials sought to redefine the subjecthood of Guaraníes from the missions, incorporating 
them more closely as secular subjects, they contemplated the eradication of tolderías through the killing or 
                                                       
93 "Sobre las margenes de estos arroyos habitaban seis u ocho tolderias de indios minuanes, resto de la antigua nacion de este 
nombre, que de tiempo de la conquista se extendia y dominaba los Campos de Vera, que son los septentrionales del Rio de la 
Plata; y que desde entonces se ha mantenido en la independencia, sin haber querido recibir la luz de la Fe. Hasta estos ultimos 
tiempos los toleraron los vecinos de Montevideo y Maldonado en sus inmediaciones, y aun los minuanes les servian de algun alivio 
en los trabajos de las estancias; pero habiéndoseles agregado después alginos delincuentes y facinerosos, gente toda de casta y 
perversa,los corrompieron y acostumbraron a las raterias, violencias y otros desordenes, que cometian a cada paso contra los 
caminantes; de forma que se vieron en la necesidad de perseguirs de mano armada, hasta conseguir desalojarlos de aquellas 
comarcas, y se acogieron de estas, donde viven en el dia, nocon mucha enmienda de quellos vicios" Groussac, Anales de la 
biblioteca, 343. 
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capture of their inhabitants. This was particularly salient for Spanish authors, as the imagined borderline 
placed most regional tolderías within their crown’s territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdictional completeness 
claimed through the mapping expeditions made impossible the idea of mobile peoples as third parties. They 
could only be vassals of one crown or another, and given their deviance from the idealized notion of 
sedentary subjecthood, they posed a problem for imperial designs. For Portuguese officials, the issue of 
mobility was more salient in other areas, such as in Amazonia and the Eastern Sertão.94 The positioning of 
the borderline in the Río de la Plata permitted them to draw different conclusions from their ethnographic 
assessments. 
 
Conclusion 
 The demarcation efforts of the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso were watershed moments for 
legal thought, geographic design, and interethnic relations. As such, they generated immediate responses 
from local actors whose lands commissioned mapmakers traversed, transforming customary relations 
between imperial administrators and mobile peoples. A close reading of the accounts and maps produced by 
demarcation officials reveals the superimposition of an idealized territorial structure upon both early 
modern and indigenous territorialities. This change was principally discursive, at least at first, as maps 
served as templates for future endeavors rather than representations of extant socioterritorial conditions. 
Mapmakers envisioned complete territorial control, a stable borderline, and a sedentary population that 
could be easily administered. They also reified the region’s tolderías into rigid and unchanging ethnic 
categories, which in turn served to define possible relations between tolderías and imperial projects. In 
short, the template ruled out the possibility of incorporating tolderías as rational subjects. 
                                                       
94 While the Portuguese in the Río de la Plata tended to accept tolderías’ mobility, this was by no means a universal tendency. 
Interethnic policies were generally developed on a regional basis and were shaped by whether or not Portuguese officials were 
more concerned with accessing the other side of the border or preventing foreign competitors from accessing their side. See: 
Domingues, Quando os índios eram vassalos; Langfur, The Forbidden Lands; Sirtori, “Nos limites do relato”.   
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 These discursive changes would have meant little if they had not impacted imperial policy and 
tolderías themselves. They would have been simply the musings of lettered elites, filed in distant archives. 
Instead, the two demarcation efforts initiated a new way for imperial authors to experience their 
relationships with tolderías, and altered the ways in which Charrúas, Minuanes, and other actors positioned 
themselves geographically. In other words, border thinking engendered border practices. The mapmaking 
expeditions were propositions to which all sorts of regional actors responded. As will be shown in the 
following chapter, the cumulative response to these events is what transformed the region’s territorial 
outlook.
 
 
CHAPTER 4: TO THE BORDER 
 
The reduction of the barbarous nations can only take place in one of three ways: the first is through 
commerce and agreements, the second is by force, and the third is by persuasion. The first has never been 
tried, it is the longest and most difficult with some nations…The use of force or persuasion that inspires 
them to make reductions is the most expedited means. – Félix de Azara1 
 
[These Minuán tolderías] join together not only to collect gifts from contrabandists and travelers, [which 
they achieve] through intrusive requests, visits, and occasional threats. They also go frequently to the ranches 
of our missions, which are made to give them yerba mate, knives, tobacco, etc. because if they refuse, the 
Christian Indians [on the ranches] suffer various forms of harassment. – Andrés de Oyarvide2 
 
 
A Tale of Two Caciques 
 In May of 1785, a Minuán cacique named Bartolomeo sent a letter to the interim governor of Rio 
Grande do Sul, Rafael Pinto Bandeira. In it, he sought support from the Portuguese against the Spanish and 
safe passage across the border as he and his family moved their cattle from mission ranches along the Río 
Ibicuí to the Rio Bacacaí area (Map 4.1). Months earlier, Bartolomeo had been visited by representatives of 
the Spanish crown, who had offered to give him and his people “everything they wanted” in exchange for 
settling near Montevideo. The cacique was likely aware of recent Spanish raids against tolderías established 
by refugees from the Guaraní missions, and the pending threat that this posed to his people.3 Faced with 
                                                       
1 “La reducción de las naciones bárbaras sólo puede verificarse por 3 medios: el 1º es por el comercio y trato; el 2º por la fuerza y 
el 3º por la persuación. El 1º jamás se ha intentado, es el más largo y difícil con algunas naciones…El usar de la fuerza o del 
respeto que infunde para hacer reducciones es el medio más expedito.” Félix de Azara, Geografía, física y esférica de las provincias del 
Paraguay y misiones guaraníes (Montevideo: Museo Nacional, 1904), t. 1, 366-7. 
2 “se suelen unir no solo para cobrar de los changadores y pasajeros que encuentran sus regalos con impertinentes peticiones, 
visitas y á veces amenzas, sino que van á menudo a las estancias de nuestros pueblos de Misiones, y les han de dar la yerba mate, 
cuchillos, tabaco, etc. pues de lo contrario se exponen aquellos Indios cristianos á sufrir varias vejaciones.” Andrés de Oyarvide, 
“Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas 
partidas de la demarcación de límites en la América Meridional,” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, 
capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de 
Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros dias, ed. Carlos Calvo Tomo Octavo (Paris: A. Durand, 1866), 212. 
3 On April 20, 1785, Spanish forces raided two “Tape,” or Guaraní, tolderías who had joined together with Charrúas and 
Minuanes near the Río Ibicuí, capturing 98 of them and taking them back to the missions. When the Charrúas and Minuanes drew 
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two options in dealing with the Spanish – resettle or endure violence – he sought to strike a deal with Pinto 
Bandeira and relocate to the Bacacaí area. Given the proximity of the Portuguese forts of Rio Pardo and 
Yacuí, they represented a useful ally against Spanish aggression.4 
Map 4.1 – Borderlines and Key Sites 
Pinto Bandeira immediately requested approval for the move from the Portuguese king. He also 
contacted another Minuán cacique, Miguel Ayala Caraí, in an effort to gather more information on 
                                                       
near, the Spanish forces withdrew with their captives. AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-06-08). Bartolomé’s meeting 
with the Spanish likely occurred in January of that year, as recorded in AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (Santa Tecla, 1785-01-26). 
4 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 7, f. 743; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 511; “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que 
foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780),” Revista do Museo e Archivo Publico do Rio Grande do Sul, no. 23 (1930): 497. 
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Bartolomeo’s situation. A year would pass before Pinto Bandeira wrote again about the situation. In April 
1786, he transmitted news from Caraí, who reported that Bartolomeo and his people had been “destroyed” 
by the Spanish and had gone to seek refuge with other caciques near Yapeyú. Caraí had gone to visit them, 
and Bartolomeo and the others had expressed their desire for a relationship with the Portuguese because the 
Spanish wanted to expel them from the “lands which they inhabit, as their ancestors did for many centuries, 
and which are theirs by right of being the first settlers there.” They hoped to move with 1,000 of their kin 
and over 2,600 horses and cattle to the Bacacaí area, near Batoví. They offered to sell some of these animals 
in exchange for clothing and proposed a mutual accord against Spanish aggression.5 In an effort to facilitate 
this move, Caraí sent representatives to the Caxoeira Parish to procure a license of sale on behalf of the 
other caciques.6 
This case’s paper trail does not permit us to know whether Bartolomeo and the other five caciques 
eventually took their cattle to Batoví. The Portuguese viceroy in Rio de Janeiro was skeptical of the 
maneuver, citing a desire to avoid conflict with the Spanish.7 It is clear, however, that when the Spanish and 
Portuguese demarcation teams moved through the Río Caciquey area one year later, they were confronted 
by numerous Minuán tolderías that both claimed the lands as their own and charged them tribute for 
passage. The travelers remarked that Miguel Ayala Caraí continued to be the key figure in the area, with as 
many as eleven other caciques and their tolderías demonstrating loyalty to him. He was the first collector of 
payments from both mapmaking teams, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
                                                       
5 “campos, em que habitam, e seus antecessores de muitos séculos, que por direito são seus, por serem os primeiros povoadores 
deles” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 101-102v, 206-7, cited in Revista do Museo e Archivo Publico do Rio Grande 
do Sul, no. 23 (1930): 499; Elisa Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados: as relações de 'amizade' entre os 
minuanos e os lusitanos no sul da América portuguesa (c. 1750-1800),” Varia História 24, no. 40 (jul/dez 2008): 623–5. 
6 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 205. 
7 AHU - Rio de Janeiro (017), Caixa 128, Doc 10244. 
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 The fragments of information relating to Bartolomeo’s predicament reveal some of the key 
dynamics of the Río de la Plata during the second half of the eighteenth century. On one hand, they 
demonstrate shifting Iberian engagement with the region’s interior. As Spanish authorities endeavored to 
eliminate tolderías from the countryside – through negotiated settlement or aggression – Portuguese 
officials frequently attempted to establish pacts with Charrúa and Minuán caciques. On the other hand, this 
case highlights the variety of responses from tolderías as Iberian bordermaking efforts presented them with 
both challenges and opportunities. Bartolomeo and the other four caciques experienced the increased 
violence, or the specter of violence, that these efforts produced. They found themselves wedged between 
competing empires that were at best inconsistent allies, and they could no longer spread their resources 
across distant locales. This was probably why they sought to concentrate their cattle in the Bacacaí area and 
to make pacts of mutual defense against Spanish aggression. 
 Despite the challenges faced by Bartolomeo and his kin, these changing territorial dynamics 
provided opportunities for other caciques and tolderías. At the center of this case, we find Miguel Ayala 
Caraí arbitrating Bartolomeo’s move with Pinto Bandeira, procuring trade agreements with local 
Portuguese officials, and collecting tribute payments from demarcation teams. In fact, during the 1770s and 
1780s, Caraí seems to have been the most important figure in this part of the countryside. His ability to 
manage the new territorial conditions that the bordermaking efforts were creating made him one of the 
most noted caciques in Iberian sources. He developed kinship ties and political allegiances with other 
tolderías, with mission refugees, and with high-ranking imperial officials in the region. Both Spanish and 
Portuguese administrators recognized his regional authority and depended upon his support to make the 
borderline operative. They regularly offered him payments in exchange for protection or aid.8 
                                                       
8 Tiago Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira: uma produção social de mercadorias,” Revista de la ABPHE 2003/95 Versión electrónica 
(2003): 5. 
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The mapmaking expeditions of the treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso thus initiated a radical 
restructuring of territorial and, in turn, interethnic relations in the Río de la Plata. Demarcation teams had 
not sought to represent extant territorial arrangements, but to transform the region into something 
knowable and manageable for their imperial patrons. Though their expeditions produced few immediate 
material changes, they laid the legal and discursive groundwork for Iberian administrators to reframe their 
engagement with the countryside and the people who lived in it.9 Administrative policies following the 
demarcations varied, yet they all sought to increase control over movement of their subjects and resources 
by means of sedentism, land titling, and surveillance. These objectives required a functioning borderline, 
and for that reason officials on both sides were invested in its success, despite interimperial competition and 
mutual distrust.  
Spanish and Portuguese administrators' attempts to materialize the cartographic borderline on lands 
they did not physically control led them to engage tolderías in new ways. They depended upon caciques’ 
support or toleration of new forts, towns, and ranches along the borderline, and they solicited their help in 
making the border work. The development of an operative borderline thus did not indicate imperial power, 
but rather a proposition embodied by mapmakers, settlers, and soldiers. The increased presence of new 
actors in the countryside demanded responses from tolderías, who often found their options conditioned by 
their proximity to the proposed borderline. While individual actions ranged from accommodation to 
resistance, they rarely fell into such neat categories, and nearly all responses tended to reinforce the border 
in the end. Iberian officers prescriptively declared the border to exist, but the collective responses of 
tolderías are what transformed the imaginary cartographic line into a meaningful territorial arrangement.10 
                                                       
9 One of the key tasks of the demarcation teams was to erect stone pillars intermittently along the border in order to indicate the 
beginning of one dominion and the end of another. On occasion, they also carved into trees as a means to mark key locations or 
the dates of particular events. Alejandro N. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su labor en el Río de la Plata,” Itsas 
Memoria. Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco 6 (2009): 752. 
10 Cartography was only one part of a broad series of spatial practices through which the border became meaningful. Declaring a 
border through mapmaking was not enough to make it exist; only through the many responses to that call did it gain any 
 191 
 
Imperial bordermaking initiatives and indigenous responses eventually generated a new borderland 
space within the Río de la Plata. Prior to the demarcation efforts, most engagement between tolderías and 
their imperial counterparts occurred near the walls of individual plazas. This had produced a series of local 
borderlands – for example, between Santa Fe and Charrúas or Rio Grande and Minuanes – around the 
perimeter of the region. Following the mapping expeditions, however, both interimperial and interethnic 
engagement gradually became concentrated along the general location of the borderline. This territorial 
restructuring became one of the defining features of the region from that point forward.11 
 
From the Maps to the Land 
Between the signing of the Treaty of Madrid in 1750 and the end of the San Ildefonso mapping 
efforts in 1805, three different borderlines bisected the Río de la Plata (Map 4.1). The Madrid line was 
drawn over the course of the 1750s and annulled by the Treaty of El Pardo in 1761. For the next decade 
and a half, Spanish and Portuguese officials sought to exercise their claims over the regional interior through 
a series of unprecedented military advances and local agreements.12 By 1777, the two crowns had reached a 
second border accord, the Treaty of San Ildefonso, and within seven years, mapping teams would begin the 
demarcation of the region’s second borderline. These efforts continued through the turn of the century, and 
                                                       
significance. Maps are “propositions” that elicit responses, which in turn made them operative. Denis Wood, Rethinking the Power 
of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), 39–52. Even if those responses are subversive, they often reinforce the original 
proposition of spatial organization through their engagement with it. Robert Kaiser and Elena Nikiforova, “The Performativity of 
Scale: The Social Construction of Scale Effects in Narva, Estonia,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26 (2008). 
11 Luís Fernando da Silva Laroque, “Os nativos charrua/minuano, guarani e kainkang: O protagonismo indígena e as relações 
interculturais em territórios de planície, serra e planalto do Rio Grande do Sul,” in Releituras da História do Rio Grande do Sul, ed. 
Claudio Knierim and Sandra Careli, 15–42 (Porto Alegre: CORAG, 2011), 20; Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as 
Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), Chapter 2. 
12 Following the annulment of the Treaty of Madrid, administrators ordered that the stone obelisks be destroyed and thrown to 
sea. AGNA - IX. 3-2-1, (Montevideo, 1761-08-25). From 1762 to 1763, a Spanish expedition led by Pedro de Cevallos resulted 
in the occupation of Santa Teresa, São Miguel, and Rio Grande, after which local officials maintained a de facto agreement. 
Tamar Herzog, Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 
45–46. In 1776, Portuguese forces pushed south to reclaim Rio Grande as well as the Spanish fort of Santa Tecla, and the 
following year, Cevallos retaliated by taking control of Santa Catarina and Colônia do Sacramento. 
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the 1801 Treaty of Badajoz reaffirmed the legal weight of the San Ildefonso line. Nonetheless, Portuguese 
soldiers took possession of the Siete Pueblos and adjacent lands in 1801, leading to a new territorial 
arrangement, which regional officials formalized in 1804 as a legitimate status quo.13 The mapping efforts, 
which had wound down over the course of the 1790s, definitively ended in 1805.  
The borderlines were part of broader projects to reconceptualize and restructure Portuguese and 
Spanish governance in the new world. They coincided with the creation of new administrative units in the 
Río de la Plata region, including the Governorates of Montevideo (1751) and Misiones (1769), the 
Departments of San Miguel and Yapeyú (1769), and the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (1776) and its 
numerous intendancies (1782) by Spain and the Captaincy of Rio Grande de São Pedro (1760), parishes, 
and judicial districts by Portugal.14 In addition, the coincided with the expulsion of Jesuit missionaries from 
the Portuguese (1759) and Spanish (1767) empires, and subsequent reordering of lands that had been within 
their jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the long histories that diplomats adduced as they staked territorial claims 
served to present disparate plazas as cohesive territorial units. Most notably, the Jesuit-Guaraní missions 
east of the Río Uruguay became Siete Pueblos Orientales. Within these new units, imperial administrators 
sought to implement new policies to promote sedentism, agriculture, and regulated trade. In the Río de la 
Plata, this included the regulation of land tenure and the formation of units of mounted guards (blandengues) 
by the Spanish and the establishment of chains of forts, towns, and ranches along the border by both the 
                                                       
13 Enrique M. Segarra, Frontera y límites (Montevideo: Nuestra Tierra, 1969), 22. 
14 John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782-1810: The Indendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (London: 
University of London, 1958), Chapter 4; Local territorial divisions for the Portuguese included parishes (Santa Ana [1770], Santo 
Amaro, Taquari, and Santo Antônio [1771], Porto Alegre and Viamão [1772], Mostardas [1773], Conceição do Arroio and 
Estreito [1774], and Caxoeira [1779]) and judicial districts (Partido de Flores, etc.). By 1803, Rio Grande had four judicial 
districts and fourteen parishes. Sebalt Rüdiger, Colonização e propriedade de terras no Rio Grande do Sul (século XVIII) (Porto Alegre: 
Instituto Estadual do Livro Divisão de Cultura, 1965), 54–63; De Província de São Pedro a Estado do Rio Grande do Sul: Censos do RS, 
1803-1950 (Porto Alegre: Fundação de Economia e Estatística, 1981), 49–50. 
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Spanish and the Portuguese.15 Imperial officials simultaneously treated the borderline as a self-evident fact, a 
political objective, and a tool to achieve their ends. 
Iberian diplomats devised the borderlines as a means to end their decades-old dispute over 
territorial possession in South America, but their efforts instead concentrated imperial conflicts in the lands 
through which the borders ran. The Río de la Plata was no exception, as old arguments regarding possession 
of the Banda Norte gave way to new ones regarding the precise location of the interimperial boundary.16 
Such disputes were both the product of mapmakers’ attempts to interpret available historical, ethnographic, 
and geographical information to their crown’s advantage, and contradictions between treaty instructions 
and extant settlement patterns. The Madrid and the San Ildefonso accords provided guidelines for the 
location of the imaginary borderline, yet required that it cover existing settlements of each crown’s vassals. 
Dissonance between the line’s prescribed location and extant settlement patterns forced mapmakers to 
prioritize one or the other. As demarcation teams walked and plotted the dividing lines, they frequently 
discovered that Spanish or Portuguese vassals were living in lands recently designated for the other crown.17 
Furthermore, as independent native peoples inhabited and controlled much of the disputed territory, 
                                                       
15 Raúl O. Fradkin, “Las milicias de caballería de Buenos Aires, 1752-1805,” Fronteras de la Historia 19, no. 1 (Enero-Junio de 
2014). 
16 The principal exception to this rule was the military expeditions ordered by the then Governor of Buenos Aires, Pedro de 
Cevallos, in 1762 and 1777, during which Spanish forces took control of the plazas of Colônia do Sacramento and Rio Grande. 
17 See, for example, article nine of the Treaty of Madrid and articles four and twelve of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. See also: 
ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 106v. This facet of the demarcation instructions was built upon the premise 
of uti possidetis, as the treaties required that the line incorporate preexisting establishments into the dominion of their respective 
crown. This convention was only applied to lands proximate to the prescribed borderline, however, as evidenced by the Treaty 
of Madrid’s exchange of Colônia do Sacramento for the Siete Pueblos Orientales. Furthermore, the drawing of the border was 
meant to supersede uti possidetis; once officials agreed upon the precise location of the line, settlement would have to be 
adjusted to accommodate it. In this way, the Treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso did not represent the triumph of uti possidetis, 
as scholars commonly assume, but instead the replacement of the concept with that of the border. See, for example: Dauril 
Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil, with Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1799 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 68; Fernando Camargo, “Las relaciones luso-hispánicas en torno a las Misiones 
Orientales del Uruguay: de los orígenes al Tratado de Madrid, 1750,” Fronteras de la Historia 8 (2003): 237-8, 244–246; Íris 
Kantor, “Soberania e territorialidade colonial: Academia Real de História Portuguesa e a América Portuguesa (1720),” in Temas 
Setecentistas: governos e populações no império português, ed. Andrea Doré and Antonio Cesar de Almeida Santos, 233–9 v. 1 
(Curitiva: UFPR/SCHLA, 2009), 233–39. 
 194 
 
mapmaking officials occasionally sought to claim them as vassals. This was reflected in Spanish assertions 
that Mbayá Indians near Paraguay were their subjects because they had hosted Jesuit missionaries decades 
earlier, as well as the Portuguese rejection of Spanish claims over yerba mate forests (ervais) due to the 
presence of Tupi Indians there. The same logic applied following the 1801 Portuguese takeover of the Siete 
Pueblos and their ranches, as Portuguese officials claimed disputed lands on account of their being 
controlled by Charrúa and Minuán tolderías.18 
In the Río de la Plata, the most contentious portions of the borderline were the Rio Piratiní and 
Montegrande (Map 4.1). While the Treaty of Madrid designated these zones to be well within Portuguese 
dominion, the San Ildefonso line ran through both. In the case of the Piratiní, mapmakers disagreed over 
whether or not the San Ildefonso borderline should run along that river or one further south. Spanish 
officials decried Portuguese settlements along the river’s southern shore as a violation of the treaty’s 
statutes, while Portuguese officials countered that they preceded the demarcation and therefore warranted 
accommodation.19 Disputes over Montegrande played out in reverse. There, Portuguese officials accused 
                                                       
18 Jeffrey A. Erbig Jr., “Forging Frontiers: Félix de Azara and the Making of the Virreinato del Río de la Plata,” (M.A. Thesis, The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010), 27–29; “Informe del Virrey Arredondo á su sucesor Melo de Portugal, sobre 
el estado de la cuestion de límites en 1795,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias 
del Río de la Plata, vol.  3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 383–414 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900), 403; ANB - 86. 
Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 111-112; “Documentos relativos á incorporação do território das Missões ao domínio 
portugues no anno de 1801,” Revista do Archivo Público do Rio Grande do Sul Volume I (1921): 71–4. This dynamic played out in 
reverse in the northern part of the continent, as Portuguese administrators, under the Diretório dos índios, tried to incorporate 
independent native peoples as imperial subjects in order to claim their lands. See: Rita Heloísa de Almeida, O Diretório dos índios: 
um projeto de "civilização" no Brasil do século XVIII (Brasília: Editora UnB, 1997), capítulo 5; Ângela Domingues, Quando os índios 
eram vassalos: colonização e relações de poder no norte do Brasil na segunda metade do século XVIII (Lisboa: Comissão Nacional 
Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 2000), capítulo 3. 
19 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, 79-83v; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 161-169v; ANB - 
86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 5, f. 48-51v, 173-4; ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2 (Buenos Aires, 1791-07-
21); AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 134, carpeta 2, no 85; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 78, f. 1, 172; Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria 
geográfica de los viajes practicados desde Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la 
demarcación de límites en la América Meridional (Parte II de IV),” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, 
capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de 
Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta nuestros dias, vol.  8, ed. Carlos Calvo, 11 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 1862), 181–86; Tiago Gil, 
“Sobre o comércio ilícito: A visão dos demarcadores de limites sobre o contrabando terrestre na fronteira entre os domínios lusos 
e espanhóis no Rio da Prata (1774-1801),” (2005): 8; Artigo apresentado nas II Jornadas de História Regional Comparada Porto 
Alegre, October 12-15 2005. Both the Rio Piratiní and the adjacent Lagoa Mirim were part of the principal corridor for cattle 
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their Spanish counterparts of attempting to create new settlements to alter the agreed-upon line of 
demarcation.20 It was due to acute disagreements such as these that the San Ildefonso demarcation efforts 
dragged on for decades, as mapmakers sought to hold the border’s certainty in abeyance in areas where 
their own settlers were advancing.21 While most of the mapping had ended by 1789, remaining points of 
contestation lingered until 1805, creating zones of jurisdictional uncertainty where both sides would 
attempt to establish control by settlement or by force. Similar conflicts over geographical ambiguity 
appeared throughout the continent.22 
 Disputes over the precise location of the borderline did not serve to undermine its legitimacy; they 
instead fortified it in two key ways. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, in order to disagree over the 
precise location of the borderline, officials, administrators, and soldiers on both sides had to agree over its 
existence. If on a regional scale the border isolated territorial conflict in a relatively narrow corridor of 
land, differences in where the division ran could result in dramatic local consequences. The paper trail that 
resulted from these local disputes served to harden the notion of a borderline by constructing legal 
precedent, historical arguments, and geographic logic. Second, disagreement over the precise location of 
the borderline made the fortification and population of adjacent lands a political priority. Prior to the 
demarcation efforts, few of these locales had been a specific point of contestation between the two crowns. 
Instead, most efforts to establish effective territorial control had occurred along the northern coast of the 
                                                       
runs between Maldonado and Rio Grande, making Spanish and Portuguese officials invested in their control. RAH - Mata 
Linares, t. 74, f. 155-160; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 32v. 
20 IHGB - Arquivo, lata 110, doc 28, f. 18-37. This issue arose again after the 1801 conquest of the Siete Pueblos by the 
Portuguese. ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 13, f. 112-113v. 
21 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, 17-23, 109, 111v, 113v, 233-235v, 301; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 24-5. 
22 Other disputes arose over the locations of the Río Pepiri-guaçú and the Río San Antonio, as well as the existence and locations 
of the Río Igurey, the Río Igatimy, and the Río Corrientes. “Informe del Virrey Arredondo á su sucesor Melo de Portugal, sobre 
el estado de la cuestion de límites en 1795” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias 
del Río de la Plata; ANB - 1A. Cisplatina, caixa 494, f. 2-2v. 
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Río de la Plata estuary. Beginning with the treaty of Madrid, both sides ushered in new initiatives to make 
the imaginary line a material reality. The result was new settlement patterns in borderline areas that would 
not have occurred otherwise.  
 The Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping teams saw their work as the first step in realizing a new 
territorial order. Although the stated purpose of the demarcation efforts was to determine the location of 
the interimperial divide, mapmakers took copious notes on resources, grazing grounds, watering holes, and 
river crossings so that administrators could target areas for new population centers.23 They also designed 
their maps as living documents that would serve not only as a legal base for claims of possession, but as 
templates for future settlement initiatives. In writing to the Cabildo of Asunción, Félix de Azara stated: 
[the maps that I have given to you] will be able to be used at any time not only to show the natural 
state of the province...but also so that when some town or parish is founded or moved, the cabildo 
can situate it upon them….In this way it can continue adding what is new.24 
 
For this same purpose, many members of the demarcation teams continued producing maps of the 
borderline after the end of the expeditions. In 1772, for example, Portuguese mapmaker José Custódio de 
Sá e Faria drew a map for the Governor of São Paulo in which he  
marked all of the places that according to our intelligence seem to be the most useful, which should 
be fortified or populated for the security and defense of the [Nossa Senhora dos Prazeres plaza] and 
also for the establishment of the dominions of His Majesty in this part of the south of Brazil.25  
 
                                                       
23 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 144-148v; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 5, f. 170-170v. 
24 “[los mapas que te entregué] podrán servir en cualquiera siglo no solo para hacer ver el estado natural de la provincia…sino 
también para que cuando algún pueblo, ó parroquia se fundase ó trasladase, pueda el cabildo disponer que se sitúe en dichos 
mapas….De este modo, insensiblemente y sin trabajo, se irá añadiendo lo nuevo.” Letter transcribed in: Félix de Azara, 
Descripción é historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara Tomo Segundo (Madrid: Imprenta de Sanchiz, 
1847), 257–58. 
25 “vão marcados todos os lugares que segundo a nossa inteligencia nos parecerão mais uteis, e que se devião fortificar, ou povoar 
para Segurança e defensa da Praça do Guatemy, como tambem para establecimento |sic| dos Dominios de Sua Magestade por 
esta parte do Sul do Brasil.” IEB - YAP-035, f. 6-9. Three years later, Sa e Faria would make another journey to map borderlands 
near the Rio Iguatemy. Maps from that expedition can be found at: ANB - F4/MAP.675. 
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These maps gave governors and viceroys the capacity to think for the first time in terms of consolidated 
provinces.26 They were undoubtedly prescriptive renderings of regional lands, but at the same time they 
served as tools in the effort to produce such idealized territorial conditions. 
 Demarcation officials were also key policymakers in the region. Some, like Gomes Freire de 
Andrade, already occupied high administrative posts at the time of the expeditions, which they temporarily 
left in order to help draw the borderline. Others used the demarcation efforts as a springboard into long 
careers in the new administrative units that the expeditions produced, serving as governors or overseeing 
particular aspects of new territorial initiatives. These might include designing borderland forts, 
underwriting and certifying land titles for borderland settlers, serving as special advisors to viceroys, or 
founding new towns along the borderline (Table 4.1). Thus many former demarcation officials dedicated 
themselves to advancing the territorial vision that they and their teams had represented in their maps. 
Bordermaking was not only a project to secure territorial possession, but a cornerstone of broader Iberian 
reforms. First, it was a means to connect distant locales into cohesive administrative and economic units and 
to focus on new portions of the South American continent. It thus dovetailed with the transfer of Brazil’s 
capital from Salvador da Bahia to Rio de Janeiro in 1763 and the foundation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de 
la Plata, with Buenos Aires as the capital city, in 1776. Viceroys in both cities aimed to link their various 
provinces, captaincies, or intendencies, and while treaty maps gave them the capacity to see the continent 
on a viceregal scale, they needed to secure the borders to coordinate commerce between regional units.27 
Thus the border was not only a division, but a corridor. Borderland settlements served both as barriers to 
those hoping to cross from one side to the other and stopping points for those traveling along the 
                                                       
26 See also: ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 1, (Viamão, 1772-02-12; Porto Alegre, 1804-10-01); “Relatorio 
apresentado ao governo de Lisboa pelo vice-rei Luiz de Vasconcellos, em Outubro de 1784, sobre o Rio Grande do Sul,” Revista 
do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Anno IX, 1 trimestre (1929): 26. 
27 One year after the signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, the Spanish king Charles III issued the “Reglamento de Libre 
Comercio,” which enabled for direct trade between Spanish ports in the Americas.  
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borderline, while waterways such as the Río Paraná and the Río Paraguay both marked the interimperial 
divide and served as key pathways for people and goods. In the Río de la Plata region, disparate Spanish 
forts, such as Batoví, Santa Tecla, Cerro Largo, and Minas operated as stopping points along the “Wagon 
Way” (Camino de las Carretas), which linked the missions to Montevideo and Maldonado.28 
 NAME (CROWN) DURING EXPEDITION AFTER EXPEDITION 
M
A
D
R
ID
 
Gomes Freire de Andrade (Pt) 1st Officer of Demarcation Governor of Rio de Janeiro and 
Minas Gerais 
Francisco Antônio Cardoso de 
Meneses e Sousa (Pt) 
1st Officer, 1st Subdivision Governor of Santa Catarina; 
Governor of Colônia do Sacramento 
Joseph Pinto Alpoim (Pt) 1st Officer, 2nd Subdivision Provisional Governor of Rio de 
Janeiro 
José Custódio de Sá e Faria (Pt) 1st officer, 3rd Subdivision Governor of Rio Grande (Pt) 
Explorations in Patagonia (Sp) 
Miguel Ciera (Pt) Cosmographer Compiled and edited treaty maps for 
Portuguese crown 
Gaspar Tello y Espinosa (Sp) 1st Officer of Demarcation Dean of Supremo Consejo de Indias 
Francisco Bruno de Zavala (Sp) Captain of Cavalry Governor of the Misiones 
SA
N
 I
L
D
E
F
O
N
SO
 
Diego de Alvear (Sp) 1st Officer, 2nd Subdivision Major General in Buenos Aires 
Bernardo Lecocq (Sp) 2nd Officer, Engineer Engineer of borderland forts 
Félix de Azara (Sp) 1st Officer, 3rd Subdivision Commander of the Countryside 
Pedro Antonio Cerviño (Sp) Engineer Mapped Province of Buenos Aires 
Andrés de Oyarvide (Sp) Geographer/Pilot Published map of Río de la Plata 
Sebastião da Veiga Cabral (Pt) 1st Officer of Demarcation Governor of Rio Grande 
Francisco João Roscio (Pt) 2nd Officer, 1st Subdivision Governor of Rio Grande 
Joaquim de Fonseca Manso (Pt) Astronomer/Geographer Sargent-Major of the Missions 
José de Saldanha (Pt) Astronomer/Geographer Governor of the Missions 
 Francisco das Chagas Santos (Pt) Engineer Demarcation of Badajoz Adjustment 
 Alexandre Eloi Portelli (Pt) Captian, Engineer Frontier Commander in Rio Pardo 
Table 4.1 – Officers during and after the Treaty Demarcations29 
                                                       
28 AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1793-09-30; 1794-03-15); Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira”: 12. Other attempts to develop travel 
routes along the border included: “Informe del Virrey Arredondo á su sucesor Melo de Portugal, sobre el estado de la cuestion de 
límites en 1795” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, 406-7, 
409. 
29 The relative lack of officials that remained in the region after the Madrid expedition is likely because many of the participants of 
the technical experts of the former were Jesuits or from other European kingdoms. The Spanish captured the Portuguese officer 
José Custódio de Sá e Faria in 1777, from which point he began to work for them in Buenos Aires and Patagonia. 
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Second, bordermaking served as a means to control the movement of imperial subjects. Over the 
course of the eighteenth century, Spanish and Portuguese administrators became increasingly interested in 
monitoring and regulating their vassals’ travels. Accordingly, they required licenses or passports for 
individuals who sought to enter the countryside and created increasingly long paper trails for travel and 
activities outside of individual plazas.30 The use of passports was a longstanding practice; however, it was at 
this moment that administrators aimed to control activities in the countryside, not only movement from 
one plaza to another. Military guard-posts along the borderline were important to this endeavor because 
they allowed for surveillance of key travel routes, and the day-by-day records from such sites reveal the 
interception of numerous individuals. Administrators in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Rio Grande, and Porto 
Alegre all sought to exercise new levels of control over subjects who moved beyond the purview of local 
plazas.31 
Third, the border was a means to determine property rights and control commodities. For the Río 
de la Plata, this meant cattle, which could be used for meat, hides, wool, tallow, grease, oils, and 
transportation, thus serving as a principal foodstuff for the region and a lucrative export. With the growth 
of mining and plantation labor in southeastern Brazil, Portuguese officials hoped to transport cattle and 
cattle-based products like jerky and leather from the Río de la Plata to such areas.32 Meanwhile, Spanish 
                                                       
30 Tamar Herzog, “Naming, Identifying and Authorizing Movement in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America,” in Registration 
and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History, ed. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter, 191–209 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). The immensity of the border made this objective elusive for administrators, yet the requests for 
passports or licenses to travel in the countryside or cross the border indicate the risks involved for individuals traveling without 
them. 
31 AHRS - F1243, f. 163-4. 
32 Julia Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions: A Socioeconomic History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 75–82. The 
Sorocaba cattle market near São Paulo, which was the destination of many cows and mules from the Río de la Plata, became 
institutionalized in 1750, while the “Caminho de Lages” between Curitiba and Viamão opened up in the 1760s. João Borges 
Fortes, “Velhos Caminhos do Rio Grande do Sul,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul, 4o trimestre 
(1938): 250–4; Pedro Ari Veríssimo da Fonseca, Tropeiros de mula: A ocupação do espaço, a dilitação das fronteiras, 2a edição revista e 
ampliada (Passo Fundo: Gráfica Editora Berthier Ltda., 2004), 67. 
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merchants not only traded leather in Europe, but found lucrative markets for jerky and other products with 
the growth of plantation labor in the Caribbean. Félix de Azara calculated that with proper territorial 
organization and oversight, the region could provide enough meat, hides, and tallow for all the sailors in the 
world, feed all the slaves in Havana and other parts of the Americas, and generate double the profits of all 
the mines in the Americas combined.33 By defining a border and claiming dominion, both Portuguese and 
Spanish officials could begin to regulate the ownership and commerce of cattle and other livestock. Vacant 
lands (tierras baldías) became royal lands (tierras realengas), and territorial possession became less an issue of 
access to resources than one of ownership. Imperial officials exerted property claims over feral livestock 
located within their dominion and sought to inhibit the movement of both royal and privately owned 
livestock across the border. In 1764, for example, the Spanish crown issued a royal decree that prohibited 
the transportation of animals from Spanish dominions into Brazil, an assertion that would have been 
impossible without a clear sense of what constituted the dominions of either crown.34 Likewise, the start of 
the San Idefonso demarcation coincided with a series of Spanish initiatives, known as the “Ordering of the 
Countryside” (Arreglo de los Campos) to promote and enforce territorial occupation, sedentism, and 
ranching.35 
                                                       
33 Félix de Azara, Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes (Buenos Aires: Editorial Bajel, 1943), 10, 23-4. 
34 One of the functions of any borderline is to regulate commerce, thereby distinguishing licit trade from smuggling. See, for 
example: Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 
89–93; Tiago Gil, Infiéis Trangressores: os contrabandistas da 'fronteira' (1760-1810) (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2007), 79. 
35 Smaller-scale “arreglos de los campos” occurred around mid-century, particularly in areas between Santa Fe, Santo Domingo 
Soriano, and the Campo del Bloqueo. AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vívoras, 1746-07-02). The 1784 “Arreglo de los Campos” 
intended to regulate the slaughter and sale of cattle, resolve jurisdictional disputes within the newly claimed lands, protect 
ranchers, and enhance the economic productivity of the Río de la Plata. It focused on territories between the Río Yi and the Río 
Negro, where agents from Montevideo competed with others from the missions for control of local cattle. At this time, these 
lands laid beyond the jurisdiction of either locale, and were instead known as “tierras realengas.” Over the course of the next two 
decades, Spanish officials expanded its principals throughout the region and to the borderline. A copy of this document is 
available at AGI - Buenos Aires, 333. See also: AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo XV, 187–201; See also: Aníbal Barrios Pintos, De 
las vaquerías al alambrado: Contribución a la historia rural uruguaya, Biblioteca Uruguaya 5 (Montevideo: Ediciones del Nuevo 
Mundo, 1967), 184–86; Julio Carlos Rodríguez, Torre, Nelson de la. and Lucía Sala de Touron, Evolución económica de la Banda 
Oriental, 2nd ed. (Montevideo: Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, 1968); Jorge Gelman, Campesinos y estancieros (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
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By clarifying territorial possession, officials could also recast longstanding commercial practices as 
contraband. A dispute between Portuguese mapmaker Francisco João Roscio and his Spanish counterpart, 
Diego de Alvear, about commerce around the Rio Piratiní reveals this gesture. Roscio wrote in 1785: 
These lands were the refuge of many vagrants of the two nations, since they had not yet been 
determined, nor divided according to which of the two dominions they pertained to. For that 
reason, what has been found does not appear to me to be contraband because it was not clandestine 
commerce in the land of another Power. It is certain that only a few bull hides were found, which 
were gathered wild and untamed, like any other stock that does not have an owner. [Alvear] 
responded to me that this was not so because these lands expressly belonged to Spain, and the 
Spanish, being in possession of them, had strict orders from their court to patrol and guard them 
and to pursue offenders.36 
 
It was only by defining territorial possession that officials could intercept traders who operated in the 
countryside and deem them to be smugglers. Since the locations of the Madrid and San Ildefonso lines 
placed most cattle reserves in the region on the Spanish side of the border, officials such as Alvear often had 
greater incentives to solidify territorial claims. Still, unsanctioned cattle trade had deleterious effects for the 
Portuguese as well. In particular, it undermined their ability to tax the entrance of cattle into their own 
lands, fomented the growth of regional strongmen, and allowed other commodities such as tobacco to flow 
across the border in the other direction.37  
                                                       
Los Libros del Riel, 1998), 126; Julio Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution: Frontier Settlement Policy and the Emergence of 
New Spaces of Power in the Río de la Plata Borderlands, 1777-1810,” Hispanic American Historical Review 88, no. 4 (2008). 
36 “estes campos erão refugio de muitos vadios das duas Nasçõens, por não estarem ainda determinados, nem devididos a qual dos 
Dominios pertencia, e por isso, o que se encontrasse, me não paressia rigorozo contrabando, porque não era comercio 
clandestino em terreno de outra Potencia, sendo certo que só se acharião alguns couros de touro, que apanhavão selvagens, e sem 
domo, como qualquer outra Casta que não tem Senhorio: respondeome q' não era assim, por que estes campos érão de Espanha 
expressam.te; e delles estavão de posse, e tinhão ordens apertadas da sua corte para os patrulharem, guardarem, e persseguirem 
os infractores.” BNB - 09,4,14, 32v, 208-209v. 
37 Tensions occasionally arose between officials in Porto Alegre and borderland agents such as Rafael Pinto Bandeira, whose name 
was ubiquitous with illicit trafficking of cattle towards the end of the century. Gil, Infiéis Trangressores. Such conflicts derived from 
the heterogeneity of imperial agents, including those along the borderline, those in capital cities, and “trans-imperial” actors. See: 
Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution”; Fabrício Pereira Prado, “A carreira transimperial de don Manuel Cipriano de Melo no Rio 
da Prata do século XVIII,” Topoi. Revista de História 13, no. 25 (jul/dez 2012). Examples of Portuguese regulation of contraband 
along the border include: ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 174-82, 200, 354-357v; BNB - 09,4,14, f. 444. 
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 The borderline also generated points of mutual interest between the two imperial projects, and 
officials on both sides frequently collaborated in making it function. Together, they established official 
practices designed to eliminate “disorder” (moving bodies) and “contraband” (unsanctioned commerce). For 
example, the Treaty of Madrid’s nineteenth article stated: 
Along the entire frontier, commerce between the two nations will be prohibited and deemed to be 
contraband….In addition to this prohibition, no person will pass from the territory of one nation to 
the other by land or by water; nor will they navigate in the rivers that are not exclusive to their 
nation, or shared [by both], regardless of their pretext or motive, without obtaining beforehand a 
license from the Governor, or from the superior of the lands that they go to, or might go to, 
[having been] sent by the Governor of their own land for some express purpose. To this end, they 
will carry their passport and transgressors will be punished.38 
 
The Treaty of San Ildefonso’s seventeenth article repeated this sentiment. 
 
Any individual from these two nations who is apprehended for contraband trade with individuals 
from the other will be punished in terms of themselves and their goods, according to the laws of the 
nation that apprehended them. The same punishments will be incurred by the subjects of one 
nation if they even enter into the territory of the other, or in the rivers or parts of them, that are 
not exclusive to their nation or shared by both. The only exception is in the event that they arrive 
in a port or adjacent lands on account of indispensable and urgent necessity (which they must prove 
in every possible way) or if they cross to neighboring territories having been commissioned by their 
Governor or the superior of their respective country in order to communicate a letter or news, in 
which case they must carry a passport that expresses this motive.39 
 
It also included a clause regarding the return of runaway slaves: 
 
At the same time, since the riches of that country consist of slaves that work in agriculture, their 
Governors will agree to mutually return [slaves] in the event that they run away, so that they do not 
gain freedom by passing to the other’s dominion.40 
 
                                                       
38 “Tratado firmado en Madrid á 13 de Enero de 1750, para determinar los límites de los estados pertnecientes á las Coronas de 
España y Portugal, en Asia y América,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del 
Río de la Plata, vol.  3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 331–42 (Buenos Aires: V. Colmenga, 1900). 
39 “Tratado preliminar sobre los límites de los estados pertenecientes á las Coronas de España y Portugal, en la América 
meridional, ajustado y concluido en San Lorenzo, á 11 de Octubre de 1777,” in Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia 
antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata, vol.  3, ed. Pedro de Angelis, 2a ed, 5 vols., 343–55 (Buenos Aires: V. 
Colmenga, 1900). 
40 ibid. 
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Thus, in conjunction with the prescriptive borderlines, the two crowns established new rules of 
engagement for the region’s countryside. Hoping to use the border as a means to regulate the movement of 
bodies and commodities, they hinged the success of the treaties upon mutual participation in its operation.41  
 In the years following these treaties, administrators on both sides frequently negotiated with their 
counterparts to put the new rules into practice. Combing through manuscripts from borderland 
establishments such as Santa Tecla and Rio Pardo, one finds numerous letters regarding the return of 
fugitive slaves, military deserters, and other individuals traveling without a passport.42 Given that the 
documentary record mostly reveals cases in which officials complied with the rules – there would be no 
reason to note their incompliance – it is difficult to estimate how often they did not. Moreover, local 
interests led numerous officials in borderland posts to overlook the movement of certain people and goods, 
as they used their regional authority to develop contraband networks and undermine challengers. 
Nonetheless, Portuguese and Spanish administrators knew that the apprehension and return of individuals 
leaving their dominions required that they also keep track of those entering into it, leading them to 
collaborate as well.43 The “good harmony” that diplomats hoped to instill through the treaties and the 
borderline required at least an aura of mutuality in the joint policing of it. 
Following the demarcation efforts, both sides raced to populate lands adjacent to the current 
borderline. The mapping expeditions provided Portuguese and Spanish administrators the legal authority to 
                                                       
41 For example: ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2 (1793-03-04). 
42 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 132-136v; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 440-440v; 
ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2 (Montevideo, 1799-04-17; Buenos Aires, 1791-07-21; Rio Grande de São Pedro, 
1791-10-12); AGNA - IX. 1-3-5, (letters from Azara to Ólaguier Feliú, 1798-01-26, 1798-02-01, 1798-02-11); AGNA - IX. 18-
2-4, (San Miguel, 1799-07-18 & 1799-09-18; San Nicolás, 1799-10-20); AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (letters dated 1780-05-16 & 1794-
11-09); AGNA - IX. 1-5-3, (Puesto de Santiago, 1759-06-26; s/l, 1760-05-04); AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (1753-06-01); AGNA - IX. 
4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-06-27; Buenos Aires, 1758-07-07 & 1760-11-30; San Borja, 1759-12-13 & 1759-03-21; 
Salto, 1759-09-24); AGNA - IX. 4-3-3, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1761-06-26, 1761-07-09, 1761-07-10, 1761-08-21, 1761-08-31, 
1761-09-23, 1761-09-27, 1761-11-23); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Colonia, 1777-06-20); AGNA - VII. Lamas 32 [2635], f. 113v-
115v. 
43 AHRS - F1245, f. 12v-13; Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira”. 
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issue titles to lands beyond the reach of their plazas. Prior to the accords, neither side could offer land 
grants to settlers, as they exercised neither legal nor physical control over such spaces. During and after the 
demarcation efforts, however, officials strived to create a human frontier that would solidify the newly 
produced cartographic lines. Borderland settlements took a variety of forms, including forts, towns, and 
individual farms and ranches. Spanish authorities first sought to establish a chain of forts or towns along the 
borderline, while the Portuguese principally issued land titles (sesmarias) to individuals, a policy that the 
Spanish began to replicate toward the end of the century.44 Regardless of the particular strategy, the 
demarcation efforts were both an impetus and a tool toward demographic engineering along the borderline. 
Most borderland plazas were founded during the mapping expeditions, in the 1750s, 1780s, and 1790s 
(Map 4.2), and a close look at the dates of issuance of sesmarias near the borderline reveals a similar uptick 
during those years.45 Conversely, during the 1760s and 1770s, decades in which no legal border existed in 
the region, efforts to create new borderline settlements nearly came to a standstill. 
                                                       
44 Each strategy had limitations, as forts were necessary to protect and police local settlers, while agricultural and pastoral 
production was necessary to sustain a fort. Nonetheless, both sides eventually concluded that no amount of forts would be 
sufficient to control such a vast countryside, and that a contiguous line of settlers along the borderline was necessary to make it 
operational. Azara, Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes, 6-7, 16; Francisco João Roscio, “Compêndio 
Noticioso,” in O Capitalismo Pastoril, ed. Décio Freitas, 105–40 (Porto Alegre: Escola Superior de Teologia São Lourenço de 
Brindes, 1980), 139. 
45 “Demarcação do sul do Brasil: pelo Governador e Capitão General Gomes Freire de Andrada, 1752-1757,” Revista do Arquivo 
Público Mineiro 24, no. 1 (1933): 49–295; AHRS - F1244, p. 171v-172; AHRS - F1246, 140v-142, 190-191v, 197v-198, 216v-
217v; AHRS - F1247, 60-1, 100-104, 147-148v, 183-184v, 189v-190, 250v-252, 257v, 259, 288-9; AHRS - F1248, 1-2v, 22-3, 
37v-38v, 67-8, 188v-190v, 216v-218, 263-5, 277-279v, 289v-290; AHRS - F1249, 69-70v, 76-8, 111v-113, 200-201v, 259v-
261, 263v; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 2, #28 & #45; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 3; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 5; AHRS - Sesmarias, 
Maço 5; AHRS - Sesmarias, Maço 7, #137 & #148; Aurélio Porto, “Fronteira do Rio Pardo: Penetração e fixação de 
povoadores,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul Ano IX, 1 trimestre (1929). For more on sesmarias, see: 
Helen Osório, “Regime de sesmarias e propriedade da terra,” Biblios 5 (1993). 
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Map 4.2 – Borderland Plazas founded between 1750 and 180646 
The establishment of settlements along the interimperial borderline was neither the closing of 
Portuguese and Spanish imperial frontiers nor the result of natural population growth in the region. Instead, 
it was part of explicit projects to establish imperial control far beyond the reach of existing plazas. At the 
time of the demarcation efforts, Portuguese and Spanish territorial authority was limited to the various 
plazas that dotted the region’s perimeter and portions of the fragile corridors that connected them. The 
borderlines did not supplant other local borderlands dynamics, such as the relations of Montevideo, Santo 
                                                       
46 Portuguese soldiers founded Santa Teresa in 1762, but Spanish forces took control that fort and São Miguel the following year. 
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Domingo Soriano, and Yapeyú with Charrúas and Minuanes, or the “three frontiers” of Rio Grande.47 Nor 
did they transform the vast territories that were beyond imperial control into consolidated, governable 
spaces. The desire to control the borderline engendered a jump in settlement patterns, from the plazas’ 
vicinities to distant lands, thus creating a new borderland that had not previously existed. For this reason, 
administrators on both sides relied on new settlers – mission inhabitants interested in acquiring land titles 
or immigrants from Portugal’s and Spain’s Atlantic Islands – to populate sites such as Rio Pardo, Novo 
Maldonado (modern-day San Carlos, Uruguay), Canelones, Minas, Belén, and Batoví.48 They offered land 
titles in exchange for a settler’s promise to remain on the land, cultivate it, build houses, participate in local 
militias, support military officers, refuse to harbor contrabandists, and help to sustain a local priest.49 To 
their chagrin, these efforts to involve settlers in the policing of the borderline frequently failed, given the 
settlers' exposure and imperial authorities' inability to compete with other networks of regional authority. 
 Despite their ambitions, Iberian administrators struggled to materialize their designs on the ground. 
The sheer length of the borderline was overwhelming and stretched their logistical capacities. Officials from 
each side frequently complained that they lacked the personnel and resources to monitor and control 
                                                       
47 The “three frontiers” of the Captaincy of Rio Grande included, from north to south, Vacaria, Rio Pardo, and Rio Grande. ANB 
- 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 132-136v. 
48 Juan Alejandro Apolant, Operativo Patagonia: Historia da la mayor aportación demográfica masiva a la Banda Oriental (Montevideo: 
Imprenta Letras, 1970); José María Mariluz Urquijo, La fundación de San Gabriel de Batoví (Montevideo, 1954); Apartado de la 
"Revista Historica". Racialized skepticism of mission Indians’ industriousness led many officials to offer land grants instead to 
islanders, and for this reason, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, Desterro (modern-day Florianopolis, Brazil) and 
Montevideo became significant ports of disembarkation for immigrants from the Azores and the Canary Islands. BUC - MS 148, 
f. 138v-139; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.29, f. 51v-55v, 72v-84. Particularly in the Spanish case, these settlers lived 
off a stipend and held a special legal status that restricted their movement until receipt of their lands. AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 
243, carpeta 3, no 114; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 249, carpeta 2, no 119. For more on settlers from the missions, see: José María 
Mariluz Urquijo, La expedición contra los charrúas en 1801 y la fundación de Belén (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1952); Separata de 
la "Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay" Tomo XIX, 53-94; Elisa Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser 
índio: Políticas indígenas e políticas indigenistas no extremo sul da América portuguesa (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2009). 
49 ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 2, (Porto Alegre, 1773-09-02); Azara, Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y 
otros informes, 17–18. This effort to populate borderland spaces generated tensions between large-scale ranchers/landowners and 
small-scale farmers. Rodríguez, Torre, Nelson de la. and Sala de Touron, Evolución económica de la Banda Oriental; Gelman, 
Campesinos y estancieros; Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution”. While estimates differ on the proportion of large- versus small-
scale farmers, it is certain that imperial aims to incorporate settlers into the policing of the countryside were fraught with 
frustrations and shortcomings. 
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borderline activities effectively, as the countryside was simply too vast.50 As a result, contraband networks 
persisted and grew, and many individuals moved relatively freely through the countryside. Though the 
consequences for apprehension without a license or passport were severe, neither imperial government was 
able to achieve the omnipresence that it desired. Each effort to regulate commerce or limit movement met 
with individuals and groups who persistently crossed the imaginary borderlines, occupied lands without 
titles, and slaughtered cattle they did not legally own. The bordermaking efforts also resulted in the growth 
of alternative networks of authority, as local administrators or strongmen moved goods and distributed land 
titles without their governor’s or viceroy’s consent.51 Imperial officials complained about the very 
individuals to whom they had given land titles, accusing them of occupying lands beyond the limits of their 
titles, refusing to remain in one place, abandoning their properties, or harboring smugglers.52  
The convention of neutral lands (campos neutrales) illustrates Iberian authorities’ limited capacity to 
enforce the borderline. While the Treaty of Madrid projected a single line across South America, growing 
contraband trade led the Treaty of San Idefonso’s demarcation teams to draw parallel lines in areas where 
smuggling was particularly problematic. The idea was to create complementary rows of military 
establishments – one on each side of the neutral lands – through which contrabandists would have to pass 
when transporting cattle and other commodities. Imperial officials also hoped that these neutral lands would 
prevent future disputes between the two crowns regarding settlement and military activity; neither side 
could issue property titles for these lands, nor could they enter them with armed soldiers or guards. (Map 
4.3).53 While the two crowns hoped these neutral lands would be a panacea for the problems of illegal trade  
                                                       
50 AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1795-02-26). 
51 ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 11, f. 442v; AHRS - F1244, f. 171v-172; Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution”; 
Gil, Infiéis Trangressores; Prado, “A carreira transimperial de don Manuel Cipriano de Melo no Rio da Prata do século XVIII”. 
52 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.29, f. 71-72v; AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Buenos Aires, 1760-08-09). 
53 See articles five and six of the Treaty of San Ildefonso. See also: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 267v; Segarra, 
Frontera y límites, 18. 
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Map 4.3 – “Mapa Esferico de las Provincia Septentrionales del Rio de la Plata,” 1796. The Treaty 
of San Ildefonso’s neutral lands (marked with red lines) began along the Atlantic Coast, encompassed the 
Lagoa Mirim and portions of Montegrande, and continued to the Río Uruguay further north, covering 
approximately 3,000 square miles.54 
                                                       
54 Mapa Esferico de las Provincias Septentrionales del Rio de la Plata (1796); MNM - 42-B-7; Segarra, Frontera y límites, 18. 
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and settlement, in the end they proved to be the opposite. Imperial subjects began to occupy what were 
supposed to be empty lands, and smugglers used these areas as harbor from the mounted guards that the 
two empires had placed along the edges. There was little that officers in borderline forts could do in 
response, as surveilling or pursuing individuals into neutral lands constituted a rupture of the treaty 
agreement and incited negative responses from their counterparts.55 Designed to enhance the effectiveness 
of the borderline, neutral lands ultimately served to undermine its utility. 
 
Engaging Tolderías 
 The largest obstacle to imperial efforts to populate and enforce the borderlines were the people 
whose lands they bisected. Despite the presumption of imperial control (or eventual territorial control) that 
the border demarcations implied, Minuanes and Charrúas controlled much of the borderline through the 
end of the eighteenth century. A close look at areas of Spanish and Portuguese settlement reveals this, as 
most towns and forts were located in the easternmost part of the region, near the Lagoa Mirim and the Rio 
Piratiní (Map 4.2). Further west, between Santa Tecla and São Martinho, neither side was able to entrench 
itself firmly along the borderline. Moreover, while key plazas such as Santa Tecla and Rio Pardo held 
upwards of 50 troops, only about one to two dozen guards operated others such as Batoví or San Rafael.56 
Such a small number of troops could barely maintain a fort’s existence, and military agents and settlers alike 
found themselves subject to the interests of Charrúa and Minuán caciques. For this reason, imperial officials 
had difficulty selling titles to lands frequented by tolderías and chose instead to concentrate their settlement 
                                                       
55 AGNA - IX. 1-3-5, (Cerro Largo, 1798-11-25); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Colonia, 1775-09-26; Real de San Carlos, 1775-09-30); 
AGNA - IX. 37-8-5, f. 15-18; AHRS - Informações sobre pedidos de terras, Maço 1, (Erval, 1800-11-09); AHRS - Autoridades 
Militares, Maço 1, (Rio Grande, 1795-10-26); ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 1, (Rio Grande, 1792-06-02); ANB - 
86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 93, v. 1, (Buenos Aires, 1779-04-28; s/l, 1779-10-04); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 
1.2.19, f. 28v. 
56 AGNA - IX. 1-3-5, (Cerro Largo, 1800-06-30 & 1805-10-01). 
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in other areas.57 The presence of tolderías also undermined Spanish efforts to use the borderline as a 
roadway to link Paraguay and the Guaraní missions to Montevideo and Maldonado. While the chain of forts 
that appeared along the borderline were intended to bridge this gap, an observer commented in 1801 that 
“it is difficult to cross a country so extensive, rugged, and inhabited only by barbarous and ferocious 
Indians.”58 
 In order for their borderland institutions and settlers to survive, Spanish and the Portuguese 
administrators needed the support, or at least the indifference, of tolderías. With the assistance of local 
caciques and their people, imperial agents sought both to achieve the principal goals of the borderline – 
control of moving subjects and commodities – and to destabilize their rival. As they did so, officials of both 
crowns assumed hierarchical relationships with Charrúas and Minuanes, even if many of their actions 
betrayed the fallacy of this assumption. While interimperial discussions posited that tolderías were 
independent, if landless, actors protected by natural law, Iberian officials presumed Charrúas and Minuanes 
to be imperial subjects or subordinates when developing internal policies. Amidst these broader tendencies, 
Spanish and Portuguese administrators developed unique strategies vis-à-vis tolderías in the region, and the 
nuances of these initiatives were shaped by the location of the operative borderline. 
The various borderlines of the late eighteenth century Río de la Plata situated most independent 
tolderías and cattle reserves within Spanish dominions. As Spanish authorities aimed to establish territorial 
“order” on their side of the border, they began to engage tolderías in new ways. First, with the extension of 
imagined possession from plazas to the entire countryside, Spanish officials asserted that all lands on their 
                                                       
57 Imperial officials considered the presence of tolderías both when calculating the value of land titles and when determining sites 
for new plazas. Barrios Pintos, De las vaquerías al alambrado, 70, 188. 
58 “Esta mesma diverção não produzerá tanto effeito como talves se imagine, para facilitar mais a conquista; porque a vastissima 
porção digo vastissima extensão do terreno comprehendido entre os dois Rios não permite que dois establecimentos centrais 
acudam forças para protegerem a Costa maritima por ser difficilisimo, ou atravessar hum Paiz extenso inculto, e só habitado de 
Indios barbaos e ferozes, ou fazer o tranzito em Canôas que convem serem infinitas para ó transporte de quanto exige hum corpo 
numerozo de tropas” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.1, f. 344v-345. 
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side of the border constituted imperial dominion and that all resources on those lands were by extension 
property of either the crown or whichever plaza held jurisdiction. By claiming the regional interior as “royal 
lands,” Buenos Aires’s governors and viceroys effectively imagined Charrúas, Minuanes, and other mobile 
peoples off the map, discarding their claims over cattle or for control over particular areas. It was for this 
reason that as Yapeyú, San Miguel, and other missions intensified efforts to establish ranches and collect 
cattle, they did not recognize their expansion as an intrusion upon lands over which tolderías had claims.59 
Writers from these locales instead narrated the responses of Charrúas and Minuanes, which included raiding 
or occupying these new ranches, as “invasions” that impinged upon the property rights of ranchers.60 If feral 
livestock belonged to the crown or plazas, tolderías were necessarily thieves. 
Second, Spanish agents ceased to imagine mobile native peoples as independent agents with whom 
they could strike partnerships and potentially negotiate vassalage. Instead, they considered tolderías to be 
imperial subjects by virtue of their living on imperial lands. Assuming subjecthood to be the a priori 
condition of those living within the territorial dominions of a given crown, Spanish officials ceased to rely 
upon reducciones or pacts with tolderías to claim them as vassals. With this territorialization of subjecthood 
came the expectation that tolderías abide by Buenos Aires’s dictums and proclamations regarding land and 
property or face “punishment” or “extermination.”61 They were “inhabitants” of royal lands, rather than 
                                                       
59 Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, Chapter 8. 
60 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vívoras, 1750-11-09); AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-10-03). Many historians have 
repeated this idea, even though it is predicated upon a subjective notion of territorial possession and property rights. See, for 
example: Mariluz Urquijo, La expedición contra los charrúas en 1801 y la fundación de Belén; Eduardo F. Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los 
charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), 2 vols. 1 (Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso, 1989), Capítulo 11; AGNA - IX. 
4-3-4, (Vívoras, 1798-09-28); AGNA - IX. 3-9-2, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 
261v. 
61 Examples of the use of the term “castigar” (to punish) include: AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-01-26); AGNA - IX. 4-
3-1, (Campo de Bloqueo, 1749-10-29, 1752-10-19, 1757-07-19, 1757-08-06; San Salvador, 1746-05-16, 1746-09-20; Santo 
Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Arroyo de la Virgen, 1797-12-27); AGNA - IX. 24-3-6, leg 30, exp 8 
(Las Vívoras, 1800-02-18); AGNA - IX. 28-7-7, (Montevideo, 1803-10-24). Examples of the use of the term “exterminar” 
include: ANHA - Enrique Fitte, III-75; AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (San Salvador, 1799-09-24); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Buenos Aires, 
1806-05-23); AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 10, carpeta 2, no 1-2; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo 
hispánico), capítulo 4; Juan Alejandro Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya (Montevideo: Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del 
Uruguay, 1966), 861; Hebe Livi, “El Charrúa en Santa Fe,” Revista de la Junta Provincial de Estudios Históricos de Santa Fe, no. 49 
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autonomous agents, and any refusal to respect imperial decrees was considered an affront to Spanish 
sovereignty. This new aversion to negotiation and pact-making intensified over time, as settlement 
initiatives through evangelization, trade relations, and other partnerships gave way to campaigns for 
expulsion, extermination, or containment.62  
Third, the mobile lifestyles practiced by tolderías were antithetical to the new ideal of sedentary 
subjects. Mirroring broader Iberian attitudes, authorities in the Río de la Plata began increasingly to develop 
pejorative opinions of mobile peoples over the course of the eighteenth century.63 It is certain that the 
seasonal mobility of tolderías had always befuddled imperial and ecclesiastical writers, as early modern 
epistemologies featured sedentism as a core attribute of Christianity and subjecthood. Still, the eighteenth 
century saw intensified disdain for mobility, a point made clear through the frequently-used term 
“vagabond.” According to the 1739 Diccionario de Autoridades, a vagabond referred to both a “subject who 
wanders from one site to another without stopping at any, even though they have a purpose or intention” 
and “lazy people, who could work, and live with ambition, but do not do it.” Similarly, while Raphael 
Bluteau’s 1728 Vocabulario Portuguez & Latino defined a vagabond as “one who wanders without residence or 
                                                       
(1978): 36–7; Fernando Klein, “El destino de los indígenas del Uruguay,” Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Cincias Sociales y Jurídicas 15, 
no. 1 (2007): 7; Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, 199. One recent study suggests that Spanish authorities were more 
interested in incorporation than extermination, though it focuses on post-independence dynamics. Leonel Cabrera Pérez and 
Isabel Barreto Messano, “El ocaso del mundo indígena y las formas de integración a la sociedad urbana montevideana,” Revista 
TEFROS 4, no. 2 (2006). 
62 While seeking to establish peaceful relations with tolderías in the Pampas and Patagonia, Spanish authorities in the Río de la 
Plata adopted strategies of systematic violence vis-à-vis Charrúa and Minuán tolderías. Abelardo Levaggi, Paz en la frontera: historia 
de la relaciones diplomáticas con las comunidades indígenas en la Argentina (Siglos XVI-XIX) (Buenos Aires: Universidad del Museo Social 
Argentino, 2000); David J. Weber, Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2005); Raul Mandrini, “Transformations: The Río de la Plata During the Bourbon Era,” in Contested Spaces of Early America, 
ed. Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, 142–62 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). Conversely, while 
seeking to establish peaceful ties with Charrúa and Minuán tolderías, Portuguese authorities in other areas of Brazil adopted 
policies of systematic violence. See, for example: Hal Langfur, The Forbidden Lands: Colonial Identity, Frontier Violence, and the 
Persistence of Brazil's Eastern Indians, 1750-1830 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); Mary Karasch, “Catechism and 
Captivity: Indian Policy in Goiás, 1780-1889,” in Native Brazil: Beyond the Convert and the Cannibal, 1500-1900, ed. Hal Langfur, 
198–224 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014). 
63 Langfur, The Forbidden Lands, 76–88; Tamar Herzog, “Naming, Identifying and Authorizing Movement in Early Modern Spain 
and Spanish America” in Registration and Recognition; Heather F. Roller, Amazonian Routes: Indigenous Mobility and Colonial 
Communities in Northern Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), Chapter 5. 
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a clear dwelling place,” Antonio de Moraes Silva’s 1789 Diccionario da lingua portuguesa added, “because they 
do not have a King, nor a homeland that they love.”64 Over time, mobility became synonymous with 
vagrancy, landlessness, and lack of loyalty to a crown. 
In the Río de la Plata, these changing notions of territoriality and subjecthood increasingly led 
Spanish officials to associate tolderías with contrabandists and general territorial “disorder.” Time and again, 
as imperial authorities sought to explain tolderías’ raids on newly-established ranches or the exaction of 
payment from travelers, they attributed such behavior to tolderías' alliances with or subjugation to 
contrabandists. In other instances, they considered Charrúas and Minuanes to be Portuguese subjects and 
thus enemy combatants.65 In addition, the new imperial ethnographies that grew out of the demarcation 
efforts deemed tolderías’ actions to be the result of their “bad inclination” (mala inclinación), thus discarding 
any material or territorial explanation. For example, in explaining several military expeditions near the Río 
Uruguay, officials noted that ranchers had been exposed to “those people, who for no other reason than 
whim killed, robbed from their ranches, and set fire to their settlements and harvests.”66 If tolderías simply 
acted out of malevolence, rather than in logical defense of land claims or to gain access to resources, then 
amicable relations were impossible. 
 During the second half of the eighteenth century, Spanish officials adopted two principal strategies 
in their engagement with Charrúas and Minuanes: military action and strategic settlement. Both of these 
aimed to force individual tolderías to accept reduction. Beginning with the 1749 military expeditions near 
                                                       
64 Diccionario de autoridades Tomo VI (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1739); Fuente electrónica elaborada por el Instituto de 
Investigación Rafael Lapesa y editado en Madrid por la Real Academia Española; Raphael Bluteau, Vocabulário Português e Latino, 8 
vols. 8 (Coimbra: Colégio das Artes da Companhia de Jesus, 1728), 346; Antonio de Moraes Silva, Diccionario da lingua portugueza 
- recompilado dos vocabularios impressos ate agora, e nesta segunda edição novamente emendado e muito acrescentado 2 (Lisboa: Typographia 
Lacerdina, 1789), 826.  
65 See, for example: AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de Chunireri, 1776-06-04 [x2], 1776-10-27; San Nicolás, 1776-04-01, 
1776-04-04, 1776-04-09; San Borja, 1776-05-06). 
66 “de aquella gente, que sin otra razon que la de su antojo mataban, robaban las aciendas, e incendiaban las poblaciones, y las 
mieses” AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, “Undated Letter to Viceroy”. 
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Santa Fe and Montevideo, Spanish authorities began to echo a common refrain – “kill all of those who 
[refuse reductions]” – and the subsequent campaigns to “clean the countryside” represented a stark shift 
from earlier policies.67 While military engagement had always been a facet of relations between plazas and 
tolderías, prior to 1749 it tended to be in response to acute conflicts rather than aimed at subjugation. 
Furthermore, when describing these earlier campaigns, imperial writers tended to characterize them as 
military campaigns (salidas), rather than police actions. These endeavors had often been in response to raids 
on ranches or attacks upon imperial subjects traveling outside of the plazas, and they had frequently ended 
with pacts between a plaza and neighboring tolderías or with no engagement at all.68 Most importantly, the 
objective had been neither settlement by force nor extermination. Although imperial and ecclesiastical 
agents had hoped that tolderías would ultimately accept reduction and a relationship of vassalage, this had 
never been a precondition of ending military conflicts. 
Preemptive military action to force settlement became a centerpiece of Spanish engagement with 
tolderías at the same time as the demarcation efforts. This occurred in three waves: the 1750s excursions 
from Santa Fe and Montevideo, attacks from Montevideo and Santo Domingo Soriano in the 1760s, and a 
sustained assault near the borderline from 1796 to 1806.69 In each instance, military officers predicated 
their aggression upon prior hostilities by local tolderías, generally in the form of raids on newly-founded 
ranches in indigenous lands. Nonetheless, the objective of the subsequent military attacks was not simply to 
dissuade tolderías from entering ranches or attempting to recover livestock. Their purpose was to purge the 
                                                       
67 “los pase a cuchillo si no se contenían despues de aberlos requerido con Paz” AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 2, carpeta 24, no 2, f. 1; 
Norberto Levinton, El espacio jesuítico-guaraní: La formación de una región cultural, Biblioteca de Estudios Paraguayos - Volumen 80 
(Asunción: Centro de Estudios Antropológicos de la Universidad Católica (CEADUC), 2009), 112; AGI - Buenos Aires, 333, 
"Copia del informe sobre arreglo de campos". 
68 See, for example: RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, f. 54-59v; AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1713-12-30. 
69 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), capítulos 4-12. In addition to the 1750s 
expeditions, military incursions occurred in 1761. If nearly all of these expeditions were in response to “hostilities” by tolderías, 
most of their raids were against newly founded ranches in their lands. AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 10, carpeta 2, no 1-2; RAH - Mata 
Linares, t. 11, f. 38v-39; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 229, carpeta 7, no 57. 
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countryside of tolderías to make way for future settlements. These initiatives gradually intensified and 
became systematized, culminating in the 1797 formation of a group of blandengues to patrol the 
countryside, uproot contraband networks, and extirpate Charrúa and Minuán tolderías. Between 1798 and 
1806, blandengues and local militias were in a near constant state of warfare with Charrúas and Minuanes 
between Santo Domingo Soriano, Yapeyú, and Batoví.70 They raided tolderías one by one, killing all the 
men they could and shipping captured women and children to Buenos Aires. Passenger logs of boats 
traveling down the Río Uruguay between 1798 and 1801 reveal no less than 210 Charrúa captives, while 
one of Buenos Aires’s main holding centers, known as the "House of Confinement” (Casa de la Reclusión), 
recorded dozens of Minuanes as well.71  
The stated objective of blandengues’ expeditions was to protect ranchers and individuals from the 
plazas who were herding and slaughtering cattle, but in practice, their forays were part of a broader plan to 
force tolderías to accept reduction. In 1801, for example, a commission from Yapeyú approached the 
Minuán cacique Masalana near the Río Cuareim and presented an ultimatum (Map 4.1). 
If it pleases you to establish a population in the vicinity of the San Marcos ranch, given the land’s 
fertility and the abundance of wood, water, and fish, I will mark for you a place large and 
comfortable enough to be populated. With respect to this location, I would be pleased to have you 
nearly within sight and would be able to meet your needs more easily, attending to you in 
everything as a beneficent and loving father….But if you are ungracious and disregard the great 
charity of the Honorable Lord Viceroy, and the expressive signs that I give of my benevolence, and 
you want to persist obstinately in your wickedness, I will execute the higher orders that His 
                                                       
70 The blandengues of Montevideo modeled similar military orders that operated along Buenos Aires’ southern frontier and in 
Santa Fe. Klein, “El destino de los indígenas del Uruguay”: 7; Weber, Bárbaros, 177; Fradkin, “Las milicias de caballería de Buenos 
Aires, 1752-1805”: 140–1. Within a year of their formation, they had already begun expeditions against Charrúa and Minuán 
tolderías. AGNA - IX. 2-9-7, (San Miguel, 1798-12-18). Militias from the missions also organized expeditions against Charrúas 
and Minuanes. AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Yapeyú, 1799-09-17, and 1799-10-17; Santo Tomé, 1799-07-20; San Borja, 1799-07-19); 
AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20).  
71 In many cases, elite families in the city claimed these captives as domestic laborers in exchange for the promise of instruction in 
Christian doctrine. AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Salto Chico, 1798-08-29, 1798-09-26 [x2], 1798-10-13; Capilla Mandizoby, 1798-08-
25; Yapeyú, 1798-08-17); AGNA - IX. 21-2-5, (Buenos Aires, 1797-10-02 & 1801-07-21); Susana Aguirre, “Cambiando de 
perspectiva: cautivos en el interior de la frontera,” Mundo Agrario. Revista de estudios rurales 7, no. 13 (2006). 
 216 
 
Excellency has communicated to me, and I will not desist until I have exterminated [your] 
malignant, inhuman, and harmful race.72  
 
This declaration demonstrated at once a prescriptive sense of Spanish territorial sovereignty and the belief 
that Charrúas and Minuanes were unruly inhabitants of imperial territory. Viceroy Gabriel de Avilés echoed 
this declaration; he considered himself “obligated to punish them to make an example,” yet desired to 
“forgive them for their crimes, and pardon them from the punishment that they deserve” in an act of 
“clemency and humanity.” Rather than serving to promote peaceful relations, the proposed reduction was a 
strategy for subjugation. The commission described this site to Masalana as lush, and presented the 
arrangement a means to solidify amicable relations with the mission, yet declared internally: 
[If the tolderías settle in the] vicinity and almost within sight of Yapeyú, we will be able to observe the 
conduct of these Indians and easily contain any excess or act of disorder. It will also lead to maintaining 
the respect and subjugation of the Indians.73 
 
Masalana’s toldería rejected the offer and absconded to the Río Ibira-puitã, near the interimperial border. 
Over the course of the next year, however, militias from Yapeyú and numerous teams of blandengues 
ambushed nearby tolderías, taking dozens of prisoners and killing scores more.74 The violence was so severe 
                                                       
72 “Si fuese del agrado de Vms. que se establezca su poblacion en la vecindad de la Estancia de San Marcos, yá por la fertilidad del 
terreno, como por la abundancia de maderas, aguas, y pesca, les señalarè el sitio suficiente y comodo para poblarse: en que tendrè 
mucho placèr, por tenerlos casi a la vista, respecto de la inmediacion, y tambien para remediar sus necesidades con mas facilidad; 
asistiendolos en todo como Padre beneficio y amoroso….Pero si por desgracia de Vms. despreciasen la grande beneficencia del 
Exmõ. Señor Virrey, y las expresibas señales que les doy de mi benevolencia, y quisiesen persistir obstinados en su iniguidad, 
pondrè en execucion las superiores ordenes que S.E. me tiene comunicadas, y no desistirè hasta extorminar una raza tan maligna, 
inhumana, y perjudical.” AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, no 1, f. 20-
20v. San Marcos was located near the headwaters of the Río Queguay, in one of Yapeyú’s main clusters of ranches, about 200 
miles from the plaza itself and 100 miles from the recently founded Paysandú. 
73 “por q.e estando con immediacion, y cuasi à la vista de ese Pueblo de Yapeyù podrâ observarse la conducta de estos Yndios, y 
contenerse facilmente qualquier exceso ò desorden. Tambien podrà conducir mucho à mantener el respeto y sugecion de los 
Yndios.” ibid., no 1, f. 6. 
74 Casualties from these encounters included the caciques “Ignacio el Gordo,” “Juan Blanco,” and “el Pintado” (Charrúas), as well 
as “Zará” and “el Zurdo” (Minuanes). AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, 
no 1, doc. 17, f. 29-30, no. 2-11; MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C28, P1, No. 3; AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Concepción del 
Uruguay, 1799-11-12, 1800-03-24,; Paysandú, 1800-04-23, 1800-11-14, 1801-01-03, 1801-01-17; Buenos Aires, 1800-10-04; 
Quartel General del Yacuy, 1801-03-21); Francisco Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay Tomo Segundo 
(Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 1895), libro 6, 337-353. 
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that the commander of these expeditions, Jorge Pacheco, claimed that he had eliminated all tolderías from 
the countryside.75 Nonetheless, a closer look at the details of these expeditions reveals that the blandengues 
frequently found themselves outmatched, hiding from tolderías, suffering defeat, or retreating. This 
included losses against Masalana’s tolderías in 1804. While they were certainly a threat to individual 
tolderías, the blandengues did not dominate the countryside.76 
Given the limited success of the extermination campaigns undertaken by blandengues, the Spanish 
government in Buenos Aires also sought to eliminate tolderías through strategic settlements. In addition to 
producing a human border and potentially undermining contraband, these establishments functioned to 
prevent tolderías from accessing key stopping points (paraderos) and to separate them from principal 
resources. The most ambitious of these projects was San Gabriel de Batoví, which was founded in 1801 
along the Río Bacacaí near the interimperial divide.77 The head of this initiative, Félix de Azara, was a 
former official of the San Ildefonso boundary demarcation. He compared his settlement program to 
Pacheco’s military expeditions in the following way:  
I know how useless many of [Pacheco’s expeditions] have been, and I am far less vain than he has been 
in saying that he will extinguish the infidels. My system is entirely the opposite, and it can be reduced to 
positioning the troop so that it covers advancing populations. I would manage things this way until the 
infidels have to abandon the countryside, or as is more natural, turn themselves in or go join our 
mission Indians, as this would not be the first time they have done it. I will not take one step towards 
pursuing them even if I see them in front of me. I do not consider this task to be as long as one might 
think. Maybe less than a year and a half.78 
                                                       
75 AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Batoví chico, 1801-08-20); MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C28, P1, No. 3. 
76 MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C29, P1, No. 20; Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay, 343-4, 349-50; 
Archivo Artigas Tomo II (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1951), 296, 300, 304-5. 
77 Pacheco’s plan also stipulated four settlements, although he was only successful in founding Belén. Bauzá, Historia de la 
Dominación Española en el Uruguay, 338; Mariluz Urquijo, La expedición contra los charrúas en 1801 y la fundación de Belén; Andres 
Azpriroz Perera and Adriana Dávila Cuevas, “Indios 'Infieles' y 'Potreadores': Sociedad colonial y poblaciones indígenas en las 
fronteras de la Banda Oriental. La fundación de Belén 1801,” (2009): 2–7. His 1801 campaign was cut short by an order from the 
viceroy to aid the Batoví project. AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, no 1, 
doc 7. 
78 “sè lo inutiles que han sido las muchas que se han hecho [las expediciones de Pacheco], y estoy muy lexos de lisongearme como 
èl de que hà de acabar con los ynfieles. Mi sistema es enteramte opuesto, y se reduce à apostar la tropa para que cubra àl mismo 
tiempo que le baya Poblando. Asi me manejaria hasta precisar à los ynfieles à abandonar él pais; ò lo que es mas natural, à que 
entreguen ò se baian à incorporar con nuestros yndios de misiones, como no ès la primera bez que lo han echo. Ni un paso daria 
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Whereas Pacheco’s objective was to overwhelm tolderías by systematic attacks, Azara contended that such a 
strategy would prove useless, given the vastness of the countryside and the control that Charrúas and 
Minuanes continued to exercise over it. Instead, he suggested that by founding settlements in strategic 
locations, the Spanish could eventually force tolderías to accept reduction.79 Yet his tactics proved as futile 
as Pacheco’s expedition, and by the end of the year, Charrúa and Minuán tolderías together with 
Portuguese military forces evicted Spanish authorities from Batoví, the Siete Pueblos, and other settlements 
along the border.80  
 Following the demarcation efforts, Portuguese officials adopted a radically different approach to 
engaging tolderías in the Río de la Plata. With the mapping of the San Idlefonso line, authorities in Rio 
Grande found themselves cut off from many of the region’s cattle reserves. Charrúas and Minuanes thus 
became necessary partners in the acquisition of cattle on the other side of the border, given their liminal 
status as independent agents protected by natural law and unbounded by the restrictions of the interimperial 
limit. They enabled Portuguese officials to engage the other side of the border without inciting a military 
response from their Spanish counterparts, and their superior knowledge of the countryside allowed them to 
evade the borderline forts and patrols established to intercept trade. Whether transporting cattle 
themselves or guiding smugglers, their presence was a key component in accessing and extracting this 
valuable resource.81 Most importantly, through the end of the eighteenth century, tolderías represented the 
                                                       
yo para perseguirlos aun que los biese delante. La obra no la considero tan larga como se podria pensar. Tal vez no pasaria de año 
y medio.” AGNA - IX. 37-8-5, f. 20-3.  
79 Azara, Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes, 17`. Azara considered numerous sites for the new 
settlement, including the ruins of the former Guenoa reduction of Jesús María; however, in the end he determined that this place 
and others were too exposed to attacks by local tolderías. Mariluz Urquijo, La fundación de San Gabriel de Batoví, 19. 
80 ANHA - Enrique Fitte, III-75, (Batoví, 1800-11-07); AHRS - Autoridades Militares, Maço 1, (Acampamento do Santa Maria, 
1801-11-29; Acampamento da Conceição, 1801-11-29); Mariluz Urquijo, La fundación de San Gabriel de Batoví. 
81 Erich L.W Edgar Poentiz, “Los infieles minuanes y charrúas en territorio misionero durante la época virreinal,” (1985): 7–8; 
Azpriroz Perera and Dávila Cuevas, “Indios 'Infieles' y 'Potreadores'”. 
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preeminent power along the borderline and Portuguese officials knew that the survival of their forts and 
settlements depended upon positive relations with Charrúas and Minuanes. 
Portuguese officials did not adopt a policy of reduction or extermination with local tolderías, but 
rather one of hierarchical collaboration and mutual aid. In fact, they stopped seeking reductions almost 
entirely. For them, the sea of tolderías that separated them from Spanish plazas served as an important 
buffer against the military advances of their imperial foe.82 An 1801 letter from the Governor of Rio Grande  
to the commander of the borderline fort of Rio Pardo, encapsulated this sentiment. 
I agree with and I am very satisfied by the meeting of the infidel Indians, as the Honorable Lord General 
had recommended, God willing: Nothing is risked by letting them work hostilely against our enemies, 
[or] at least perform the service that our explorers could do if we had them. They are troublesome 
when they make wild demands, but it is necessary to suffer these things to have them on our side; and 
[we should be careful not to] offend them; because beyond being grateful for their good will we should 
avoid increasing our enemies.83 
 
As the Portuguese in Rio Grande prepared to reconquer the Siete Pueblos and other territories between the 
San Ildefonso line and the Río Uruguay in 1801, they depended upon the support of Charrúa and Minuán 
tolderías. Aware of their own lack of control over the borderline and adjacent lands, as well as their lack of 
knowledge of lands on the other side, they identified tolderías as necessary allies. Though sustaining 
Charrúa and Minuán support was a costly endeavor that required frequent payments, having them as 
enemies would have been even costlier. This strategy paid off, as toldería attacks caused Spanish forces to 
                                                       
82 A 1801 map by Portuguese geographer José de Saldanha identified a Minuán settlement south of the Río Jaguaron, but we have 
not any other evidence of it. José de Saldanha, Mappa Corographico da Capitania de S. Pedro (1801); BNB - ARC.023,13,003, 
http://objdigital.bn.br/objdigital2/acervo_digital/div_cartografia/cart168591/cart168591.html (accessed February 23, 2015). 
See also: Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 256–57. 
83 “Convenho, e me-fica grande saptisfação na reunião dos Indios Infieis, conforme o havia recomendado o Ex.mo S.nor General, 
que Deos haja: Nada se arisca em deichalles obrar hostilmente contra os nossos Inemigos, e pello menos fazem o serviço, que 
poderião fazer os Aventureiros se os tivessemos. Elles são importunos quando se lhes fazem desmariadas vontades, e agazalhos; 
mas hé precizo sofrer algua couza para os ter da nossa parte; e de todas as formas deve ser prohibido, e acautelado o 
escandalizallos; que alem da gratidao a sua vontade devemos evitar augmentar Inemigos.” ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 
104, v. 13, f. 68. 
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abandon lands south of the Río Ibicuy, west of the Río Ibira-puitã, and as far south as the Río Queguay even 
before Portuguese troops arrived, thus resulting in an adjustment to the San Ildefonso line.84 
 Porto Alegre’s successful partnership with Charrúas and Minuanes in 1801 was part of a longer 
pattern of collaboration following the demarcation efforts. A quarter-century earlier, as Portuguese forces 
advanced southward and took the then-Spanish fort of Santa Tecla, Charrúa and Minuán tolderías played an 
important role in their victory. Not only did they provide guidance and safe passage to the borderline fort, 
but they also maintained a protracted assault on San Borja’s and Yapeyú’s ranches and cattle herds. While 
the tolderías certainly had their own motivations for attacking these ranches, such as Yapeyú’s increased 
impingement upon their lands and accelerating cattle extraction, they proved willing to coordinate with the 
Portuguese in pursuits of mutual interest.85 In addition to these two moments of interimperial war, Minuán 
and Charrúa caciques made pacts with Portuguese officials in Rio Pardo and Porto Alegre in 1786, 1805, 
and 1806.86  
Still, relations between administrators in Rio Grande and tolderías ran deeper than wartime 
assistance. Charrúas and Minuanes served as key trading partners and were likely seasonal laborers on 
Portuguese ranches and hemp plantations (feitorias do linho cânhamo). Tolderías also proved to be key 
sources of information about activities on the other side of the border, reporting on the movements of 
                                                       
84 This included ranches belonging to Yapeyú, San Borja, San Luis and Santo Ángelo. “Documentos relativos á incorporação do 
território das Missões ao domínio portugues no anno de 1801”: 56-7, 72; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 257-
60v, 261v; Archivo Artigas, 406; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), capítulo 13; Poentiz, 
“Los infieles”: 13; Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 251–52. This territorial advancement by the Portuguese resembles 
the actions of the United States of America following Comanche raids in northern Mexico. Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand 
Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
85 AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Letters dated 1776-04-01, 1776-04-04, 1776-04-08, 1776-04-09, 1776-04-15, 1776-05-02, 1776-05-06, 
1776-06-04, 1776-07-04, 1776-10-27); “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto 
Bandeira (1780)”: 124–5; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 3–5; Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, Chapter 8. 
86 IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 252-252v, 286-288; AHU - Rio Grande (019), Caixa 11, Doc 667; Caixa 121, 
Docs 720 e 754; Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 258–63. Following the 1777 peace agreement, Portuguese 
authorities struggled to convince Minuanes and Charrúas to stop their raids against Spanish ranches. “Autos principaes ao 
Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 174–6. 
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Spanish troops and travelers.87 The Portuguese officials' need for Minuanes and Charrúas is perhaps best 
illustrated by the case of Rafael Pinto Bandeira, a coronel who led the 1776 invasion of Santa Tecla and 
served as the interim governor of Rio Grande during the 1780s. Contemporaries and historians alike have 
known Pinto Bandeira for two things: successful military campaigns against the Spanish and an extensive 
network of contraband trade. He was an integral component of Portuguese expansion in the region, yet at 
the same time a perpetual thorn in the side of authorities in Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro. Pinto 
Bandeira’s success was in large part due to his relationship with Minuanes. While his father, Francisco Pinto 
Bandeira, had maintained ties with several Minuán tolderías, Rafael married Barbara Victoria, the daughter 
of cacique Miguel Ayala Caraí. It is also clear that following his campaign against the Spanish in 1776, Pinto 
Bandeira distributed approximately 800 heads of cattle, valued at over one million reais, among Minuanes 
“in order to have them content and satisfied.”88 The Governor’s dealings with Minuanes was so well known 
and valued that the Viceroy in Rio de Janeiro noted in 1786: 
He knows how to manage [these services] with great astuteness and subtlety, showing himself very 
necessary to that Continent [of Rio Grande de São Pedro, and] perhaps all of his actions, as bad as 
they might be, should be overlooked and tolerated by whomever governs.89 
 
Regardless of how detrimental Pinto Bandeira’s participation in smuggling might have been to imperial 
objectives, his relationship with Minuanes was one of the principal reasons why he maintained his post until 
his death in 1795. 
                                                       
87 BNB - 09,4,14, f. 11v-119, 199-200, 500-503v; “Relatorio apresentado ao governo de Lisboa pelo vice-rei Luiz de 
Vasconcellos, em Outubro de 1784, sobre o Rio Grande do Sul”: 12. 
88 “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 124–5. Regarding the 
marriage of Pinto Bandeira and Barbara Victoria, see: Augusto da Silva, “Rafael Pinto Bandeira: De bandoleiro a governador. 
Relações entre os poderes privado e público no Rio Grande de São Pedro,” (Dissertação de Mestrado Inédita, PPGH-UFRGS, 
1999); Gil, “O contrabando na fronteira”: 5. 
89 “servisos estes que ele sabe figurar com grande astucia, e subtileza para se mostrar muito necesario n'aquele Continente, 
capacitando-se talvez q.e todos os seus procedim.tos por pesimos que sejão, devem ser disfarsados e tolerados p.r quem governa” 
“Officio do vice-rei Luiz de Vasconcellos, sobre o Rio Grande do Sul,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul 
Ano IX, 1 trimestre (1929): 46. 
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Performing Borders 
Cartographic borders were undoubtedly European inventions designed to define territorial 
possession and produce governable states. Yet the need for an operative borderline, the determination of its 
location, and its material production in the Río de la Plata, were inextricable from the activities of tolderías. 
The initial invention of a borderline had been a response to tolderías’ control over regional lands, as it 
allowed Portugal and Spain to claim possession without having to claim tolderías as imperial subjects. When 
treaties had transformed into mapping expeditions, tolderías had limited the activities of demarcation 
teams. Disputes over the borderline’s precise location, and its movement over time, had derived from the 
fact that it cut through native lands. Following the demarcations, as administrators attempted to transform 
cartographic lines into operative territorial arrangements, their actions – declaring possession, occupying 
spaces, soliciting aid, offering payments, signing pacts, and undertaking raids, to name a few – elicited 
responses from tolderías. Tolderías’ replies ultimately determined the outcome of bordermaking projects, 
and while responses varied according to tolderías’ locations in the region, when taken together, they tended 
to reproduce borderline territorialities. 
The demarcation efforts ushered in a variety of changes for tolderías in the region, resulting in a 
general pattern of migration toward the borderline. By georeferencing the over 500 cited locations of 
Charrúa, Minuán, Bohán, Yaro, and Guenoa tolderías from 1750 through the end of the demarcation efforts 
in 1806 (Map 4.4), we can clearly see this trend. Over the course of a little more than a half century, 
imperial records show both increased interactions with tolderías near the borderlines and decreased 
interactions with those in other parts of the region. During the 1750s, tolderías could be found as far west 
as Santa Fe and Corrientes, as far south as Colônia do Sacramento, Montevideo, and Maldonado, as far east 
as Rio Grande, and as far north as the plazas of the Siete Pueblos. Conversely, by the 1790s and the 1800s, 
nearly all citations refer to tolderías in areas between the San Ildefonso line and lands immediately south of 
the Badajoz adjustment.  
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Map 4.4 – Cited Toldería Locations, 1750-1806 
How can we account for this broad trend in the extant documentary record? It is necessary to 
recognize first that this geographical pattern reflects imperial perceptions of individual tolderías’ locations 
rather than their actual locations. Given the limited spatial vision of imperial texts and the fragmented 
nature of borderland archives, more tolderías existed than those this map represents, and more citations 
will likely surface in the future. The pattern of increased recorded activities near the borderlines thus 
represents in part a heightened presence of imperial actors in those areas, who in turn engaged with 
tolderías that already lived there. This is only a portion of the story, however, as the increased number of 
citations near the borderline was accompanied by a decreased number around region’s perimeter, where 
imperial settlers were more entrenched and therefore more likely to generate documentary evidence. 
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Given the frequent references to tolderías in such areas in earlier decades, this discursive disappearance 
suggests tolderías’ eventual absence from these lands. Some tolderías moved toward the borderline, while 
some individuals remained behind to work on local ranches and farms. The former moved beyond the 
purview of local record-keepers, and imperial writers were unlikely to identify the latter according to 
ethnic identifiers if they were not clearly associated with tolderías. 
Amidst this general tendency to move toward the borderline, specific reactions to bordermaking 
initiatives varied from toldería to toldería. The unique circumstances that particular tolderías faced and their 
responses to them did not correspond to imagined ethnic divisions. It is therefore impossible to write of a 
“Charrúa” or a “Minuán” response to the border, as the varied responses of tolderías identified by the same 
ethnonym present persistent contradictions and inconsistencies. Rather, the actions of each toldería were 
rooted in changing territorial conditions that affected caciques and their kin on local levels. Minuanes who 
moved between Colônia do Sacramento and Maldonado experienced territorial changes very differently 
than Minuanes who moved between Santa Tecla and Yapeyú, for example, and therefore they adopted 
unique strategies. Broadly speaking, tolderías located far from the borderlines faced greater pressures, while 
those closer to the borderlines frequently found new opportunities in exploiting imperial initiatives and 
appropriating the boundaries for their own purposes. 
As imperial agents engaged the Río de la Plata’s countryside ever more intensely, new challenges 
arose for many tolderías. Expanding markets for hides brought new actors into indigenous lands and 
increased pressures upon the region’s cattle reserves, particularly those located between the Río Negro and 
Río Yi. As competitors from Yapeyú, Santo Domingo Soriano, and Montevideo all sought to slaughter 
cattle and extract hides as quickly as possible, smugglers and cattle rustlers (gauderios) developed far-
reaching contraband networks across the border to Brazil and to other portions of the region.90 In addition, 
                                                       
90 Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 7–8; Gil, Infiéis Trangressores; Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, 194–95.  
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when epidemics periodically spread through nearby missions, individual tolderías found themselves at great 
risk. Information regarding the impact of diseases upon Charrúas and Minuanes is scant, but the citations 
that exist point to a correlation between mission outbreaks and sickness in tolderías. For example, in 1787, 
two years after a smallpox outbreak in the Departments of Yapeyú and San Miguel, a Spanish demarcation 
official commented, “All of these [Minuanes] are very fearful of contracting smallpox, and if they know that 
there are sick individuals in some ranch, they will not go there for a long time.”91 There were also reports of 
smallpox in Minuán tolderías near the Río Yi in 1762, two years before an outbreak throughout the 
missions.92 If smallpox and other epidemics posed grave challenges to the Guaraní missions, they were 
potentially devastating to tolderías, given their generally small populations. The challenges of foreign 
pathogens were certainly not new, but the increased presence of mission inhabitants in the region’s interior 
made it increasingly difficult for tolderías to avoid disease.93 
Individual tolderías experienced these broader changes in a variety of ways, according to their 
location in the region. In the southern and western portions of the region, the increased presence of 
ranchers, the drying up of Colônia do Sacramento as a trading center, and the violent military campaigns 
from Spanish militias placed tolderías in a precarious situation. The new boundary resolved the competing 
                                                       
91 “Todos estos infieles son muy temerosos del contagio de viruelas, de manera que les basta saber que en alguna estancia hay 
enfermos de ellas para no llegarse en mucho tiempo” Andrés de Oyarvide, “Memoria geográfica de los viajes practicados desde 
Buenos Aires hasta el Salto Grande del Paraná por las primeras y segundas partidas de la demarcación de límites en la América 
Meridional (Parte II de IV)” in Colección histórica completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros actos 
diplomáticos de todos los estados de la America Latina comprendidos entre el golfo de Méjico y el cabo de Hornos, desde el año de 1493 hasta 
nuestros dias, 212. 
92 Revista del Archivo General Administrativo: Colección de Documentos para Servir al Estudio de la Historia de la República del Uruguay, 13 
vols. 3 (Montevideo: Imprenta "El Siglo Ilustrado" 1887); Patrocinada por el gobierno y dirigida por el Dr. D. Pedro Mascaró, 
357. Recent studies on the impact of pathogens upon tolderías include: Ítala Irene Basile Becker, Os índios charrua e minuano na 
antiga banda oriental do Uruguai (São Leopoldo, RS, Brasil: Editora Unisinos, 2002), capítulo 11; Mario Consens, Extinción de los 
indígenas en el Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2010); Anderson Marques Garcia and Saul Eduardo Seiguer Milder, 
“Convergências e divergências: Aspectos das culturas indígenas Charrua e Minuano,” vivência 39, no. 39 (2012): 45. 
93 See, for example: Jaime Cortesão, ed., Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri: Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Paraguai (1703-1751), 
Manuscritos da Coleção De Ángelis VI (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1955), 55–67; Cayetano Cattáneo, “Relación del 
viaje realizado de Buenos Aires a la Misiones Orientales,” in La cruz y el lazo, ed. Esteban F. Campal, 175–94 
(Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1994), 187. 
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imperial claims to lands in the south of the region, along the northern shore of the Río de la Plata estuary. 
This enabled Spanish administrators to distribute land titles and populate territories south of the Río Yi, 
which they did at a remarkable rate in the eighteenth century’s closing decades. The establishment of new 
settlements, guard posts, farms, and ranches between Santo Domingo Soriano, Colônia do Sacramento, and 
Montevideo challenged tolderías’ access to local livestock and strategic stopping points in the area. 
Meanwhile, the cession of Colônia to the Spanish also dried up a once vibrant market for cows, horses, and 
other goods that tolderías had provided to Portuguese settlers earlier in the century. It also eliminated the 
need for Minuán guides between the plaza and Rio Grande, as Portuguese traders ceased to move back and 
forth between the two areas.94 While had once been an advantage for these tolderías, the region’s territorial 
restructuring undermined its utility. 
 Cut off from the Atlantic economy and no longer the dominant force in the countryside, tolderías 
in the South and West of the region adopted a number of strategies. One was to seek partnerships with 
local plazas and ranchers. The increase in Spanish settlers increased the demand for Charrúa and Minuán 
laborers, who were known throughout the region for their ability to tame horses and herd cattle.95 Much 
like their northern counterparts who worked seasonally at Portuguese feitorias, Minuanes near Maldonado 
could be found gathering cattle for Spanish ranchers, while Montevideo’s cabildo recognized them as “useful 
men” to have on the ranches.96 The lack of documentary records from ranches, combined with the use of 
general terms such as “indio” or “peon” to identify rural laborers, makes it difficult to assess how frequently 
                                                       
94 Between the signing of the Treaty of Madrid and the official transfer of Colônia do Sacramento to Spanish control, Portuguese 
traders attempted to transport livestock from there to Rio Grande. The official opening of the Sorocaba market, near São Paulo, 
in 1750 also increased demand for livestock in lands north of the Río de la Plata. Fonseca, Tropeiros de mula, 67.  
95 Charrúas & Minuanes hired to herd cattle & tame horses. Poentiz, “Los infieles”; Azpriroz Perera and Dávila Cuevas, “Indios 
'Infieles' y 'Potreadores'”. 
96 AGI - Buenos Aires, 107, (Montevideo, 1789-03-05); Diego de Alvear, “Diario de la segunda partida demarcadora de límites 
en la América Meridional, 1783-1791 (continuación),” in Anales de la biblioteca: Publicación de documentos relativos al Río de la Plata 
con introducciones y notas, vol.  2, ed. Paul Groussac, 10 vols., 288–360 2 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora de Coni 
Hermanos, 1902), 343. 
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individuals from tolderías participated in such activities. Nonetheless, given the continued presence of 
tolderías near plazas such as Montevideo and Santo Domingo Soriano until at least the end of the 1760s, it is 
likely that their members were regularly involved in herding and corralling cattle.  
Partnerships between plazas and tolderías far from the borderline were necessarily unequal. Unable 
to dominate the countryside and bereft of opportunities to exploit Spanish and Portuguese competition, 
numerous tolderías turned to reductions. As had happened earlier in the century, negotiations over 
reduction occurred in moments of duress, local populations conflicted with native newcomers, and 
settlements were generally short-lived. This was the case for several Charrúa tolderías near Santo Domingo 
Soriano immediately after the Guaraní War. In exchange for settling near the plaza, Spanish administrators 
offered to give the families in these tolderías one cow per day to sustain themselves. This relationship of 
dependency angered the plaza’s residents, who were reluctant to share from their stocks; they also accused 
the newcomers of crimes against local women. It posed risks for the Charrúa families as well, as they found 
themselves wedged between hostile hosts and nearby Charrúa, Minuán, and Bohán tolderías, and by the end 
of 1759, they had abandoned the plaza and returned to the countryside.97 A similar instance involved the 
Minuán cacique Cumandat and a number of tolderías that lived near the Río Yi. After two years of 
negotiations, Cumandat and other caciques reached a peace agreement with Montevideo in 1764 and settled 
about seventy-five miles north of the plaza, at the limits of its jurisdiction. Faced with smallpox and an 
increasingly hostile environment, these tolderías considered peace with Montevideo a logical course of 
action. Much like Charrúas in Soriano, these Minuanes also found themselves exposed to attacks. Six years 
                                                       
97 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Buenos Aires 1757-05-02; Santo Domingo Soriano, 1757-07-01; Campo del Bloqueo, 1757-03-10, 1757-
04-14, 1757-08-05; s/l, 1757-05-18, 1757-06-09); AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-02-27, 1758-04-01, 1758-
09-10, 1758-11-06; Buenos Aires, 1760-08-09). 
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after the agreement, when a band of forty men raided the Minuanes’ ranches, the nearby Spanish guard 
proved ineffective in stopping the attack.98 
 These two settlements, along with the Cayastá reduction near Santa Fe, demonstrate the 
trajectories of a handful of tolderías, but represent only a part of the story. Given the number of tolderías in 
the southern and western portions of the region at the time of the Madrid demarcation and the absence of 
settlements near Maldonado, these cases are hardly representative of a broader trend. It appears more likely 
that over time individuals from southern and western tolderías either blended together with rural 
populations or migrated toward the borderline to integrate with other tolderías. Judicial and ecclesiastical 
records reveal the presence of individuals identified as Charrúa or Minuán living in or immediately outside 
of Santa Fe, Montevideo, and Maldonado through the end of the century. Some married, baptized their 
children, and made use of the legal system, while others found themselves imprisoned for a variety of 
offenses.99 Though few in number, these cases point to numerous individuals leaving tolderías for cities or 
farms. Overall numbers are also likely larger than the documentary record suggests, given the ambiguous 
terms used to identify native peoples who were not associated with a toldería. 
 More evidence exists of tolderías moving toward the border and integrating with others. For 
example, the Minuán cacique Moreira, who was an integral player in the Guaraní War and among those 
                                                       
98 Several of these caciques also had kinship and economic ties in the city, which likely contributed to their decision to form a 
settlement. AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 11, carpeta 3a, no 1; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 12, carpeta 7, no 1; Revista del Archivo General 
Administrativo, 357-9, 390-3; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), Capítulos 8 y 9; AGI - 
Buenos Aires, 536, (Arroyo de Pintado, 1770-04-11; Montevideo, 1770-05-14). Sometimes tolderías found plazas to be 
unwilling partners in the establishment of reductions, as a group of Charrúas and Bohanes discovered in 1773. Norberto 
Levinton, “La burocracia administrativa contra la obra evangelizadora: una reducción de Charrúas fundada por Fray Marcos 
Ortiz,” Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas. Universidad del Norte Santo Tomás de Aquino (Agosto 2003); De las Primeras Jornadas de 
Historia de la Orden Dominicana en la Argentina. 
99 See, for example: AGI - Buenos Aires, 536, (Buenos Aires, 1759-07-02); AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1775-05-26); AGNA - IX. 10-
6-1, (Batoví Chico, 1801-08-20); AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de Santa Fe de 1772-04-11, 1780-10-03, 1790-10-05, 1802-07-04; 
AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 3, No 18; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 26, No 43; AGNU - Archivos 
Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 28, No 31; Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya, 176-8, 264, 351-2, 369, 384, 387, 406, 467-71, 480, 
512-3, 534, 609-611, 630-631, 802; Juan Apolant, Padrones olvidados de Montevideo del siglo XVIII tomo II (Montevideo: Imprensa 
Letras, 1966), 117. 
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who accompanied Cumandat to Montevideo in 1762, stood alongside Miguel Ayala Caraí at Santa Tecla in 
1775. Another Minuán cacique, Saltein, was present for the 1762 negotiations in Montevideo, and then 
appeared with Caraí in 1787 as they charged tribute to the demarcation teams. In the same way, the 
Charrúa cacique Ignacio sought out a reduction in San Borja in 1794, only to return to the countryside and 
become a “supreme caudillo” six years later.100 Joining together with other tolderías was often a complicated 
enterprise, however, as evidenced by the stories of Miguel Salcedo and his two sons, Juan and Pedro 
Ignacio. All three had been baptized and raised in Cayastá, and by the early 1790s they had abandoned the 
reduction with their kin. Nonetheless, by 1794, Miguel appeared in Santo Domingo Soriano and Juan in 
one of San Borja’s ranches, hoping to negotiate new reductions. They had gone to the countryside, but 
returned to seek refuge from contrabandists. Pedro Ignacio was apprehended in the blandengue expeditions 
of 1801, alongside other Charrúas and Minuanes.101 Within a decade of leaving Cayastá, each of these men 
was pulled back into the Spanish colonial apparatus. 
For all of the challenges faced by tolderías far away from the various treaty lines, there was a 
plethora of new opportunities for those who lived nearest to them. In particular, the bordermaking 
initiatives provided new chances to develop commercial ties, kinship relationships, and patronage networks. 
While the transfer of Colônia do Sacramento to Spanish control dried up numerous markets along the 
Banda Norte, it coincided with an expanding network of borderline commerce. As an inhibitor of the 
movement of imperial subjects, the borderline created a demand for individuals who could transport cattle 
across it. Charrúas and Minuanes thus positioned themselves as key commercial intermediaries, since their 
                                                       
100 For Moreira and Saltein, see: AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1775-05-26 & 1775-08-19); Revista del Archivo General Administrativo, 357-
9, 390-3; José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido,” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 135–301 Volume LI (Rio de 
Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1929), 234–35; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), 
111–12. For “Don Ignacio,” see: AGNA - IX. 36-2-6, (Informes de Zabala al Virrey, 1794-03-24, 1794-04-25, & 1794-05-23); 
Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 9–11; AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Rio Queguay, 1800-05-28). 
101 AGNA - IX. 24-2-6, exp. 27; AGNA - IX. 36-2-6, (Informes de Zabala al Virrey, 1794-03-24, 1794-04-25, & 1794-05-23); 
AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Batoví chico, 1801-08-20); Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 9–11; Leonel Cabrera Pérez, “La incorporación del 
indígena de la Banda Oriental a la sociedad colonial/nacional urbana,” Revista TEFROS 9 (Agosto 2011): 16. 
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tolderías continued to exert some control over the regional interior. They guided Portuguese smugglers 
(changadores) back and forth across the border undetected by Spanish cavalries, led them safely to cattle 
ranges, aided in the herding and slaughtering of cattle (vaquerías), and tamed wild horses.102 In other 
instances, they transported cattle and horses directly across the border themselves, cutting out 
intermediaries and selling them to buyers on the other side.103 They sought other economic opportunities as 
well, including seasonal labor on ranches or at Portuguese feitorias.  
As Charrúas and Minuanes built new economic networks across the interimperial divide, they 
retained their position as the principal arbiters of access to rural lands. Although the growing number of 
outsiders entering the countryside undermined their autonomy, tolderías continued to exercise territorial 
authority, particularly in lands east of the Río Uruguay and north of the Ríos Negro and Yí. In some 
instances, they aided individual plazas in combatting raids upon their ranches, as occurred in Santo 
Domingo Soriano in 1757. More often, they prevented imperial cavalries from pursuing contrabandists or 
other enemies into their lands. In 1795, for example, as Spanish guards from Batoví sought to apprehend 
contrabandists near the border, a number of Charrúas intercepted them and left at least two soldiers 
dead.104 Similarly, in 1805, a militiaman named Miguel Lenguasár found himself on the run from Spanish 
mission authorities and sought to escape to the Portuguese side of the border. 
                                                       
102 For examples of tolderías working as guides: Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 6–8; giving harbor to contrabandists: AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, 
(Arroyo de la Virgen, 1797-12-27); IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 273-280v, 289-289v, 327-331v. Nationalist 
historiographies have long used the figure of the gaucho/gauderio as a stepping-stone a long process of toldería acculturation and 
incorporation into creole societies, while some recent works have considered gauchos/gauderios and tolderías distinct and 
competing groups. Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 11–2; Diego Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes: Interacción y destrucción, indígenas del 
Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2004), 291–92; Cesar Castro Pereira, “'Y hoy están en paz': relações entre os índios 
'infiéis' da Banda Oriental e guaranis missioneiros no período colonial tardio (1737-1801),” (Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso, 
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, dezembro de 2008), 14-16, 36. Evidence suggests instead that many tolderías 
participated in informal economies, but that this was not a process of acculturation. Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem 
os seus aliados”: 629.  
103 Poentiz, “Los infieles”; Azpriroz Perera and Dávila Cuevas, “Indios 'Infieles' y 'Potreadores'”. 
104 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1757-04-26, 1757-05-02). In the 1757 case, Charrúa tolderías found themselves on 
both sides of the conflict. Some supported the residents of Santo Domingo Soriano against deserters from the missions known as 
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He resolved to flee, and the Portuguese recommended to the Infidel Indians that they let him pass to 
these places as has been verified, not only without experiencing poor treatment, but also with their 
guidance….He was able to count over 600, including Minuanes, Charrúas, and Tapes from the 
missions occupied by the Portuguese, who live together in seven tolderías.105 
 
The positive relations that these tolderías maintained with Portuguese officials at the time made Lenguasár’s 
escape possible. While it is unclear exactly where the militiaman had escaped from, the tolderías deposited 
him well onto the Brazilian side of the 1804 status quo division (Map 4.1). Thus despite Portuguese claims 
of dominion, these tolderías continued to arbitrate movement across the border. Their control over the 
countryside was not lost upon individual travelers, either. For example, in 1799, when a party of 
blandengues apprehended a Portuguese man named Juan Adolfo on the Spanish side of the border, he was 
unable to present a passport and claimed that he had lost it in an ambush by Charrúas as he transited the 
“unpopulated countryside.”106 Regardless of the veracity of this account, Adolfo’s telling of it indicates that 
it was potentially believable.  
The control that certain caciques and their tolderías exhibited over borderland spaces was in many 
ways enhanced by Iberian efforts to establish an effective borderline. As both empires' borderline 
institutions were notably weak, they frequently sought to establish partnerships with tolderías as a means to 
make the borderline operative. For example, in October of 1775, Spanish troops stationed at Santa Tecla 
invited a contingent of Charrúa and Minuán caciques to the fort, offering gifts and soliciting their aid in 
apprehending unauthorized travelers. The caciques agreed to monitor the countryside, but demanded that 
the Spanish withdraw their troops into the fort and make specific personnel changes, to which the Spanish 
                                                       
“indios cimarrones,” while others aided the cimarrones, Minuanes, and Bohanes in their raids on the plaza’s ranches. For details of 
the 1795 case see: AGNA - IX. 1-3-5, (Guardia de Melo, 1796-02-12). 
105 “se resolvio á huir recomendado delos Portugueses á los Indios Infieles para que ledejasen pasar á estos lugares como lo há 
verificado, no solo sin experimentar vejamen alguno, sino que los mismos Indios le conduxeron…pudo contar ses cientos, y 
tantos entre Minuanes, Charrúas, y Tapes de los Pueblos de Misiones ocupados por los Portugueses, que viven juntos en siete 
Tolderías.” Archivo Artigas, 396. See also: Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 253–54. 
106 AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Concepción del Uruguay, 1799-10-13). 
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acquiesced. Despite this agreement, Minuán caciques guided Portuguese soldiers to Santa Tecla the 
following year, enabling them to topple the fort. This case reveals the ability of caciques and tolderías to 
extract benefits from the establishment of borderline institutions. They drew upon the Spanish need to 
monitor the countryside to obtain payments from officers at Santa Tecla and to regulate the activities of 
soldiers stationed there. Likewise, they exploited the Portuguese desire to expel their imperial foe in order 
to obtain even higher payments from them.107 Charrúas and Minuanes along the borderline were more than 
allies of imperial agents; they also acted as the principal authorities in various locales. Even after Portuguese 
forces abandoned Santa Tecla and retired northward, Minuán caciques continued to control the area. They 
reported the Portuguese departure to scouts from the missions, but prevented them from traveling to the 
area to see for themselves.108   
 The primary cacique involved in the events surrounding Santa Tecla, Miguel Ayala Caraí, provides 
a clear example of how a savvy individual could use the influx of imperial actors to develop expansive 
networks of kinship and allegiance. Years before the Portuguese invasion, Caraí had married his daughter to 
its principal architect, Rafael Pinto Bandeira, and he was likely among the Minuanes who collected 
payments from Pinto Bandeira’s personal account following the attack. At the same time, he orchestrated 
the escape of Santa Tecla’s ranking officer, Miguel Antonio de Ayala, with whom he likely shared familial 
bonds as well.109 Caraí had not always been a powerful cacique; he was born to an immigrant from Santiago 
                                                       
107 The caciques involved in this meeting included Ruvio, Miguel, Christoval, Carvayo, Agustín, Coraya, and Moreira, among 
others. AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (Letters dated 1775-05-26, 1775-06-17, 1775-08-19, 1775-10-20, 1775-11-15); AGNA - IX. 4-3-
8, (Letters dated 1776-04-01, 1776-04-04, 1776-04-08, 1776-04-09, 1776-04-15, 1776-05-02, 1776-05-06, 1776-06-04, 
1776-07-04, 1776-10-27). Two years after the accord and the subsequent Portuguese invasion, a Minuán cacique named Lorenzo 
presented papers to Spanish authorities, which certified the alliance. He agreed to direct the five tolderías and over 200 
individuals under his authority to apprehend contrabandists and deserters and bring them to Santa Tecla. He also offered to 
provide safe passage to Spanish troops moving through the countryside. AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (Letter dated 1778-02-09). 
108 AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de Chunireria, 1776-06-04). 
109 “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 124–5. In addition to 
sharing a name with the cacique, Miguel Antonio de Ayala frequently served as an intermediary between Caraí and Santa Tecla 
and provided regular gifts to Minuán tolderías. It is possible that he was the cacique’s father. AGNA - IX. 17-4-6, (1776-04-09); 
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del Estero and a Minuán woman and spent much of his youth as a ranch hand for Francisco Pinto Bandeira, 
Rafael's father. At some point, perhaps because of his ties to both Spanish and Portuguese leaders, he rose to 
become cacique. In fact, “Caraí” was most likely an honorific rather than a surname.110 By the 1770s, he had 
become one of the most important figures in the borderland region, repeatedly referred to as the “cacique 
of caciques” in Spanish and Portuguese sources. Whether managing the events at Santa Tecla, developing 
trade networks, brokering the settlement of his fellow Minuán cacique Bartolomeo, or collecting tribute 
payments from Spanish and Portuguese demarcation teams, he positioned himself as a principal authority 
along the borderline.111  
The influx of migrants to areas near the borderline also enabled some tolderías to expand their 
networks of kinship and power. Following the Guaraní War in the 1750s and continuing through the end of 
the century, many individuals and families left the missions for other areas of the Río de la Plata region. 
While many of them settled in other missions, rural ranches, or nearby cities, others integrated into 
Charrúa or Minuán tolderías or formed tolderías of their own.112 The level of desertions worried 
administrators, who continually tried to separate mission dwellers from neighboring tolderías. They 
believed that Charrúas and Minuanes had corrupted these “runaway Tapes” (tapes cimarrones) and that their 
                                                       
AGNA - IX. 23-2-6, (1775-10-20 & 1776-04-08); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (San Nicolás, 1776-04-01 & 1776-04-09); Levinton, El 
espacio jesuítico-guaraní, 110. 
110 In Guaraní, the term karai means, among other things, “Lord,” “Spanish,” “white,” or “baptized.” The rough antonym of this 
term would be ava, which means “savage” or “unconverted Indian.” It is likely that the use of Caraí was an honorific for Miguel 
Ayala, rather than a surname, and the term also applied to Bartolomeo in his letter to Pinto Bandeira. 
111 AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (1776-04-01, 1776-04-04, & 1776-04-09); ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 8, f. 101-102v, 
204-7; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 87-87v; Diego de Alvear, “Diario de la segunda partida demarcadora de 
límites en la América Meridional, 1783-1791 (continuación)” in Anales de la biblioteca, 343; Aurélio Porto, História das Missões 
Orientais do Uruguai (Primeira Parte), Jesuítas no Sul do Brasil Volume III (Porto Alegre: Livraria Selbach, 1954), 70–71; Frühauf 
Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados”: 268–9.  
112 Citations on population decline and outward migration. Guillermo Wilde, “Los guaraníes después de la expulsión de los 
jesuitas: dinámicas políticas y transacciones simbólicas,” Revista Complutense de Historia de América 27 (2001): 102; Guillermo 
Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII,” Horizontes Antropológicos 9, 
no. 19 (julho de 2003): 87; Robert H. Jackson, “The Post-Jesuit Expulsion Population of the Paraguay Missions, 1768-1803,” 
Colonial Latin American Historical Review 16, no. 4 (2007); Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, 156–57. 
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mobile lifestyles made them prone to steal cattle or take captives.113 For Minuanes and Charrúas, however, 
these migrants represented an opportunity to expand their familial and tributary networks. By 
incorporating them into their own tolderías or as clients, individual caciques could extend their range of 
influence. For example, in 1785, refugees from the San Nicolás mission declared that they “recognized no 
other God or King than Batu of the Minuanes, to whose toldería they had sent all of their women and 
possessions in anticipation of the arrival of [Spanish forces].” When the Spanish troops subsequently attacked 
and killed the head of this toldería, Chuannera, and six others, the rest ran away and sought protection from 
Minuanes.114 
Distant tolderías also moved toward the border, where they developed ties with others already 
there. By the end of the 1760s, the number of ethnonyms used to identify tolderías dropped from five to 
two – Bohanes, Guenoas, and Yaros disappeared from written records, leaving only Charrúas and Minuanes 
– as imperial observers struggled to differentiate one from another. At this same time, Charrúas and 
Minuanes, who for decades had appeared in imperial records as antagonistic enemies, began to appear 
together on a regular basis. It is unclear whether this discursive shift corresponded to native self-
identification, but it does point to new relationships between previously distant native communities.115 In 
                                                       
113 “Tapes” refers here to Guaraníes. AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-04-26); AGNA - IX. 17-7-2, (San Luis, 
1785-05-11); AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-06-08) IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 278-279v; 
Wilde, “Orden y ambigüedad en la formación territorial del Río de la Plata a fines del siglo XVIII”: 112–7. When Portuguese 
authorities took control of the Siete Pueblos, they too aimed to separate mission inhabitants from nearby tolderías. IHGB - 
Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 276v, 278v. 
114 “no reconocía mas Dios ni mas Rey que el cacique Batu de los Minuanes, a cuia toldería abia remitido, con anticipación a su 
venida todas las mujeres y otras cosas, que es regular tuviese.” AGNA - IX. 17-7-2, (San Nicolás, 1785-04-13). See also: Poentiz, 
“Los infieles”: 8; Guillermo Wilde, “Guaraníes, 'gauchos' e 'indios infieles' en el proceso de disgregación de las antiguas doctrinas 
jesuíticas del Paraguay,” Universidad Católica Revista del Centro de Estudios Anthropológicos XXXVIII, no. 2 (Diciembre 2003): 105, 
107. 
115 AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1750-12-30). Subsequent 
imperial ethnographies often explained this change as the extermination of one “nation” by another. Félix de Azara, Descripción é 
historia del Paraguay y del Río de la Plata. Obra póstuma de Félix de Azara Tomo Primero (Madrid: Imprenta de Sanchiz, 1847), 145, 
160-161; Gustavo Verdesio, Forgotten Conquests: Rereading New World History from the Margins (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2001), 99–107. Recent scholarship has framed this engagement as an “alliance”; however, given that the ethnonyms 
“Charrúa” and “Minuán” were identities “imposed” by imperial writers rather than categories of national self-identification, it is 
better understood as a process of ethnogenesis, comparable to the “araucanización” of the pampas between Buenos Aires and the 
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addition, this tendency toward tolderías’ union coincided with shifting relationships with plazas. No 
accounts exist after 1760 of tolderías allying with Spanish or Portuguese settlers against other wandering 
peoples. Whereas prior to the demarcations, individual tolderías had used plazas as refuges or allies in 
moments of conflict against others, this ceased to be a strategic possibility. Conflict undoubtedly existed 
between tolderías, and imperial agents continued to be important allies against other imperial adversaries, 
but the local relationships between plazas and tolderías that had once superseded ethnic or imperial 
identities ceased to exist in imperial records. 
 Bordermaking initiatives and increased numbers of outsiders in the regional interior also created 
challenges for tolderías nearest to the borderlines. This was perhaps most evident in the relationships 
between Charrúas and Minuanes and ranchers from the Guaraní missions. Extant documentary records 
point to acrimonious relations between ranchers and tolderías, usually as justification for military 
expeditions of blandengues or militias. These reports depicted tolderías “invading” mission ranches, for 
which they offered one of two explanations: the “bad inclination” of tolderías or the influence of Portuguese 
officials who wanted access to the ranches. For example, in 1776, as Portuguese forces took control of 
Santa Tecla, Charrúa and Minuán tolderías attacked numerous ranches pertaining to the Yapeyú, San Borja, 
Santo Tomé, and San Nicolás missions. In a letter to Governor Joseph Vertiz, Francisco Bruno de Zavala 
argued that “these insults presently committed by Minuanes are known to have been promoted and 
encouraged by the Portuguese, [who offered them] shelter and protection and to buy from them whatever 
they steal from the missions.” Although these attacks occurred soon after the takeover of Santa Tecla, they 
began well before the Portuguese invasion and continued for months afterward, even after Portuguese 
                                                       
Andes described by Guillaume Bocarra. Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes, 270, nt. 47-50; Lidia R. Nacuzzi, Identidades impuestas: 
Tehuelches, aucas y pampas en el norte de la Patagonia, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2005); Guillaume Boccara, 
Los vencedores: Historia del pueblo mapuche en la época colonial, 1 ed (San Pedro de Atacama: Línea Editorial IIAM, 2007); traducido por 
Diego Milos. One exception to this discursive trend was the use of the term “Bohanes” in 1773 to identify tolderías who were 
considering a reduction along the Río Uruguay. Levinton, “La burocracia administrativa contra la obra evangelizadora”. 
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authorities petitioned the tolderías to stop.116 This points to different motivations for Minuán caciques that 
were independent of Portuguese interests. It is likely that, given the accelerated rate in which the Yapeyú 
mission in particular had begun to slaughter cattle during these years, the response was due to what Minuán 
caciques perceived as increased incursions upon their lands.117 
 Despite Spanish administrators’ trope of Charrúa and Minuán hostility, individual tolderías likely 
felt themselves to be on the receiving end of ranchers’ and militias’ aggression. As imperial writers 
denounced the repeated attacks on newly-established ranches, they presumed that the ranches were located 
within the universally recognized jurisdiction of a given plaza or upon royal lands and, by extension, that 
local resources were the ranches' property. However, the resolution of imperial possession and 
jurisdictional divisions did not correlate with control of rural lands, and for local tolderías, new ranches 
instead constituted an intrusion. Few ranches existed far beyond individual plazas at mid-century, but the 
demarcation efforts precipitated the founding of many new ones that were hundreds of miles away, as the 
missions in particular sought to garner cattle from between the Río Negro and the Río Yi. These ranches 
were generally isolated and located in areas controlled by tolderías (Map 4.5).118  
The founding of new ranches would not necessarily have been a problem for caciques and their kin, 
as they likely did not share the concept of individual property rights with their imperial counterparts. 
Nonetheless, if mission inhabitants were to maintain ranches in Charrúa or Minuán lands, local tolderías 
                                                       
116 “Estos insultos cometidos por los Minuanes en la presente ôcasion se dexan conocer que han sido promovidos y persuadidos 
por los Portug.s ôfreciendoles su abrigo, y amparo y comprarles lo que robasen en los Pueblos.” AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, 
(Campamento de Chunireri, 1776-06-04; San Borja, 1776-05-06). See also: “Autos principaes ao Conselho de Guerra a que foi 
submettido o coronel Rafael Pinto Bandeira (1780)”: 174–7; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 5–7. Portuguese authorities found 
themselves in a similar situation as they tried to establish peace with the Spanish after retaking the missions. IHGB - Conselho 
Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 286-288. 
117 Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, Chapter 8. While the 1760s saw no recorded conflicts between tolderías and mission 
actors, violent encounters in and around mission ranches abounded in the 1770s. 
118 Most “invasions” occurred on “advanced ranches” (estancias avanzadas), rather than those nearest to a given plaza. AGNA - IX. 
10-6-1, (Buenos Aires, 1799-11-20). 
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would likely have expected them to recognize their authority and limit their levels of resource extraction. 
The evacuation of San Borja’s ranches in 1784 illustrates this dynamic:  
The infidels are with their tolderías in our ranches consuming the cattle that we have herded, [even 
though] we pay in tribute all that they ask for, in particular yerba mate and tobacco. And although 
we give all of this continually, those that are outside of the ranches [commit] great insults, taking 
horses from cowboys or scattering the cattle that they have collected. And this past March, they 
took all of the horses from a herd, killing one of our Indians and injuring another badly. This 
establishment, in addition to the express and indispensable tribute to the infidels [and other 
expenses, nonetheless] acquires all that it needs in yerba mate, cotton, sugar, honey, lumber, and 
the rest only with the cows that it collects from the countryside.119 
 
While various tolderías permitted the existence of San Borja’s ranches in their lands, they required frequent 
payments from the ranches’ inhabitants. The tolderías subsequent takeover of these ranches, which 
occurred during a moment of peace between Spain and Portugal, was therefore not part of a broader war 
effort. It was more likely a response to dissatisfaction with the payments they had received. This coincided 
with the demands for tribute payments that Minuán caciques placed on demarcation officials two years later 
when they passed through this area.120 It may also have been a response to what the tolderías perceived to be 
unbridled impingement upon their own resources, as the dates coincide with a peak of hide production in 
the missions.121 For tolderías, the founding of ranches, the accelerated extraction of cattle, Spain’s 
extermination campaigns, and violence by gauderios would have resembled aggression or invasions more 
than any of their own responses. 
                                                       
119 “los ynfieles los que se allan con sus tolderías en nrâs propias estancias gastando de el ganado de aquellos rodeos ya que se 
agrega estarles contribuyendo con q.to piden en Particular la Yerva, y el tavaco, y aun con todo hacen de contínuo los que estan 
campo afuera grandes ynsultos ya quítando las cavalladas a los Baquer.s o ya desparramandoles el ganado que acopían, y en el mes 
de Marzo proximo passado quitaron la Cavallada a una Baquería dando muerte a uno de estos Naturales y a otro mal erido Este 
establecímiento amas de la contribucíon expresada è indespensable a los Ynfíeles la manutencíon y vestuario de todos sus natur.s 
paga de R.s tributos sueldos de Adm.or Maestro de Escuela y Capataceses adquíere quanto necesita de yerva, tavaco, algodon, 
azúcar miel tablasón, y demas solo con las Bacas de recogen en sus campos...” AGNA - IX. 22-8-2, exp. 3, f. 13. 
120 In fact, the second time Minuán tolderías stopped the Portuguese demarcation teams and required that they pay a “tax,” they 
were near one of San Borja’s ranches. ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 9, f. 22–23. 
121 Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, 192, 203-4. 
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Map 4.5 – Mission Ranches. This map represents the approximate locations of mission ranches (green) 
and outposts (orange) during the second half of the eighteenth century, derived from four georeferenced 
maps. While this is not an exhaustive rendering of ranch locations, it nonetheless demonstrates their scattered 
and isolated nature, particularly between the Río Negro, and the Río Ibicuí.122 
The varied responses of tolderías do not fit neatly into the analytical categories of resistance or 
accommodation. Considering, for example, Charrúa and Minuán raids of mission ranches, one can see how 
such actions both undermined and reinforced the border. In taking cattle, charging tribute, or occupying 
                                                       
122 Guillermo Fúrlong Cárdiff, Cartografía jesuítica del Rio de la Plata, 2 vols. 2 (Buenos Aires: Talleres S. A. Casa Jacobo Peuser, 
1936), mapa XXIV; AGNA - IX. 22-8-2, (Map signed in La Cruz, 1784-09-14); José Varela y Ulloa, Plano topografico que 
comprende una parte del Montegrande, el Rio Yacuy, los establecimentos y misiones del Uruguay, los yervales que actualmento poseen los indios 
guaranias y el curso del mismo Uruguay desde la boca del verdadero Pepiri o Peguiri hasta el paso que llaman de Concepcion ([178-]); LOC - 
G5202.U7 178- .V2. 
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ranches, tolderías rejected imperial claims to territorial possession and, by extension, individual claims to 
property, both of which were facets of the borderline’s territorial logic. At the same time, by taking cattle 
and moving it across the border to Portuguese buyers in Rio Grande, these tolderías made possible new 
borderline economic networks. Likewise, as caciques such as Miguel Ayala Caraí rejected imperial authority 
over borderland spaces by collecting tribute from bordermaking teams or requiring Santa Tecla’s soldiers to 
remain within the fort, they also reinforced the new territorial logic by agreeing to apprehend unauthorized 
travelers and allowing the establishment to remain. While these tolderías probably did not share the bird’s-
eye perspective of imperial officials, their experience of changing territorialities on a local level produced 
responses that simultaneously reinforced the borderline and limited its functionality. When taken together, 
however, this multiplicity of responses all reinforced the borderline in the end. Whether through migration 
or the incorporation of migrants, trade, or tribute, apprehending contrabandists or contrabanding 
themselves, tolderías made the borderline meaningful by their appropriation of it. 
 
Conclusion 
 The invention of an interimperial border was a watershed moment for interethnic relations in the 
Río de la Plata region. The mapping expeditions of the treaties of Madrid and San Ildefonso represented an 
epistemological and legal shift in the ways Iberian officials engaged the countryside. Presuming territorial 
possession over the totality of regional space, both Portuguese and Spanish authorities assumed they had 
legal authority over all inhabitants within their borders and property rights over all objects within their 
realm not otherwise subject to individual title. They pursued ideals of territorial order, which to them 
meant sedentary imperial subjects, regulated land titling, and controlled commerce. These efforts to attain 
fixity proved elusive, due to would-be imperial subjects' tendencies to move and informal exchanges among 
them, as well as the continued territorial authority exercised by independent, mobile native peoples. 
Challenges were greater for Spanish officials in the region, as the precise location of the various borderlines 
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situated most resources within their dominions, leading them to implement different strategies than those 
of their Portuguese counterparts. Nonetheless, in each case, imperial officials were faced with the 
conundrum of depending upon settlers and tolderías to make the borderline function while simultaneously 
attempting to exert increased control over them. 
 For tolderías in the region, imperial bordermaking initiatives demanded responses and, depending 
upon a toldería’s geographical location, provided either challenges or opportunities. Those further away 
from the imaginary borders suffered from the transfer of Colônia do Sacramento to the Spanish, as it shifted 
informal markets toward the border and allowed for increased settlement initiatives in the area. 
Conversely, tolderías located near the borderlines exploited imperial desires to make the cartographic 
convention operative. They incorporated new migrants into their networks of kinship and authority, 
utilized new settlements as sources of tribute, and developed new economic networks. In these ways, 
territorial conditions rather than imagined ethnic categories were the principal determinants of indigenous 
action during the latter part of the eighteenth century. Additionally, despite a wide variety of local 
responses to bordermaking efforts, tolderías collectively participated in making the borderline a meaningful 
territorial division. 
 Over time the opportunities that the borderline provided tolderías gave way to challenges. As 
borderland institutions became more entrenched, settlers increased pressures on cattle reserves, mounted 
guards persistently harried individual tolderías, and imperial authorities collaborated against mobile 
peoples, lands near the borderline became perilous spaces of conflict. The principal advantage of tolderías – 
their ability to control vast swaths of land with relatively small numbers of people and simultaneously 
engage distant locales – soon became a liability amid growing populations in the region. Eventually, 
bordermaking efforts transformed the region into an uninhabitable space, presenting mobile native peoples 
with difficult decisions about how to survive. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: WHERE THE LINE ENDS 
 
When the Marquis of Avilés arrived in Buenos Aires, he found Charrúa and Minuán women, young and 
adult, who had been deposited in a former Jesuit house called the residence. These women were 
entrusted to wealthy people with good morals, who wanted to take charge of maintaining them and 
instructing them in civil and Christian life, under the watch of the parish priests and the neighborhood 
mayors. – Miguel de Lastarria, 18041 
 
Every day we see Indians around us and living in our own houses: I am speaking of the Pampas and 
Charrúas – Letter to the editor of Telégrafo Mercantil, 18012 
 
 
After the Raids 
 On the morning of May 3, 1831, Montevideo’s police force corralled seventy-nine Charrúa 
captives into one of the city’s military barracks. The captives included women, young and old, as well as 
children and infants, each of whom the police would entrust to local individuals or families. Having 
arranged the captives in a line according to their list of names, the police commenced their distribution 
(repartición). One by one, elite families and military officers approached and selected the captives they 
desired, no more than one or two per petitioner. Once they had made their choice, these petitioners signed 
an agreement to “treat [their captives] well, to educate them, and to Christianize them.” None of the 
captives could be required to remain in a household for more than six years, nor could they be taken outside 
                                                       
1 “Quando llegó el Marqués de Avilés á Buenos Ayres halló varias mugeres chicas y adultas Charruas y Minuanes depositadas en 
una Casa de los Exjesuitas, que llaman la residencia; y las fue entregando á las personas pudientes, y de buenas costumbres que 
quisieron hacerse cargo de mantenerlas, é instruirlas en la vida civil y Christiana; estando á la mira los Parrocos, y los Alcaldes de 
Varrio.” Miguel Lastarria, “Descripcion topografica y Fisica,” in Documentos para la Historia Argentina, 147–343, Tomo III (Buenos 
Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1914), 273–74. 
2 “Todos los dias presenciamos con los Indios que tenemos á nuestros alrededores, y que viven en nuestras propias casas: hablo de 
los Pampas y Charrúas.” Telégrafo Mercantil: rural, político-económico e historiógrafo del Río de la Plata (1801-1802) Tomo VI (Buenos 
Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1914); Reimpresión facsimilar dirigida por la Junta de Historia y 
Numismática Americana, 85-6 (115-116). 
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the country.3 The individuals distributed that day represented less than half of the captives brought to 
Montevideo the previous week. Even before their arrival in the city, military officials from the countryside 
had begun to receive requests from families for captives of specific profiles, most often children between 
seven and ten years of age or infants. Montevideo’s police withheld male captives over the age of fifteen 
from the distribution, considering them too dangerous to be entrusted to individual families. They instead 
detained them in the city’s jail, sent them to public works projects, or offered them to ship captains on the 
condition that they no longer set foot on shore.4 
 Over the course of the following months, the Charrúa captives appeared numerous times in local 
police records, which in turn provide a glimpse of their experiences of captivity in Montevideo. Those who 
were not claimed during the repartición remained in the city jail, sustained by a daily ration of meat, 
tobacco, and yerba mate. Their numbers dwindled to eleven by a week after the general distribution; 
however, they grew over time as some families sought to return their captives for being “useless,” while 
others simply deposited them in the streets. A second convoy of captives arrived in September that year. 
Those in jail often remained for months on end, until they were claimed, succumbed to smallpox, or died 
of other causes.5 Those who remained in the custody of local families endured other sorts of suffering. In a 
letter to El Universal, one of Montevideo’s newspapers, several people who had acquired women during the 
repartición lamented having separated them from their children. They reported that these captives “cried 
for hours on end, clamored for their children, and sometimes pulled out their own hair,” and on the 
grounds of sympathy for motherhood, they sought to arrange a place and time for the women to be 
                                                       
3 “son obligados a tratarlos bien, educarlos y cristianarlos” Eduardo F. Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental 
(período patrio), 2 vols. 2 (Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso, 1989), 73 (Documento U1). The principal exception to this six 
year limit were captives under twelve years of age, who would remain until their eighteenth birthday. 
4 Ibid., 51-72 (Documenos G1-S1). 
5 Ibid., 74-5, 78, 105-6 (Documentos W1, X1, Z1, & S1). 
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reunited with their children.6 One young Charrúa named Felipa sought asylum from the woman in whose 
house she lived. She presented herself at another household with “burn marks on her face and scars on her 
body…saying that she preferred death to returning to her master who had treated her with great cruelty,” 
but soon after the master, a woman, appeared with a soldier and an order from the chief of police for her 
return. Like Felipa, numerous others sought to escape their plight by running away, only to be apprehended 
by local police and returned to the city.7 
 The captives taken to Montevideo in 1831 were from tolderías ambushed near the Río Salsipuedes 
in the north of Uruguay earlier in the year. Their plights have represented a denouement to both 
triumphant national histories celebrating the settling of the countryside with the extirpation of tolderías and 
revisionist accounts lamenting the “tragic” end of Charrúas. Indeed, their tolderías were among the last to 
succumb to the violent attempts at a gendered ethnocide by the newly formed republic, and their captivity 
was an effort to disappear them from the countryside.8 Nonetheless, this case raises a number of important 
questions. How, one hundred years after they nearly forced the abandonment of Montevideo, and nearly 
fifty years after stopping demarcation parties to charge them tribute, did tolderías in the region cease to 
exist as sociopolitical entities? Did the disappearance of tolderías from documentary records imply the end 
of Charrúas, Minuanes, and other ethnicities? How did individuals manage the changing territorialities and 
relationships of power between tolderías and plazas over the course of the eighteenth century? 
                                                       
6 “llorar las horas enteras, clamar por sus chiquillos, y á veces hasta arrancarse los cabellos” ibid., 72-3 (Documento T1). 
7 Ibid., 73, 77-8 (Documentos V1 & Z1), 107-8 (Documento X). 
8 For example: Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (período patrio), vol.  2, Parte II; Oscar Padrón Favre, Los 
Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final (Durazno, Uruguay: Tierradentro Ediciones, 2004), 60–79; Ángel Vidal, La leyenda de la 
destrucción de los charrúas por el General Fructuoso Rivera (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1933); Apartado de la "Revista del Instituto 
Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay" Tomo IX, 1932" Annie Houot, El trágico fin de los indios charrúas (Montevideo: Linardi y 
Risso, 2013), 13–16; Diego Bracco, Con las armas en la mano: Charrúas, guenoa-minuanos y guaraníes (Montevideo: Planeta, 2013), 
Capítulo IV. Other authors have focused on these captives as a means to suggest that Spanish officials sought to integrate Charrúas 
and Minuanes into colonial society, rather than exterminate or disappear them from the countryside. Leonel Cabrera Pérez and 
Isabel Barreto Messano, “El ocaso del mundo indígena y las formas de integración a la sociedad urbana montevideana,” Revista 
TEFROS 4, no. 2 (2006). 
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 Despite their relatively late date, the accounts of captives in Montevideo connect to a strategy of 
interethnic engagement adopted by Spanish officials during the mid-eighteenth century and replicated by 
republican authorities soon after Uruguayan independence. While captive-taking had always been a facet of 
relations between plazas and tolderías, captive-taking as an imperial strategy of territorial dispossession 
represented a significant shift from earlier policies. Long after prohibitions on tributary labor grants 
(encomiendas) and captive-taking (rescate), Spanish and Uruguayan officials aimed to combine extermination 
campaigns with captive-taking as a means to remove tolderías from lands coveted by ranchers and settlers. 
This policy posed an ever-present danger to tolderías on the Spanish side of the border and had a significant 
impact upon subsequent historical recollections. 
Both nationally inspired and revisionist histories of the Río de la Plata have generally marked 1831 
as the end of Charrúas, preceded by an end to Minuanes, which in turn was preceded by the disappearance 
of other native peoples from the countryside. Historians have depicted the demise of independent native 
peoples in the region as a product of superior imperial and republican military forces, rampant pathogens, 
alcoholism, or the loss of women to gauchos and other rural competitors.9 While military aggression, 
disease environments, and new actors certainly placed pressures upon tolderías, these explanations 
overlook the discursive and sociocultural processes that contributed to the disappearance of these 
ethnonyms from written records. They equate the waning of Charrúa, Minuán, and other ethnonyms 
employed in written records to the disappearance of the native peoples and kinship communities to whom 
they referred. Furthermore, they uncouple tolderías from plazas and the rural worlds of farmers and 
ranchers from which contemporary societies have claimed lineage.  
                                                       
9 Francisco Bauzá, Historia de la Dominación Española en el Uruguay Tomo Segundo (Montevideo: A. Barreiro y Ramos, Editor, 
1895); Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (período patrio), vol.  2; Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su 
etapa final; Diego Bracco, Charrúas, guenoas y guaraníes: Interacción y destrucción, indígenas del Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y 
Risso, 2004), 263-4, 316, 332-3, 337, 344-5; Mario Consens, Extinción de los indígenas en el Río de la Plata (Montevideo: Linardi y 
Risso, 2010). 
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 The story of plazas and tolderías in the Río de la Plata in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries was one of shifting territorial and sociopolitical structures, which shaped both the options 
available to native individuals and the ways in which they appeared in written records. Changing patterns of 
territorial organization made possible certain power, kinship, and economic relations in a multipolar world 
of local affiliation and authority. Still, numerous individuals traversed the divisions between plazas and 
tolderías, blurring the lines between them. Some moved back and forth for their own interests, while 
others found themselves taken captive and trapped in unfree relationships. Amid broader structural 
changes, individuals from both plazas and tolderías faced ever-present risks, including abduction, starvation, 
and death; nonetheless, some also found new opportunities to improve their economic or social status. 
Many acted as economic, linguistic, and cultural brokers between local authorities or developed kinship ties 
across ethnic divisions. Their narratives are significant for understanding connections between individual 
actions and broader territorial changes; they are also crucial for dissociating the eventual demise of tolderías 
from the supposed elimination of the people who inhabited them.  
A close look at civil records from plazas and their proximate countryside reveals the persistent 
presence of individuals from tolderías living and working among settler communities. These individuals 
represented the reverse of the captives, migrants, deserters, and merchants incorporated into tolderías. 
They arrived in urban centers or rural settlements not only through captivity, but through arranged 
marriages and other kinship ties, the lure of economic opportunities, or because tolderías had become a less 
viable option. Appearing occasionally in baptismal, marriage, and death records, their activities reveal 
patterns of mestizaje and a blurring of divisions between plazas and tolderías. They also highlight the 
complex decisions faced by individuals, families, and caciques as they managed the region’s ever-shifting 
territorial dynamics. Particularly, as tolderías struggled to control vast amounts of regional space through 
strategic mobility and as borderlines became increasingly hostile environments, native individuals 
considered movement beyond tolderías, while caciques strived to maintain their tolderías intact.  
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The actions of eighteenth-century individuals add depth to the broader narrative of plazas, 
tolderías, and bordermaking. They also demonstrate the fragility and fluidity of the imposed ethnonyms 
appearing in imperial sources. Ethnic identifiers, such as Charrúa or Minuán, were inextricably linked to 
tolderías and their geographical locations, with few exceptions. Depending upon whether individuals were 
acting in or on behalf of their toldería or living within the walls of a given plaza, they may appear in written 
records according to their ethnonym or by generic terms such as “indio” or “china.” The converse was true 
for the emigrants from missions and other plazas whom imperial authors engaged while in tolderías. When 
taken together, these individual cases also reveal that movement was not unidirectional from tolderías to 
plazas or vice-versa, and that although there were risks involved in traversing the plaza-toldería divide, 
numerous people were able to move back and forth.  
The imagined disappearance of Charrúas, Minuanes, and other native peoples cannot be separated 
from the material and discursive processes set off by the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcation efforts. 
These initiatives transformed imperial objectives in engaging tolderías in the regional interior, presenting 
increased opportunities for tolderías nearest to the borderline and challenges for those furthest away. 
Nonetheless, imperial instability in the early nineteenth century led to an unstable borderline, and the 
advantages that the interimperial division had once presented to nearby tolderías ceased to exist. At the 
same time, the ethnographies produced by the mapping led many imperial officials to see tolderías as 
unreformable and to rule out the possibility of their peaceful acceptance of sedentary subjecthood. These 
officials both reified ethnic categories and prescriptively excised tolderías from their maps. Just as 
ethnonyms were linked to tolderías, the elimination of certain tolderías led to the disuse of an ethnonym – 
not elimination of the people previously identified in that way. 
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Territorial Removal through Captivity 
 As in many other borderland regions of the Americas, captive-taking was an integral aspect of 
interethnic relations in the eighteenth-century Río de la Plata. Although the practice has garnered little 
attention in scholarship on the region, both plazas and tolderías raided nearby establishments, taking with 
them individuals whom they hoped to incorporate into their own social order. Patterns of captive-taking by 
tolderías in the Río de la Plata resembled those of other independent native peoples in the Americas. Like 
the raids (malones) of the Pampas, Araucanía, and the Chaco, they tended to be in response to imperial 
aggression in the form of advancing ranches or military assaults and raids. Like the Comanche raids in Texas 
and Northern Mexico in the nineteenth century, they correlated at times with lapses in tribute flows from 
local settlers to caciques.10 And as occurred in most borderland areas, women and children were the 
                                                       
10 Captive-taking was a common practice in borderland areas of the Americas, and studies focusing on the practice have 
proliferated in recent decades. Scholarship focusing on colonial settlers taken by native communities has analyzed the roles of 
raids, abduction, and the return or sale of captives in terms of ritual, reproduction, tribute, and pact-making. Carlos A. Mayo, 
“El cautiverio y sus funciones en una sociedad de frontera: El caso de Buenos Aires (1750-1810),” Revista de Indias XLV, no. 175 
(1985); Susan Socolow, “Los cautivos españoles en las sociedades indígenas: el contacto cultural a través de la frontera argentina,” 
Anuario del IEHS 2 (1987); Fernando Operé, Indian Captivity in Spanish America: Frontier Narratives (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2008); translated by Gustavo Pellón; Raul Mandrini, “Transformations: The Río de la Plata During the Bourbon 
Era,” in Contested Spaces of Early America, ed. Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, 142–62 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2014); Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008). Conversely, those who have addressed imperial raids and acquisition of native captives have pointed to 
labor needs that captives fulfilled or the justifications for captive-taking. John M. Monteiro, Negros da terra: Índios e bandeirantes nas 
origens de São Paulo (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994); Nizza da Silva, Maria Beatriz, ed., Brasil: Colonização e escrividão (Rio 
de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1999), Parte 1; Ângela Domingues, Quando os índios eram vassalos: colonização e relações de poder 
no norte do Brasil na segunda metade do século XVIII (Lisboa: Comissão Nacional Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 
2000), Capítulo 1; James O. Sousa, “Mão-de-obra indígena na Amazônia Colonial,” Em Tempo de Histórias, no. 6 (2002); Juliana 
Barr, “From Captives to Slaves: Commodifying Indian Women in the Borderlands,” The Journal of American History 92, no. 1 
(2005); Alan Gallay, ed., Indian Slavery in Colonial America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); Chantal Cramaussel, 
“Forced Transfer of Indians in Nueva Vizcaya and Sinaloa: A Hispanic Method of Colonization,” in Contested Spaces of Early America, 
ed. Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, 184–207 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). Others have 
suggested that captive-taking was not only a means of subjugation or labor-acquisition, but a strategy of territorial removal. Paul 
Timothy Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800,” 
(Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, August 2011); Mary Karasch, “Catechism and Captivity: Indian Policy in Goiás, 
1780-1889,” in Native Brazil: Beyond the Convert and the Cannibal, 1500-1900, ed. Hal Langfur, 198–224 (Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press, 2014). Despite the violence of raids and the unfree status of captives, captive-taking was also a means of 
multidirectional intercultural exchange and the forging of kinship ties. James Brooks, Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and 
Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and 
Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Florencia Roulet, “Mujeres, rehenes y secretarios: 
Mediadores indígenas en la frontera sur del Río de la Plata durante el período hispánico,” Colonial Latin American Review 18, no. 3 
(2009); Salvador Bernabéu Albert, Christophe Giudicelli and  Gilles Havard, eds., La indianización: Cautivos, renegados, "hommes 
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predominant targets of such endeavors. Yet captive-taking did not appear to be the principal purpose of 
toldería raids on imperial settlers in the Río de la Plata. These assaults were primarily a way to extract cattle 
and enact violence; kidnappings were not ubiquitous with raids, and captives comprised a relatively small 
proportion of tolderías’ populations.11 
 Spanish raiders were instead the principal agents of captive-taking in the region during the 
eighteenth century. Far greater numbers of individuals from tolderías were seized by Spaniards than vice-
versa, while the Portuguese largely abstained (Table 5.1). These differences derived from the respective 
territorial strategies of the competing empires, as Portuguese officials depended upon tolderías to connect 
Colônia do Sacramento to the rest of Brazil, and after the Madrid and San Ildefonso mapping expeditions, to 
access cattle reserves on the Spanish side of the border. Conversely, Spanish and missionary officials saw 
captive-taking as a means of territorial appropriation and toldería depopulation. This strategy existed 
throughout the eighteenth century, yet it intensified following the demarcation efforts, reaching a 
crescendo as the century came to a close. Spanish raids against tolderías in the Río de la Plata resembled 
strategies they employed against Apache peoples at the far north of their empire. They aimed not only to 
exact punitive damage, but to exterminate or contain whoever they could while displacing the rest.12 Unlike   
                                                       
libres" y misioneros en los confines americanos (s. XVI-XIX) (Madrid y Paris: Ediciones Doce Calles; Écoles des Hautes Études en 
Sciences Sociales, 2012). 
11 Imperial writers and record keepers often distinguished their attacks and abductions from those of tolderías. They understood 
their own aggressions to be “punitive campaigns” (“salidas al castigo”) and those whom they seized to be “prisoners.” Conversely, 
they considered tolderías’ attacks to be “invasions” and those whom they abducted to be “captives.” The underlying premise of 
this distinction was that tolderías were aggressors and imperial agents were simply responding defensively under the precepts of 
just war. To avoid this moralizing and pejorative distinction, which was based upon subjective notions of property rights and 
imperial sovereignty, I use the terms “raids” and “captive” to identify both imperial and indigenous attacks and abductees from 
both sides. See: Conrad, Captive Fates, 10–11. 
12 Susana Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva: cautivos en el interior de la frontera,” Mundo Agrario. Revista de estudios rurales 7, 
no. 13 (2006): 2–3; Diego Bracco and José M. López Mazz, Charrúas, pampas y serranos, chanáes y guaraníes: La insurrección del año 
1686 (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2006), 7–20; Matthew Babcock, “Rethinking the Establecimientos: Why Apaches Settled on 
Spanish-run Reservations, 1786-1793,” New Mexico Historical Review 84, no. 3 (2009); Conrad, Captive Fates; Chantal Cramaussel, 
“Forced Transfer of Indians in Nueva Vizcaya and Sinaloa” in Contested Spaces of Early America, 186–87; AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 
169, No. 51 (1789-04-01). 
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YEAR CAPTIVES TAKEN M F CH TOTAL RESCUED DESTINATION 
1697 Charrúas, Machados, 
others 
  2 2 4   Chile 
1702 Mbojas, Mbatidas, 
Yaros, others 
      500   San Borja; Jesús 
1707 Yaros       100   Yapeyú 
1708 Bohanes, Guenoas, 
others 
      n/a  26 Yapeyú; Santa 
Cruz 
1715 Bohanes, Charrúas 
Machados, Yaros 
      2   Yapeyú 
1728 Charrúas        n/a   Missions 
1750 “Infieles”       150 1 Las Vívoras; 
Missions 
1750 Charrúas       339   Cayastá 
1751 Minuanes       124   Montevideo 
1751 Charrúas     7 7 3 n/a 
1752 Charrúas       53   Military officials 
1752 Minuanes    60  Military officials 
1758 Minuanes 4 4   8   Montevideo 
1785 Tapes 46 31 21 98   Missions 
1798 “Infieles”       n/a    n/a 
1798 Charrúas, Minuanes       133 13 Missions 
1798 Charrúas, Minuanes       164   n/a 
1800 Minuanes       32 3 San Miguel Ranch 
(Yapeyú) 
1800 Charrúas   4 2 6 1 Buenos Aires 
1801 n/a   30   30 5 Quartel del Yacuy 
1801 Charrúas 4 23 25 52 3 Buenos Aires 
1801 Charrúas; Minuanes 3 13 11 27 4 Buenos Aires 
1806 Charrúas; Minuanes    67 2 Buenos Aires 
 TOTAL 57 107 68 1956 61  
Table 5.1 – Spanish Raids. This table demonstrates the numbers of native captives (male, female, child) 
taken compared to the numbers of Spanish captives rescued during Spanish attacks on tolderías. Destinations 
refer to the remittance of native captives following their abduction.13 
                                                       
13 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg 1, exp 1; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo; 1749-10-29 & 1757-04-26); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, 
(Montevideo, 1751-05-07); AGNA - IX. 28-7-7, (Montevideo, 1803-10-24); AGNA - IX. 2-9-7, (Colonia, 1798-08-23; San 
Miguel, 1798-12-18); AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Yapeyú, 1798-08-15); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Río Queguay, 1800-05-28; Estancia de 
Román, 1801-05-25; Campamento en el Ibirapuita-guazú, 1806-04-24; Batoví chico, 1801-08-20); AGNA - IX. 24-3-6, leg 30, 
exp 21; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 46-8, 88-9, 110-115 184-8; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 127-30, 229; AGNU - 
Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 1, f. 24-30; AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de 
1750-01-14, 1750-02-03, 1750-11-03 y 1752-01-19; AGI - Buenos Aires, 235, f. 12, 89v, 108, 130-130v, 150v, 172, 214v, 
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raids against Apaches, however, these instances of Spanish aggression were not designed as a means to 
procure a labor force. Given the availability of laborers from the Guaraní missions and the steady influx of 
enslaved Africans toward the end of the century, the numbers of captives from local tolderías would have 
been insufficient for this purpose.14 Captives were integrated as unfree laborers, but captive-taking was 
principally a measure of territorial removal. 
 Spanish efforts to acquire captives in the Río de la Plata dated back as far as the sixteenth century. 
Most notably, throughout the seventeenth century, residents of the plaza of Santa Fe frequently traded with 
nearby Charrúa tolderías for individuals whom the Charrúas had seized from other tolderías (indios de 
rescate). This practice continued though most of the century, despite official prohibitions in 1612, 1618, and 
1680 and numerous efforts from Buenos Aires to eliminate it.15 Ignoring these restrictions, in 1690, 
                                                       
239v, 259v, 276v, 296, 320-320v, 345v, 371v-372, 385v, 405v-406, 429v; AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-06-
08); MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C28, P1, No. 3, f. 1-3; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 101, f. 239-40; Telégrafo Mercantil, Tomo 
VI, 252 (282); Revista del Archivo General Administrativo: Colección de Documentos para Servir al Estudio de la Historia de la República del 
Uruguay, 13 vols. 3 (Montevideo: Imprenta "El Siglo Ilustrado" 1887); Patrocinada por el gobierno y dirigida por el Dr. D. Pedro 
Mascaró, 28–29; Jaime Cortesão, ed., Tratado de Madri: Antecedentes - Colônia do Sacramento, Manuscritos da Coleção De Ángelis V 
(Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1954), 116, 144-5, 311, 321-2; Eduardo F. Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la 
Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), 2 vols. 1 (Montevideo: Librería Linardi y Risso, 1989), 40–48; Sergio Hernán Latini, “Relatos 
del conflicto interétnico: Francisco García de Piedrabuena contra los 'charrúas y otros infieles', 1715,” Corpus. Archivos virtuales de 
la alteridad americana 2, no. 2 (2do semestre 2012): 12. The 1752 raid against Minuanes was a joint effort between Spain and 
Portugal. IEB - YAP-011, f. 9v, 11v-12. The blandengue expeditions between 1801 and 1806 likely took other captives as well.  
14 Guaraní workers appeared in Montevideo, Maldonado, and other locations throughout the eighteenth century, but their 
presence as a labor force outside of the missions likely grew following the 1767 expulsion of the Jesuits. Likewise, the thirty-five 
year period between 1777 and 1812 saw over 70,000 African slaves disembark in the region. Guillermo Wilde, “Los guaraníes 
después de la expulsión de los jesuitas: dinámicas políticas y transacciones simbólicas,” Revista Complutense de Historia de América 27 
(2001): 100; Barbara A. Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 
Chapter 5; Robert H. Jackson, “The Post-Jesuit Expulsion Population of the Paraguay Missions, 1768-1803,” Colonial Latin 
American Historical Review 16, no. 4 (2007): 440; Julia Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions: A Socioeconomic History (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2014), 147–59; Alex Borucki, “The Slave Trade to the Río de la Plata, 1777-1812: Trans-Imperial 
Networks and Atlantic Warfare,” Colonial Latin American Review 20, no. 1 (April 2011); Marisa Pineau, ed., La ruta del esclavo en el 
Río de la Plata: Aportes para el diálogo intercultural, 1a ed (Caseros: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero, 2011). 
15 Juan Faustino Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe (Montevideo: Gómez y Compañía, 1926), Capítulo 4; Nidia R. Areces, Silvana 
López and Elida Regis, “Relaciones interétnicas en Santa Fe la Vieja: Rescate con charrúas,” in Reflexiones sobre el V Centenario, ed. 
Nidia R. Areces, 155–69 (Rosario: UNR Editoria, 1992); Carina P. Lucaioli and Sergio Hernán Latini, “Fronteras permeables: 
circulación de cautivos en el espacio santafesino,” Runa 35.1 (2014); Imperial prohibitions on forced indigenous labor, and by 
extension, captive-taking, included the Ordenanzas de Alfaro (1612), which Hapsburg King Felipe III decreed in 1618, as well as 
the 1680 Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias. Matthew C. Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish 
America, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 85–91. 
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residents of Santa Fe who had acquired captives (piezas) rationalized their commerce as a means to save 
these individuals from imminent death at the hands of Charrúas. 
Those who are captured or bought are sentenced to death; they kill those captured from their 
enemies, executing this harshness with no exception for age or sex.…[We received] the prisoners 
from the Charrúa Indians, who of their own will offer them in exchange for useless items…We can 
continue this exchange without the Indians having to remain slaves.16 
 
By building such commercial relationships with Charrúas, traders in Santa Fe were able to acquire a labor 
force while circumventing imperial prohibitions. This manner of obtaining captives, while common in the 
seventeenth century, disappeared soon after.17 
 Beginning in 1697, evidence emerges for a new pattern of acquiring native captives. Rather than 
relying upon commercial ties with indigenous intermediaries, imperial agents began to attack tolderías 
directly, generally under the pretext of punitive campaigns. In that year, a resident of Santa Fe named 
Balthasar Ramírez de Arrellano requested custody of two captive women, Petrona and Micaela, and their 
three children following a campaign against Charrúas, Machados, and others. He promised to bring them 
“to Christian brotherhood and civility” and to support them from his own finances, and his petition was 
approved “for the purpose of indoctrinating and raising them in Christian education.”18 This stated objective 
would become a common refrain in justifying the distribution of captives acquired in such raids. Raiding for 
captives also expanded beyond Santa Fe, as armed fighters from the Jesuit-Guaraní missions abducted as 
many as 500 “Mbojas, Mbatidas, Yaros, and the rest of their allies” in 1702, using them to populate the 
                                                       
16 “hay pena de la vida impuesta contra los que los rescataren o comprasen, sucede que pasan a cuchillo a los así apresados de sus 
enemigos, ejecutando este rigor sin excepción de edades ni sexos….[Nosotros recibimos] las presas de los indios charrúas, 
quienes de su voluntad las ofrecen y por muy poco útil que se les dé; de esta materia se puede tratar sin que los indios queden 
esclavos.” José de Herrera y Sotomayor. Expediente iniciado el 28 de abril de 1690 sobre rescate de cautivos a los charrúas. 
Documento H3. Fondo de Documentos del Archivo General de Indias, Museo Etnográfico de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de 
la Universidad de Buenos Aires, transcribed in Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”: 124. 
17 Santa Fe also exchanged captives with Abipones and Mocovíes from the Chaco; however, their persistent purchase of captives 
from Charrúas was unique. ibid., 122. 
18 “al gremio y policía cristiana…con el fin de doctrinarlas y criarlas en la educazion christiana” AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg 1, exp 1. 
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newly-founded missions of San Borja and Jesús.19 In addition to acquiring neophytes, participants justified 
this particular campaign by arguing that 
if this war had not been made, [the twenty eight Jesuit-Guaraní missions] would have suffered great 
need for food….[The tolderías] were allied with the Portuguese in the fortress of San Gabriel… 
[and] they were the cause of the breaking of peace between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns.20 
 
If they had not attacked and forcibly taken these captives, deponents claimed, they would have lost access to 
the large cattle reserves that the missions coveted. Furthermore, the presence of tolderías in the 
countryside disrupted the fragile peace with Portugal that had held since the founding of Colônia do 
Sacramento. Similar campaigns by mission forces occurred in 1707 against Yaros, in 1715 against Bohanes, 
Charrúas, Machados, and Yaros, and around 1728 against Charrúas.21  
 In 1750, a shift occurred in Spanish patterns of captive-taking in the region. Dovetailing with the 
Treaty of Madrid’s cession of nearby lands to the Spanish crown, military expeditions from Santa Fe, Santo 
Domingo Soriano, and Montevideo all sought to inflict maximum damage against the tolderías that 
neighbored each plaza. Although imperial authors exaggerated the overall impact of these expeditions, they 
did produce a large number of captives: 339 were taken to Santa Fe, 124 to Montevideo, and 53 were 
distributed among the campaign’s participants.22 In addition to producing hundreds of captives, these raids 
also constituted the first Spanish efforts at territorial removal. Rather than pointing to religious 
justifications, the Spaniards hoped to “clean” and “order” the countryside through extermination 
                                                       
19 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 46; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 101, 239–40; 
Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 116, 144-5, 311; AGNA - VII. Colección Segurola. Reales Órdenes y Cédulas, libro 181, f. 938. 
20  “sino se hubiera hecho esta Guerra padecieran suma necesidad de comida dichos veinte y ocho pueblos por las razones que se 
dizen en la preg.ta [‘estaban apoderados de las baquerias propias de dichos pueblos christianos’]…estaban coligados con los 
portugueses de la Ciudadela de S. Gabriel…avian de ser causa de quebrantam.to de la paz entre las dos coronas España y 
Portugal” Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 42. 
21 AGI - Buenos Aires, 235, f. 12, 89v, 108, 130-130v, 150v, 172, 214v, 239v, 259v, 276v, 296, 320-320v, 345v, 371v-372, 
385v, 405v-406, 429v; Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 321–22; Latini, “Relatos del conflicto interétnico”. 
22 AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de 1750-01-14, 1750-02-03, 1750-11-03 y 1752-01-19; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Campo del Bloqueo; 
1749-10-29); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 46-8, 88-9, 110-115, 184-7; AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 229. 
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campaigns.23 Although officials explained each military foray as a small-scale raid against specific tolderías 
that had captured or killed settlers, they also pointed to the benefits of removing mobile native peoples 
from the countryside and presented the assumed completion of that objective in their post-expeditionary 
reports: “I am persuaded that none of the neighboring Charrúa Indians remains in the countryside.”24 Given 
this aim of territorial removal, Spanish raids were disproportionate to indigenous attacks and targeted 
numerous tolderías rather than those directly responsible for earlier aggressions. 
 For most of the next half-century, Spanish captive-taking occurred intermittently, but by the 
century’s end it would again accelerate. Between 1752 and 1797, only one recorded raid against tolderías 
occurred: in 1785, Spanish forces surprised two tolderías of Tapes who had deserted the missions to live 
near the Río Ibicuí. They seized 98 individuals and returned them to the mission plazas they had 
abandoned.25 By 1797, however, with the formation of a regiment of mounted guards (blandengues) in 
Montevideo, viceregal authorities restarted their campaign of territorial removal through captive-taking. 
Over the next five years, blandengues commanded by Jorge Pacheco engaged in a systematic effort to raid 
tolderías one by one, killing as many adult men as possible and capturing women and children. This 
initiative, which focused on tolderías between the Yapeyú mission and the interimperial divide, proved 
unsuccessful in expunging them from the countryside, but it produced a steady flow of captives, most of 
whom Pacheco sent to Buenos Aires.26 
                                                       
23 AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo IV, 3; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vívoras, 1746-07-02). These campaigns broadly targeted mobile 
peoples (“gente vagabunda”), and included the employment of imperial subjects who were not cultivating crops as well as the 
elimination or subjugation of independent native peoples through military campaigns. 
24 “me lo persuade mas el constarme no haber quedado Cuerpo de Yndiada Charrùa en la Campaña que èran los Fronterìzos À las 
referidas Poblaciones” MM - Archivo Colonial, Arm B, C28, P1, No. 3, f. 3. 
25 AGI - Buenos Aires, 70, (Buenos Aires, 1785-06-08). 
26 For details on the Pacheco expeditions, see Chapter 4. 
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While Spanish raids on tolderías sought territorial appropriation through death and dislocation, 
tolderías’ incursions into Spanish and mission ranches generally were in response to imperial aggression or 
territorial occupation. Extant sources are insufficient to draw direct connections between Spanish raids and 
native responses, yet a temporal correlation existed (Table 5.2). For example, after Yapeyú’s militia took 
100 captives to their mission in 1708, Guenoas and Bohanes took twenty-six captives from the mission’s 
ranches.27 Similarly, one year after the 1715 expedition led by Francisco García de Piedrabuena, Charrúas,  
YEAR LOCATION CAPTORS M F CH TOTAL CATTLE 
1703 Colônia do 
Sacramento 
n/a 1 1 1 3 70 mares & 2 
horses 
1708 Santa Cruz; 
Yapeyú 
Bohanes, Guenoas, allies       26 n/a 
1716 Itatí Bohanes, Charrúas, Yaros   1 2 3 n/a 
1750 Santo Domingo 
Soriano 
Infieles     1 1 cows & mares 
1751 Santa Fe Charrúas       16 horses & cattle 
1751 Queguay River Bohanes, Charrúas, 
Minuanes 
2 2   4 n/a 
1751 Calera del Rey 
(Maldonado) 
Minuanes       2 80-100 horses & 
500 cows/oxen 
1758 Rosario Charrúas, Tapes 1   2 3 "many horses" 
1759 Ibira-puitá River Charrúas, Minuanes 2 2 3 7 n/a 
1776 Mission ranches Minuanes   2   2 cows & oxen 
1798 Mission ranches Charrúas, Minuanes       20 3,000 horses 
1799 Paysandú Charrúas, Minuanes       n/a horses 
1800 Paysandú Charrúas, Minuanes       3 n/a 
1800 Mission ranches Infieles   6 3 9 n/a 
1800 Mission ranches Charrúas, minuanes   2   2 900 horses 
  TOTAL 6 16 12 101   
Table 5.2 – Native Raids. This table demonstrates the numbers of captives (male, female, child) taken in 
toldería raids or apprehended in the countryside, as well as the number of horses and livestock extracted.28 
                                                       
27 Cortesão, Tratado de Madri, 321–22. 
28 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, f. 4-11v; AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, f. 794 (Montevideo, 1751-11-13); AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 
1758-03-03 & 1758-04-26; Buenos Aires, 1758-05-11); AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, 
(Campamento de las Puntas de Chunireri, 1776-06-04); AGNA - IX. 2-9-7, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 3-9-2, 
(Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Paysandú, 1799-11-04 &1800-04-23; Concepción del Uruguay, 1799-11-05); 
AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 46-8, 88-9, 110-115; AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-
1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 5, f. 122-3 & no 6, f. 124-7; AGI - Charcas, 382, Informe del fiscal (1716-10-17) y resolución del Consejo 
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Bohanes, and Yaros began capturing women and children from Itatí and other settlements in the area.29 
Other cases of increased violence and native raiding followed a similar pattern; raids occurred in 1728 (after 
Jesuit-Guaraní raids), 1750 to 1751 (after campaigns from Santa Fe, Santo Domingo Soriano 
andMontevideo), 1758 (after the Guaraní War), 1798 (following attacks by farmworkers [faeneros]), and 
from 1799 to 1800 (following blandengue attacks).30 Moreover, certain sources indicate that indigenous 
captive-taking was principally a measure of retribution. Following the midcentury expeditions, Santo 
Domingo Soriano’s magistrate (corregidor) expressed concern that “we have ever more enemies; if before 
they were only Charrúas and their kin, now Minuanes have joined with them and they are the greatest in 
number. The majority of [our] captives are Minuanes and they always set out to seek vengeance.31 Likewise, 
a 1797 report explained the underlying motives for Charrúa and Minuán attacks against mission ranches in 
the following way: 
Their tolderías were sacked and set on fire not once, but many times, and their occupants were 
killed like livestock at the butcher. The majority of the elderly of both sexes gave their necks to the 
knife and the ferocity of a mob of men abandoned by the sentiments of humanity, and the youth 
were expended and condemned to the captivity of capricious injustice. These acts, Your 
Excellency, gave Minuanes and Charrúas motive to join together and plant their tolderías in an 
advantageous location that offered them protection….The Indians ambushed a vaquería, killing 
three individuals….They surrounded another where they killed as many as ten.32 
                                                       
(1716-10-20); AGI - Buenos Aires, 536, (Buenos Aires, 1759-07-02); RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, f. 55; Cortesão, Tratado de 
Madri, 321–22. 
29 AGI - Charcas, 382, Informe del fiscal (1716-10-17) y resolución del Consejo (1716-10-20); RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, f. 
55. 
30 AGI - Buenos Aires, 235, f. 12, 89v, 108, 130-130v, 150v, 172, 214v, 239v, 259v, 276v, 296, 320-320v, 345v, 371v-372, 
385v, 405v-406, 429v; AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 88-9, 110-
115; AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Arroyo de la Virgen, 1797-12-27; Paysandú, 1799-11-04; Concepción del Uruguay, 1799-11-05); 
AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 2-9-7, (Montevideo, 1798-03-20); AGNA - IX. 3-9-2, 
(Montevideo, 1798-03-20); RAH - Mata Linares, t. 74, f. 155-6; AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del 
Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 1, f. 7-7v & No. 6, f. 124-7. 
31 “Cada vez tenemos mayores enemigos pues si antes eran solos los charrúas y sus parciales ahora se les an agregado los minuanes 
que son los de mayor numero pues los mas de los cautivos son minuanes y siempre an de tirar a vengar.” AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, 
(Santo Domingo Soriano, 1750-01-16). 
32 Sus pueblos ó tolderías no una sino muchas vezes fueron dados al fuego y saco, y àsesinados sus ócupantes como las reses en èl 
matadero: La maiór parte de la ancianidad de ambos sexos, entregó la cerviz ál cuchillo y fiereza de una turba de hombres 
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As tolderías’ raids responded to attacks against their own kin, they resembled the malones that occurred in 
the Pampas, Araucanía, and the Chaco. Since many such raids in the Río de la Plata involved the burning of 
crops and buildings and the killing of ranch hands, captive-taking was likely not their principal objective. In 
addition, the occasional offering of captives to local plazas, an action that at once served as a means to obtain 
commodities and as a gesture of goodwill in an effort to procure peace, aligns them with malones in other 
areas.33 
 Raids into Spanish or mission ranches also occurred in moments of apparent peace. For example, 
numerous Minuán tolderías extracted cattle, killed ranch hands, and took captives from mission ranches in 
1776, and reports suggested that they intended to do the same in 1785.34 Nonetheless, given the accelerated 
extraction of mission cattle during these decades and lapses in payments from ranches to tolderías, it is 
likely these raids were retributive as well.35 The numbers of captives taken in tolderías’ raids paled in 
comparison to those of their Spanish and mission counterparts' raids, and many raids did not include 
captive-taking at all. In most instances, tolderías took no more than a dozen captives, and frequently fewer 
than that. Rather, they targeted cattle, which they often took in large numbers. This tendency indicates that 
captive-taking was principally a wartime measure, while the extraction of cattle was a more common 
                                                       
desprendidos de los sentim.tos de la humanidad; y la Juventud fué expensa y condenada al cautiberio de la arbitraridad 
caprichosa. Estos echos S.or Exm.o; dieron motivo a q.e Minuanes y Charrùas formasen un cuerpo, y plantasen sus tolderias, en 
la situacion ventajosa q.e les ofrece el seno…expersaron los Yndios una Vaqueria matando tres yndividuos de los q.e la 
componían…cercaron ótra en donde mataron hta el numero de diez AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Arroyo de la Virgen, 1797-12-27). 
33 See, for example: AGNA - IX. 4-3-1, (Las Vívoras, 1750-11-09); AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, f. 794 (Montevideo, 1751-11-13); AGI - 
Buenos Aires, 536, (Buenos Aires, 1759-07-02). Comparative cases include Mayo, “El cautiverio y sus funciones en una sociedad 
de frontera”; Daniel Villar and Juan Francisco Jiménez, “"Para servirse de ellos": Cautiverio, ventas a la usanza del pays y rescate 
de indios en las pampas y araucania (siglos XVII-XIX),” Relaciones de la Sociedad Argentina de Antropologia XXVI XXVI (2001); 
Guillaume Boccara, Los vencedores: Historia del pueblo mapuche en la época colonial, 1 ed (San Pedro de Atacama: Línea Editorial 
IIAM, 2007); traducido por Diego Milos; Operé, Indian Captivity in Spanish America; Raul Mandrini, “Transformations” in Contested 
Spaces of Early America; Lucaioli and Latini, “Fronteras permeables”: 125–6. 
34 AGNA - IX. 4-3-8, (Campamento de las Puntas de Chunireri, 1776-06-04). 
35 Sarreal, The Guaraní and Their Missions, Chapter 8. For more on ranches and tribute payments, see chapter 4. For a comparative 
case articulating relationships between tribute payments and raids see: DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts. 
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practice that belied Spanish and mission assumptions of property rights. On a visit to Santa Fe in 1743, for 
example, the Bishop of Buenos Aires, José de Peralta noted: 
[Nearby Charrúa tolderías] stole all of the cattle during peacetime, which were uncared for in the 
countryside, saying that the peace agreement served only to prohibit the killing of men and women, 
but not to stop robbing cattle whenever they could.36 
 
While Santa Fe was at peace with Charrúa tolderías to the east and Abipón and Mocoví tolderías in the 
west, they could not prevent their native counterparts from extracting cattle.37 
 In the back and forth of raiding, individuals forcibly removed from tolderías far outnumbered those 
taken from imperial settlements, and they arrived at numerous destinations, in cities, in the countryside, 
and on missions. During the first half of the eighteenth century, most captives found themselves taken to 
one of the southernmost Jesuit-Guaraní missions, presumably to be baptized, catechized, and incorporated 
as neophytes. Beginning with the 1750 expeditions, however, invading forces also remitted captives to 
Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Maldonado, and other plazas. Captives arriving at non-mission plazas generally 
found themselves divided and distributed among one of three sorts of beneficiaries – military personnel, 
bureaucrats, or elite families (gente decente).38 These distributions occurred both informally, among 
participants in the expedition before arrival at the plaza, and formally, upon arrival.  
It was customary for the individuals to whom the captives were entrusted to sign agreements that 
outlined the terms of captivity. The earliest such agreements resembled both contracts of indentured 
servitude and encomiendas, as they established a finite period for service, prohibited the transfer or sale of 
                                                       
36 “en medio de la paz se roban todos los ganados, que por descuido en el campo se quedan, diciendo, que la paz sirve solo p.a no 
hacer muertes de hombres ni muxeres, pero no p.a dexar de robar quando pudieren” AGI - Charcas, 373, f. 8. 
37 Captive-taking likely occurred between tolderías as well, though little documentation exists beyond the sixteenth-century 
exchanges between Santa Fe and neighboring tolderías. 
38 Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”: 8–9. This shift in destinations reflects the growth of Spanish fighting forces over time, 
and decreased dependence upon Guaraní militias. 
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captives, and required religious instruction. Following a 1752 expedition, for example, the Governor of 
Buenos Aires declared:  
I have determined that [the captives] be distributed among the participants in the expedition to 
serve for ten years, with an obligation [for their recipients] to teach them the mysteries of our Holy 
Catholic Faith….The sale of these prisoners is not permitted since they should be treated as free 
people with only a payment (pensión) of ten years of service.39 
 
These captives, which included men, women, and children, were duly distributed and bound to a ten-year 
agreement of servitude. Each captor was required to instruct them in Catholicism, and at no point could he 
legally sell them or transfer them to another’s custody. By contrast, the agreement that governed the 
distribution of captives in Buenos Aires in 1801 neither restricted their term of captivity nor prohibited 
their transfer or sale. 
The Indian shall be turned over to the supplicant who solicited him, obliging [the supplicant] to 
respond at all times to this superior Government and to maintain, dress, and educate him, 
instructing him in the mysteries of our Sacred Religion without employing him in hard or 
excessive labors.40 
 
This contract implied a relationship of perpetuity, as the captor was required to provide not only religious 
education, but clothing and sustenance. It provided for vague limits on treatment, yet made no mention of 
the transfer or sale of the captive. Each of these agreements made the distribution of captives conditional 
upon a promise of Catholic instruction in exchange for labor; however, this was a governing principle of the 
captor-captive relationship rather than a justification for the raids. Captive-taking was a strategy aimed at 
territorial removal and exile rather than the acquisition of a steady labor force. 
                                                       
39 “determino se rrepartiesen entre estos con la pension de servidumbre por dies años con la obligaz.n de ensenarles los misterios 
de nra S.ta Fe Catholica,…no se permita venta destos prisioneros por deber se tratar como personas libres con sola la pension de 
serbidumbre por diez años” AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1752-01-19. 
40 “Entreguese al/a la suplicante el chino/a que solicita obligandos à responder de èl en todo tiempo à este superior Govierno y à 
mantenerlo vestirlo y educarlo, instruyendolo en los Misterios de nuestra Sagrada Religion sin emplearlo en travajos duros ni 
excesivos” AGNA - IX. 21-2-5, (Buenos Aires, 1801-07-21). 
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 Records surrounding two of the largest captive distributions (repartos) involving Charrúas and 
Minuanes – in Montevideo in 1751 and in Buenos Aires in 1801 – provide clues about the intentions of 
petitioners and the experiences of the indigenous individuals who found themselves in such a predicament. 
In each instance, as expeditionary forces returned from their campaigns, residents lined up to petition for 
the rights to newly-arrived captives. Since most captives were women or small children, many petitioners 
hoped to incorporate them into their households as domestic laborers. After the distribution, however, 
numerous recipients of captives complained that they were unfit for household duties. Other captors sought 
conjugal relations with their captives, as occurred in 1798 when a sergeant was killed trying to abscond with 
a Minuán captive whom he aspired to marry.41  Individual requests for custody occasionally specified 
particular profiles for captives, with petitioners often preferring children to adults. Sometimes, officials in 
charge of the distribution offered captives as gifts: in 1751, for example, Montevideo’s governor sent a 
Minuán woman to the wife of the Governor of Buenos Aires.42 While women and children found 
themselves claimed by individuals or families, the few men taken captive faced different circumstances. 
Those who were caciques tended to be separated from their kin and exiled to other locales, as occurred in 
1751 when the Minuán cacique Manuá was sent to Buenos Aires.43 Others might be sent to public works 
projects, as occurred with a cacique named Foroñan, likely from Buenos Aires or Patagonia, who was 
brought to Montevideo with twenty of his kin in 1774 and sentenced to perpetual labor.44 
 Beginning in 1797, a steady flow of women and children abducted in the expeditions commanded 
by Jorge Pacheco began to arrive in Buenos Aires little by little via the Uruguay River. Upon arriving in the 
                                                       
41 AGNA - IX. 4-3-4, (Vívoras, 1798-10-15). 
42 AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-05-19 & 1751-07-11). 
43 AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 188. 
44 AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 37, Carpeta 6, no 6, 1774-09-22. 
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city, they were detained at a holding center known as the Casa de la Reclusión de la Residencia.45 This 
former Jesuit residence reopened in the 1770s as a detention facility for captives within the jurisdictional 
limits of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata as well as for orphans, enslaved women, and women whose 
social behavior was deemed illicit.46 The experiences of captives who arrived there differed according to 
provenance. Pampas and other women from lands adjacent to Buenos Aires might be used as ransom for 
Spanish captives held by neighboring tolderías, while those who came from lands north of the Río de la Plata 
estuary had no such possibility. The transfer of Charrúas and Minuanes to Buenos Aires constituted a 
permanent exile and an intentional act of territorial removal.47 Their distribution to the capital city rather 
than local settlements was an effort to prevent their escape and return to the countryside. Revealingly, Juan 
de Ventura Ifrán, the leader (comisionado) of an expedition against tolderías, complained in 1800 about 
instructions to take captives to one of Yapeyú’s ranches. 
It would be useful if you could tell me where I should put these infidel prisoners. I should explain 
that it is necessary to have them under all custody and security, anything to the contrary and they 
will all run away….I find it to be necessary that the said families be sent to that town where they 
will be more secure because in the San Marcos [ranch] they remain exposed to the invasion of 
others from their nation.48 
 
Since the purpose of captivity was territorial removal, it was necessary to relocate captives to distant places 
where they could not escape or be rescued by their kin.  
                                                       
45 AGNA - IX. 18-2-4, (Yapeyú, 1798-08-17; Capilla de Mandizoby, 1798-08-25; Salto Chico del Uruguay, 1798-08-29, 1798-
09-26, 1798-10-13; Buenos Aires, 1798-09-06, 1798-08-16); AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Puerto de S. José, 1797-09-26; Cuchilla de 
Tacuarembó, 1797-10-14; Buenos Aires, 1797-10-02).  
46 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 133, 146-8; Pérez Baltasar, María Dolores, 
“Orígenes de los recogimientos de mujeres,” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea 6 (1985): 20–1; David J. Weber, 
Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 238; Aguirre, 
“Cambiando de perspectiva”: 5–8. 
47 Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”: 6. 
48 “Sirvase decirme en donde debo poner estos infieles àpresados: deviendo exponerle que se necesita tenerlos bajo de toda 
custodia y seguirdad, y a lo contrario se han de huir todos…hallo ser preciso que dhas familias las mande pasar a ese pueblo en 
donde estaràn con mas seguirdad, porque en [la estancia de] San Marcos quedan expuestas a la imbasion de los de su Nacion” 
AGNU - Manuscritos Originales Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 1, f. 29-29v. 
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In addition to the territorial disorientation that captives would likely have experienced, their 
subsequent distribution in the city would have separated them from most of their kin. A survey of the 1801 
distribution of Charrúa and Minuán captives shows that no more than three went to any given household 
(Table 5.3). Those claimed by a single household were generally mothers and children; however, they too 
faced separation at times.49 Furthermore, being bound to individuals or families made captives subject to  
RECIPIENT OF CAPTIVE TITLE ADULTS CHILDREN INFANTS 
María Teresa García Widow of Former 
President-Elect 
25 years M; 4 years 
F; 4 years 
 
Gregorio Ramos Expindola  40 years  F; 1.5 years 
Mariano José Sánchez Bishopric Priest 36 years  F; 4 months 
Vicente García Grande y Cárdenas  24 years  F; 6 months 
María Antonia Suio Vecina 36 years  F; 1 months 
Laureana Mancilla  20-21 years  F; 1-1.5 years 
José Antonio Sánchez Josef Sanchez’s son 22-24 years  F; 6-7 months 
Ana Ynes Seyer Vecina 24 years  F; 5 months 
Manuel Igncencio de Uriarte   F; 7-8 years  
Josefa Gabriela Ramos Mexica   F; 2-3 years  
Martina Palacios Vecina 40 years  S; 8 months 
José Ignacio de Picazarri Priest 20 years  S; 3-4 months 
Tomasa Escalada   F; 6-8 years  
Buenaventura Berenguier Vecino  M; 4 years  
Mauricio Berlanga Lieutenant  M; 6-7 years  
José García Martínez de Casares Commander M; N/A   
Agustin Rameri Captain 20 years M; 2-3 years  
Francisco María Sempol Ayudante 20 years  F; 1 months 
Juan Claveria Vecino  F; 3 years  
Bernarda Perez de la Rosa Vecina 38 years  F; 1 months 
Gregorio Ramos Expindola Mejia   F; 9 years  
Bartolina de San Luis y Boyso  40 years   
María Concepción  N/A  N/A 
 distributed  16 10  12 
 deceased   7 
 remaining 18   2 
 TOTAL 34 10 21 
Table 5.3 – Charrúas and Minuanes Distributed at the Casa de la Reclusión, July 180150 
                                                       
49 AGNA - IX. 9-2-9, transcribed in Leonel Cabrera Pérez, “La incorporación del indígena de la Banda Oriental a la sociedad 
colonial/nacional urbana,” Revista TEFROS 9 (Agosto 2011): 10. See also: Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”: 9–10. 
50 AGNA - IX. 21-2-5, (Buenos Aires, 1801-07-21). 
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their changing residences, particularly if the individual was a military official. Such was the case for 
Francisca, a Minuán woman who was stabbed to death in Buenos Aires in 1774. Francisca was a servant and 
the only individual identified as “minuana” in the house of Lieutenant Coronel Lucas Infante, who had 
brought her to the city from Maldonado.51 Similarly, following the 1751 distribution in Montevideo, a 
surgeon brought a captive Minuana and her daughter with him to Buenos Aires, and following the 1801 
distribution in Buenos Aires, another Minuana had to move with her captors to the frontier settlement of 
Luján.52 
 Not all captives found themselves in the households of petitioning families. Following the 1750 
campaign against tolderías near the Gualeguay and Uruguay rivers, administrators in Santa Fe marched 339  
captives across the Paraná River to establish a reduction north of the city. This settlement, Nuestra Señora 
de la Concepción de Cayastá, was designed both as a forced exile for captives and as a buffer between the 
plaza and Abipones and Mocovíes from the Chaco.53 Accordingly, it included a walled exterior and an 
adjacent fort (Map 5.1). Authorities in Santa Fe had sought to erect a fort in this area as early as 1726, and 
the foundation of an advance settlement instead would “enable the residents [of Santa Fe] to recover their 
                                                       
51 AGNA - IX. 39-8-8, leg. 284, exp. 13; AGNA - IX. 4-3-3, (Campo de las Vacas, 1761-06-02). 
52 AGNA - IX. 2-1-4, (Montevideo, 1751-05-19); AGNU - Falcao Espalter, tomo I, 187–88; Aguirre, “Cambiando de 
perspectiva”: 10. 
53 This reduction, operated by the Franciscan order, represented one of three that they operated to the west of the Paraná River, 
along with San Jerónimo de Abipones (1748) and San Fracisco Javier de Mocovíes (1753). AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1756-04-
10; Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 266–78; Florencia Sol Nesis, Los grupos mocoví en el siglo XVIII (Buenos Aires: Sociedad 
Argentina de Antropología, 2005), 89–97; Carina P. Lucaioli, Abipones en las fronteras del Chaco: Una etnografía histórica sobre el siglo 
XVIII (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2011), 107–21. In purpose, these reductions resembled settlements 
populated by genízaros in the north of New Spain, given their strategic position as a defensive buffer between Spanish settlers and 
independent native peoples. In the case of Cayastá, however, its occupants constituted an exile community who had little 
knowledge of the lands they had come to occupy, served no military purpose, and could not claim any legal right to return to 
their homeland and kin. See: James Brooks, “'We Betray Our Own Nation': Indian Slavery and Multi-Ethnic Communities in the 
Southwest Borderlands,” in Indian Slavery in Colonial America, ed. Alan Gallay, 319–52 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2009), 322, 324, 326, 331, 337. 
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former possessions” by providing a first line of defense.54 Indeed, within five years of Cayastá’s founding, its 
inhabitants found themselves subject to raids from “rebels from these nations [Charrúas, Mocovíes,  
 
Map 5.1 – Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Cayastá55 
 
                                                       
54 “posibilitará al vecindario recuperar antiguas posesiones.” AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de 1750-09-11, 1750-09-25, & 1795-11-
09; RAH - Mata Linares, t. 102, 402v. 
55 AGNA - IX. 31-6-6, leg. 33, exp. 975. 
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Abipones], many of whom remain dispersed and unsubjugated.”56 Over the course of the next forty years, 
the reduction repeatedly endured attacks, droughts, plagues of locusts, and insufficient aid by residents of 
Santa Fe, who had agreed to support the settlement militarily and with livestock. By 1790,Cayastá’s 
population totaled less than sixty adults, one sixth of the number of original settlers, and three years later it 
was abandoned completely. Many of these individuals left for the countryside and incorporated themselves 
into other tolderías, while others likely found employment in or around Santa Fe.57 
 
Worlds Together 
The acquisition and distribution of indigenous captives generated long paper trails, yet these 
individuals were not the only ones who moved from tolderías to plazas. A handful of eighteenth-century 
records exist of people identified as Charrúa or Minuán who lived in plazas and neighboring ranches in all 
corners of the region. While isolated and infrequent, the appearance of such individuals in imperial records 
points to broader patterns of activity and indicates the probable presence of others in similar circumstances. 
Their activities belie the conceptual divide between sedentary and mobile societies and challenge the notion 
that the waning numbers of tolderías at the turn of the nineteenth century signified the elimination of 
peoples who had inhabited them. A close look at available evidence reveals the challenges that such 
individuals faced and the strategies they employed, both legal and extralegal, to make lives for themselves. 
 To search for evidence of Charrúas or Minuanes living within the walls of Santa Fe, Buenos Aires, 
Rio Grande, or Montevideo is to look for a needle in a haystack. In the abundant imperial and ecclesiastical 
records generated daily in these plazas and others, few accounts exist of individuals identified by the 
                                                       
56 “los rebeldes de estas naciones, que mucho se mantienen dispersos sin sugesion.” AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1755-09-09. 
57 AGNA - IX. 7-2-1, (Buenos Aires, 1782-05-21 & 1792-01-13); AGNA - IX. 37-5-3, (Pueblo de la Concepción, 1789-08-01 & 
1790-06-30; Santa Fe, 1790-10-19; s/l, 1793-04-29). Among those who abandoned Cayastá were the Salcedo family, caciques 
who integrated into tolderías east of the Uruguay River. It is unclear how many of their kin followed their movements, but the 
sharp decline in the reduction’s population indicates that it did not serve to contain the exiled captives. 
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ethnonyms most often assigned to tolderías. Nonetheless, this paucity of sources derives more from the 
perceptions of imperial writers and their inability to monitor the activities of their own farms and ranches 
than from a physical absence of such actors. Principally, ethnic identifiers ceased to be significant or 
perceptible to record-keepers once an individual was separated from a toldería. Terms such as Charrúa and 
Minuán were a means for officials to catalog and conceptualize the many tolderías that occupied the 
countryside, and carried little weight within the walls of a given plaza. Their application to an individual 
was contingent upon that person’s perceptible connection to a toldería – living within it, acting on behalf of 
it, or having recently left it – and the greater the temporal and geographical distance that people had put 
between themselves and the toldería from which they came, the less likely they would appear in record-
books with a specific ethnonym.  
Myriad generic terms were employed to situate individuals within the social milieu of the lettered 
city, replacing the ethnonyms that had previously associated them with tolderías. These included terms that 
indicated indigenous ancestry, such as Indian (indio) or Indian woman (china); some that emphasized age, 
such as pre-adolescent child (párvulo) or infant (criatura); others that highlighted occupation, such as 
domestic laborer (criada), peon (peon), or attached household dependent (agregado); and some that pointed 
to color, such as mulatto (mulato). Such identifiers occasionally appeared alongside ethnonyms, particularly 
in the cases of new arrivals to a given locale, yet tended to replace them over the course of an individual's 
lifetime. Even when an individual entering into a plaza had a clear association with a toldería, as occurred 
with captives, that association sometimes disappeared from the documentary record over time. Likewise, 
ethnic identifiers tended not to cross generational boundaries, as few sources mention “Charrúa” or 
“Minuán” children born in a particular plaza or adults who were taken captive and distributed in their 
infancy or youth. Part of the reason for this transition may have been the forcible breaking of kinship ties 
through the distribution of captives or the occlusion of ancestry through mestizaje, yet not all inhabitants in 
plazas were subject to distributions. The principal exception was at Cayastá, where individuals continued to 
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appear as Charrúa into the 1790s. In this instance, however, the reduction itself was associated with 
Charrúa captives and was distant from the plaza of Santa Fe. It is therefore more likely that "Charrúa" 
functioned as a catch-all term for its inhabitants, similar to "Guaraní" in the thirty Jesuit missions, 
"Abipones" in San Géronimo, or "Mocovíes" in San Javier.58 
 Records regarding native individuals on the outskirts of a given plaza, working or living on farms or 
ranches, also provide few mentions of ethnonyms. Despite evidence suggesting that tolderías’ inhabitants 
worked as seasonal laborers, traded with local settlers, and tamed horses for them, they largely remained 
invisible to imperial and ecclesiastical record-keepers or too unremarkable to warrant mention. This overall 
absence from the documentary corpus did not signify physical absence, but the limited reach of the lettered 
city. Christian baptism or marriage were not prerequisites to participating in ranching activities, and the 
few censuses that included rural households did not account for nonresident laborers.59 As a result, it is 
difficult to estimate the numbers of individuals from tolderías who inhabited or participated in the 
economies of plazas and their adjacent ranches. Moreover, the lack of ethnonyms prevents the association of 
records regarding Indians or laborers with emigrants from tolderías.60 
 Combing through eighteenth-century civil records, one nonetheless finds a few mentions of 
individuals identified by ethnonym, almost always Charrúa or Minuán. These references varied 
                                                       
58 Unlike captive distributions in Montevideo and Buenos Aires, the establishment of Cayastá was not designed to break kinship 
ties. Whereas distributions aimed to incorporate captives into a creolized social order, the reduction instead sought to transform 
“indios infieles” to “indios de misión” through exile and separation from Spanish settlements. Its purpose was therefore not 
acculturation, but instead “Indianization.” Guillermo Wilde, “Indios misionados y misioneros indianizados en las tierras bajas de 
América del Sur: sobre los límites de la adaptación cultural,” in La indianización: Cautivos, renegados, "hommes libres" y misioneros en 
los confines americanos (s. XVI-XIX), ed. Salvador Bernabéu Albert, Christophe Giudicelli and Gilles Havard, 291–310 (Madrid y 
Paris: Ediciones Doce Calles; Écoles des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2012). 
59 Isabel Barreto Messano, “Padrones y archivos parroquiales en el Uruguay: Desafíos y alternativas en el estudio de las 
poblaciones históricas,” in Poblaciones históricas: fuentes, métodos y líneas de investigación, 95–115 (Rio de Janeiro: Asociación 
Latinoamericana de Población, 2009). 
60 The propensity of imperial record-keepers to omit ethnonyms has created a formidable hurdle to the study of a Charrúa or 
Minuán diaspora. Future research will require large-scale data collection and triangulation in order to identify individuals via the 
households of their captors or other individuals to whom they were directly associated. 
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geographically and in content, and they ranged from baptisms in Rio Grande to marriages in Montevideo to 
domestic disputes in Buenos Aires. Though infrequent and scattered, they nonetheless demonstrate the 
presence of individuals associated (or previously associated) with tolderías in each of the region’s plazas. 
This includes not only plazas that had neighboring tolderías, but places where Charrúas and Minuanes were 
seemingly absent. For example, before the wave of blandengue raids that swept across the northern portion 
of the region, numerous individuals identified as Charrúa were already living in Buenos Aires. This included 
Josef Ramos (1794), María Mercedes Charrúa (1796), Josef Maria Charrúa (1797), and Juana Manuela 
Benita Peralta (1797), all of whom were baptized as children and appear to have been distributed among the 
city’s elites (vecinos).61 It is also clear that Charrúa and Minuán women were taken as far away as Chile and 
Rio de Janeiro, the former through captivity and the latter for reasons that are unclear.62 More significantly, 
decades after the supposed expulsion of Charrúas from lands between the Paraná and Uruguay rivers, 
individuals identified as Charrúa appeared in Santa Fe’s prison. They included Felipe Antonio Silva, for 
having drawn a knife against a priest; José Bernardo Ramírez, for having freed an Indian woman from 
prison; José Bernardo Campuzano, who was perhaps a descendant of the cacique Campusano, for having 
abducted a woman in the countryside; and Juan Bautista, for theft.63 Given their Christian names, these 
                                                       
61 "Argentina, Capital Federal, registros parroquiales, 1737-1977," index and images, FamilySearch; Josef Ramos Isidro Charrua, 
23 Apr 1794; Inmaculada Concepción, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Argentina, parroquias Católicas, Buenos Aires, 
FHL microfilm 611,230; "Argentina, Capital Federal, registros parroquiales, 1737-1977," index and images, FamilySearch; Maria 
Mercedes Charrua, 01 Dec 1796; Nuestra Señora de La Merced, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Argentina, parroquias 
Católicas, Buenos Aires, FHL microfilm 1,102,295; "Argentina, Capital Federal, registros parroquiales, 1737-1977," index and 
images, FamilySearch; Josef Maria Charrua, 16 Dec 1797; Nuestra Señora de la Piedad, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, 
Argentina, parroquias Católicas, Buenos Aires, FHL microfilm 1,096,676; "Argentina, Capital Federal, registros parroquiales, 
1737-1977," index and images, FamilySearch; Juana Manuela Benita Peralta, 24 Jun 1797; Inmaculada Concepción, Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Argentina, parroquias Católicas, Buenos Aires, FHL microfilm 611,230. 
62 AGNA - IX. 41-3-8, leg 1, exp 1; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.1.25, f. 59-62 AHU - Rio de Janeiro, Castro e 
Almeida (017-01), Caixa 17, Doc 3580. Between 1776 and 1802, 67 Charrúas and 9 Minuanas were baptized in the La Merced 
and Concepción parishes in Buenos Aires. Aguirre, “Cambiando de perspectiva”: 5. 
63 AGPSF, Actas de Cabildo de 1772-04-11, 1780-10-03, & 1802-07-04; Aníbal Barrios Pintos, “Caciques Charrúas en Territorio 
Oriental,” Almanaque del Banco de Seguros del Estado 70 (1981): 87–8; Sallaberry, Los charrúas y Santa Fe, 249. 
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individuals appear to have been baptized, and were possibly former residents of Cayastá, although their 
presence in Santa Fe and the adjacent countryside indicates that they had since left. 
 In other plazas, migrants from tolderías arrived for reasons other than captivity and comprised a 
more visible presence. In 1747, a man from Buenos Aires, Esteban Rodríguez, and a Minuán woman named 
Josefa baptized their daughter in Rio Grande, with the plaza’s governor acting as godfather. Two years 
later, 54 Minuanes were baptized in what was likely a ceremonial pact between the plaza and numerous 
caciques, and 23 more received the same sacrament in 1753.64 Of the 54 baptized in 1749, exactly half 
were listed as children or grandchildren of caciques, while the only cacique baptized was José Ladino (Table 
5.4).65 The baptisms were sex-segregated, with male recipients going first followed by females; almost all 
the females had godparents listed next to their names, while none appeared next to the males. The 
baptismal records do not articulate the motives, but the caciques presumably entrusted their daughters and 
other girls to Portuguese families in an effort to establish kinship ties. In the same way, Portuguese 
godparents would have been able to use these bonds as a means to gain access to the countryside.66 In the 
decade following the baptisms, several Minuanes also married in Rio Grande, although it is unclear whether 
these were the same individuals who had been baptized years before or others who lived in and around the 
                                                       
64 The baptisms occurred at the Capella da Senhora Santa Anna, within the Jesus Maria Joseph parish, and were administered by a 
Jesuit named Francisco de Faria. "Brasil, Rio Grande do Sul, Registros da Igreja Católica, 1738-1952," images, FamilySearch; 
Paróquias Católicas, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande, São Pedro, Batismos 1738, Jul-1755. A parcial transcription is available in: 
José M. López Mazz and Diego Bracco, Minuanos: Apuntes y notas para la historia y la arqueología del territorio guenoa-minuán 
(Indígenas de Uruguay, Argentina y Brasil) (Montevideo: Linardi y Risso, 2010), 146–51. See also: “Registro de atos oficiais no 
presídio do Rio Grande (1737-1753),” Anais do Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul Volume 1 (1977): 235–6. 
65 Ladino was baptized at some point before this event, and while his actions suggest a certain position of authority, sources do 
not directly refer to him as a cacique. It is possible that he was the same “José” who was baptized in Rio Grande in 1739. López 
Mazz and Bracco, Minuanos, 146. 
66 Martha D. Hameister, “'No princípio era o caos': a formação de um povoado na fronteira americana dos Impérios Ibéricos 
através do estudo das relações do compadrio,” Revista de História Regional 15, no. 2 (2010): 110–5. Both sides would have 
benefitted from such ties: Portuguese settlers would gain access to the countryside and Minuán caciques would gain allies, access 
to external goods, and potential clients to add to their broader networks of authority. 
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plaza. Similar cases of baptism occurred over the years in Buenos Aires, San Borja, and Colônia do 
Sacramento.67 
CACIQUE SONS DAUGHTERS TOTAL GODPARENTS 
Agostinho 4 4 8 6 
Bocayl 1 0 1 0 
Cabeçam 1 1 2 0 
Caçopâ 1 3 4 3 
Cassildo* 5 1 6 2 
José Ladino 1 1 2 2 
Palorça 1 0 1 0 
Tacú 1 2 3 4 
Not listed 16 11 27 11 
TOTAL 30 24 54 29 
Table 5.4 – Caciques with Children Baptized in Rio Grande, 1747-175068 
 
 Numerous civil and criminal records from Montevideo provide perhaps the most detailed glimpse 
into the activities of individuals who resided around plazas.69 These accounts reveal numerous women 
identified as “indias minuanas” marrying, serving as witnesses in marriages, baptizing their children, and 
utilizing the legal system to settle civil disputes. Spouses included other Indians and Afro-descendants 
(pardos), almost all of whom were migrants to Montevideo; none was identified as Minuán. Their places of 
origin included the Jesuit-Guaraní missions, Paraguay, Santo Domingo Soriano, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, 
Santiago del Estero, Mendoza, and Valparaiso, Chile, indicating that they too had been separated from local 
                                                       
67 FURG - Centro de Documentação Histórica, Microfilme 16, cited in: Carolina López Israel, “As relações de fronteira no início 
do século XVIII a partir de um estudo demográfico de Rio Grande,” Biblios 20 (2006): 53, 62. Baptisms in Buenos Aires likely 
occurred in the seventeenth century, while those in San Borja are based upon Jesuit Juan José Rico’s 1743 estimate that one third 
of San Borja’s population was Güenoa. Nicolás del Techo, Historia de la Provincia del Paraguay 2 (Madrid: A. de Uribe y Companía, 
1897); Versión del texto Latino por Manuel Serrano y Sans, 175; AGI - Charcas, 384, “Petición del Procurador de la Compañía 
de Jesús, padre Juan José Rico (s/f), pero visto en consejo en (1743-10-17)”; Aurélio Porto, História das Missões Orientais do 
Uruguai (Segunda Parte), Jesuítas no Sul do Brasil Volume IV (Porto Alegre: Livraria Selbach, 1954), 44. 
68 *Casildo’s grandson was also baptized. "Brasil, Rio Grande do Sul, Registros da Igreja Católica, 1738-1952," images, 
FamilySearch. 
69 From 1726 to 1773, the city conducted four censuses, some of which extended into the adjacent countryside. Isabel Barreto 
Messano, “Padrones y archivos parroquiales en el Uruguay” in Poblaciones históricas, 100. 
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kinship networks. These marriages thus point to an effort to develop new familial ties and social networks, 
as witnesses also tended to be outsiders to the region.70 The dates of these unions – most occurred in the 
1750s and 1760s – indicate certain entry points for such "indias minuanas." Many appeared as criadas of 
military officials or vecinos, indicating that they had arrived in the plaza during the 1751 distribution. In 
some instances, they remained identified with the person who had claimed them in the distribution, but in 
others they gained release from their custody. For example, a woman named Juana de Rivas appeared as the 
criada of Francisco Cardoso in the record of her 1754 marriage, yet in 1772, she reportedly lived on a ranch 
belonging to Pedro Almeida; Cardoso had died in 1774.71 Similarly, María Josepha Gutiérrez’s 1759 
marriage record notes that she was the criada of Francisco Gutiérrez, but a decade later she appeared living 
on a farm (chacra) outside of the city with her sister-in-law.72 Some records noted that other Minuán women 
were living outside the city in the nearby countryside during the 1760s, raising the possibility that they 
maintained relations with the Minuán tolderías that made peace with the plaza during those years. 
 The appearance of Minuán and Charrúa men in several records from Montevideo’s countryside 
intimates that their arrival was not linked to captivity. A census of Montevideo’s armed forces in 1772 and 
1773 identified three Charrúa men within a company of foreigners (forasteros) that included individuals from 
the Jesuit-Guaraní missions, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, and even Brazil. These three lived 
on the outskirts of Montevideo’s jurisdiction, near the Río Santa Lucía, and their ages – one was about 50 
years old, while the others were born in the mid-1750s – and assigned ethnonym means they were probably 
not captives from the city’s 1750 expedition. The circumstances that led them to participate in this 
                                                       
70 Juan Alejandro Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya (Montevideo: Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay, 1966), 176-
8, 351-2, 384, 369, 387, 406, 467-71, 480, 512-3, 534, 609-11, 630-631, 661-2, 802. The principal exception to this rule was 
Felipa García, the illegitimate daughter of a man from Cordoba and “una de sus minuanas.” She married a soldier in Maldonado. 
ibid., 264. 
71 Ibid., 167-8, 369, 609-11.  
72 Ibid., 512–13; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 30, No. 8. 
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company are unclear, but their location placed them far away from any tolderías identified as Charrúa.73 At 
the same time as census-takers were tallying these Charrúa men, Montevideo’s police sought out a Minuán 
named Francisco Camejo for having killed a man on a ranch outside the city. The manhunt came to no avail, 
as Camejo absconded to the countryside and the investigation was soon abandoned. Camejo’s presence on 
the ranch and ability to find refuge in the countryside show that despite the disappearance of Minuán 
tolderías from local source material, some individuals remained.74 Indeed, a decade before Camejo’s name 
appeared in judicial records, Minuán caciques had brokered an agreement with Montevideo’s cabildo to 
allow individuals from their tolderías to work in Montevideo’s ranches. 
The young men of their nation with license from their caciques to work on the ranches and farms 
will be able to do so only if they desire, certain that the Lord Governor will compensate them for 
their work in the event that there is any neglect by the people who contracted them.75 
 
In spite of a 1767 military campaign that supposedly expelled nearby tolderías, Montevideo’s cabildo 
confirmed the sustained presence of Minuanes in its residents’ ranches in a 1789 session. The cabildo 
concluded that “they were useful on the ranches and many [ranch owners] maintained them there for 
convenience and in order to gather livestock.”76 
 Living within the jurisdiction of a given plaza placed Charrúas and Minuanes under the watchful yet 
limited gaze of imperial authorities. In 1758, authorities in the Rosario district, near Santo Domingo 
Soriano, sought to apprehend a Christian Charrúa woman on account of her alleged drunkenness. 
According to reports, the woman had expended all of her husband’s possessions, although it is unclear 
                                                       
73 Juan Apolant, Padrones olvidados de Montevideo del siglo XVIII tomo II (Montevideo: Imprensa Letras, 1966), 117. 
74 AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 26, No. 43. 
75 “los Muchachos Desu Nacion con Lisencía desus Casiques conchabarse enlas estancias, y Chacras podrian bien haserlo asu 
Voluntad sola Seguros deq.e el S.or Gov.or les haria satisfas.r su travajo en caso Deq.e en esto hubiese alguna ômision para las 
Personas quelos Conchavasen” Revista del Archivo General Administrativo, 392. 
76 “eran hombres utiles en las Estancias, y varios los mantenian en ellas por comveniencia propia, y con el fin de recojer el 
Ganado.” AGI - Buenos Aires, 107, (Montevideo, 1789-03-05). 
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whether he had been the one to notify authorities. In response, local administrators confiscated her goods 
and “deposited her children in houses where they would be educated.” Given the proximity of tolderías at 
the time, however, Soriano’s authorities were fearful that the woman and her remaining son might contact 
their kin and incite them to attack, and thus returned to apprehend them as well. To their chagrin, they 
were only able to locate the son.77 The report did not mention whether this woman was one of the Charrúas 
who had been supported by Santo Domingo Soriano around this time, nor did it directly link her to the 
attacks by tolderías against nearby ranches the previous year. Nonetheless, much like Camejo, she faced 
imperial measures of social control, and her principal mode of resistance was a return to nearby tolderías. 
Escape to a toldería was not always an option, however, particularly for those who had been separated from 
their kinship communities through captivity. For example, María Francisca Torre and Josepha Plaza, two 
Minuán women who were domestic laborers in Montevideo, found themselves enveloped in a 1770 scandal 
that involved their husbands, two pardo shoemakers. They and their husbands were sentenced to exile in 
Buenos Aires and the penalty for return would be ten years of labor.78 Without a nearby toldería to which 
they could escape, the woman found themselves with few options but to accept their fate. 
 In some instances, Charrúas or Minuanes living in plazas utilized the legal system to their individual 
or collective benefit. In 1773, a Minuán woman named Juana Arnero brought a case against a man with 
whom she was living on account of his failure to follow through with a promise of marriage and his 
mistreatment of her children. Her case was successful and the man was exiled to Buenos Aires the following 
month.79 Similarly, in 1790, a Charrúa man named Cipriano Lencias petitioned the viceroy directly 
                                                       
77 “depocito con los dema hijos menores en casas donde los heducasen” AGNA - IX. 4-3-2, (Campo del Bloqueo, 1758-12-05). 
78 Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya, 630–31; AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 39, No. 13. 
79 AGNU - Archivos Judiciales, Civil 1, Caja 28, No. 31. It is possible that this was the same woman – Juana de Rivas – who had 
achieved separation from the man to whom she was entrusted upon captivity. Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya, 176-8, 369, 
609-11. 
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regarding the poor treatment, scarcity of food and clothing, and poor administration of the Cayastá 
reduction. His case, in which he compared the reduction to others nearby (San Jerónimo and San Javier), 
caught the attention of authorities in Buenos Aires, who initiated an investigation into its mismanagement. 
Three years later they ordered the reducition’s evacuation.80 Lencias’s petition was not the first attempt by 
Cayastá’s inhabitants to bring their case before regional authorities; it followed a 1782 complaint to 
Franciscan authorities and a request by one of its caciques in Santa Fe to be named administrator.81 When 
taken together, these cases reveal Charrúas’ and Minuanes’ occasional use of imperial forms of authority. 
While too small a sample to represent a broader trend, they nonetheless demonstrate the capacity of 
individuals to adapt to the modes of justice available in plazas. 
 Movement from tolderías to plazas was not always unidirectional or permanent, and a return to 
one’s toldería did not always indicate conflict with imperial authorities. Some individuals drew upon their 
ability to move between plazas and tolderías, as well as their connections to people in diverse locales, as a 
means to personal gain. One of the Minuán children baptized in Rio Grande in 1749, Joseph Francisco, 
demonstrates this dynamic. A close look at the baptismal records from that date suggests that Joseph was 
the son of the cacique Casildo and six years old at the time of the event. Although no godparents appear 
next to his name, he maintained close ties with Portuguese settlers over the years, working as a bricklayer 
and later as a ranch hand near Rio Pardo. Years later, Spanish authorities apprehended him near Maldonado, 
where his mother was said to have lived, and nearly sentenced him to death. From there he escaped, and by 
1772, several contrabandists had contracted him to extract livestock from near Santa Tecla in order to 
establish a new ranch in Portuguese lands. Joseph had become so well known that when demarcation teams 
                                                       
80 AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1790-10-15; AGNA - IX. 37-5-3, f. 1-28v, 36-36v. 
81 AGNA - IX. 7-2-1, (Buenos Aires, 782-05-21); AGNA - IX. 37-5-3, f. 24. 
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passed near the Rio Camaquã they noted that one of the river’s main crossings had been named after him.82 
His story reveals the opportunities available for individuals who were able to move not only between plazas 
and tolderías, but across the interimperial divide. The son of a cacique who had built bonds to both 
Portuguese settlers in Rio Grande and Spanish settlers in Maldonado, he used his knowledge of the 
countryside to work as a ranch hand, to guide contrabandists, and to earn wages moving livestock. 
 These opportunities did not extend only to children of caciques, nor were such networks restricted 
to Portuguese contrabandists. Several years after Spanish officials apprehended “Joseph the Minuán” on his 
way to Rio Pardo, a Minuán boy named Francisco found himself in a similar situation. Only ten to twelve 
years old at the time, Francisco was transporting livestock to a known contrabandist in Montevideo when 
Spanish authorities arrested him. An investigation into his past revealed that years earlier his godfather had 
turned him in to Montevideo’s police for having stolen horses from a ranch near Santa Teresa. He was then 
claimed by one of Montevideo’s vecinos, Miguel de Larraya, who took him back to his house. Larraya soon 
returned Francisco to the prison after he had stolen clothing, and the boy again found himself claimed by 
one of the city’s elites. He escaped soon after, and began to move between ranches and farmhouses, stealing 
from one and escaping to another. He eventually became associated with a Paraguayan contrabandist and 
the two made a living for some time moving livestock between Montevideo and Rio Pardo.83 Unlike 
Joseph, Francisco appears to have been the product of captivity, as he was continually entrusted to elite 
individuals. Nonetheless, from a young age, he was able to participate in networks of unsanctioned trade 
between different plazas in the eastern portion of the region. While the details of his case describe his 
association with contrabandists, the information that it omitted warrants further interrogation. Why did 
Francisco begin to steal horses at such a young age? To whom would he have sold them? What made him 
                                                       
82 AGI - Buenos Aires, 540, f. 24-27v, 66v-7, 88v; José de Saldanha, “Diário resumido,” in Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de 
Janeiro, 135–301 Volume LI (Rio de Janeiro: M.E.S. - Serviço Gráfico, 1929), 187.  
83 AGI - Buenos Aires, 542, (Santa Teresa, 1778-01-22; Buenos Aires, 1778-01-29). 
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identifiably Minuán, rather than an “indio,” like so many others? More evidence would be necessary to 
provide definitive answers, yet given the time and places of his activities, it is possible that he forged new 
connections with Minuán tolderías or with other individuals associated with them.  
 The movement of people back and forth between tolderías and plazas positioned certain individuals 
as intermediaries between them. These “go-betweens” occupied a variety of roles, from translators to 
guides to commercial brokers, and their actions shaped both the trajectory of events and the messages 
communicated and recorded in intercultural exchanges. Details on particular “go-betweens” are scarce, yet 
these individuals were present in many recorded interactions between plazas and tolderías, often occupying 
central roles.84 Nearly every Portuguese, Spanish, or missionary foray beyond the immediate reach of a 
plaza required a guide who knew the countryside and the locations of tolderías. For example, in his 1705 
journey from the San Borja mission to the Vaquería del Mar, Jesuit Silvestre González traveled with several 
Guenoa guides, who helped his troop avoid interactions with tolderías of Guenoas and Yaros.85 Likewise, 
when imperial or ecclesiastical agents sought out tolderías, they frequently relied upon native individuals 
who had come from them to seek them out, as occurred in 1731 when Francisco de Borja, a Guenoa man, 
guided a Jesuit peace commission to his former toldería.86 Similar patterns occurred throughout the 
eighteenth century, during military campaigns, peace initiatives, mapping expeditions, and borderland 
patrols. Nonetheless, travel logs that named guides did not always ascribe ethnonyms to them, thus 
                                                       
84 Alida C. Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); Yanna 
Yannakakis, The Art of Being In-Between: Native Intermediaries, Indian Identity, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008). While the concept of a “go-between” can apply to a wide variety of actors, I focus here on native 
intermediaries. It is also important to note that not all individuals who moved from a toldería to a plaza or vice-versa served as 
go-betweens. Many, such as individuals who ran away to tolderías to evade the imperial legal system, or captives who were 
exiled, never mediated relations between plazas and tolderías. 
85 Silvestre González, Diario de viaje a las Vaquerías del Mar (1705), Primera Edición (Montevideo: Artes Gráficas Covadonga, 
1966), 11, 13-15, 18. 
86 See Chapter 1. 
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prohibiting the identification of direct connections to tolderías, and many seem to have been ranch hands, 
mission-dwellers, or settlers who possessed knowledge of the countryside. 
 Clear linkages between native intermediaries and specific tolderías are more apparent in instances 
of baptisms or catechism. For example, the 1749 baptisms of Minuanes in Rio Grande might never have 
occurred if not for José Ladino, a Minuán who was fluent in Spanish. Although several tolderías had sought 
refuge at São Miguel earlier in the year, they refused to enter the fort because a Minuán woman had been 
gravely wounded within its walls. To assuage their apprehension, the Portuguese governor sent a Jesuit 
priest and Ladino to meet them in the countryside. The Minuanes were “assured by the catechist Ladino that 
they would find good treatment with the [Jesuits],” and he convinced them to travel to Rio Grande.87 
Ladino’s role in the negotiation was threefold: he served as a translator between the priest and the tolderías; 
he was a catechist, indicating that he also prepared individuals for baptism; and he provided an example for 
others, as he and several of his children were baptized as well.88 It is unclear whether Ladino was a cacique 
or how long he had lived in Rio Grande before this event. It is possible that he was from one of the other 
Minuán tolderías that were already in Rio Grande at the time of the exchange, and his fluency in Spanish 
rather than Portuguese indicates that he had not lived in the plaza very long. It suggests Ladino had close 
relations with either the Jesuit-Guaraní missions or Spanish settlers near Montevideo and Maldonado. Other 
intermediaries also facilitated baptisms and settlement on a smaller scale, generally traveling with members 
of their extended families. In 1731, for example, a man who had been taken captive by Charrúas as a child 
returned to the Yapeyú mission with his “gentile” wife, their two children, and an old woman who had 
                                                       
87 “assegurados pela catequista Ladino do bom tratamento que achariam nos Padres,” Serafim Leite, História da Companhia de Jesus 
no Brasil, 10 vols. 6 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1945), 528–29. According to this document, the baptisms occurred in 
1750, but it is more likely that they occurred in 1750. Martha D. Hameister, “Para dar calor à nova povoação: Estudo sobre 
estratégias sociais e familiares a partir dos registros batismais da Vila do Rio Grande (1738-1763),” (Tese de Doutorado, 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2006), 284–85. Regardless, it appears that two groups of Minuanes entered into the 
plaza of Rio Grande: those who arrived with Ladino in 1749 and those whom he was sent to convince later on.  
88 Ibid., 284. 
 277 
 
raised him. They were followed later that year by “an Infidel Guenoa with his wife and their nursing child.” 
Particularly in the first of these two cases, the ties that the former captive held with the Yapeyú mission 
facilitated not only his return, but the emigration of the rest of his family from the toldería.89  
  Native intermediaries were also integral figures in diplomatic negotiations between plazas and 
tolderías, both for their linguistic skills and for their familiarity with both sides of the divide. Many of these 
individuals had been taken captive years earlier, only to serve as negotiators in subsequent expeditions. For 
example, the 1801 commission from Yapeyú to persuade Charrúa and Minuán tolderías to form a reduction 
included two Charrúas who lived in Buenos Aires, Antonio Ocalián and Vicente Adeltú. Both were deemed 
Christian and the latter was a cacique. According to reports from the leader of this endeavor, Juan Ventura 
Ifrán, these two men had been sent to Buenos Aires years earlier as prisoners, most likely as a result of the 
Pacheco expeditions. Ifrán requested that Ocalián and Adeltú serve as the principal “ambassadors” 
(embajadores) to the tolderías because they were “Indians from their same nation,” and he hoped that they 
could “persuade [the Charrúas and Minuanes] to settle on a reduction and live in peace.”90 His plan was to 
receive the two said ambassadors [at the Salto del Uruguay], Vicente Adeltú and Antonio Ocalián, 
and then lead and escort them to wherever the Infidel Charrúas and Minuanes were. He would have 
them go out and negotiate the peace propositions with [the caciques].91 
 
Rather than serving merely as guides or interpreters, Adeltú and Ocalián were proxies for the viceroy, 
charged with procuring peace. They worked under the auspices of Ifrán, yet appeared to have autonomy in 
                                                       
89 “un Infiel Guenoâ con su muger y un hijo de pecho” Jaime Cortesão, ed., Antecedentes do Tratado de Madri: Jesuítas e Bandeirantes 
no Paraguai (1703-1751), Manuscritos da Coleção De Ángelis VI (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional, 1955), 164–248. These 
cases illustrate the mechanisms through which individuals facilitated baptisms; they do not indicate any sort of “spiritual 
conquest.” Numerous individuals from plazas also found themselves imprisoned after being discovered in tolderías and charged 
with apostasy. For example: AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1749-12-24. 
90 “por medio de Vicente Adeltú, y Antonio Ocalian Yndios de su misma Nacion, que fueron remitidos como prisioneros a la 
Capital de Buenos Ayres….[Los enviamos para] persuadirles que se reduzcan a vivir en pàz” AGNU - Manuscritos Originales 
Relativos a la Historia del Uruguay, 50-1-3, Carpeta 10, No. 1, f. 19. 
91 “recivirà los dos dichos Embajadores que se hallan en àquel destino, Vicente Adeltù, y Antonio Ocalian, conduciendolos, y 
escoltandolos hasta donde halle alguna parcialidad de Ynfieles Charruas, ó Minuanes; en cuio caso los hará salir a tratar con ellos 
las proposiciones de Paz, y amistad q.e en nombre del Rey” ibid., No. 1, f. 34. 
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the negotiations. Upon arrival at the tolderías, the two men were the first to speak, offering a presentation 
to the caciques; after the expedition, they returned to Buenos Aires to provide an official report to the 
viceroy.92 The details of Adeltú and Ocalián’s exchange with the caciques escaped the written record, but 
given the troublesome experiences of other captives in Buenos Aires, their presentation was likely less 
enthusiastic than Ifrán would have wished. In any case, their position as the principal negotiators reveals at 
once the dependency of imperial officials upon native intermediaries and the relative autonomy that such 
individuals could come to possess in negotiations with tolderías. 
 The ability to communicate in Spanish, Portuguese, or Guaraní also appears to have been a key 
attribute of many caciques in the region’s tolderías. In many documented encounters in and around 
tolderías, imperial and ecclesiastical writers noted the languages in which they communicated and whether 
or not a translator was present. Examples include Moreira, who “knew the Paraguayan language well and 
even Spanish”; Juan Yasú, who spoke “in the language of Paraguay”; Juan Salcedo, who spoke Spanish; his 
son Pedro Ignacio Salcedo, who “[spoke] Spanish with much skill, and [spoke] Guaraní, Charrúa, and 
Minuán perfectly”; and Vaimaca Perú, who spoke Spanish and Portuguese.93 Being multilingual might even 
have been a path to becoming cacique, as it positioned one as a linguistic intermediary and was a sign of 
knowledge of neighboring peoples.94 This would explain how an individual such as Miguel Ayala Caraí, who 
                                                       
92 Ibid., No. 1, f. 19-20v, 21-21v, 34-34v, 38, 42-43v, 45. See also: Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental 
(periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 163. 
93 “The Paraguayan language” here referred to Guaraní. “sabia muito bem a língua paraguia e até a española,” Anton Sepp von 
Rechegg, Viagem às Missões Jesuíticas e Trabalhos Apostólicos, Biblioteca Histórica Brasileira (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora; 
Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1972); tradução de A. Reymundo Schneider, 105; AGPSF, Acta de Cabildo de 1715-12-
07; Erich L.W Edgar Poentiz, “Los infieles minuanes y charrúas en territorio misionero durante la época virreinal,” (1985): 9; 
“habla el castellano con bastante propiedad, perfectamente el Guarani Charrua y Minuan,” AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Batoví Chico, 
1801-08-20); Barrios Pintos, “Caciques Charrúas en Territorio Oriental”: 88. 
94 In other regions, such as the Pampas and Patagonia, tolderías sometimes had multiple caciques, each of whom held a different 
function – caciques of war, caciques of peace, and ceremonial caciques. It is possible that a similar arrangement existed in the Río 
de la Plata, which would explain both the ability of certain individuals to return to tolderías as cacique and their visibility in 
imperial sources. See: Lidia R. Nacuzzi, “Repensando y revisando el concepto de cacicazgo en las fronteras del sur de América 
(Pampa y Patagonia),” Revista Española de Antropología Americana 38, no. 2 (2008): 77–8. 
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was the son of a Spanish man and a Minuán woman, was able eventually to rise to the position of cacique.95 
At the same time, fluency in Spanish or Guaraní would necessarily have positioned one as an intermediary in 
negotiations with plazas, leading counterparts to assume one was a cacique. 
 The 1763 peace negotiation between Minuanes and Montevideo perhaps best encapsulates the many 
ties that linked plazas and tolderías despite their many divisions. As Minuán caciques stood in the halls of the 
cabildo and faced the city’s authorities, their conversation was translated and mediated by “Petrona, an 
Indian from the same nation who lives among us since she is now a Christian, and also sister of the cacique 
Don Joseph….[She is a] translator or interpreter for the said Indians, and speaker of our language.”96 Given 
Petrona’s linguistic ability, she had probably inhabited in the city for some time, and was perhaps the same 
Petrona who married a Pampa Indian in 1755.97 The cabildo record did not indicate who selected her to be 
interpreter, but her presence nonetheless suggests preexisting kinship ties between the plaza and Minuán 
tolderías. She was not Joseph’s only family member who lived in the city, either. 
The Indian Don Joseph, one of the four caciques in attendance and brother of the Cacique 
[Cumandat], wanted to remain in the city because his wife lived here. [We communicated that] if 
he wanted to do so no violence would come upon him, to which [Cumandat] responded that he did 
not oppose this arrangement and of course he would concede it with pleasure.98 
 
By assuring Joseph’s safe entrance and exit from the city, Montevideo’s officials formally recognized a 
marriage that crossed the plaza-toldería divide. The accords sought to deepen such ties through economic 
                                                       
95 Elisa Frühauf Garcia, “Quando os índios escolhem os seus aliados: as relações de 'amizade' entre os minuanos e os lusitanos no 
sul da América portuguesa (c. 1750-1800),” Varia História 24, no. 40 (jul/dez 2008): 628–9. 
96 “Petrona Yndia Dela misma nas.on que Vive entre nosotros siendo ya Christiana, y hermana del dho Casique d.n 
Joseph….Yndia Lenguaras ó Ynterprete de dhos Yndios, y ladina en nrô Ydioma.” Revista del Archivo General Administrativo, 391. 
97 Apolant, Génesis de la familia uruguaya, 406. Petrona also appears to have been the sister of Cumandat, since Joseph was his 
brother. Revista del Archivo General Administrativo, 289. 
98 “el Yndio d.n Joseph (vno de los referidos q.tro) hermano del Cacique quería quedarse enestaCiu.d por tener aquí Su mujer 
Viese Si venia gustoso enello pues no se intentaba hacerle ninguna violencia, sino que arbitrase en esto a su libre voluntad, a que 
respondió el Casique que no se le Ofrecia poner reparo alguno en la quedada del dho Yndio pues desde luego la concedia, y 
dispensaba gustoso.” Revista del Archivo General Administrativo, 293; Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental 
(periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 112. It is unclear whether Don Joseph’s wife was also Minuán and how she came to live in the city. 
 280 
 
exchange as well, and although official peace was short-lived – the city attacked the tolderías in 1767 – the 
individual ties that it recognized and created persisted nonetheless.99 
 
The End of the Line 
  The first decade of the nineteenth century was critical for bordermaking and tolderías in the Río de 
la Plata. In 1801, after Charrúa and Minuán tolderías had taken control of Guaraní mission ranches, 
Portuguese forces followed their lead and retook possession of the Siete Pueblos east of the Río Uruguay, as 
well as Batoví, Santa Tecla, and other Spanish settlements along the border. This move necessitated an 
adjustment of the San Ildefonso line, and officials moved three years later to formalize the de facto division 
the invasion had produced.100 Tolderías again were central to this dispute, as negotiators debated tolderías' 
relationships with the two crowns in order to determine whether or not their expulsion of ranchers 
constituted a Portuguese takeover. Meanwhile, the fighting produced a heavily militarized borderline area, 
in which Spanish military forces sought simultaneously to prevent further Portuguese advances and to 
continue their extermination campaigns against Charrúa and Minuán tolderías.101 Portuguese forces aimed 
to consolidate their gains and expand their own ranching economies, while tolderías began to move back 
and forth across the new de facto limit for commerce and for refuge against Spanish attacks. This dynamic 
proved short-lived, as Spanish and Portuguese forces joined in a particularly devastating attack on tolderías 
                                                       
99 AGNU - Ex AGA, Caja 14, Carpetas 3 & 4. 
100 Vicente G. Quesada, La política del Brasil con las repúblicas del Río de la Plata, Historia diplomática latino-americana II (Buenos 
Aires: Casa Vaccaro, 1919), 29–65; Enrique M. Segarra, Frontera y límites (Montevideo: Nuestra Tierra, 1969), 22; Ruperto 
Pérez Martínez, “Los limites del Estado Oriental y el Tratado de 12 de Octubre de 1851,” La Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y 
Administración 7o Año, no. 19 (1901): 305. 
101 The 1801 hostilities in the Río de la Plata occurred after the signing of the Treaty of Badajoz, which ended the War of the 
Oranges between Portugal and a Franco-Hispanic alliance, yet before news of the war’s end had reached the region.  
 281 
 
in 1806.102 Tumult ensued for tolderías, and the next quarter-century witnessed numerous armies and 
factions moving back and forth across the region. By 1832, tolderías disappeared altogether from the 
documentary record. 
 To that point, as we have seen, the various borderlines that came to define imperial action in the 
late eighteenth century had provided numerous opportunities for tolderías. Whether through developing 
kinship or tributary relationships with new migrants, creating commercial networks across the interimperial 
divide, or moving back and forth in times of duress, tolderías near the borderlines did not simply adapt to 
imperial territorial arrangements, but instead made them their own. Their investment in the opportunities 
the borderline provided would eventually break down, however. As the borderline area became an 
increasingly dangerous place, more and more tolderías found themselves exposed to violence and 
competition. Moreover, as the border had created avenues for personal gain for caciques, the far-flung 
networks of indigenous authority that reached from mission plazas to Montevideo and Maldonado no longer 
existed. In the final decades of the century the “caciques of caciques,” or those who ostensibly held authority 
over numerous tolderías, such as Miguel Ayala Caraí, Batu, Masalana, or Ignacio “El Gordo,” had 
concentrated themselves near the borderlines. When the border failed to restrict the movements of 
imperial agents and the alliances predicated upon the border no longer guided imperial action, tolderías’ 
mobility ceased to be an advantageous strategy. As caciques’ success and their tolderías’ survival had 
become intimately tied to borderline territorialities, the rupture of these arrangements undermined both. 
 In the wake of the 1801 hostilities, tolderías experienced two contradictory conditions. First, the 
de facto borderline incorporated many of their lands into Portuguese dominions. Territory to the south of 
the Río Ibicuí had been controlled by tolderías when the fighting broke out, and its subsequent acquisition 
                                                       
102 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1, 222; Elisa Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas 
de ser índio: Políticas indígenas e políticas indigenistas no extremo sul da América portuguesa (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2009), 
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by the Portuguese was a direct result of their relationships with Charrúas and Minuanes.103 In order to claim 
these lands – which once held numerous mission ranches, but had since been abandoned – the Governor of 
Rio Grande argued: 
The wilderness of San Borja, as well as [lands to] the south of the Río Ibicuí and the west of the Rio 
Ibará-puitã, having been abandoned by the Spanish nation beforehand, due to hostilities from 
Charrúa and Minuán Indians, were nonetheless explored during the war by our repeated patrols as 
a precaution, and also by militiamen, natives, and those undomesticated Indians who inhabit the 
solitary highlands in between and are declared enemies of the Spanish.104 
 
Given the abandonment of the mission ranches, the continued occupation of these lands by tolderías, and 
the ability of Portuguese agents to traverse them, the governor considered them to be effectively 
Portuguese possessions. By pointing out the declared enmity between tolderías and Spaniards – most likely 
a reference to the Pacheco expeditions – he also sought to undermine Spain’s potential claims to tolderías' 
lands through vassalage. In the temporary absence of an official line to determine sovereignty and 
possession, the Portuguese governor instead relied upon an argument about occupation rights and 
indigenous independence.105 If Charrúas and Minuanes were declared enemies of the Spanish crown, the 
lands that they controlled and Portuguese forces explored during the conflict would necessarily pertain to 
Portugal. This meant the tolderías would have to cross a new line to gain refuge from Spanish aggression, 
                                                       
103 Make sure that I discussed this issue in the previous chapter. AGNA - IX. 18-2-3, (Yapeyú, 1801-04-17); Poentiz, “Los 
infieles”: 13. 
104 “As desertas do Povo de S. Francisco de Borja, igualmente ao Sul do mesmo Ibicuhy, e ao Occidente do Ibará-puitã, 
presentindo já dantes em abandono da Nação Hespanhola, por causa das hostilidades dos Indios Charruas e Minuanos, não 
deixarão comtudo de ser exploradas durante a Guerra, por motivos da mais conveniente percaução pela nossa repetidas Patrulhas, 
assim de Millicianos, como de Naturais, combinados com aquelles indomesticos Indios, moradores nas Solitarias Serranias 
intermedias e declarados Inimigos dos Hespanhoes” “Documentos relativos á incorporação do território das Missões ao domínio 
portugues no anno de 1801,” Revista do Archivo Público do Rio Grande do Sul Volume I (1921): 72. 
105 For the first time since the Treaty of Madrid, the juridical concept of uti possidetis guided legal imperial possession in the Río 
de la Plata, since most of these territories were conquered during the conflict. In addition, Portuguese diplomats sought to 
discredit Spanish claims that mission inhabitants and tolderías were their vassals; when describing the struggle, they claimed that 
residents of the Siete Pueblos greeted them as liberators, while Charrúas and Minuanes expelled the Spanish themselves. 
Regardless of the arguments, however, the pervasive objective of both sides was to restore a functional borderline. ibid., 71 
Segarra, Frontera y límites, 22; Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 201–2. 
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without the neutral zone that had existed under the Treaty of San Ildefonso. They knew that by crossing the 
line, they would move beyond the reach of Spanish attacks.106 
 The second result of the 1801 fighting was intensified militarization of the borderline area. As 
occurred after the Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcations, officials in both Buenos Aires and Porto Alegre 
moved to populate the new borderlines with ranches and plazas, including military forts. In the 1780s and 
1790s, Spanish authorities had used the presence of autonomous tolderías as a principal justification for the 
establishment of forts and roving guards along the line. This had produced occasional tensions with officers 
across the border in Portuguese forts, who accused their Iberian counterparts of moving too close to 
Portuguese dominions or entering into neutral grounds under the guise of responding to tolderías’ 
aggressions.107 The territorial losses incurred by the Spanish in 1801 made these formerly intermittent 
disputes a fixture of borderline politics. On numerous occasions between 1801 and 1806, Portuguese 
officials denounced Spanish officials for using Charrúas and Minuanes as a pretext to reclaim lost lands. The 
Governor of Rio Grande complained in 1803: 
I do not cease to be cautious with those neighbors, principally when I see them keep troops in the 
countryside. Even though they are more than 100 leagues distant from our frontiers, and they have 
assured me in two letters that [the troops] are for the Charrúa and Minuán Indians, I am nonetheless 
always suspicious that they are waiting for some orders from Europe.108 
 
Patrício José Correa da Camara, a military officer at the time, was less circumspect about the situation. 
 
                                                       
106 Ibid., 254–58. 
107 Disputes over Spanish breaches of the agreed upon line occurred in 1783, 1785, and 1792. These cases demonstrate both 
Spanish attempts to disregard the borderlines in conflicts with tolderías and the limits on their capacity to do so, given the 
tensions that it caused with Portuguese officials. ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 5, f. 170-170v; ANB - D9. Vice-
Reinado, caixa 749, pac. 1, (Rio Grande, 1792-06-02); BNB - 09,4,14, f. 111v-119, 508v. 
108 “eu não deixo de estar sempre com toda a cautela naqulles viscinhos, e principalmente em quanto lhe vir conservar Tropa no 
campo ainda que distantes das nossa Fronteiras para cima de cem legoas, e certificarem-me nas duas cartas ser para os Indios 
Charruas e Minuanos, com tudo eu sempre estou na desconfiança que elles esperão algumas ordens da Europa” IHGB - Conselho 
Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 63-63v. 
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[The Spanish] augment their forces little by little with the apparent motive of pursuing Infidel 
Indians, gauchos, and wrongdoers to the point that they occupy places that they want to add to 
their system of disputed lands.109 
 
For Portuguese officials, Spanish aggressions against tolderías did not constitute the punishment of unruly 
vassals, but instead a strategy to mitigate the losses incurred in 1801 and even to reconquer lost lands.110 
 The territorial limits of Spanish engagement with tolderías generated a broader discussion with 
their Portuguese neighbors regarding territorial possession, sovereignty, and the rights of independent 
native peoples. With few exceptions, Spanish officials generally respected the de facto borderline in their 
forays against tolderías. Their first strategy in combatting tolderías’ ability to move back and forth across 
the borderline was thus to solicit Portuguese enforcement of their side of the border, even before the de 
facto limit became official. Following the 1801 hostilities, Spanish officials wrote to Francisco João Roscio, 
Governor of Rio Grande: 
Rather than allowing these delinquents and infidels to find refuge in those dominions with the 
vassals of [the Portuguese Crown], you must have the commanders of that district, for the good 
harmony, union, and alliance that reigns between our august sovereigns, not only pursue them in 
common agreement with the Spanish chiefs and commanders, but take interest in their punishment 
and chastisement as any cultured nation should.…In observance of the existing treaties, your 
government must conduct itself along the border between the two nations with the circumspection 
and good faith that they demand.111 
 
Similar requests occurred through the end of 1805, and Portuguese officials repeatedly offered promises to 
patrol their side of the border. They denied association with tolderías and pointed to their own attempts to 
                                                       
109 “elles cada vez augmentarrão mais pouco a pouco as suas forças com o aparente motivo de perseguirem ao infieis, gauxos, e 
malfeitores até ao ponto de occuparem os lugares que querem adicionar ao sistema das suas disputas.” ibid., f. 255v-256. 
110 Other instances included: AHU - Brasil Limites (059), Caixa 4, Doc 272; AHU - Rio de Janeiro (017), Caixa 208, Doc 
14559; ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 13, f. 151-2, 155; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 65v-66, 
208-209v, 237, 258-9v, 261v. 
111 “lejos de encontrar estos delincuentes e Infieles abrigo en essos Dominios e vassalos de S.M.F. dispondra V.S. que los 
Commandantes de ese distrita en justa correspondencia de la buena armonia, union, y alianza que reyna entre nuestros Augustos 
Soveranos, no solo los persignan de comun acuerdo con los Gefes y Comandante Españoles sinoii que por el interes que en su 
castigo y escarmiento deve tomar toda nacion culta…en observancia de los Tratados subsistentes se conducirá ese Govierno en 
punto a limites entre las dos naciones con la circunspeccion, y buena fee, que aquellos exigem” ibid., f. 240v-241.  
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expel them from certain territories, further contending that the countryside was too large to excercise 
complete control.112 Dissatisfaction with Portuguese efforts and the perpetuity of conflict with tolderías led 
the Spanish to level accusations that the Portuguese were acting in bad faith and violating the statutes of the 
borderline. An 1804 discovery of clandestine vaquerías that purportedly included both Portuguese vassals 
and tolderías confirmed their suspicions, and the Spanish decided to act unilaterally.113 Rather than crossing 
unannounced into lands occupied by Portuguese settlers and soldiers, however, they instead requested 
license. In 1805, the commander of Spanish forces wrote to the Governor of Rio Grande. 
Those barbarians, when they feel persecution [by Spanish forces], find asylum and security, crossing 
to the dominions of [the Portuguese Crown], aware or suspecting that the armies of the [Spanish] 
King cannot pursue them there. It is necessary for me to give prior notice to Your Excellency of my 
intention to have you permit me in this case to enter into those dominions for the sole purpose of 
pursuing the Infidels, extinguishing them, and finishing them, because this is the only way to 
prevent the continuous persecution and hostility that this countryside suffers.114 
 
This petition for access simultaneously acknowledged Portuguese territorial possessions and sought 
temporarily to suspend the agreed-upon borderline. It also highlighted the relationship between the 
territorial limits of imperial authority and the incapacity of officials in Buenos Aires and Montevideo to 
assert control over territories they claimed to possess. 
 Portuguese responses to this request were invariably negative, and the grounds for their opposition 
was rooted in precise definitions of imperial territorial possession and tolderías’ natural rights. Rio 
Grande’s governor answered the commander of the Spanish forces in the following way: 
                                                       
112 For example: ibid., f. 65v-66v, 247-8; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 158-162. 
113 Ibid., f. 273-279v, 289-289v, 292-5, 327-331v, 365-74. Portuguese prisoners denied the participation of tolderías in the 
vaquería, yet affirmed that they were trading partners. Archivo Artigas Tomo II (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1951), 
281–323. 
114 “como esos barbaros al sentir la constancia de la persecucion jurguen hallar asilo, y seguiridad, pasando-se a esos Dominios de 
S.M.F. instruidos, ó sospechosos de que las armas de el Rey no puede seguir-los en ellos, me es preciso anticipar a V.Ex.a el aviso 
de mi determinacion para que me permitta en el expuesta caso entrar por esos Dominios con el solo proposito, y objecto unico 
de perseguir á los Infieles, extinguir-los, e acabar-los, porque solo de este modo pueden prevenir-se los continuados prejuicios, y 
hostilidades que padecen estos campos” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 263v. 
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I consider it to go against natural and human rights for me to concur in attacking the savage nations, 
embroiled in war with your government [if I do not have] a higher order or motives other than the 
pretext that they do not have any political representation. Consequently, I judge myself unable to 
permit Your Lordship to pass Portuguese guardposts with an armed force for the purpose of 
pursuing and finishing your enemies. This would be an injury to the state, would violate its 
territory, and would harm human rights.115 
 
This two-pronged rejection simultaneously claimed Portuguese territorial possession and positioned 
tolderías as nonsubjugated actors. The argument for territorial integrity was clear – Portugal had the 
exclusive right to inflict punishment within the limits of its territory – but the argument for natural rights 
was more nuanced. The governor suggested that any attack against tolderías was predicated upon the idea 
that they “had no political representation,” thus marking them as autonomous and not Portuguese vassals. 
Rather, he treated them as landless peoples over whom he had no authority and for whose actions he 
therefore had no responsibility, as they occurred outside Portuguese dominions. Moreover, since there was 
no direct conflict between the tolderías and Portuguese authorities, he saw no justification for attacking 
them.116 He instead offered “neutrality.” 
I have resolved to observe the most perfect neutrality, and in that way consent should not be given 
to Spanish troops breaking the sovereignty and territorial independence [of Portuguese dominions], 
entering with an armed force beyond our guards, for the purpose of pursuing their enemies. In the 
same way, all kinds of help and favor to the savages should be denied.117 
 
                                                       
115 “considero contrario ao direito natural, e das gentes concorrer eu a atacar as Naçães selvagens empenhadão em guerra com 
esse Governo, sem ordem superior nem outros motivos da minha parte, e unicamente com o pretexto de não terem alguma 
representação politica. Conseguintemente julgo-me tambem nas estreitas circunstancias de não poder permittir que V.S.a passe as 
guardas Portuguezas com força armada, a fim de perseguir e acabar os seus inimigos, no que se faria uma injuria ao Estado, se 
violaria o territorio, e se feriria o direito humano” ibid., f. 265-265v. 
116 This line of argumentation differed markedly from the back and forth between the governors of Buenos Aires and Colônia 
after the death of Jesuit Manuel González in 1703, as discussed in chapter 2. Whereas in the earlier case, the Spanish governor 
offered to seek out and punish tolderías for grievances filed by his Portuguese counterpart, the governor of Rio Grande offered 
no such assurances in 1805. This was due to the fact that his territorial claims did not require him to define tolderías as vassals; 
they instead derived from the juridical weight of cartographic demarcations and borderline agreements. 
117 “estou resolvido a observar a mais perfeita neutralidade, e assim como não deve consentir se que as Tropas Hespanholas 
quebrantem a Soberania e independencia do Territorio, entrando com força armada para dentro das nossas guardas, afim de 
perseguirem seus inimigos, da mesma sorte deve negar-se todo o genero de ajuda e favor aos selvagens” ibid., f. 265-265v, 270-
270v; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 271-2. 
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A position of neutrality enabled the governor to honor his duty to maintain the border without being forced 
to attack Charrúa and Minuán tolderías, who were useful allies. 
Meanwhile, authorities in Rio Grande were simultaneously negotiating with tolderías. Most 
notably, in September of the following year, a Charrúa cacique named Gaspar traveled to Porto Alegre and 
made pacts with the cabildo. In justifying the agreement, the governor argued:  
Such an alliance is of utmost interest to the State, in the event of any breaking [of peace] with the 
bordering nation, since these individuals are the most dexterous in the handling of horses and the 
most practiced in this countryside. For these reasons, they have always been made to dread the 
Spanish, who anxiously desire their total extinction. In this way, during times of peace, they will 
serve us as a formidable barrier against any surprises by our neighbors, and in [times of] war, 
without expenditures of the Royal Coffers, they will augment the number of [fighters on our 
side].118 
 
By striking a mutual defense agreement, he hoped to procure a buffer against potential Spanish incursions 
into recently claimed lands. Gaspar’s tolderías were located south of the Río Ibicuí, lands principally 
controlled by tolderías and claimed by Portugal in the 1801 hostilities. Whereas Spanish troops sought 
tolderías’ extermination, the Portuguese governor saw them as useful allies who could access the Spanish 
side of the border and prevent Spain from entering Portuguese dominions without his having to claim 
responsibility for their actions.119 
 For tolderías, since Portuguese officials in Porto Alegre were unable to enforce arrangements in the 
countryside, the borderline eventually ceased to be a means of protection. While the Governor of Rio 
Grande and the Spanish commander of the region sought to resolve hostilities between tolderías and Spanish 
                                                       
118 “tal alliança é de summa interesse ao Estado, na occasião de algum rompimento com a Nação confinante, sendo estes 
individuos os mais destros no manejo dos cavallos, e os mais práticos desta campanha, por cujos motivos se tem feito sempre 
temer e recear dos Hespanhoes, que anciosamente dezejão a sua total extincção e assim no tempo da paz servindo-nos d'uma 
formidavel barreiro contra qualquer surpreza dos nossos visinhos, na guerra, sem despeza á Real Fazenda, augmentarão o numero 
dos hostilizadores” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 286-8.  
119 Portuguese officials also made pacts with Minuán tolderías during these same years. ibid., f. 252-3, 268v-71. For more on the 
pacts between “Dom Gaspar” and Portuguese authorities in Porto Alegre, see: Frühauf Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 258–
63. 
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ranchers in a way that would preserve the borderline, blandengue captain Jorge Pacheco procured support 
from Portuguese captain Antonio Adolfo as well as a contingent of gauderios. In exchange for an attack on 
tolderías, Pacheco offered fourteen thousand head of cattle to Adolfo and six pesos to each gauderio. In 
April of 1806, Pacheco reported having raided three tolderías, killing 46 inhabitants and capturing 67 more, 
whom he remitted to Buenos Aires. His expedition soon ended, however, and before long, invasions by 
English ships along the coast diverted the attention of Spanish imperial officials.120 Nonetheless, the 
collaboration between Spanish blandengues, Portuguese troops, and gauderios constituted an 
unprecedented rupture of the borderline arrangement that tolderías had come to manage efficiently. 
Whereas late-eighteenth-century borderlines had produced predictable territorial practices on the part of 
imperial officials, this breach restructured power dynamics and undermined standing pacts.121   
 By 1806, attempts to map the de facto borderline also fell by the wayside. Following the 1801 
conflict, officials on both sides had made calls to formalize the de facto interimperial division through 
renewed expeditions. The former demarcation official, Francisco João Roscio, who had become Governor 
of Rio Grande, complained that his Spanish counterparts wanted to “alter the entire system and order of the 
Legislation of Limits,” and that the former head of the Spanish demarcation teams had already returned to 
Spain. Two years later, however, the Spanish Viceroy in Buenos Aires replied that he wanted to establish a 
                                                       
120 AGNA - IX. 10-6-1, (Tacuarembó Chico, 1806-01-20, 1806-02-01, 1806-02-28, 1806-03-28; Buenos Aires, 1806-03-16, 
1806-04-12; Pontos de Nhandei, 1806-02-25; Chacra, 1806-02-17; Campamento en el Ibirapuita-guazú, 1806-04-24); Frühauf 
Garcia, As diversas formas de ser índio, 254–58. Pacheco and other Spanish officials had appealed for a joint expedition with their 
Portuguese counterparts against tolderías since at least the previous year. See: IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, f. 
241v-244v, 267-286v; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 156-7, 159-162. Two years before this expedition, 
prisoners interrogated by Pacheco estimated that there were about 400 to 600 people living in tolderías in the countryside, 
suggesting that while significant, this attack only involved a portion of tolderías. Archivo Artigas, Tomo II, 311, 316. Pacheco 
continued his campaign for another year, and he claimed to be closing in on seven of nine remaining tolderías. Nonetheless, it 
appears that he never engaged them between that moment and the end of his tenure as blandengue captain in 1810. AGNA - IX. 
18-3-7, (Belén, 1807-07-29); Guillermo Wilde, “Guaraníes, 'gauchos' e 'indios infieles' en el proceso de disgregación de las 
antiguas doctrinas jesuíticas del Paraguay,” Universidad Católica Revista del Centro de Estudios Anthropológicos XXXVIII, no. 2 
(Diciembre 2003): 115. 
121 In 1804, numerous tolderías had made pacts with Antonio Adolfo. Some were baptized and moved to the San Borja and San 
Juan missions. Archivo Artigas, Tomo II, 305. 
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provisional line to avoid future conflicts.122 By 1804, the two sides had signed an agreement to formalize the 
de facto border, but bilateral mapmaking expeditions would not occur until 1852, as part of an agreement 
between the Brazilian Empire and Uruguay. As borderlines again became political objectives and sources of 
contestation in the region at mid-century, republican diplomats relied upon the cartographic works of the 
Madrid and San Ildefonso expeditions as legal precedents and guidelines, claiming territorial inheritance 
from colonial states.123 They raced to publish and interpret the works of imperial demarcation officials in 
order to fortify their own claims, at times reprinting eighteenth-century maps with new lines and labels 
(Maps 5.2 & 5.3).124 By this point, however, tolderías had ceased to be a viable option for native peoples in 
the countryside and two decades had passed since the last reference to Charrúa or Minuán communities. 
                                                       
122 “alterar todo o systema e ordem da Legislação de Limites” IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.3.7, f. 205, 210, 366. A 
“provisional line” would be a predetermined division to be certified by demarcation teams, as had occurred in the Treaties of 
Madrid and San Ildefonso. In the end, the demarcation never happened, as most of the San Ildefonso officials had either died 
(Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral, 1801 & João Francisco Roscio, 1805), returned to Iberia (José Varela y Ulloa, 1791, Félix de 
Azara, 1801, and Diego de Alvear, 1805), or been assigned to different projects. ANB - D9. Vice-Reinado, caixa 749, pac 1, 
(Porto Alegre, 1805-04-10, 1805-10-10 & 1805-10-21; Rio Grande, 1801-11-08); ANB - 86. Secretário de Estado, cod. 104, v. 
12, f. 98-109; IHGB - Conselho Ultramarino, Arq. 1.2.19, 1.2.19, f. 212-245v; Alvaro Mones and Miguel A. Klappenbach, Un 
ilustrado aragonés en el Virreinato del Río de la Plata, Félix de Azara (1742-1821): Estudios sobre su vida, su obra y su pensamiento 
(Montevideo: Museo Nacional de Historia Natural, 1997); Alejandro N. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su 
labor en el Río de la Plata,” Itsas Memoria. Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco 6 (2009); Teresa Zweifel, “De Palas a Minerva: 
panorama de la representación técnica en el Río de la Plata 1789-1866,” in Historias de la Cartografía de Iberamérica: Nuevos caminos, 
viejos problemas, ed. Héctor Mendoza Vargas and Carla Lois, 307–28, Colección Geografía para el siglo XXI, Serie Libros de 
investigación 4 (México, D.F.: Instituto de Geografi ́a, UNAM; INEGI, 2009), 309–16. 
123 Candido Baptista de Oliveira, Reconhecimento topográphico da fronteira do império, na Província de São Pedro (Rio de Janeiro: Na 
Typographia Nacional, 1850); Segarra, Frontera y límites, 18, 38, 44, 46. As occurred following the Madrid and San Ildefonso 
demarcations, the subsequent years saw numerous projects to populate the borderline. Other borderline disputes in which 
imperial maps served as important legal antecedents included those between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and between 
Argentina and Uruguay. Bertocchi Moran, “El piloto Andrés de Oyarvide y su labor en el Río de la Plata”: 753.  
124 Examples of published volumes designed to define and claim national space through imperial documents include: Pedro de 
Angelis, ed., Colección de obras y documentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires: 
Imprenta del Estado, 1836); ilustrados con notas y disertaciones; Melitón González, ed., El limite oriental del territorio de Misiones 
(República Argentina) t. 1 (Montevideo: Imp. a vapor de El Siglo, 1882); Moussy, Victor Martin de, Description geographique et 
statistique de la Confederation Argentine (Paris: Imprimeurs de l'Institut, 1873). These retrospective gazes fetishized perceived 
national spaces and projected contemporary territorial imaginations upon colonial pasts. Ana Frega, “Uruguayos y orientales: 
itinerario de una síntesis compleja,” in Crear la nación: Los nombres de los países de América Latina, ed. José Carlos Chiaramonte, 
Carlos Marichal and Aimer Granados, 95–112 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2008), 96–102. This trend would 
continue until the foundation of national geographic and topographic societies – Brazil (1838), Argentina (1879), and Uruguay 
(1892) – which began to print their own cartographic works. Susana I. Curto et al., “La fundación de GÆA Sociedad Argentina 
de Estudios Geográficos – 1922,” Boletín de GEA, no. 126 (2008): 2–3. 
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Map 5.2 – Cabrer, José María, Carta Esférica de la Confederación Argentina, 1853 [1802]. This was 
the published version of a manuscript map drafted by Spanish demarcation official José María Cabrer, who 
had compiled the works of numerous San Ildefonso demarcation teams. The 1853 publication substituted 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay for the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata.125 
 
                                                       
125 José María Cabrer, Carta esférica de la Confederación Argentina y de las Repúblicas del Uruguay y del Paraguay (Paris: Imprenta 
Bineteau, 1853 [1802]); MM - 23-1-42. 
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Map 5.3 – José Pedro Cesar, Mappa da Provincia de San Pedro, 1830. This was a published version of 
a manuscript map that had been made for the Visconde de São Leopoldo to accompany his Annais da Província 
de São Pedro. It was a composite of maps created under the San Ildefonso mapping expeditions, including Josef 
Varela y Ulloa and Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral’s Plano topografico que comprende la costa del mar and José 
de Saldanha’s Mapa Corographico, framed to highlight the features of the Brazilian state.126 
 
 References to tolderías between 1806 and 1831 were few and far between, and those identified by 
historians generally pertain to their participation in wars between Spanish and Portuguese armed forces and 
agents of republican independence. Most notably, tolderías allied with José Gervasio Artigas against an 1811 
                                                       
126 José P. Cesar, Mappa da Provincia de San Pedro (Paris: Depôt General de la Guerre, 1839); Biblioteca Nacional do Brasil, 
ARC.028,01,018 ex.1 Cartografia; José Varela y Ulloa and Cabral da Camara, Sebastião da Veiga, Plano topografico que comprende 
la costa del mar (1789); Library of Congress, Map Collections, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g5620.br000087 (accessed 
February 23, 2015); José de Saldanha, Mappa Corographico da Capitania de S. Pedro (1801); BNB - ARC.023,13,003, 
http://objdigital.bn.br/objdigital2/acervo_digital/div_cartografia/cart168591/cart168591.html (accessed February 23, 2015). 
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Portuguese invasion, aided him in an 1813 siege of Montevideo, and were present at his defeat in 1816.127 
The breakdown of an operative interimperial border and the rise of numerous factions created a precarious 
environment for tolderías, as imperial and republican militaries crisscrossed the countryside, consumed its 
resources, and inflicted violence. Faced with armed and unpredictable allies, different tolderías supported 
different parties or moved between them, appearing in the encampments of rival armies.128 These relations 
occasionally proved beneficial, as several caciques and tolderías that had previously accepted reductions or 
abandoned certain lands reappeared to stake claims over contested grounds. Masalana, whose toldería had 
been continuously harried by Pacheco’s blandengues, appeared alongside Artigas in 1812, as did 
“Caciquillo,” whose tolderías had previously settled on missions.129 Moreover, for the first time in nearly 
fifty years, Minuán tolderías returned to Montevideo to participate in the city’s siege. Upon visiting the 
encampment overseeing Montevideo’s siege, one traveler observed, “I had the opportunity to speak with 
the Minuán caciques….One of them ate with his wife at the General’s table.”130 Still, armed forces proved to 
be precarious allies at times. The Charrúa cacique Gaspar, who had traveled years earlier to Porto Alegre to 
make a pact with the Portuguese governor, met with Portuguese forces in 1812, receiving gifts of aguardiente, 
tobacco, and yerba mate. He was accompanied by Masalana and others. One week later, this same force raided 
their tolderías, killing as many as 80 people, taking 66 captives, and burning their fields.131 
                                                       
127 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (período patrio), vol.  2, 3, 5-6, 8, 19-21, 57; Padrón Favre, Los 
Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final, 38. 
128 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (período patrio), vol.  2, 19–21. 
129 Ibid., 164–66. The cacique most closely associated with Artigas in historical texts was Manuel Artigas, “El Caciquillo.” It is 
possible that this was the same “Caciquillo” who had moved his tolderías to San Borja in 1794. AGNA - IX. 36-2-6, “Informes de 
Zabala al Virrey de 1794-03-24, 1794-04-25, and 1794-05-23”; Poentiz, “Los infieles”: 9–10. 
130 “tuve ocasión de tratar con los Caciques Minuanos…uno de ellos comió con su mujer en la mesa del General” Damaso Antonio 
Larrañaga, Selección de escritos (Montevideo: Ministerio de Instrucción Pública y Previsión Social, 1965), 28–30. At least 100 
Charrúas also participated in the siege. Archivo Artigas Tomo XIII (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1975), 249. 
131 Barrios Pintos, “Caciques Charrúas en Territorio Oriental”: 88; Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final, 40; 
Archivo Artigas Tomo X (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1969), 26-8, 32-6. This is the only recorded captive raid by the 
Portuguese against Charrúa or Minuán tolderías. 
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 Tolderías remained key actors in the military conflicts that embroiled the region’s countryside through 
the end of the decade. They were present in key battles and also limited the movements and communications of 
rival forces throughout the countryside.132 When Artigas retreated to Paraguay in 1820, however, tolderías 
chose not to follow. They instead remained active agents in the Río de la Plata’s countryside during the years of 
Brazilian occupation – the Cisplatine Province – and through Uruguayan independence. For administrators they 
were both useful allies, as they apprehended and traded deserters for payments, and obstacles to the realization 
of idealized territorial states. They were important actors in the military expeditions that helped achieve 
Uruguayan independence, yet soon after found themselves the target of extermination campaigns.133 By this 
time, the number of tolderías in the countryside had dwindled through captivity, emigration, or the adoption of 
lifestyles that made them indistinguishable in sources from other native peoples. The borderline that had once 
offered opportunities no longer served as a useful tool, and in the wake of years of factionalism and warfare, 
mobile independence ceased to be feasible.  
 
Conclusion 
 The disappearance of tolderías, and by extension ethnonyms, from imperial records was not a 
unidirectional or inevitable process of vanquishment. Although military aggression, disease environments, 
and competition for resources placed pressures on certain tolderías, these factors do not alone explain their 
discursive erasure. In many parts of the region, particularly near the borderline, local caciques and their 
tolderías initially saw an expansion of their power and tributary networks with the increased presence of 
imperial settlers and traders. Thus neither nationalist nor revisionist histories that point to gradual decline 
captures the heterogeneity of tolderías’ experiences or the indistinguishability of Minuanes and Charrúas 
                                                       
132 For example: Archivo Artigas Tomo XVII (Montevideo: A. Monteverde y Cía, S.A., 1980), 307, 336. 
133 AGNU - Ministrio de Gobierno, Caja 805, f. 403-4; AGNU - Ministrio de Gobierno, Caja 807, f. 428; Padrón Favre, Los 
Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa final, 43–60.  
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from other native peoples once they were separated from their tolderías. There was never a “Charrúa War,” 
and not all individuals from tolderías responded to imperial agents bravely, albeit futilely, “with their 
weapons in hand.”134 Nor did the disappearance of tolderías signify the vanishing of individuals who had 
lived in them or their de-Indianization through mestizaje. In fact, baptismal records as late as late as the 
1860s identify individuals as “Charrúa.”135 
 Three factors instead contributed to the eventual absence of Charrúas and Minuanes from written 
records: captivity, invisibility, and the rupture of borderline territorialities. Over the course of the 
eighteenth century, approximately two thousand individuals from tolderías, and perhaps more, found 
themselves abducted in imperial raids and subjected to exile from their homelands. The vast majority 
nonetheless remained in the region, alienated from their kin and distributed among elites and military 
officials as unfree laborers. This separation from tolderías made their ancestry or kinship ties invisible or 
insignificant to imperial writers, as ethnonyms were mostly linked to tolderías themselves. In the same way, 
the ever-present networks of collaboration and exchange with imperial settlers, evidenced by intermittent 
references in record books, largely escaped the gaze of the lettered city. For these reasons, those tolderías 
that were attacked or captured between 1806 and 1831 were not the final holdouts from a gradually waning 
ethnic community, but those whose livelihood had become intertwined with a functional borderline. In the 
eventual absence of a clear and predictable interimperial division, tolderías struggled to manage the 
movement of peoples and goods and eventually found themselves without refuge.   
 
                                                       
134 Acosta y Lara, La guerra de los charrúas en la Banda Oriental (periodo hispánico), vol. 1; Bracco, Con las armas en la mano. 
135 "Uruguay, bautismos, 1750-1900," index, FamilySearch; Thomas Charrua, 16 Mar 1839; Nuestra Señora del Carmen, Salto, 
Uruguay, FHL microfilm 625,269; "Uruguay, bautismos, 1750-1900," index, FamilySearch; Candida Charruas, 4 Sep 1863; 
Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes, Mercedes, Soriano, Uruguay, FHL microfilm 625,479. While scant, these records nonetheless 
point to the persistence of individuals who had once been associated with tolderías. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In the early months of 1849, in preparation for a joint border demarcation with Uruguay, the 
Brazilian Empire sent a topographic team to survey its southernmost limits. The surveyors set out to 
determine the borderline from the Atlantic Coast to Bagé, a town near the ruins of Santa Tecla. To guide 
themselves, they carried “two maps of [Rio Grande], accompanied by a note containing the positions of 
important points in the province, as determined by the Commission of Limits, which began its work in 
1784.”1 As they moved inward from the coast, they came upon the remaining walls of the former São 
Miguel fort, where they paused to survey the local landscape. The leading officer of the expedition, 
Candido Baptista de Oliveira, climbed a nearby hill to gain a better vantage point, where he noted “an 
abundance of certain plants that generally appear in lands fertilized by animal remains, as is generally 
observed in cemeteries.” He asked a local inhabitant about this anomaly, and the man replied that this 
mound and others nearby were “cemeteries of the savage Indians [Tapes or Minuanes] who used to wander 
around this part of the countryside” and that “any digging done there uncovered human bones.”2 Oliveira 
calculated that there must have been hundreds of cadavers below his feet, and concluded that it must have 
been a mass grave dug after a great battle with the fort. 
                                                       
1 “Pelo Archivo Militar da Côrte me havião sido fornecidos hum Circulo Repetidor de Trougton inteiramente novo, e dous mapas 
da Provincia de S. Pedro, acompanhados de huma nota, contendo as posições de diversos pontos importantes d’essa Provincia, as 
quaes havião sido determinadas pela Commissão de limites, que no anno de 1784 começara os trabalhos da demarcação” Oliveira, 
Reconhecimento topográphico da fronteira do império, na Província de São Pedro, 7; Segarra, Frontera y límites, 33. 
2 “Notando eu que, na pequena elevação do terreno, em que eu me havia colocado para melhor descobrir os objetos situados alêm 
do Arroio, abundavão certas plantas, que costumão aparecer nos terrenos estrumados por detritos animaes, como de ordinário se 
observa nos cemitérios…inquiri de hum morador do lugar, que nos havia acompanhado…fui por elle informado que, em razão 
dos ossos humanos que se mostravão em qualquer escavação ali feita, acreditava-se, que fôra esse local outr’ora o cemirerio dos 
Indios selvagens, que vagueavão por esse lado da campanha” Oliveira, Reconhecimento topográphico da fronteira do império, na 
Província de São Pedro, 12–13. 
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 Oliveira’s diary resembled those of Spanish and Portuguese officials in the 1750s and 1780s. It 
interspersed historical anecdotes and topographical measurements with an itinerant account of places names 
and descriptive observations. Unlike the earlier demarcation teams, however, his party traveled without a 
rival counterpart, and they concluded their labors in approximately three months. Oliveira dedicated a 
large portion of his text to narrating the history of this international limit, beginning with the 1750 Treaty 
of Madrid. He recounted the numerous attempts to “definitively demarcate Brazil’s frontier,” seamlessly 
assembling earlier demarcations in a century-long history that culminated in his efforts. This diary also 
differed from prior accounts, since it entirely expunged tolderías from its narration. As tolderías no longer 
occupied the countryside, Oliveira deemed their actions peripheral to his teleological narrative of the 
realization of contemporary territorial order, a pattern that would characterize subsequent historical 
accounts.3 
 This dissertation has provided a different interpretation of the relationship between borderlines and 
native peoples in the Río de la Plata region. It differs from both traditional accounts – which, like 
Oliveira’s, considered the mapping of lines as the achievement of imperial territorial order – and those of 
revisionists who have dismissed borderlines altogether. Instead, I suggest intimate ties between imperial 
bordermaking and indigenous actions. I began with a new conceptual framework for eighteenth-century 
patterns of territorial organization – an archipelago of plazas and tolderías – that emphasized the 
overlapping, localized, and relatively isolated nature of imperial and ecclesiastical settlements, as well as the 
centrality of independent indigenous communities to regional dynamics. Tolderías arbitrated plazas’ access 
to and travel across the Río de la Plata’s countryside, and used their mobility to negotiate between settlers 
from distant locales. 
                                                       
3 ibid., 20–25. See also: José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira, Memória histórica sobre a questão de limites entre o Brasil e Montevidéo (São 
Paulo: Typ. Liberal de J.R. de A. Marques, 1852). 
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 We also saw how local territorial dynamics interacted dialectically with broader juridical debates in 
the Iberian and European worlds. Through the first half of the eighteenth century, Spain and Portugal relied 
upon relationships with tolderías not only to access regional lands, but to claim possession over them. Given 
the restricted reach of their own settlements, each side sought pacts with tolderías in order to prevent the 
establishment of foreign settlers. Meanwhile, in diplomatic debates, each claimed tolderías as vassals in 
order to stake claims to the lands that native communities effectively controlled. Yet the uncertainty, 
ephemerality, and locality of agreements between plazas and tolderías proved troublesome, and ultimately 
untenable, for Iberian governors, viceroys, and royal courts. Their solution was to place their faith in the 
latest mapping technologies as a means of projecting their respective territorial claims and undermining the 
legitimacy of their competitors’. By midcentury, the two royal courts had agreed to combine mapmaking 
and treaty making, and signed an agreement in Madrid to commission massive demarcation teams to devise 
an interimperial divide throughout South America. 
 The Treaty of Madrid, and later the Treaty of San Ildefonso, relied upon teams of trained 
mapmakers to transform the general framework of a jurisdictional borderline into a usable template for 
local administrators. These expeditions performed the imaginary lines, as teams of approximately one 
hundred workers walked, rode, or navigated the length of their designated portions. Their experiences 
constituted the meeting point of extant and idealized territorial orders, thereby inciting responses from 
indigenous communities that ranged from collaboration to violent attacks. In the Río de la Plata, the Madrid 
expeditions incited three years of warfare, while the San Ildefonso expedition members found themselves 
paying tribute to tolderías as they claimed possession of their lands. The details of these encounters, kept in 
the daily journals of demarcation officials, contrasted with the stable images of their maps and the neatly-
catalogued ethnographies that some officials provided. Therefore, the vast corpus of documentation 
generated by the expeditions both revealed continued indigenous territorial control and incentivized 
imperial administrators to populate lands adjacent to the borderlines. 
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 The borderline demarcations both correlated with and enabled a broad overhaul of Spain’s and 
Portugal’s territorial and interethnic policies in the region. Spanish administrators began to imagine 
tolderías as imperial subjects because most of them lived on the Spanish side of the border. They expected 
them to behave as sedentary subjects, respect property claims, and avoid commerce with Portuguese 
neighbors. In contrast, Portuguese officials used tolderías as a means to access the Spanish side of the border 
without inciting interimperial conflict, offering them payments in exchange for safe passage or for 
transporting cattle to their ranches. For their part, caciques and their tolderías utilized the growing 
presence of imperial actors near the imaginary borderline, and the increased imperial need to operationalize 
or subvert the border, as a means to advance their own interests. Caciques often incorporated migrants into 
their tolderías, extracted payments in exchange for policing the borderline (or undermining the policing of 
it), and built commercial networks across the interimperial divide.  
 But if the development of a borderline territoriality provided opportunities to certain tolderías, its 
dissolution eventually served to debilitate them. Beginning with a joint operation against tolderías in 1806, 
many more Spanish and Portuguese agents moved back and forth across the imaginary divide with impunity. 
While tolderías had once used the borderline as a means of taking refuge from Spanish raids, they could no 
longer employ this tactic, as the following quarter-century saw numerous armed factions crossing these 
lands. Still, the eventual disappearance of tolderías from the documentary record did not signal the end of 
the people who had inhabited them, only the discarding of ethnonyms. As patterns of captive-taking, 
interethnic mixture, and individual movement between plazas and tolderías blurred the divisions between 
imperial and indigenous actors, ethnonyms disappeared from the documentary lexicon. Terms such as 
Charrúa and Minuán gave way to others, such as “indio” or “china,” as distance increased between 
individuals and tolderías. 
 The production of an interimperial borderline in the Río de la Plata was therefore a defining event, 
deeply tied to native authority, dependent upon native participation, and significant for native advancement 
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or decline. The invention of a borderline did not imply the consolidation of imperial authority, nor did it 
constitute the discursive representation of extant territorial conditions.4 Rather, it was a strategic response 
to the inability of either Iberian crown to exert control over lands and actors beyond the reach of its isolated 
settlements. The changing juridical landscape aimed to circumvent local conditions – particularly native 
authority – when defining territorial possession. The Madrid and San Ildefonso lines were prescriptive 
declarations of an idealized spatial order that impelled and legally equipped imperial administrators to 
pursue new territorial policies. Maps produced by the demarcation expeditions were not simply cultural 
texts, but territorial templates that local officials utilized as they sought to claim lands and impose order. 
Such efforts depended upon the participation of autonomous native communities, whose support Iberian 
administrators alternatively requested or demanded. Native leaders responded in numerous ways, yet in 
engaging and molding the bordermaking initiatives, they ultimately reinforced them. It was not until after 
the demarcations that tolderías tended to concentrate themselves in lands adjacent to the imaginary line, as 
for them it became a regional center. The borderline was nonetheless an unstable institution, and its 
dissolution eventually led to tolderías’ demise. 
This case points to borderland dynamics that diverge from current narratives about the Río de la 
Plata region and the Americas as a whole. I demonstrate the centrality of independent native peoples, 
organized in tolderías, to broader economic, political, and social networks in the region. Rather than 
constituting a backyard to the settlements that dotted the region’s perimeter, the rural interior was the 
center that enabled such settlements to exist. As imperial agents sought access to, and eventually control 
over, the regional interior, they simultaneously challenged and enhanced indigenous authority. Particularly 
for tolderías situated near the imaginary borderlines, the late eighteenth century was a moment of 
expanding power, not another step in a long march toward defeat and disappearance. The actions of people 
                                                       
4 Furtado, O mapa que inventou o Brasil, 18–19. 
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identified as Charrúas and Minuanes also force us to reconsider the significance of mapped lines in 
borderland spaces. European bordermaking did not imply native decline, as it augmented imperial needs 
and, in turn, dependency upon indigenous communities. The invention of the borderline required that 
administrators stretch their human resources across a vast and hostile countryside, making themselves 
vulnerable to and reliant upon tolderías. Thus the development of borderline territorialities simultaneously 
represented European territorial imaginations and increased indigenous authority. Migrants to the 
borderline were at once a human frontier against an imperial foe and tributaries or kin to tolderías, and 
seemingly divergent, incompatible territorialities – European versus indigenous – coexisted in the same 
space. 
 Bordermaking efforts in the Río de la Plata also offer a new vantage point for interpreting the 
power of mapmaking. Maps were undoubtedly tools of empire that served to appropriate space discursively 
by concealment, incorporation, naming, and other gestures. They also represented shifting spatial order and 
spatial imaginations, evidencing on-the-ground changes. This case demonstrates that mapmaking was also 
significant for what it engendered. The Madrid and San Ildefonso demarcations were prescriptive calls to 
idealized territorial order, backed by the weight of interimperial accords. Mapmakers performed the 
borders through their expeditions, then sought to replicate them materially as they assumed governing 
positions in their newly-imagined territories. As mapped lines shaped imperial initiatives and human 
movement, mapmakers, travelers, and settlers embodied the new territorial pattern. Their actions solicited 
responses from independent native peoples, who most likely never set eyes upon the demarcation maps. 
Regardless of their actions – whether apprehending contrabandists or moving cattle across the border – 
tolderías, by increasingly engaging borderline practices, reproduced the borderline as a meaningful 
territorial order. In a context where imperial dominance did not exist and native peoples were neither 
imperial subjects nor clients, the borderline nonetheless became meaningful. 
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 To identify the interplay between divergent territorial imaginations and changing interethnic 
relations, this study adopted a regional approach. Consequently, it identified certain contextual factors that 
might not extend to other places and times. The mapped borderlines discussed here were interimperial 
boundaries backed by treaties to resolve territorial disputes in an area contested by Spain and Portugal. If 
not for the treaties, the maps produced by these expeditions would not have had sufficient legal weight to 
enable property claims, land titling, and borderline policing. Lines drawn in areas where only one European 
empire was present, as in Patagonia, the Chaco, or northern New Spain, might not have engendered the 
same opportunities for local communities. Similar studies in other parts of the Americas have demonstrated 
comparable results. Most notably, it appears that demarcations in the Amazon region were very much 
analogous to those in the Río de la Plata, although the competing Iberian empires occupied reversed roles. 
There, native communities utilized the Portuguese desire to stabilize the borderline to their advantage, 
challenging Portuguese attempts to incorporate them as imperial subjects and relying on the specter of 
Spanish competitors. It remains to be seen whether other mapping endeavors, such as the work of the 
Spanish Royal Corps of Engineers in northern New Spain, produced similar scenarios.5 
 This regional approach focused on broad dynamics and patterns throughout the Río de la Plata, 
sometimes at the expense of the detailed analyses of individual plazas and neighboring tolderías. More work 
is thus necessary to evaluate how much this new regional perspective allows us to reconsider local events. 
Likewise, by subordinating ethnic identifiers to territorial factors in interpreting the actions of tolderías, my 
approach demonstrates the need for a reassessment of the meaning of ethnonyms and their significance to 
the peoples whom they sought to define. To what extent did such terms correspond with indigenous social 
order? Did native peoples ever come to adopt them as self-identifiers? In addition, this study points to the 
                                                       
5 Domingues, Quando os índios eram vassalos, Capítulos 3 & 4; Dennis Reinhartz and Gerald D. Saxon, eds., Mapping and Empire: 
Soldier-Engineers on the Southwestern Frontier (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005). 
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presence of numerous individuals from tolderías in settlements throughout the region. More research is 
required to determine the trajectories of such individuals and their roles in urban societies. Lastly, in 
focusing on the Río de la Plata’s countryside and independent indigenous peoples, my analysis has 
intentionally provincialized traditional areas of study, such as Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and the mission 
complex. More efforts to connect tolderías to other actors, such as small farmers, Afro-descendants, and 
deserters, would undoubtedly yield many fruits. 
 Historical perceptions of territorial order  and indigenous action continue to imbue political 
discourse and social movements in the Río de la Plata region. In 1989, the Association of Descendants of the 
Charrúa Nation (Asociación de Descendientes de la Nación Charrúa) was formed in Uruguay, and during the 
following decade, Uruguayan activists lobbied for the repatriation of the remains of famed cacique Vaimaca 
Perú from France as a matter of national patrimony. In 2002, his body was placed in the Uruguayan 
National Pantheon, and in 2009, the Uruguayan Parliament declared April 11 the “Day of the Charrúa 
Nation and of Indigenous Identity.”6 Meanwhile, scientists have matched vestiges of Perú’s DNA with that 
of current Uruguayans, estimating that about 0.7% of the Uruguayan population has Charrúa ancestry. 
Biologists in Rio Grande do Sul have made similar arguments, while a community outside Porto Alegre has 
petitioned for territorial rights under a claim of Charrúa descent.7 Such efforts have been polemical, pitting 
“Charruists” against the skeptics, including former presidents and prominent scholars, who dismiss them as 
                                                       
6 Uruguay’s government placed Peru’s remains in the National Pantheon, which is the same location where Fructoso Rivera, the 
country’s first president and the architect of the cacique’s exile to France, can be found. See: Klaus Hilbert, “Charruas e 
minuanos: entre ruptura e continuidade,” in Povos indígenas, ed. Nelson Boeira and Tau Golin, 179–205, História Geral do Rio 
Grande do Sul Volume 5 (Passo Fundo: Méritos, 2009), 185; Gustavo Verdesio, “Entre las visiones patrimonialistas y los 
derechos humanos: Reflexiones sobre restitución y repatriación en Argentina y Uruguay,” Corpus. Archivos virtuales de la alteridad 
americana 1, no. 1 (1er semestre 2011). 
7 Monica Sans, Gonzalo Figueiro and Pedro C. Hidalgo, “A New Mitochondrial C1 Lineage from the Prehistory of Uruguay: 
Population Genocide, Ethnocide, and Continuity,” Human Biology 84, no. 3 (June 2012); Michael Kent and Ricardo Ventura 
Santos, “'Os charrúas vivem' nos gaúchos: A vida social de uma pesquisa de 'resgate' genético de uma etnia indígena extinta no sul 
do Brasil,” Horizóntes Antropológicos ano 18, no. 37 (jan/jun 2012).  
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pseudoscientific romantics.8 In each case, indigenous pasts are measured by their relationship with national 
presents, generally in terms of biological or cultural lineage. By focusing on the actions of tolderías in 
eighteenth-century Río de la Plata, we can liberate indigenous pasts from such nationalistic retrospection 
and develop a new framework for imagining regional history.
                                                       
8 Recent “Charruist” literature includes: Carlos Maggi, Artigas y su hijo el Caciquillo: El mundo pensado desde el lejano norte o las 300 
pruebas contra la historia en uso (Montevideo: Editorial Fin del Siglo, 1991); Danilo J. Antón, Uruguaypirí (Montevideo: Rosebud 
Ediciones, 1994); José E. Picerno, ¿Qué quieren estos hombres? (Montevideo: Tradinco, 2003); Fernando Córdova, Leyendas, mitos, 
cuentos y otros relatos charrúas (Buenos Aires: Longseller, 2008); Gonzalo Abella, Reconstruyendo nuestra raíz charrúa (Montevideo: 
BetumSan, 2010). Critics include academics and national leaders: Renzo Pi Hugarte, “Sobre el charruismo: La antropología en el 
sarao de las seudociencias,” Antropología Social y Cultural en Uruguay (2002-2003); Padrón Favre, Los Charrúas-Minuanes en su etapa 
final, 84–87; Julio María Sanguinetti, “El Charruismo,” El País, April 19, 2009, 
http://historico.elpais.com.uy/09/04/19/predit_411886.asp (accessed February 23, 2015); Sebastián Cabrera, “La garra 
minuana,” Qué pasa, April 6, 2013, http://www.elpais.com.uy/que-pasa/los-abuelos-indios.html (accessed February 23, 2015). 
Debates over native pasts played out differently according to country, as many Uruguayans have emphasized Guaraní descent in 
order to dismiss Charrúa ancestry, while Riograndenses have utilized Charrúa ancestry as a way to dismiss modern day Guaraní 
communities. See: Basini Rodríguez, Jose Exequiel, “Índios num país sem índios: a estética do desaparecimento,” (Tese 
(Doutorado em Antropologia Social), Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2003); Silvina Merenson, “Cuando ser indio 
no rinde: Sociedad política, particularismo y excepción en las narrativas nacionales del Uruguay,” Espaço Ameríndio 4, no. 2 
(jul./dez. 2010); Ceres Víctora, “'A viagem de volta': o reconhecimento de indígenas no sul do Brasil como um evento crítico,” 
Sociedade e Cultura 14, no. 2 (julio-diciembre 2011). 
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